Wang Yanzhong. "Chinese Values, Governance, and International Relations: Historical Development and Present Situation." In *Changing Values in Asia: Their Impact on Governance and Development*, edited by Han Sung-Joo. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999, 12–63.

East Asia

— 2 —

Chinese Values, Governance, and International Relations: Historical Development and Present Situation

WANG YANZHONG

WITH THE TRENDS of globalization and cross-cultural exchange, exploring the relationship between values, governance, and international relations is a complex task. This chapter seeks to examine these relationships in the context of Chinese history and present reality.

Values are the sum total of people's different assessments, attitudes, recognition, and behavior vis-à-vis various phenomena or different aspects of a single phenomenon. Chinese sociologists and anthropologists generally regard culture as the "customs, traditions, attitudes, concepts, and characteristics which control social behavior" (Yin 1988, 38), or the "trends of values and modes of behavior which openly or covertly guide or manipulate the material and spiritual production and life of society, and the medium for knowledge, beliefs, morality, arts, education, law, the general physiological system, and their material forms which are shared by society and spread between members of society" (Jiang et al. 1987, 1). Values are the core of a given cultural system, and Du Weiming says that the "core of culture is composed of a series of traditional concepts in general and a system of values in particular" (1987, 118). Changes in values are largely the basis of changes in culture and they "reflect not only the structure of this system, but to a large extent also point the direction in which the characteristics of the system will develop" (Zhang and Cheng 1990, 209–210).

Political outlook is embodied and reflected in the values of the cultural system in the political realm. Three factors—political emotion,

political recognition or belief, and political behavior—interact with each other in a given cultural context to produce governance.

A country's political values and its government's application of those values give shape and substance to that country's foreign policy. Interaction between nations exerts an impact on all and results in a relative balance in a region or larger environment, as well as in common rules of conduct that participants obey or acquiesce to. Changes in member states' domestic situations or foreign policy, in relations between states, or in the overall world situation can affect the relative balance in regional or international relations. However, after a period of adjustment, a new balance and new rules of conduct could emerge. In this process of eternal change, international relations can influence and change the political outlook, values, and entire cultural system of a given country.

But when a country is minimally exposed to international exchange, its traditions of administration, values, and culture can show little or no change for a long period of time. So a study of Chinese tradition is essential to analyzing the relationship between changes in China's economic and social structure, values, and domestic governance. It is also necessary for exploring China's foreign policy and the impact of international relations on Chinese values and governance.

This chapter comprises four parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics of China's traditional values and culture—its political values particularly—and dissects domestic governance and foreign policy in terms of these values. The second part looks at changes in the Chinese tradition, including modern China's passive response to the West and its later active exploration of modernization. After adopting reform and opening up to the outside world, remarkable changes occurred in the economic, social, and cultural fields, as well as in domestic governance and foreign policy. Examining these changes provides the context for discussing the relationship between economic and social change, and changes in values and domestic governance. The third part discusses the relationship between changing values, governance, and foreign policies in contemporary China, while the fourth and final part gives an overall picture of contemporary Chinese values, governance, and international relations.

Characteristics of the Chinese Tradition

Chinese traditional culture can be divided into relatively clearly defined historical periods. Generally speaking, from the Spring and Autumn

period to the middle and late Qing dynasty, or for more than 2,000 years up to the Sino-British Opium War of 1840, the Chinese created, developed, and gradually perfected their own culture while drawing on the culture, lifestyle, and customs of different regions within the country. Traditional Chinese culture—Confucianism—then spread to peripheral countries and regions so that it became an important component of Oriental culture.

Of the ancient world's major cultures, Chinese culture differs markedly from Indian and Athenian cultures. The tradition of India was characterized by a religious culture centered on Buddhism, while the development of Athenian culture was closely related to the ocean. With the ocean as its backdrop, Athens formed an industrial and commercial culture and city-state civilization that were open to the rest of the world and never stopped absorbing the fruits of civilization from surrounding regions. Traditional Chinese culture, however, influenced by a relatively closed geographical environment, evolved gradually into an isolated and continuous continental culture. In this culture, farm production based on individual households was the major mode of production. This had a far-reaching influence on Chinese interpersonal relations, government administration, and culture. Indeed, Confucianism derived from the reality of production and life in agrarian society where blood relations and a natural hierarchy were the essence of relations. Individuals lost their independence and, in the case of China, patriarchal ethics created a society governed by "rites." "Traditional Chinese culture is a continuous continental agrarian and patriarchal feudal culture" which, over a long period of time, "lacked exchange and competition with other major civilizations, and its traditional force was especially strong. Western culture was formed through the exchange and intermingling of several of the world's major civilizations and by the intense competition of nations by and large at the same developmental level. By contrast, Chinese culture was isolated, self-contained, and born in the absence of strong cultural competition" (Zhang and Cheng 1990, 163–166). Isolation, continuity, folklorishness, agrarianism, patriarchy, and ethical "rites" constitute the salient features of traditional Chinese culture. And traditional Chinese culture could continue uninterrupted to this day because the mode of production and lifestyle of society changed little over a long period.

Since Chinese culture came into contact with Western culture in modern times, the number of writings and books on the national characteristics of the Chinese increased. Sha Lianxiang (1990) summarized

studies of Chinese national characteristics in various historical periods (71 persons and 542 viewpoints in all), and classified the viewpoints into eight categories according to the frequency with which each viewpoint appeared. Sha's synthesis of the judgments of Chinese national characteristics is as follows: Chinese are industrious, hard-working, content with poverty, and care for nothing but principles or "the Way"[1] (24.4 percent); are selfish, hypocritical, and jealous (22.3 percent); put family and clan above everything and believe in authority (12.9 percent); are benevolent, kind, self-aware, and self-disciplined (11.6 percent); are elusive and ignorant (8.5 percent); follow the doctrine of the "mean, modest, mature, and subtle" (8.5 percent); are wise, flexible, and constantly improving themselves (6.8 percent); and are magnanimous, peaceful, and generous (5.2 percent) (see table 1).

Sha also discovered that most people today hold slightly different opinions to those featured in table 1. In a 1987 questionnaire, 35.7 percent of the respondents believed the foremost strong points of Chinese to be that they are intelligent, flexible, and constantly improving themselves; 24.9 percent that Chinese are industrious, hard-working, content with poverty, and care for nothing but principles and "the Way"; and 24.3 percent that Chinese are magnanimous, peaceful, and generous. In addition, 45.2 percent maintained that the chief weakness of Chinese is that they are selfish, profit-minded, hypocritical, and jealous; 20.3 percent that Chinese put family, clan, and authority above everything; and 16.4 percent that Chinese are ignorant (Sha 1990, 23–28).

