ASEAN-Japan Cooperation in East Asia: An Overview

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The following eight chapters that comprise this section were produced by a study group that was tasked with exploring how ASEAN-Japan cooperation can contribute to community building in East Asia. The aim was to seek ways to achieve an East Asia that is peaceful, prosperous, and governed by the rule of law rather than by power. We believe that ASEAN and Japan together can contribute to creating such a region and that the well-being of ASEAN and Japan is inseparable from that of East Asia as a whole.

Over the last four decades, ASEAN and Japan have enjoyed shared economic growth and increasing stability in their bilateral relationship. This in turn has contributed to increased domestic stability within these nations. Some countries have matured as democracies, while others have moved from authoritarian rule toward a more open political system. The growth of civil society has meant more opportunities for people to live to their full potential and has contributed to further societal and economic growth. Today, ASEAN and Japan share a basic value system and norms with regard to governance, human rights, and democracy.

East Asia as a whole has followed a similar path, and the region is now hailed as the growth engine of the global economy. Several factors have contributed to this accomplishment. First, great power relations were unchallenged. The bipolarity that existed during the Cold War and the US predominance thereafter provided the region with stability. Second, ASEAN maintained its unity and centrality, providing a base upon which regional institutions developed, and the absence of severe competition among the major powers contributed to maintaining ASEAN centrality. Recently,
however, several of the underlying conditions that allowed East Asia to enjoy its stable development have been undergoing significant changes.

This chapter begins with a review of the current developments that are having an impact on the regional security landscape in East Asia. It lays out the changes occurring in the geostrategic landscape of East Asia and examines the challenges that the changes may pose to the future of East Asia in maintaining regional peace, security, and prosperity. Following the review, the chapter proposes several recommendations for ASEAN and Japan to deepen their cooperation in order to mitigate the negative consequences of the geostrategic changes and maximize the chances of creating an East Asian Community grounded on common interests and shared visions.

Based on the eight papers prepared by scholars from ASEAN and Japan for this study group, this chapter offers a summary of recommendations for enhancing ASEAN-Japan cooperation in East Asia. These recommendations focus on how ASEAN and Japan can work together to promote the foundations of cooperative security by establishing and strengthening institutions, norms, and rules to address a range of security challenges facing the region. These include such issues as maritime security, cyber security, humanitarian disasters, development gaps, and poor connectivity.

**The Changing Strategic Landscape and the Resulting Challenges**

One of the most significant changes shaping the region’s strategic landscape is the change in the relative position of the major powers: China and the United States. A corollary to this is the increased level of strategic distrust. This has led to growing competition between the United States and China in East Asia.

The United States has been the world’s biggest economy since the end of the 19th century. The US economy is still number one in the world, but it is in relative decline. The United States in 2001 accounted for 33 percent of the global economy, but that figure was down to 22 percent in 2013. China, on the other hand, has grown from 4 percent to 12 percent in the same period. Japan’s share of global gross domestic product (GDP) dropped from 13 percent in 2001 to 6 percent in 2013. On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the International Monetary Fund estimated that China’s GDP surpassed that of the United States in 2014. Looking ahead to 2015–2030, most economic forecasts predict that China’s economy will grow to be bigger than that of the United States even in nominal GDP by 2030.
Militarily, the United States still overwhelms the rest of the world. In 2014, its defense spending was about 34 percent of the world total, and this is comparable to the sum of the next 7 countries’ defense budgets put together. US military preponderance will continue for some time as the stockpile and accumulation of technological superiority are harder to achieve than economic growth. Nevertheless, there is a growing perception of US decline. This results in a public perception, domestic and regional, of a declining US commitment to international affairs. The US government sought to counter such perceptions by announcing its priority on and commitment to Asia through its “pivot” strategy.

China, on the other hand, has steadily developed its economy and deepened integration with other economies in the region. The Chinese government places great importance on economic development, which it sees as the source of political and social stability. However, its behavior in recent times—particularly in its trade practices and policies on maritime space—has raised concerns among other countries in the region. In other words, China has increased its assertiveness at the cost of stable relations with others in East Asia. Its number one priority seems to be changing from rapid economic development to the establishment of its strategic claims. The cause of China’s recent assertiveness is unknown. China may become increasingly assertive as its power grows, although it is also possible that it will become a satiated power in the current international system and not act as a revisionist state.

