

# CANADA

## THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In general, the Canadian people want their country to have an active foreign policy and a distinctive voice in international affairs. The challenge for the Canadian government is to effectuate policies to meet these goals in light of key geopolitical realities and in the face of national political and fiscal constraints. Surrounded by three oceans and bordered by the United States, Canada faces no direct territorial threats. On the other hand, it has responsibility and jurisdiction over enormous expanses of land and ocean. With a relatively small population (under 30 million), and with an economy heavily dependent on exports, immigration and trade remain critical to sustained national development. Within this context, Canada is increasingly coming to terms with its being a Pacific state.

For the past half century, Canada has pursued an activist foreign policy, emphasizing multilateralist approaches and institutions to advance its middle power perspective and further internationalist goals of economic liberalization, collective defense, arms control, peacekeeping, foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. Multilateralism traditionally has been a preferred mode for advancing Canadian interests, because it is believed that if Canada can build effective coalitions with small and middle powers, it can avoid being isolated in bilateral situations with major powers. Canadian participation in the UN, NATO, the GATT (WTO), and more recently the OAS, NAFTA, APEC, and ASEAN Regional Forum all follow from this logic.

Canadians welcomed the end of the Cold War, not only because the Soviet threat and communist economics were repudiated, but also because, in an era of good relations among the larger powers, substantial progress was seen in the institutional developments in Europe, in movements towards disarmament and arms control (START I and II the MTCR, UN arms register and Chemical Weapons Ban) and in resolution of regional conflicts. However, the end of the Cold War also undercut the rationales for Canada's long-standing foreign and defense policies. Canadian political and military leaders found themselves facing serious challenges. Traditional commitments, and especially the deployments and capabilities they entailed, no longer made sense. The international security order could no longer be analyzed solely through a Euro/Atlantic lens. The waning of optimistic visions of effective multilateral conflict management in the "new world order" brought into question the effectiveness of the UN and its peacekeeping operations, thus challenging a central dimension of Canada's

foreign and defense policies. Furthermore, while the Canadian public was not clambering for a peace dividend per se, domestic priorities took on larger significance, especially the hard economic realities of job creation and public sector indebtedness. The Canadian defense budget, already being cut before the end of the Cold War, has been and will continue to be under severe stress.

For Canadian security analysts, the evolving, post-Cold War security environment reveals substantial negative features: Intrastate conflicts, most fueled by ethnic or religious forces, have flared up, creating devastating humanitarian crises and threatening the stability of key regions. Multilateral responses to these conflicts have been inadequate. Regional powers, such as Russia and China, are sending confusing signals about their intentions; weapons are proliferating. "Unconventional" security threats are seen to be on the rise.

Thus, a substantial rethinking and reorientation of the Canadian security outlook is underway. First, the definition of "security" has been broadened to encompass a broad spectrum of concerns and policies designed to address the potentially disruptive aspects of economic, political, social and environmental change. Various phrases have been used to capture this expanded notion—cooperative security, human security, common security and shared human security. Unconventional threats to security are seen as being relevant to Canada's security planning, particularly in the longer term. Second, it is now essential to focus on the dynamics of regional politics and the insurance of regional stability in Europe, in Asia, and in the Americas. Third, restraining proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weaponry must remain an international priority. Fourth, effective multilateral action is requisite to alleviate or control war and human suffering. This calls for reform of global institutions, particularly the United Nations, and the establishment of effective frameworks for regional security.

The Asia Pacific has emerged more prominently in the Canadian world view. Canada has important interests in the region that are largely defined in economic and human terms. Trade and financial flows to and from Asian economies have grown rapidly over the last decade. Remaining a participant in the economic dynamism of the region is viewed as critical for Canadian domestic economic growth. On the human dimension, the Asian component of Canadian society has expanded dramatically in the last two decades. Canada has been the single most frequently chosen destination for emigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan, as it was for South Asian emigrants in years before. Events in Asian countries, therefore, can and do have an impact on Canadians and the Canadian

government. Maintaining stability in the region is seen as important to continued growth and prosperity—a key security interest.

At the domestic level, the Canadian public and federal government are largely preoccupied by uncertainties over the survival of the federal system and concerns over the domestic economy. Prime Minister Chrétien and his Liberal Party were elected in 1993 on a platform of increasing jobs and getting the federal budget under control. Asia, with its rapidly growing markets, has become a priority target for high profile government initiatives.