Many other works examine Chinese characteristics. For instance, the American historian Arthur F. Wright (1962) summarized thirteen Confucian characteristics after studying the personalities of famous Confucian ministers in various Chinese dynasties. The characteristics he described are: obedient to authority, obedient to rites and rules, respectful of history, love of studying tradition, respectful of role models, attentive to cultivating morality and special skills, favor peaceful reform of state and society, prudent, propensity for the doctrine of the mean, dislike of competition, a sense of mission when entrusted with great tasks, self-respectful in times of adversity, against heresy, and attentive to details when in contact with others.

These characteristics of followers of Confucianism were the result of earlier generations of Confucian scholars cultivating Confucian ideas while disseminating these ideas by example. Confucian theories fostered these characteristics and provided the basic values for cultivating

Table 1. Historical Opinions on Chinese National Characteristics

Basic Opinions	Examples of the Characteristics	Number of Times Mentioned	Frequency of Mention (as a percentage)
Industrious, hard-working, content with poverty, and care for nothing but principles or "the Way"	Firm and tenacious, adaptable, tenacious and resilient, forbearing, conservative and formal, fatalistic, not creative, traditional, industrious, content	132	24.4
Selfish, hypocritical, and jealous	Unfaithful, self-deceiving, unpatriotic, undisciplined, quarrelsome, egotistic, greedy, selfish, merciless, cruel	121	22.3
Put family and clan above everything and believe in authority	Moralistic, agriculturist, have a peasant mentality, worship ancestors, contemptuous of personal rights, pious, no independent spirit, obedient	70	12.9
Benevolent, kind, self-aware, and self-disciplined	Emphasize Confucian feelings and ethics, benevolent, sensitive, seek self-improvement, have self-respect, modest, introverted, appreciate and treasure kindness and friendship	63	11.6
Ignorant and know nothing about modern sciences	Degenerate, have an inferior mentality, no scientific curiosity, poor concentration and creativity, specious, stupid, superstitious, illogical, love of empty talk, not curious	46	8.5
Follow the doctrine of the mean, modest, mature, and subtle	Content with status quo, compromising, steady, not competitive, middle-of-the-road, harmonious, modest, subtle, mature, hospitable, indifferent	45	8.5
Wise, flexible, and constantly improving themselves	Constantly self-improving, highly accomplished, flexible, wise, benevolent, courageous, natural, creatively able, idealistic, spirited, reasonable	37	6.8
Magnanimous, peaceful, and generous	Unitive, peaceful, fraternal, love of nature, nonbelligerent, not nationalistic, autonomous, moral, pacifistic	28	5.2

SOURCE: Sha (1990, 25–26).

Confucian scholars. The core Confucian values have been preserved to this day despite changes in the theory.

Confucian values emphasize collective and intuitive thinking—in sharp contrast to Western culture, which is based on the individual and on analytical ways of thinking. In traditional Chinese society, Chinese never achieved independence in the true sense of the term as decisions were often made on their behalf by their family, clan, relatives, friends, or even village or government. "He who lives in this culture cannot possibly be independent; rather, he can only define and establish himself and achieve his value through other people and his relationship with them" (Yi 1996, 103). In this social environment, people realize that their own strength is limited and that they can survive only by relying on the collective. The collective is the basis from which individuals settle down and get on with life (Yi 1996, 109).

The sense of the collective is closely associated with the Chinese way of thinking. When observing things, Chinese stress the relationship with the whole, instead of making partial analyses. For example, the "yin and yang" theory is derived from the natural phenomena of day and night, the sun and the moon, men and women, women who give birth to sons and grandsons, and so forth. Yin and yang are present in everything, and their unity gives expression to the wholeness of things which are at once opposite and related to each other. Similarly, the five elements are believed to divide the multitude of things in the world. Metal, wood, water, fire, and earth supplement and condition each other to form an ever-lasting cycle.

On the basis of the theories on yin and yang and the five elements, Chinese describe the world as a network in which everything moves in an orderly way; time and space cross each other; and nature and society, which are of the same origin, form a colossal system (Zhang 1996, 102–109). This universal pattern has provided Chinese with a unique perspective to observe the world. Joseph Needham called this way of thinking an "organic universal philosophy." The American physicist said that to gain a complete understanding of the unity, naturalness, order, harmony, and relevance of the organic universe has been the goal of Chinese natural philosophy and science for more than a thousand years (quoted in Zhang and Cheng 1990, 226). In fact, paying attention to the relations between things, as well as their wholeness, is the embodiment of the Chinese way of thinking. Chinese also attach more importance to thinking in terms of image than Westerners, and they tend to recognize things by relying on intuition and image. Therefore,

their conclusions often lack careful analysis and irrefutable evidence, are oversimplified at times, or take a part for the whole. They also tend to regard phenomena that occur regularly as normal, speaking in their favor and even respectfully, while phenomena that arise seldom are dismissed.

Under the influence of values based on the collective and a universal mode of thinking, Chinese have formed a series of rules of behavior and beliefs for conducting interpersonal relations:

- The doctrine of the mean. Being impartial and avoiding going to extremes are major principles of Confucianism. These principles compel people to unify their thinking and conduct, and not to go beyond accepted social limits. Chinese thus always conform to the demands of society and do whatever they can not to contradict others.
- Collectivism. As noted, collectivism is a core concept in Chinese society. While the collective could mean the entire country, it refers mainly to the collective most basic to the individual—namely, the family and the clan. These small collectives are important for the survival and development of the individual, especially when the individual is growing up or has suffered a setback. Since a collective protects and cares for an individual, the individual has to repay the collective. Though collectives differ in size, sacrifice of personal interests for the sake of the collective is always advocated and appreciated. Indeed, Chinese culture only recognizes those who work for the collective interest. An individual hardly exists in society if he single-mindedly pursues personal gain, especially if he does so openly.
- Seeking peace amidst contradictions. Mencius said, "Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth; and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of men" (1987, 86). "Nothing is more precious than peace" is a basic principle and goal of Chinese in their personal relations, and the pursuit of peace is embodied in the pursuit of harmony. The Chinese greatly value harmony between man and nature, and regard nature not as an enemy but rather as something which has a mutually supplementary and dependent relationship with man. Unity between heaven and man means that man abides by the will of heaven without being asked to do so, and interpersonal relations should be governed by peace, tolerance, obedience, unity,

and mutual dependence, in which people respect and rely on each other and no one seeks to outdo others. It is not easy seeking peace amidst contradictions, and this calls for self-cultivation. On the one hand, a person should be content with his lot, and keep his desires in check; on the other, he should be conciliatory about any contradictions so that they will not intensify. By solving contradictions or preventing them from intensifying, harmony can prevail. Lao Tzu commented, "Being and non-being give rise to each other, the difficult and easy complement each other, the long and short shape each other, the high and low lean on each other, voices and instruments harmonize with one another, the front and rear follow upon each other" (Chen 1984, 442).