The changing relative power distribution between the United States and China has led to strategic distrust between the two countries. Japan and China also suffer from a strategic distrust, which is exacerbated by US-China competition. Present-day competition between Japan and China is complicated by both countries’ inability and unwillingness to reconcile questions about history. Much of each country’s policies and behavior are interpreted with skepticism and viewed as harboring malign intentions by the other. This is making East Asia more volatile and precarious.

Against the backdrop of this major power competition, however, there are also complex security threats that are compounding the challenges faced by states in the region. Many of the regional security challenges are nontraditional in nature, caused by a range of factors that include, but are not limited to, threats such as cybersecurity that stem from advances in information technology; climate-induced threats to water, food, and energy security, which are exacerbated by the frequency of devastating natural disasters in the region (floods, cyclones, and even earthquakes); and the attendant challenges to human security (e.g., population displacement, migration, and severe economic underdevelopment).
Responding to the full range of challenges is therefore no mean feat. It requires states to work together and pool resources in order to address problems that are often beyond the means of a single state to resolve. The complexity of the issues and the need to work collectively in responding to multifaceted threats highlight once again the importance of advancing cooperative security in East Asia.

**Implications for ASEAN-Japan Relations and East Asia**

The changing power dynamics described above point to a number of possible consequences, highlighted below, that affect the security environment in East Asia.

**Conflicts may increase as a result of decreasing international public goods.**

With the relative decline of the United States, it may not be able to provide the same level of international public goods. This is perhaps most significant in terms of the security of the international public space: the global commons. Some states and nonstate actors in the region may begin to contest the freedom of sea and air travel, space, and cyber space. Other powers, such as China, India, and Japan, may not be willing or able to compensate for this loss of international security. This could result in a greater risk of crimes by terrorists and pirates. It could also result in more conflicts among states. Recently, conflicts in the South China and East China Seas over territory and maritime space have grown. This trend could continue and could deteriorate further.

**Changing power dynamics may worsen security dilemmas.**

The opacity of China’s intentions and the uncertainty about the US capability and commitment to dealing with regional security problems could push countries in the region to take independent defensive measures. If the measures are taken without coordination and consultation, they could result in a more volatile region and a heightened security dilemma, even among the ASEAN member states.

Looking ahead to the coming years leading up to 2030, the region may experience a change in regional leadership from the United States to China.
There could be an attempt by the United States to prevent this, but China may feel increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. If this happens, it may become harder for other countries such as the ASEAN member states, Japan, South Korea, and Australia to find the right distance between the two great powers. This could divide the region.

ASEAN and Japan need to remain relevant if they are going to retain their seats at the table. To mitigate the negative consequences of US-China competition, it is important to establish a rules-based regional security architecture and for ASEAN and Japan to increase their collaborative efforts to build a multilateral security regime in order for their partnership to remain relevant in the region.

**Competition may emerge over the preferred regional economic architecture.**

US-China competition has ramifications for the economic architecture in East Asia. The centrality of ASEAN in regional institution building has contributed to mitigating the rivalry among the major powers, but increased competition could undermine ASEAN centrality and the regional integration process. The United States has pursued the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which requires a high degree of openness with few exceptions. The creation of the TPP has long-term strategic implications, as the United States is seeking to integrate China under this rubric. China, on the other hand, is seeking to protect its industry where necessary and prefers an ASEAN Plus architecture for East Asia. Japan is the only country that is seeking to participate in all of the different economic groupings under discussion. Only four ASEAN countries took part in the negotiations to create the TPP.

It is the economic linkages that have facilitated regional integration so far. The movement of people and goods, it was hoped, would lead to integration in other fields, such as politics and security. As political and security relations undergo a rapid change, however, the gradual process of ASEAN-led regional integration may prove to be too slow. East Asia may be divided into more developed and less developed blocs, which could derail the community-building process.
Multilateral frameworks may become ineffective in preventing conflicts.

The absence of an effective multilateral regional security institution makes East Asia vulnerable. If the centrality of ASEAN declines, the buffer that has prevented regional competition will be weakened. At the same time, if the ASEAN-led institutions cannot provide an adequate enforcement mechanism in the face of increased volatility, countries may choose to devote their energy to strengthening military alliances. Different institutions may exist with overlapping agendas, thus weakening efforts at promoting peace and stability in the region. Without careful deliberation and a well-thought-out long-term strategy, ASEAN and Japan could lose their seats at the table where the future of East Asia is being decided. ASEAN needs to find the right balance between maintaining unity and being more effective in implementing the salient areas of political and security cooperation that it has initiated and that are geared toward maintaining regional peace and building a community.