## SECURITY POLICIES AND ISSUES

Canada took its first major steps in 1994–95 to reorient its foreign and defense policies to meet the challenges presented by the post-Cold War international economic and security environments. Following its election, the Chrétien government established two Joint Parliamentary Committees to view Canada's foreign and defense policies. These respective committee reports heavily influenced the government's subsequent writing of its official foreign policy statement, *Canada In The World*, and a new Defense White Paper.

**Foreign Policy.** *The Canada in the World* document of 1995 establishes three key foreign policy objectives: (1) Promotion of prosperity and employment; (2) Protection of Canadian security within a stable global framework; and (3) Projection of Canadian values and culture. Some important shifts in emphasis were signaled in this statement. First, concern for the relative economic welfare of Canadians dominates. Second, protection of Canadian sovereignty is an important priority—a tall order for Ottawa given the extent of land and ocean to be monitored as against the available governmental resources. "Sovereignty protection" has become a rallying point for the Canadian public, as evidenced by popular support for Ottawa's unilateral, and historically atypical, action in the Atlantic offshore fisheries dispute with Spain. Third is the promotion of Canadian values—a somewhat more contentious agenda. While advancing the principles and practices of democratization, good governance, and economic liberalization are generally accepted policy goals, the promotion of "human rights" raises considerable debate in public and private sectors. Early on, the Chrétien government signaled that it would not engage in linkage politics with human rights and trade and aid policies, especially with key countries such as China. However, with a new Foreign Minister in early 1996 has come an increased voice for human rights related issues, including child labor and women's rights, and governance, in select states such as Nigeria and Burma.

The relevance of Asia for Canada has hit home for the Chrétien government.

The government has made a priority of becoming more regionally engaged, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in economic matters and, to an increasing extent, in security matters. Canadian participation is to be advanced on both official (Track One) and unofficial (Track Two) dimensions (e.g. in APEC and PECC, and in the ASEAN PMC, The ARF and CSCAP).

**Defense Policy.** The government's White Paper refers to an "unstable, unpredictable, and fragmented" environment, making it "prudent to plan for a world characterized in the long term by instability." Although Canada has no immediate military security threats, it does face threats to its well-being from the prospects of regional conflicts—causing economic and social disruption, disrupting regional and global economies, and leading to engagement of Canadian forces in multilateral responses, as in the Gulf War, or in risky peacekeeping missions, as in Bosnia.

For the long term, the White Paper prescribes the following outlines for policy: adopting a broad response to shared human security, advancing sustainable development as a precondition to realizing individual and national security; renewed emphasis on control of weapons proliferation; and strengthened global and regional multilateral institutions with enhanced capacities for preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding. In the shorter-term operational context, however, the priorities for Canadian defense policy are (1) defending Canada and "sovereignty protection", (2) sustaining and building stronger regional security frameworks, including but not limited to NATO and NORAD, and (3) contributing to international security through peacekeeping and actions to avoid/diffuse regional conflict.

For Canadian defense analysts, these various factors and components come into play within the contemporary Asia Pacific context. Relations among the major powers may be at historically peaceful levels, but tensions still exist and the territorial status quo is not acceptable to regional powers. The role that Asian states, especially China, will seek to play in regional and global security matters is uncertain. There are no proven and inclusive multilateral security institutions, particularly for the North Pacific/Northeast Asia where they could be most important, in light of the crisis potential of the Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan relations, etc. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies in and from the region is of great concern. Sophisticated conventional weaponry is being acquired by many states, but transparency and confidence-building measures are resisted for not being a part of the regional "strategic culture." Sustaining domestic stability in key states undergoing major economic and social transformations is problematic. So-called "unconventional" security threats have

serious implications, in light of drug trafficking, uncontrolled movements of persons within and across borders, and potentially destabilizing forces of ethnic and religious nationalism.

The White Paper affirms the need to “play a more active role in Asia Pacific security affairs”—more specifically, to expand cooperation and engagement with Asian states; to participate, as appropriate within the broader context of Canadian foreign policy, in military exercises and visits; and to participate in Track One and Track Two multilateral security dialogues and institutions. Recent Defense Department documents state that the four priorities of Canada’s Asia Pacific Security policy are “support of international regimes to control weapons proliferation, commitment to the building of multilateral security regimes, dialogues, and CBMs;” support of the UN in settling international conflicts and delivering humanitarian aid; and expanding bilateral political and security interaction with key Asian states—the apparent priorities being Japan, Korea, the ASEAN countries, and possibly those of South Asia.