- Treasuring human feelings, personal reputations, and relationships. Chinese believe that it is easy to repay a debt of money but very difficult to repay debts of human feelings. Yet, not to be indebted in feelings is a major aphorism for Chinese, and the most effective way to avoid indebtedness is to repay people with more friendship. But disparities in people's economic resources, social status, and reputation mean that social exchange is often unequal. So great care must be taken to preserve people's dignity. Dignity means "face" and Chinese are highly sensitive to "face." Indeed, they will do anything they can to avoid losing face. They always hope to preserve their own dignity while preserving that of others.

Relationships are crucial in Chinese society. A person's network of relationships is what counts in getting things done—not the law or various rules and regulations. Indeed, Chinese pay more attention to relationships than to the law, because the law easily loses its dignity and authority in the face of relationships. "The Chinese are a people who attach great importance to human feelings, personal dignity, and relationships, and these three aspects are major considerations in man-to-man exchanges" (Zhang 1996, 73–86).

- Structure of different sequences, in which insiders are treated differently from outsiders. Fei Xiaotong, a well-known Chinese sociologist, points out, "The grass-roots structure of rural Chinese society is a 'structure of different sequences' as well as a 'network composed of the threads of personal clout'" (1985, 29). This sequence of differences, or hierarchical order, forms the framework for the network of personal clout, and Confucian theory stipulates in great detail the rules to be observed in this hierarchical order. The

Book of Rites says, "Loved ones should be treated with affection, men of dignity with due respect, members of the older generation with reverence, and there should be a clear distinction between men and women—this is the law that cannot be changed" (Hong et al. 1983, 426). These rules reflect the hierarchical order under the patriarchal clan system and are worlds apart from the concept of equality in Western society. The difference also exists in behavior and practice. Chinese treat people and handle things according to their relationship to them, and everyone follows the principle that insiders are treated differently from outsiders. Those within a person's network of relationships are insiders, and are treated favorably and with more tolerance. Outsiders are often treated with the attitude that "official business should be done according to official principles." Official principles can, however, also be set aside. This attitude and behavior vis-à-vis insiders and outsiders is conspicuous in Chinese culture, and those who violate it are scorned as "unreasonable."

- Realism. Chinese are practical people and as the supply of goods and resources is unreliable in agrarian society, people's chief concern is meeting their daily needs. This realistic attitude toward life has a direct impact on the Chinese concept of religion, with commoners generally being too busy living their lives to consider the existence of another world. Few believe in religion or take it seriously, and those who do tend to regard it as an instrument for achieving their goals in this world or as a way of breaking away from reality. This attitude is epitomized by those who "never burn incense in their lives but embrace Buddha's feet and pray for help in time of emergency." Confucius was also indifferent to abstract religions and never spoke about "strange spirits and weird gods."
- Moralism and double standards. In a society that pays great attention to human feelings, relationships, and personal dignity, ethics and morality are fundamental. Yet the Confucian codes of moral conduct for handling human relationships are repeatedly put to the test. Confucius believed that moral cultivation was more effective and lasting than law: "If people are guided by politics and threatened with punishment, they lose their sense of shame; if they are guided by morality and treated with rites, they become mindful of shame and personal dignity" (Mencius 1987, 84). This is why he believed in the "rule of morality." Confucian theory emphasizes

that people's level of morality and personal cultivation should be enhanced by study and self-examination, rather than law enforcement.

Confucianists emphasize moral cultivation because of their belief that people are intrinsically good. Confucius felt that man is good natured at the outset, and Lao Tzu believed that men are more or less of the same nature although their habits are vastly different. This view of the inherent goodness of man is fundamental in two-thousand-year-old Chinese ideological history (Li 1996, 30–31). However, good human nature is insufficient for carrying out moral obligations in complicated human relationships, and Confucianists believe that people always need to cultivate morality and minimize their personal desires. Only in this way can people honor their obligations, preserve their own dignity and that of others, and maintain overall harmony.

However, differences in people's consciousness and circumstances mean that personal interests and desires are not overcome entirely. So there is a discrepancy between Confucian requirements and people's actual behavior. Behind the scenes people tend to disregard the restraints of Confucian rules and regulations, with their words being divorced from their deeds. Chinese politics and society are far from being governed by the "rule of morality" and people's consciousness. Instead, obsession with formality, dishonesty, and hypocrisy are manifest.

Traditional Governance and Diplomacy in China

The word *governance* in Chinese means rule and management; the English word originates from a Greek expression about the "art of steering" (King 1988, 4). David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1996, 10–14), proponents of reforming government, believe that government's steering function should be separated from its operational function, that many of its public utility projects should be privatized, and that government should concentrate on strategy and policy and bettering its steering role. Governance is closely related to the nature of a country's political and government systems, and these systems result from that country's circumstances and particular political culture or ideology.

Qinshihuang, the founding emperor of the Qin dynasty, unified China in 221 B.C. and established a highly centralized autocratic monarchy. With military, administrative, and legislative power under his control, the emperor was the supreme authority of the country. He

decided everything, large or small; "I am the country itself" was the saying. The emperor's edicts were the law, and his likes and dislikes were the criteria for judicial judgments. Autocratic monarchy lasted for more than two thousand years in China, from the Qin to the Qing dynasties, but it became an increasingly serious problem over time.

In a country with a large population and covering a vast area, dictatorship by the emperor was insufficient alone, and it became necessary to set up a government to implement the emperor's instructions and handle everyday affairs. A centralized bureaucratic system that was compatible with the autocratic system evolved. Different to the feudal fiefdoms of medieval Europe, traditional Chinese bureaucracy was born from the ownership of the land but was basically free from the influence of changes in the relationship in land ownerships (Li 1987, 234).