Promoting Common Interests and Forging a Common Vision for East Asia: Summary of Recommendations

ASEAN and Japan celebrated their 40-year friendship in 2013. In a vision statement adopted in December of that year, the governments of ASEAN and Japan reaffirmed their shared goal of strengthening cooperation in four areas: a) maintaining peace, security, and stability; b) enhancing economic prosperity; c) promoting quality of life; and d) strengthening mutual trust and understanding.

Given the strategic changes outlined above, this chapter pays special attention to the promotion of peace, security, and stability. ASEAN and Japan share a value system and basic norms with regard to governance, human rights, and democracy. We stand on the side of freedom of speech and seek to promote an environment that facilitates the protection of this right for all peoples in East Asia. Cooperation between ASEAN and Japan seeks to create an East Asia where problems are solved based on a set of rules and consultation and not by the use or threat of force. This is particularly important because power transitions have, in the past, often led to conflict caused by aggressive temptations on the part of the rising powers and fear and preventive motivations on the part of the status quo powers.
The heightened rivalry between the United States and China presents not just a risk but also an opportunity for enhancing the ASEAN-Japan partnership. ASEAN provides a stabilizing role because it is not a direct player in the power competition. ASEAN’s influence in East Asia will help boost confidence within Japan that regional relations will be based on multilateralism and will not be dominated by China. That should in turn dampen Sino-Japanese competition and help mitigate the security dilemma with China. For ASEAN to play a significant role, however, it needs to maintain its influence in the region, as seen in its ability to continue to play a central role in regional processes and to succeed in its goal of creating an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). This is where cooperation with Japan will help ASEAN achieve its community-building goals.

As critical actors in the East Asia security arena, ASEAN and Japan therefore need to rethink how they can best contribute to maintaining peace and security in the region. Both ASEAN and Japan have championed the ideas of comprehensive and cooperative security, underscoring the need for building trust and confidence among the states of East Asia, regardless of differences in political orientation. ASEAN and Japan have also actively promoted a process-driven approach to advancing cooperative security through dialogue and promoting habits of cooperation.

Going forward, ASEAN and Japan need to assess the nature of their bilateral engagement and, if need be, examine the current modalities of their bilateral cooperation. The latter would include a review of the areas of cooperation, the frequency of high-level meetings among officials (starting with the summits and ministerial and senior officials meetings), as well as the depth of people-to-people contacts between ASEAN and Japanese communities, including civil society organizations (CSOs).

The reflections and recommendations that emerged from this project revolved around two major themes. The first theme is the future prospects of multilateral frameworks in East Asia—from political-security frameworks to the economic institutions—as regional states respond to the strategic power shifts in East Asia. The second theme looks at the importance of deepening functional cooperation in addressing critical security concerns and shared vulnerabilities. The recommendations below explore what ASEAN and Japan can collaboratively do to support existing multilateral frameworks and further promote functional cooperation in East Asia.
1. Strengthen multilateral political-security and economic frameworks in East Asia.

- **Japan and ASEAN should jointly ensure that Asian multilateral platforms remain vibrant and useful for fostering peaceful and responsible behavior from all stakeholders.**

ASEAN and Japan have contributed significantly to the establishment of a number of regional political-security and economic frameworks in East Asia. To date, these include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, ASEAN+3 in 1999, the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2007. Although these are often depicted as ASEAN-led frameworks, Japan has nonetheless played an active role in shaping the substance of these multilateral institutions. Some experts have even observed that Japan’s track record in Asian multilateralism challenges the impression of Japan as a passive regional actor. An assessment of Japan’s role in Asian multilateralism over the last three decades or so reveals that Tokyo has not only been a strong supporter of ASEAN-led frameworks but has also been one of the biggest contributors to ASEAN economic development and regional integration. More importantly, Japan has also been an active participant in promoting the “building blocks” of an East Asian Community through its critical role in supporting ASEAN+3 and the EAS.