The operational effect of these commitments is apparent on both sides of the Pacific. In Canada, the Department of National Defense has increased its policy and analytical capabilities. Naval assets, including the recently acquired frigates, are being redistributed to the west coast to achieve a balanced deployment vis-à-vis the Atlantic. Canadian Pacific Command has assumed a more active role. In Asia and the Pacific, Canada continues to participate in the biennial RIMPAC exercises; and it has deployed task forces on ship visits to NE and SE Asia annually since 1994. Participation in security-related talks, workshops, and dialogues has expanded on both bilateral and multilateral levels. On the peacekeeping front, Canada, having provided an initial contingent to UNTAC, continues its commitment to Cambodia through CMAC. It has worked closely with Japan to facilitate its deployment to the Golan Heights. It has co-chaired ARF inter-sessional meetings on peacekeeping.

**Defense Spending.** With the Federal government under duress to reduce its indebtedness, the defense budget, as the single largest category of discretionary funding of federal spending, has come under sustained attack. Since 1989, a series of cuts have been imposed on the Department, usually with little advance consultation. The 1989–90 defense budget was Can \$11.6 billion, the 1993–94 was Can \$12.0 billion, the 1998–99 budget is projected to be Can \$9.25 billion (roughly U.S. \$6.8 billion)—a figure that represents a 30 percent drop in real dollar spending since 1993. In 1995, Canadian defense expenditures represented 1.58 percent of GDP.

**Personnel.** Cuts of these magnitudes will necessitate a “fundamental transformation” of the Canadian military establishment. Overall personnel levels are going to be reduced to 60,000 military and 20,000 civilian positions, representing reductions of 20 percent and 38 percent, respectively, since 1994. In 1985–86 military personnel numbers were up to 83,000. Resources assigned to the Department’s Ottawa headquarters are to be reduced by fully 50 percent, much of it on the civilian side. An entire level of operational command is being eliminated. However, land force personnel are to increase by 3,000 troops, in response to the assessed need for more deployable manpower to be available for joint and combined operations abroad. Infrastructure expenditures, until now protected by domestic political constituencies, are being reduced through base closures and the shut down of two of Canada’s three military colleges.

The mandate for the Canadian Armed Forces is very broad. It involves defense of Canadian territory, including vast expanses of coast, ocean, and the Arctic; alliance partnership; participation in regional environments, including Asia and the Americas; aid to the Canadian civil powers, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and extensive international peacekeeping responsibilities. Those responsible for the Canadian Forces, both in government and in command, continue to adhere to the long-standing principle that Canadian troops are to be trained and equipped as “multi-purpose, combat capable” forces, able to be deployed and to participate anywhere in the world in multilateral, combined operations. However, this is a very expensive policy, in terms of both human and physical resource requirements. Commitment-capability disjunctures are an inherent problem for the Canadian military. The 1994 Defense White Paper, for instance, commits Canada to providing to NATO or the UN contingency forces with capabilities that could range from a naval task group to a brigade with full combat support and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. The post-Cold War surge in the demand for experienced peacekeepers has stretched the Canadian forces to the limit. In 1994–95, 3,600 Canadians were deployed in 15 peacekeeping missions around the world; in 1995–96, with the withdrawal of the UN from the former Yugoslavia, this number dropped to 2,000, most now involved in the non-UN-controlled operations of IFOR and in Haiti. In the last five years, the government estimates that Can \$800 million has been spent on peacekeeping missions, these costs being borne entirely from the Defense Department’s annual budgets, without compensation even for those funds that Ottawa recovers from the UN. In order to strengthen its peacekeeping training programs, and with an eye to training foreign forces as well, the government has recently established a peacekeeping training center.