In ancient times, Chinese bureaucracy was rather comprehensive. During the Tang dynasty, for instance, there were six ministries (personnel, education, rites, defense, justice, and works) under three departments (Department of State Affairs, the Chancellery, and the Secretariat) at the central level, and circuits, prefectures, and counties at the local level. The emperor appointed major officials after they passed an imperial exam, a system which guaranteed officials' dependence on the emperor and ensured the centralization of the emperor's power.

Ancient Chinese political theories—mainly Legalism and Confucianism—served the imperial autocracy. Han Fei (280?–233 B.C.), who postulated Legalist theory, suggested that all major power should be centralized in the hands of the emperor and that he should not have to share this power with anyone. To implement the emperor's rule all over the country, the Legalists advocated a unified legal system—which effectively eliminated local laws. Qinshihuang was the first to practice Legalist theory, and it played a positive role in his being able to unify the country. Indeed, it laid the foundation for the political and bureaucratic system that was to last for more than two thousand years.

However, because Legalism favored stern state laws and suggested cruel punishments for disobedience, it contributed to the turmoil of the late Qin dynasty and led to the dynasty's demise. It could be said that Legalist theory was an extremist theory that worked only during the early days of the autocracy. To continue dealing with ideological issues by violence once the autocracy had stabilized only led to instability.

Confucianism, as a theory, regulates social relations in accordance

with a patriarchal ethical order. So it essentially condoned and justified the political system of monarchical autocracy. Mencius, for instance, linked the supreme position with the will of heaven. Dong Zhongshu (180–115 B.C.), an eminent Confucian of the Han dynasty, suggested that the emperor was the son of heaven because he was mandated by heaven.

Where Legalism used the threat of cruel punishment to resolve contradictions, Confucianism wisely advocated handling human relations with benevolence, righteousness, and rites. For this reason, people on various rungs of the social ladder found it easy to accept Confucianism. Emperor Wu (156–87 B.C.) of the Han dynasty drew a lesson from the downfall of the Qin dynasty and, accepting Dong's proposal, began advocating Confucianism over Legalism, thereby enabling Confucian thought to become the official underpinning of governance in China for more than two thousand years.

Confucianism was not categorically opposed to law, but instead of law, Confucians suggested reliance on "benevolent rule" by the emperor so that officials and commoners alike would willingly be loyal to the emperor. Benevolent rule used family ethics as the foundation for political rule, so the country was like a big family in which the emperor was the head, the officials at various levels were the parents, and the people were the sons. While the people were to obey the emperor and the officials he appointed, the latter were to love the people. In this way, relations between the emperor, officials, and the people, and their respective obligations, wove a big harmonious family. Ruling the country with "filial piety" covered up conflicts of interest between the parties, and on the basis of this ethical relationship members of society would be able to coexist in harmony and ensure peace (Liang 1987, 83).

However, the Confucians' political ideal of rulers loving the people and ruling benevolently, and the people obeying the rulers and being grateful for the benefits that benevolent rule brought to them, proved to be difficult to implement in reality. Very few of the more than two thousand years of autocratic monarchy saw true Confucian benevolent rule. Despotism was more characteristic. And when despotic rule reached a crisis, the old dynasty typically gave way to a new one. There were several dozen dynastic changes from the Qin to the Qing, but the political system of autocratic monarchy remained unchanged. Confucianism also remained the ruling orthodoxy, a fact that helped rulers consolidate their autocratic rule.

As the ruling orthodoxy, Confucianism had a tremendous impact on governance in China and the Chinese political system. First, it confirmed the reasonableness and sanctity of autocracy as the foundation of Chinese politics. Second, ancient Chinese politics became bureaucratic politics. After long years of evolution, the bureaucracy became a "central organ which supervised the making and implementation of policies, with central and local organizations connected into a well-knit system" (Liu 1994, 3). Third, Confucianism adopted the coat of Legalism while using Confucian hierarchical ethical relations for law making and enforcement. The result was a minority of people having hierarchical prerogatives while the majority were deprived of their legal rights (Wu et al. 1994, 6). It is not that there was no law in ancient China, but that law was secondary to hierarchical ethics and personal relationships. Fourth, Confucianism believed that rulers' moral conduct was decisive for achieving clean government and social harmony and stability. "Benevolent rule" was actually "moral rule." Fifth, the prerogatives of governance in ancient China flowed one way, with no mechanisms existing to check or balance the power of the emperor or officials. The quality of state governance hinged entirely on the moral conduct and ability of the emperor and officials. Sixth, while Confucianism provided the theoretical foundations for dynastic change through the loss of the mandate of heaven, it did not countenance a change in the entire political system—indeed, it underwrote imperial autocracy and bureaucratic rule.

Yet China's autocratic monarchy with its bureaucratic politics maintained relative social stability for a long period in an empire covering a vast territory. It also fostered many inventions and creations when technological progress was slow and productivity low, and kept the country a step ahead of its neighbors. But the autocracy's endurance over such a long time was detrimental to the transition of the Chinese political system toward republicanism and democracy. Indeed, the autocracy opposed democracy and belittled human rights. Karl Marx said that the only principle of autocracy was to look down on the human race and make humans inhuman; this is exactly what happened in traditional Chinese politics. The long-term perseverance of traditional Chinese politics suppressed the vitality of society and stifled the country's flexibility and ability to meet challenges. These challenges included a continuous succession of natural and man-made disasters, internal turmoil, and the threat of foreign aggression, with the population suffering untold miseries. Ray Huang (1981, 4) suggests

that the root of China's problems for more than two thousand years was the fact that morality replaced the legal system.

The Chinese Tradition of Foreign Relations

Fei Xiaotong describes how "the Chinese nation as a conscious national entity emerged from the confrontation between China and Western powers in the last hundred years, but as a self-contained national entity it came into being through a historical process of several thousand years" (1988, 319). The Huaxia tribe, which appeared in the middle reaches of the Yellow River some three thousand years ago, was the primary tribe of a number of tribes that combined to become the Chinese nation. When China emerged as a unified autocracy after the Qin and Han dynasties, this congregation of tribes was called Han, the name by which the predominant Chinese ethnic group is still known today.