New developments under the current Japanese administration have, however, cast doubts on whether Japan will continue to support the regional institutions that it helped establish with ASEAN. Prime Minister Abe’s goal of “normalizing” Japan is perceived by many states within and outside of East Asia as Tokyo’s way of asserting itself and adopting a more aggressive stance in shaping its relations with major powers, driven mainly by its need to stand up against growing Chinese power and influence. In this regard, efforts must be made by Japan and ASEAN to continue to invest in Asian multilateralism and to underscore to both parties that these regional frameworks have become critical platforms for managing interstate tensions in a changing regional environment.

Similarly, given Japan’s shifting stances and its quest for military normalization, the need cannot be overemphasized for Japan to strike a delicate balance in maintaining its close military ties with the United States without antagonizing China and to maintain its association with soft power and quiet diplomacy.

- **Among the existing multilateral frameworks, the EAS holds a great deal of potential to become the premier multilateral security forum in the region.**
ASEAN and Japan should therefore work closely to promote the institutionalization of the EAS.

The EAS is the only forum that brings together all of the major powers (the United States, China, Japan, India, and Russia) in the region. More importantly, the EAS is a leaders-led forum, and its ability to influence the principles, norms, and practices of security cooperation in East Asia cannot be overstated. The success of the EAS therefore necessitates the mobilization of full institutional support at all levels.

Some have observed, however, that the current institutional support for the EAS is limited. It does not have its own secretariat, hence the coordination and continuity of its work is dependent on and hampered by the limitations of the ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity to manage the burgeoning ASEAN agenda, as well as coordinate the activities of the other ASEAN-led institutions. In light of these challenges, ASEAN and Japan should work together to examine ways to establish a dedicated secretariat for the EAS that would advance its agenda and in turn help member states to develop a sense of ownership over the multiple processes of maintaining peace and stability in the wider East Asian region.

• A close and strong ASEAN-Japan relationship is one of the pillars of East Asian cooperation. As this relationship matures, the level of political cooperation should be raised to a higher plane.

Japan is one of the oldest and most reliable of ASEAN’s dialogue partners. Given the strategic shifts in East Asia, ASEAN-Japan relations have reached a point that necessitates a higher level of mutual trust and confidence building. The time has come for ASEAN and Japan to deepen the level of their political and security engagement. One way to do this is to increase the level of official consultations between ASEAN and Japan at all levels and to expand their engagement beyond economic and sociocultural relations to also include political and security matters.

Compared with China, which has 50 working groups with ASEAN, Japan only has 40, and most of its working groups are focused mainly on economic issues, trade and investment, customs, transport, information and communications technology (ICT), foreign affairs, the environment, social welfare, and connectivity. While China and the United States have ministerial-level meetings on defense issues with their ASEAN counterparts under the aegis of the ADMM-Plus consultative meetings, Japan has yet to form its own with ASEAN. Japan and ASEAN should address this imbalance. An important step in this direction would be to include defense and security officials from Japan in the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial
Conference (PMC). The PMC+1 could certainly be an important platform for ASEAN and Japan to discuss shared security concerns covering both traditional and nontraditional security issues. On the latter set of concerns, it is useful to note that increasing bilateral dialogue and exchange on issues such as humanitarian relief operations during times of natural disaster helps to build trust and confidence among defense and military officials in ASEAN and Japan.

- **ASEAN’s economic integration is a key pillar in building the East Asian Community. Japan’s multifaceted assistance in pushing for a successful realization of the AEC must be carefully calibrated to align with ASEAN’s regional integration programs.**

Successful establishment of the AEC is important, not only to Japan but also to ASEAN’s other dialogue partners (China, Korea, the United States, and others) given the potential that the ASEAN single market and production base offers to states within and outside of East Asia. An analysis of the ASEAN-Japan partnership in regional economic integration shows how Japan sees ASEAN as “a growth center of the world.” As Takashi Terada explains in his chapter, Japan’s interest is clearly reflected in the recent fivefold increase in the share of its foreign direct investment (FDI) that goes to ASEAN—from 3 percent in 2012 to 17 percent in 2013. And in the first nine months of 2013 alone, the value of its FDI had reached US$13 billion, exceeding the US$10.6 billion invested during the whole of 2012.

As Japan continues to invest in the AEC, it is important for the country to align its official development assistance (ODA) with ASEAN’s regional integration program. One of the key elements in the AEC that would benefit greatly from Japan’s ODA is the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), particularly physical connectivity through certain infrastructure projects. Strong Japanese support for ASEAN’s connectivity projects should not be limited to the East-West and Southern corridors of Indochina but should also extend to the wider Southeast Asian region.