**Equipment and Procurement.** As a result of overall reductions in Canadian defense appropriations, major equipment purchases, such as the planned acquisition of a submarine and the \$1.2 billion EH-101 helicopter program, have been canceled. The 1994 Defense White Paper sets out a series of additional cost-cutting measures for equipment that will reduce the number of operational fighter aircraft and terminate \$15 billion in other planned programs over the next fifteen years. Naval procurement programs have fared better: 12 Halifax class frigates have been completed and 12 coastal patrol vessels are now under construction. This sets the stage for important procurement decisions concerning the purchase/lease of conventional submarines (unlikely), the purchase of armed personnel carriers (going forward) and the purchase of sea-going helicopters (likely to be off-the-shelf purchases, but delayed until after the 1997 election). It appears that the Canadian Armed Forces of the future will likely be without submarines and have more limited air capabilities (especially in fighter aircraft), but will otherwise be relatively well equipped for their size in terms of naval assets, and be better prepared for lightly-armored land operations. In regional terms, the effects of these force restructurings and procurement schedules are likely to have less impact vis-à-vis Canadian activities towards Asia and in the Pacific.

## CONTRIBUTIONS TO REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

**Global Security.** The global dimensions of Canadian security policy continue to be advanced through multilateralism. Canada regards itself as a principal player in the UN, especially in its peacekeeping functions, having been involved in the initiation of this enterprise and in most every UN operation since. However, Canada sees reform of the UN as a necessity, regarding both basic Charter issues such as Security Council membership and the operational functioning of the UN in response to crises situations. In this regard, Ottawa has expended considerable energies advancing proposals for reform of the UN Headquarter's peacekeeping operations center, for creation of UN rapid reaction capabilities, and for enhancement of civilian peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy activities.

Canada continues to push the agenda for multilateral institutions to control the spread of nuclear and conventional weapons. These efforts include extension of the NPT, establishment of a CTBT, successful implementation of the START and CFE agreements, safe dismantling of the arsenals of the former Soviet Union, expansion of the scope and compliance of the UN arms control register, advancement of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and promotion of the MTCR, and most recently advancement towards a ban on land mines. Canada has built up extensive technical and diplomatic expertise in these areas (especially in verification and

monitoring regimes) and is looking for ways to apply this expertise in regional contexts, especially concerning East Asia and South Asia.

**Regional Security.** Canada's 1994 Defense White Paper makes clear that "the key guarantees to [its] military security" will continue to be found in the regional collective defense arrangements of NATO and NORAD. Canada regards itself as a committed NATO partner, although it no longer maintains troops stationed in Europe. It is deeply engaged in NATO's Yugoslavian efforts and looks to the future enlargement of NATO to encompass select Eastern European states. The NORAD agreement between the U.S. and Canada has just been renewed for another five-year term, without, however, having fully resolved the tricky issue of Canadian direct or indirect participation in ballistic missile defense systems.

The increased salience of Canada's post-Cold War regional outlook has been demonstrated in Ottawa's advancement of a broad-based agenda of Track One and Track Two activities on bilateral, subregional, and regional levels. With regard to Asia Pacific, Canada has utilized its long-standing relationships in Southeast Asia to support and advance the ASEAN process of building a subregional security community. For example, working with Indonesia and funded by the Canadian foreign aid agency, Canada has underwritten the South China Sea workshops. It has also sponsored the important ASEAN ISIS Annual Security Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur. Canada has taken a proactive role in the ASEAN Regional Forum, in both its annual meetings and intersessionals. CSCAP, the fledgling Track Two vehicle of the ARF, has also been the focus of considerable effort by a select group of Canadian officials and academic experts.

It is in Northeast Asia, however, that Canada sees the greater potential for traditional tension spots, such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, to escalate into destabilizing crises. Establishment of a multilateral subregional security framework, (to supplement rather than replace current bilateral alignments), has been a goal of Ottawa since the beginning of the decade. Thus, the Canadian initiative, the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, was the first effort on Track Two levels to advance multilateral, inclusive subregional efforts towards reduction of tensions, greater transparency in national security and defense policies, and understandings of the implications of unconventional security concerns. While these efforts faltered after 1993, Canadian participants, both Track One and Track Two, remain actively involved in subsequent efforts to generate an effective subregional security dialogue process in Northeast Asia.

In sum, Canada's security outlook has undergone dramatic changes during the past five years. Security is now viewed in a broader and less overtly military fashion, and the advancement of cooperative security is seen as having



operational implications. The Euro/Atlanticist focus of the Departments of National Defense and Foreign Affairs has been altered to realize the importance of other regions, especially Asia, to Canada's security interests. The result has been a coordinated effort, on Track One and Track Two avenues, to portray Canada as an engaged Asia Pacific partner in advancing regional and subregional security multilateralism.