Relations between this autocratically governed country and its neighbors were characterized, on the one hand, by a struggle for supremacy and, on the other, by a process in which many ethnic groups—including the Han and minority groups such as northern nomads—mingled and achieved harmony. In handling relations between different ethnic groups and political powers within the territory of present-day China, the Han political rulers followed various policies. When a dynasty was first established, or when China was powerful and prosperous, emperors tended to conquer and expand the frontiers. During the middle or later stages of a dynasty, or when the country was weak, the rulers generally adopted policies of pacification and fraternization. They then opened up markets for bilateral trade; presented large amounts of cloth, silk, and tea as gifts for the purpose of maintaining a peaceful environment; and tried to influence other ethnic groups with Confucian morality. Another policy followed was that of defensive resistance to foreign invasion. Harassment of China in ancient times came mainly from northern nomads who were highly mobile. The Han people, who subsisted on agriculture, were often on the defensive. The Great Wall, which took nearly two thousand years to build, from the Qin to the Ming dynasties, was a major defensive measure.

In handling its relations with neighboring countries and other nations in the world, ancient China followed similar policies to those developed from relations with different ethnic groups and political powers within present-day Chinese territory. As the largest and most developed country in East Asia, China exerted tremendous influence on the economies, cultures, and political systems of peripheral countries

such as Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian countries. With its vast territory, huge population, and advanced farming technology, China's economy was the largest in the world at the time, its bureaucratic political system had fully evolved, its culture was rather prosperous, and it could claim many inventions and creations. Joseph Needham (1957, 3) said that with a number of scientific and technological inventions in many important fields, ancient China was well ahead of legendary Greece, was neck-and-neck with Arabia, which possessed all the ancient Western world's cultural assets, and had attained a scientific and knowledge level which surpassed that of the West from the third to thirteenth centuries.

A well-developed agrarian civilization helped China maintain long-term political and cultural stability, but at the same time allowed the flourishing of Huaxia chauvinism with its conceitedness, conservatism, and isolation. This stifled the vitality needed for reform and development. When confronted with the onslaught of the more sophisticated industrial technology of capitalist civilization, the splendor and tradition of bygone days became obstacles for further development. As a result, China's progress toward modernization has been tortuous.

The Transformation of the Chinese Tradition

The Western Onslaught and Chinese Modernization

The Sino-British Opium War of 1840 marks the beginning of modern Chinese history and, under the onslaught of foreign powers, it ushered China into the age of modernization. Yan Lixian says, "Because the civilization of modern industry first appeared in Western countries and then spread to non-Western countries, the modernization of non-Western countries is, first of all, a process of accepting the civilization of Western industrialization" (1997, 129). In the more than one hundred fifty years since 1840, China has undergone a contradictory and arduous process in accepting Western civilization. It has been a process in which an ancient empire that had regarded itself as the center of world civilization was forced to recognize its own backwardness, accept rules of conduct for international exchange formulated by other countries, and be relegated to a secondary position in the world. It has also been a revolutionary process in which the country has striven for national independence, initiative, dignity, and prosperity.

Luo Rongqu (1993, 237–242) divides this process into four phases: (1) decline, mainly in the authority of state politics, agriculture, and

the entire countryside; (2) semi-peripheralization, in which China's internally generated evolution was interrupted and China was brought into the world economic system with its Western capitalist core and was gradually reduced to a dependent semicolony in politics and economics; (3) revolution, in which the Chinese rose in opposition in a peasant movement, a bourgeois democratic revolution, and a new democratic and socialist revolution under the guidance of Marxism; and (4) modernization, in which modern Chinese economic sectors are developing and traditional agrarian society is gradually moving toward a modern industrial society.

In the transitional periods, Chinese politics, economics, cultural consciousness, and state sovereignty were all under tremendous pressure, with state sovereignty probably being tested the most. The Qing government was repeatedly defeated—in the first and second opium wars, the Sino-French War of 1884–1885, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, and the Taiping Rebellion of 1890. War indemnities exacerbated economic depression, and the lease of large amounts of territory and the concession of state sovereignty also undermined the Qing government. The government adopted desperate reformist measures in 1898, but they failed to get off the ground due to the opposition of conservatives. Unable to resist foreign invaders and unable to modernize, the Qing was overthrown in the Revolution of 1911, thus ending the autocratic political system that had lasted more than two thousand years.

The Revolution of 1911 toppled the feudal monarchy, but it failed to establish a real democratic republic. After more than a decade of turbulence and disputes, two major forces rose on the Chinese political scene in the 1920s: Chiang Kai-shek's right-wing Kuomintang, which represented big landlords and capitalists; and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which represented the laboring class, the peasantry in particular. The former gained the support of the imperialist countries, broke with the communists (with whom it had an alliance) in 1927, and built a basically unified, but rather unstable, state. Chiang struggled to consolidate political power against other warlords and the communists, but the war of aggression launched by Japan against China during the 1931–1945 period dealt the telling blow, making it impossible for his regime to concentrate on modernization. During this period, the Chinese capitalist economy developed to a certain extent but could not resist the further disintegration of the rural economy. At the end of the resistance war against the Japanese, the Chinese communists

were strong enough to fight decisive battles against the Kuomintang. The founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 suggested that after more than a century of war and social turmoil, China had gained independence and state sovereignty, as well as a powerful political center capable of leading the country in modernization.

The modernization of New China falls into two phases: the establishment and development of the planned economic system (1949–1978), and socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics (since 1979). In the first phase, the establishment of a powerful political center and the emulation of the Soviet planned economic system enabled China to concentrate its resources on government-mandated state industrialization. Despite an imperialist blockade, China set up a relatively comprehensive modern industrial foundation and a national economic system that also included a defense industry. However, inefficiency and other drawbacks in the planned economic system, along with many mistakes by the CCP such as the Cultural Revolution, made it difficult to attain long-term economic growth and delayed the takeoff of the Chinese economy.

At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee convened in 1978, Deng Xiaoping established his position as the core of the second-generation leadership of the CCP. As the chief architect of Chinese reform and opening up to the outside world, he gradually established his theory and policies on building socialism with distinctive Chinese characteristics. The core of his policy was economic development and concentrating all resources on developing productivity, while maintaining political stability and upholding the four cardinal principles. As a result, during the roughly twenty years since 1979, China has gradually moved from isolation to reform and opening up, and from central planning to a socialist market economic system (Jiang 1997a, 11). China has also achieved robust economic growth, basic political stability, and vigorous developments in culture, education, science and technology, and other areas. Furthermore, rural reforms have ended long years of rural economic stagnation. After years of steady growth, rural industry has joined urban industry in China's industrialization, and half of China's rural labor force is now involved in industry and commerce, prompting changes in the social structure. From 1979 to 1996, China maintained an annual GNP growth rate of nearly 10 percent, was in the front ranks of the world in absorbing foreign capital, and, with foreign trade expanding quickly, ranked eleventh

in the world in 1996 in terms of total import and export volume. These figures suggest that, after more than a century of probing, China has finally found its way toward modernization—on its own terms.