Second, Japan and ASEAN should establish an ASEAN-Japan Integration Forum that brings together government officials, business communities, and experts from the two sides. The forum would be extremely useful in facilitating the exchange of ideas and generating valuable advice on how best to advance development cooperation in order to enhance regional integration.

Another key area for advancing the AEC and the wider East Asian Community is strengthening the currency swap agreement within the ASEAN+3 framework to help the states in the region mitigate the impact of
a possible financial crisis, as well as to provide a regional safety net through the provision of short-term liquidity support. In this regard, greater effort should be made to promote the yen in ASEAN and its members’ markets, in the same way that the Chinese yuan has been promoted to be used in regional trade and investment settlements.

Japan can also help advance the AEC by promoting the benefits of ASEAN’s Free Trade Area (FTA) and other FTAs, such as the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership among its business and industry associations. Tokyo can help raise awareness and provide information on how the Japanese private sector can utilize the FTAs and highlight the synergy that can be achieved between ASEAN and Japanese markets in the supply chain networks.

**Enhanced people-to-people cooperation provides a strong foundation for building the East Asian Community and fostering a sense of regional identity. ASEAN and Japan should build on their existing linkages and extend these beyond the official and business corridors to include civil society networks, media, youth and women’s groups, and other communities.**

The Vision Statement on ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, issued during the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December 2013 to mark 40 years of dialogue relations, described ASEAN and Japan as “heart-to-heart partners.” Given the close ties that have been built through years of ASEAN-Japan partnership, it is important that these relations also find their roots in deeper people-to-people exchanges. It should be noted that economic interdependence and trade cooperation are not enough to mitigate interstate tensions. More importantly, it is the nature of cooperation among the peoples in the region, the social interactions, and the civil society networks that may provide a panacea in managing interstate conflicts. It is therefore imperative for the governments of the ASEAN countries and Japan to provide an enabling environment to deepen these ties.

The following initiatives should be considered to enhance people-to-people exchange:

- Establish a fund to promote exchange programs among women’s groups engaged in peace building and cross-border issues, women in parliament, and women in the military.
- Support the establishment of a network of foreign language and cultural centers in East Asia.
- Develop a CSO wiki knowledge center that serves as a repository of knowledge on CSO activities and contains a catalog of experts from
CSOs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from ASEAN and Japan that work in the socioeconomic and political fields.

- Promote the development of a regional civil society by encouraging exchanges among CSOs and NGOs. These regular exchanges, in turn, should help to raise awareness and promote better understanding of the range of issues affecting the future of East Asia and encourage closer cooperation among nonstate actors in addressing regional concerns.
- Support media exchanges and cooperation through the establishment of a journalist fellowship program and promote the exchange of opinion articles and access to news items, including the rights to publish reports from other news agencies.
- Promote further student exchange programs among universities in East Asia through increased fellowship funding.

2. Promote closer functional cooperation to address common security challenges and promote shared values.

- East Asia is faced with two sets of maritime disputes: sovereignty over islands and jurisdiction over maritime spaces. These potentially destabilizing disputes compel stronger efforts among littoral states to manage maritime issues and present opportunities to intensify cooperation between ASEAN and Japan.

There are a number of official, multilateral frameworks that deal with maritime issues in East Asia, including ASEAN-led processes such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, the ARF, the ADMM-Plus, and the EAS. Within ASEAN, the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) serves as a comprehensive framework for dealing with maritime issues that goes beyond managing disputes to also address questions of governance, order at sea, confidence-building measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy, and other areas of cooperative activity. More significantly, the DOC serves as a precursor to the Code of Conduct (COC), which aims to provide a normative approach to managing maritime disputes among the littoral states.

The frameworks, however, are mostly focused on policy dialogue, exchange of views, and country briefings, and they have yet to present concrete program-based activities or projects. Moreover, participation is voluntary. This raises concerns about the lack of coordination, the duplication of scope of discussions and activities, and the drain on resources among states. Notwithstanding these concerns, Japan must maintain its support for ASEAN in its efforts to manage maritime tensions in the region, particularly in its engagement with China on the COC. The successful conclusion of the
COC provides a powerful incentive for Northeast Asia in that it underscores the importance of a rules-based approach to managing maritime conflicts, anchored on the respect for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international laws, self-restraint, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Moving forward, ASEAN and Japan should deepen their cooperation by undertaking the following steps:

- Advance implementation of prioritized CBMs, such as the establishment of hotlines; strengthen the work of the ADMM-Plus process in advance notification of military exercises, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR); and promote the Incidents at Sea Agreement.
- Assist countries in the region in effectively meeting their commitments under UNCLOS, and proactively support the adoption of regional norms in interstate conduct and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Encourage countries to clarify their claims consistent with UNCLOS through official channels and discussions in Track 2 meetings.
- Elevate discussions of functional cooperation on maritime issues, such as the protection of the environment and the sustainable exploitation of maritime resources.
- Promote and strengthen the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) for cooperation by raising participation to the ministerial level, deepening dialogue and cooperation—including developing pragmatic strategies in managing maritime disputes—and engaging all East Asia players with the objective of making the EAMF a regional institution.
- Assist countries in the region in abiding by and implementing Agenda 21, particularly Chapter 17 of the Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, which deals with the protection of oceans and all kinds of seas.

Against the vast landscape of regional maritime matters, ASEAN and Japan should therefore work together closely by acting as “Sherpas” in connecting, promoting awareness among, coordinating with, and soliciting the support of officials and other stakeholders for the peaceful and sustainable management of East Asian seas.

- Given the increasing complexity of threats to cybersecurity, ASEAN and Japan must deepen cooperation in order to adopt a strategic approach to addressing multiple challenges to critical national and international infrastructure. This includes having an active voice in shaping international norms and rules that govern cyber space.
Responses to cyber threats in East Asia are uneven. While countries in Northeast Asia have surged ahead in addressing cybersecurity challenges by crafting proactive cybersecurity programs and strategies, as well as establishing organizations dedicated to protecting and defending critical infrastructure, many ASEAN countries have lagged behind due to a lack of human and technical capacity and differing priorities given to cybersecurity policy. In this regard, it is imperative that ASEAN develop a coordinated and strategic approach to cybersecurity as it moves closer to regional integration and advances in its goal to create an ASEAN Political-Security Community. This further underscores the need for ASEAN to urgently close the digital divide that hampers a coordinated regional approach.

As East Asia continues to be one of the most dynamic economic centers in the world, ASEAN-Japan cooperation is critical in ensuring a peaceful and stable East Asia, as well as maintaining a secure business environment. Thus, ASEAN and Japan should put greater effort into bolstering strategic cybersecurity through such measures as the following:

- Raise and cultivate awareness of strategic cybersecurity by extending collaboration beyond technical expertise to include various skill sets in diplomacy, politics, and law. Japan and ASEAN can also help by promoting more discussion and exchange at both the governmental (Track 1) and nongovernmental (Track 2) levels, particularly among legal experts and senior policymakers.
- Outline rules of engagement for cyber operations. ASEAN and Japan can work together in determining whether their respective national cybersecurity strategies provide an adequate foundation from which a regional approach can be drawn to address cybersecurity concerns.
- Organize tabletop exercises and simulations to improve responses to cyber attacks, promote transparency, and build trust and confidence among countries. These exercises can be held on the sidelines of ASEAN-Japan, ARF, or ADMM-Plus meetings.
- Develop a multilevel approach to addressing the multifaceted challenges of cybersecurity by involving the private sector, Track 2 institutions, and other relevant stakeholders. This includes jointly organizing security conferences or policy roundtables, which help promote greater interaction and understanding of cyber issues between the public and private sectors.
- Promote Track 2 leadership in strategic cybersecurity to support Track 1 initiatives. In this regard, ASEAN and Japanese think tanks could initiate a series of policy roundtables aimed at producing policy recommendations for national governments in the region.
Given the vulnerability of East Asia to natural disasters, enhanced ASEAN-Japan cooperation in HA/DR can provide a solid foundation for developing a credible regional capacity and expertise to address complex challenges resulting from natural disasters.

Natural disasters are increasing in frequency and severity in East Asia. In his chapter, Ryo Sahashi cites statistics showing that in the last 30 years, 40 percent of natural disasters occurred in Asia, accounting for 90 percent of fatalities and victims worldwide as well as 50 percent of global economic losses. The vulnerabilities are compounded by the weakness in state capacity and governance to mitigate the impact of these disasters on affected communities. While ASEAN has established a number of fledging mechanisms to manage the impact of natural disasters, such as the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), Japan has also been one of the strongest supporters of regional efforts to build capacity for disaster management and relief.