Sino-Western Cultural Disputes and the Evolution of Chinese Values

Disputes between Chinese and Western cultures are a notable feature of China's modernization process. Such disputes involve reexamining the value of traditional Chinese culture under the Western cultural onslaught, along with searching for guidelines for China's modernization.

As early as the Ming and early Qing dynasties, Western science, technology, and culture had already made inroads in China. However, "among Chinese scholar-officials, there was more ignorance than understanding, and more contempt than respect" (Xiong 1994, 704). During the Opium War, Western gunboats and big guns shattered the self-imposed isolation of the Qing dynasty and shook the confidence of China's ruling Confucian scholar-officials. Shocked by China's repeated defeat by Western powers, they set aside their disdain of Western learning, and began adopting Western gunboats and arms, as well as drawing on Western technology, literature, philosophy, and social sciences.

However, because Western culture and traditional Chinese culture were at different periods of development, and because of the yawning gap between traditional Chinese Confucian morality and culture and Western cultural concepts, the impact of Western culture, which came along with the gunboats and big guns, was profound. China's acceptance and absorption of Western culture has been selective and sequential. "China's learning from the West since 1840 has undergone a process which began with the learning of Western technology, then politics, and then moved to Western learning (such as freedom, democracy, and equality)" (Zhang and Cheng 1990, 335). "Generally speaking, Western culture at the level of material civilization, and Western culture associated with applied science, showed their value and established their reputation and position through trial and by comparison" (Xiong 1994, 716). However, the Chinese have always been suspicious of Western political philosophy, social theories, and values.

Sino-Western cultural disputes in modern times fall into roughly three phases: the late Qing period, the Republican years, and since the 1980s. Making "Chinese learning the mainstay and Western learning

subsidiary" represented the Chinese attitude during the late Qing. This theory, which emerged in the 1860s and reached its heyday in the 1890s, sought to distinguish between what was cardinal and what was secondary. The consensus was to preserve Confucian culture and moralism while learning from Western science, technology, and legal principles. This was tantamount to trying to graft Western science, technology, and economic and political thought on to feudal ethics and a feudal social order and monarchy. After the demise of the Qing, this attitude—which regarded China as the center of all things—quickly lost following.

During the Republican years, China's domestic situation and that of the world changed drastically. World War I and the Soviet revolution directly impacted Chinese opinions about Western culture, as did the intensifying home situation, the Kuomintang-CCP struggle and civil war, and the war of resistance against Japan. After the overthrow of the Qing, Chinese were unanimous in their opposition to monarchic autocracy. After World War I, just as the West divided between followers of capitalism and socialism, the Chinese ideological world also splintered. Four major theories were expounded: (1) The theory on Oriental culture, advocated by Liang Shuming and Zhang Junli. This oversimplified reexamination of World War I suggested that the war marked the bankruptcy of Western culture and that the cure for this was the adoption of Oriental culture. Yet for China to modernize, adherents of this theory believed it was essential to mingle Confucian ideals, values, and morality with Western democracy, science, and capitalism. (2) The theory of "wholesale Westernization," represented by Hu Shi and Chen Xujing. They regarded Western culture as the model for other cultures, and felt that the only way to achieve development and modernization was to give up traditional culture and completely accept Western culture and the capitalist road (Hu 1935). (3) The "three principles of the people"—nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood—and the theory of "Chinese culture as mainstay." The three principles of the people formed the theoretical foundation for the Kuomintang's political rule and modernization program, as well as its concept of culture. This theory, which relinquished the idea of either Chinese or Western culture as the center, as well as that of making "Chinese learning the mainstay and Western learning subsidiary," was more conciliatory and generalized. (4) The theory of new democratism. The Chinese communists distinguished the democratic revolution of 1919–1949 under its leadership from the Kuomintang's

three principles of the people by calling the former the "new democratic revolution." In his 1940 "On New Democratism," Mao Zedong set forth that the Chinese communists sought to establish "a national, scientific, and popular culture," which was "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal." He advocated massive absorption of the advanced elements of foreign culture, and "getting rid of [ancient culture's] feudal dregs and absorbing its democratic essence" (Mao 1991, 708–709). Mao's concept of culture provided the theoretical guidelines for the cultural struggle against the Kuomintang, and impacted Chinese cultural exchange with foreign countries as well as state policy toward ancient culture and cultural development after the founding of the People's Republic.

Cultural disputes since the adoption of reform and opening up have largely been conducted by academics, even though they may not have been free of political influences, especially the class struggle of bygone days. On the mainland, discussion about culture is centered around Li Zehou's idea of "making Western learning the mainstay and Chinese learning subsidiary." Li suggests, "The road toward the future should be the integration of the modernization of subjects (mode of production, the superstructure, and everyday social life) in society and the consciousness of such subjects with the reality of China (including Confucianism as an object existing in Chinese cultural psychology)." In other words, he is for "making modernization the mainstay and nationalization subsidiary" (Li 1986, 2). Opponents of this theory believe that Li is advocating "wholesale Westernization" and that this follows the outdated mode of thought that sets Chinese learning against Western learning. Instead, these scholars suggest that the new Chinese culture should be characterized by upholding Marxism, socialist principles, and the spirit of nationalism, and integrating Chinese and Western cultures (Zhang and Cheng 1990, 398–415).

Discussions among scholars in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas on Chinese and Western cultures center around the theory of "restoring Confucianism." In the early twentieth century, Max Weber commented that the salient feature of Confucianism was the way it adapted to the world, rather than transformed it, and that the Confucian tradition was therefore inappropriate for the rise and development of capitalism. Subsequently, most Western scholars have believed that Confucianism serves to slow China's modernization. Mary C. Wright (1957), who studied the modernization movement of the late Qing, pointed out that the scholar-officials who launched the movement only wanted to learn material and technical aspects from the West and that

they were generally against reform, because the Confucian demand for stability clashed with modernization's consequence of change. Joseph R. Levenson (1965) also believed that Confucian ideas were inseparable from the Chinese feudal hierarchy and were therefore incompatible with modernization.