As climate change progresses, the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters is expected to increase. The growing frequency of natural disasters and the magnitude of the devastation caused to lives and property have heightened the urgency for the states in the region to adopt disaster risk reduction strategies through risk identification and monitoring and to establish regional standby arrangements and closer regional cooperation in joint disaster and emergency responses.

ASEAN and Japan should therefore spearhead many of these regional efforts to strengthen HA/DR by building on the current modalities and mechanisms within ASEAN and within wider regional frameworks, such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. Specifically, ASEAN-Japan cooperation on HA/DR can be enhanced in the following areas:

- Strengthen the functions and capacity of the AHA Centre in coordinating rapid disaster relief and assistance among governmental and nongovernmental actors.
- Improve civil-military cooperation in disaster relief by increasing military training on disaster management together with CSOs, NGOs, and other international organizations. Effective use of military assets in disaster operations should also be maximized by reviewing logistics in transportation, search and rescue, and medical operations.
- Enhance the sharing of experience and lessons learned in disaster management.
- Ensure a smoother transition from disaster recovery to rebuilding and development, particularly in less-developed areas. Japan’s assistance in
establishing a regional fund for reconstruction in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank is very important.

- Promote the use of technology, particularly satellite information, for disaster management and relief operations.

- Closer regional integration in East Asia can be bolstered by enhanced connectivity in all three dimensions: physical, institutional, and people-to-people connectivity. The huge challenges facing the region present a significant opportunity for Japan to assist ASEAN and advance the goal of greater regional integration through improved connectivity.

Better connectivity within ASEAN is essential in realizing the ASEAN Community by 2015 and maintaining it beyond that date. The ASEAN Community, in turn, serves as an essential building block of an East Asian Community. For all intents and purposes, a highly integrated ASEAN community opens more opportunities for extending trade and investment in the wider East Asian region and increases linkages among institutions and communities.

In order to enhance regional connectivity, ASEAN and Japan should work closely with other partners, such as China and South Korea, to ensure a broader and consistent framework for East Asian integration and cooperation schemes. In this regard, the successful implementation of the MPAC and issues related to ASEAN connectivity should be harmonized with efforts to promote East Asian connectivity.

Given the massive agenda ahead, ASEAN and Japan should work closely to enhance regional connectivity in the following areas:

- Establish ASEAN-Japan dialogues on connectivity, including the formation of a special joint working group to identify priority areas, mobilize resources, and establish implementing mechanisms to advance regional connectivity, especially those that support the improvement and operations of various supply chains.
- Japan, in coordination with ASEAN, should deepen support for capacity-building programs for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam to narrow the development gap in ASEAN and improve institutional connectivity. These include technical assistance to simplify cross-border procedures related to the movement of goods and people.
- Further liberalization in the areas of services and investment should also be explored by ASEAN and Japan while they facilitate the freer flow of trade in goods through the effective utilization of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership schemes.
• Promote frank dialogue to address behind-the-border barriers to movements of people.
• Support the portion of the MPAC dealing with physical connectivity with contributions from Japan to the development of national primary transportation networks and related facilities, including the East-West corridors, ICT, energy, and sea and air transport.
• Mobilize resources for connectivity and develop institutions for implementation. More efforts should also be made to improve existing schemes, such as the Asian Bond Markets Initiative, the ASEAN Baseline Report, the ASEAN Trading Link for regional stock markets, and the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, as well as to strengthen private sector engagement with a view toward utilizing different resources effectively. This should also be done in coordination with other regional partners, such as China and Korea.

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The recommendations outlined above indicate the extent to which the ASEAN-Japan partnership can go in advancing East Asia cooperation. Amidst the renewed era of uncertainty created by an evolving major power competition, the opportunities for both parties to mitigate the challenges are clearly present and must be seized. These opportunities are the result of years of enduring friendship and cooperation between ASEAN and Japan and should provide a solid foundation on which to build toward the realization of an East Asia Community.

Notes
1. The same figures for ASEAN are 1.8 percent in 2001 and 3.2 percent in 2013. Computation by the author based on GDP in current US dollars (United Nations Statistics).