However, Cheng Rongjie, Yu Yingshi, Du Weiming, and other overseas Chinese scholars hold opposite opinions. They believe that the economic takeoff of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1960s and 1970s clearly indicates that Confucian ideas do not clash with modernization. They suggest that the successes of these countries are fine examples of what they call "Confucian capitalism"—the integration of Confucian culture with capitalist management. They believe that Confucian ideas on personal character—the emphasis on morality, interpersonal relations, and coordination between the individual and the collective—overcome the side effects of Western utilitarianism and individualism, and help promote the renaissance of Neo-Confucianism, integrated as it is with Western culture. Mainland scholars tend to believe that as an embodiment of cultural pluralism, Neo-Confucianism can be instrumental in promoting modernization, but that Confucianism could never become the mainstream culture, because it has long passed its heyday.

Sino-Western cultural disputes in modern times have been a reaction of traditional Chinese culture—with Confucianism as the mainstay—to the onslaught and challenge of Western culture. The conflict between Chinese and Western cultures has impacted Chinese and their values. This impact can clearly be seen in the relationship between Chinese economic and social change, and the changes in values and foreign policy since the adoption of reform and opening up to the outside world.

The Chinese Political System and Foreign Relations in Modern Times

The Revolution of 1911 ended the Qing government and buried the autocratic political system that had lasted for more than two thousand years. After the demise of the Qing and the abolition of the imperial exam system, an effective system for choosing government functionaries was not established, and political life was full of ranking officers who achieved their positions by military means. During the warlord conflicts of the early Republican years and Chiang Kai-shek's rule of the mainland, there was no civilian politics to speak of in China.

The central government the Kuomintang established in 1927 did not adopt a political system of "controlling power with power." Rather, it introduced dictatorship by a single political party. Although the Kuomintang did not give up the ideal of a Western democratic system, the legal system implemented during this time differed in content from the Western system, although it was similar in form. The modern Western legal system concerns individuals and is based on the idea that personal freedom, equality, and democratic rights should be protected from encroachment. The pioneer Chinese thinker Yan Fu said that Western countries make "freedom the mainstay and democracy subsidiary" (quoted in Wu 1994, 544). Yet freedom in Yan's eyes was not personal freedom, but that of the country. While the constitution of the late Qing dynasty restrained the rights of the autocratic monarchy, it did not erect laws protecting personal freedom. Rather, it replaced imperial power with nationalism, and regarded individual rights as complying with a person's obligations to his family and country. The Republican years, especially during the rule of the Kuomintang, marked the beginning of the modernization of traditional Chinese law, but the state and society, instead of individual citizens, remained the basic principals of the law. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the pioneer of Chinese democratic revolution, believed that law protected the interests of the public, not private interests (Sun 1981, 338). His concept of law centered on people's social duties and was therefore a continuation of traditional culture—which valued obligations over rights. The concept of personal rights is also seen as an ideological bridge for the transition from feudal rule to capitalism, as well as the theoretical cornerstone for a modern republic and the development of a capitalist economy (Wu et al. 1994, 613). Yet neither the late Qing bourgeois reformists, nor the bourgeois revolutionaries represented by Sun Yat-sen, nor the right-wing Kuomintang represented by Chiang Kai-shek, fulfilled the task of creating this bridge. The historical task of establishing democratic politics and the rule of law became that of the Chinese communists. Like the search for the way to modernize, this was no mean task.

But why did Chinese not use directly the democratic republican political system and cultural concepts that proved successful in the West to reform China's political system? For one, Chinese tradition was too strong and the obstacles to reform rather powerful. Also, the Chinese bourgeoisie that should have fulfilled this task was underdeveloped and too feeble to confront China's autocratic monarchy, clan system, and culture on the one hand, and foreign invasion and

plundering on the other. Despite its strong points, Western civilization had additionally only brought cruelty and misery to China. The Chinese bourgeoisie was confronted with two choices: either to use Western political, legal, and ideological systems to undermine the forces for feudalism in China, or to use traditional Chinese cultural principles to maintain national independence and save the country. Under the circumstances, it was impossible to copy the Western pattern for modernization.

When the Qing government was in decline, the Western capitalist world had developed enough strength from industrialization to support its expansionist efforts. China's conceitedness—it regarded itself as the Middle Kingdom, the center of world civilization—made it difficult for it to adjust its strategy for dealing with the Western onslaught. As a result, China suffered one humiliation after another in its dealings with the West. Its national sovereignty and dignity were gradually diminished and it was slowly reduced to a semicolony. China's size prevented it from becoming any one country's colony, but it became an effective colony of many capitalist countries and was subjected to a host of countries' aggression and plunder. All this accelerated the Qing's downfall and bankruptcy.

There were two dimensions to the Western onslaught. On the one hand, it brought advanced Western science, technology, and culture to China's attention, as well as ideas about political freedom, equality, and the rule of law. It broke China's self-imposed isolation and conceitedness, and alerted it to its backwardness. Indeed, without the Western onslaught, the Chinese tradition could have continued indefinitely and it would have taken China a longer time to embark on modernization. On the other hand, because the West imposed itself on China in an aggressive and predatory way, China has a contradictory and schizophrenic attitude toward foreign countries in modern times. When it has felt obliged to learn from Western civilization, China's attitude has been one of envy, praise, and imitation. Yet when confronted with subjugation and the pressure of survival, its attitude has been that of rebuffing and resisting foreign aggression.

Although China had dealt with foreign countries for several thousand years, these exchanges were between an advanced China and relatively underdeveloped peripheral countries, so they were very different to China's experience with the West. China's backwardness and defensiveness in dealing with the West caused mistakes, blunders, and losses. At the end of each war, China was invariably forced to pay

indemnities and yield some of its sovereignty, which increased its mistrust of the West and deepened China's estrangement.

Before its downfall, the Qing government handled British-led Western efforts to carve up Chinese territory by attempting to strike a deal to maintain its rule. In the early Republican years, Western countries were too engrossed in World War I to be mindful of China. At that time, Japan—which had achieved initial modernization—was the major threat to China. Britain, the United States, and other Western countries did not want Japan to monopolize China. So they worked to improve their relations with China, turned to China as an ally in the war against Japan and Nazi Germany, and promoted the international position of the Kuomintang government. After World War I, relations with the newly established socialist Soviet Union were as important to China as its relations with Britain, Japan, and the United States. Yet relations between the Soviet Union and China speeded up the disintegration of Chinese society by helping bring about a showdown between the two major antagonistic classes and presenting a choice of establishing either a British or U.S.-type capitalist modern state or a Soviet-type socialist one. Despite its feeble strength, China was a huge country in terms of territory and population, so China's choice would have an important bearing not only on its own development but also on the general pattern and balance of power in the world. Changes in China's relations with Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and other major countries were thus a barometer of the international situation.

After World War II and for complex reasons, the Chinese chose the CCP over the Kuomintang government and the Soviet brand of central planning and industrialization. Due to the U.S. blockade and containment of China, China was forced to lean diplomatically toward the Soviet Union and become a member of the Soviet-led socialist camp. This was the New China's international policy for a considerable period.

Politics, Economy, Culture, and International Relations of New China

On October 1, 1949, in Beijing, Chairman Mao Zedong solemnly proclaimed the People's Republic of China, thereby opening a new chapter in Chinese history and heralding major changes in China's politics, economy, ideology, and foreign relations. This process of change continues today.

Chinese Politics, Economy, Culture, and Foreign Relations Prior to Reform After a century of turmoil and separation—and with the exception of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan—China was finally reunified and a powerful central government under the leadership of the CCP was set up. Rather than comprising shattered pieces of the former state apparatus, the government was an entirely new political organization. First, the CCP, fresh from its victory over the Kuomintang after long years of struggle, was the ruling party. The leading position of the party was laid down in the Constitution. Second, ideology governed Chinese political life. The role of ideology in influencing people's minds and behavior reached its apex during the Cultural Revolution. Third, political mobilization and movements became a salient feature of politics in New China. Fourth, although power and authority were centralized in the CCP's leadership and the planned economic management system, the enthusiasm of localities for this system was ensured by expanding their decision-making powers. This was a significant difference from the strict centralization and central planning that the Soviet Union adopted. Fifth, a flawed legal system and constant political mobilization campaigns contributed to China not being ruled according to law after the establishment of the powerful central government. For a long time, Mao used his prestige and power to impose his will on the Party, thereby further concentrating power in his hands. Principal officials at various levels followed suit and acquired power free from the supervision of other departments. To a large extent, New China operated under the "rule of men" and the "rule of morality," instead of the rule of law. This showed that governance in New China was not severed from traditional Chinese politics, but was in fact a continuation of the traditional style. Sixth, it was in the countryside that the CCP won its revolutionary victory. However, after the founding of New China, the country focused on developing urban industry. The administration of urban residents drew heavily on the traditional family concept, with enterprises and institutions becoming the nerve endings of the government. "The enterprises are virtually running the society, and a factory director looks like a mayor," was the popular saying. The "unit" became the grass-roots administrative organization in Chinese cities (Wang 1991), the vehicle for sharing some government functions, and the key to understanding governance in China (Zhu 1997, 348).

Industrial development was the CCP's economic priority and all economic policies were designed to further this goal. To concentrate

China's limited resources, China incorporated the Soviet planned economic management system, and the state monopolized control of industry and commerce and separated the cities from the countryside (Wang 1997). As industrialization is the foundation of modernization, the hope was to industrialize rapidly by increasing industrial output by 80 times in a quarter of a century. The speed of industrialization that the Chinese government promoted enabled China to establish the basis for its own modern industry, particularly defense industry. From the establishment of the People's Republic to the eve of reform in the late 1970s, Chinese gross national product (GNP) grew an annual average of more than 6 percent, the annual average industrial growth rate was over 11 percent, annual average per capita income grew 6 percent, and annual average consumption 2 percent. Living standards thus increased for the majority of people (Wang 1994, 10–37). But China also paid a heavy price for government-promoted industrialization. The overconcentration of investment in industry meant other sectors were neglected, resulting in poor economic results and distortions in the economy.

There were also changes in the cultural sphere in New China, with the government playing the primary role in affecting these changes. The CCP thoroughly repudiated Confucianism, the traditional ruling culture of Chinese society for several thousand years, and replaced it with Mao Zedong thought, the Chinese brand of Marxism. "Red culture" in China had Marxism as its theoretical basis, it upheld CCP leadership, and its core was class struggle and proletarian dictatorship. *On Communist Party Members' Cultivation*, a book by State President Liu Shaoqi, and the diaries of Lei Feng, a commoners' hero, provided guidance for people in how to behave, think, live, and work, as well as how to handle their relations with others (Ma 1995, 364). Superficially, this red culture was brand-new and was not connected to traditional Chinese culture; some called it a fracture in Chinese culture. However, although Marxist theory came from the West and red culture was new in the Chinese context, it was also typically Chinese. For instance, Mao Zedong thought required the cultivation of morals and loyalty to the organization, the unit, and the leader. Considering that loyalty and filial piety are core values of Confucian culture, and that the unit was the de facto substitute for the family, Mao Zedong thought was inherently related to traditional culture. Revolutionary red culture thus fell short of stamping out traditional culture, and many of the concepts and modes of action it called for were in fact extensions of

traditional culture. Also, many actions during this period of ideological content and "finishing off traditional culture" were more cultural vandalism than cultural construction. Ultra-leftist trends of thought and action during the Cultural Revolution particularly caused major social disturbances, as well as a crisis in ideology itself. The profound lessons learned from this period greatly influenced cultural policies adopted with reform and opening up.

Chinese foreign relations in the 1950s favored the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, partly in response to the blockade and containment of China by the U.S.-led capitalist camp.[2] However, from the outset, relations between the CCP and the Soviet Communist Party were far from harmonious, as the Chinese were dissatisfied with Soviet hegemonic behavior within the socialist camp. Sino-Soviet disputes in the late 1950s and territorial disputes in the 1960s finally lead to a break in relations between the two parties and nations that endured for thirty years. This prompted China to develop an independent foreign policy. During the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, China enjoyed major diplomatic breakthroughs when it established diplomatic relations with Canada, France, Italy, and other capitalist countries, thereby breaking the capitalist blockade of China. This development prompted Mao's theory of three worlds: the First World composed of the United States and the Soviet Union, whose respective imperial actions and hegemonism China opposed; the Second World of all capitalist countries except the United States, who were China's potential allies; and the Third World of developing countries—like China—in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who were China's friends. In the early 1970s, China and the United States began to have contact against the backdrop of Soviet expansionism. Through "ping-pong diplomacy" and President Richard Nixon's visit to China, the People's Republic was restored to its seat in the United Nations in 1972 and it became a permanent member of the Security Council. Due to improved Sino-U.S. relations, Britain, Germany, Japan, and other major countries also established diplomatic relations with China. China's greatly improving international position during this period was also impacted by its ideological competition with the Soviet Union in the Third World. Overall though, New China's diplomatic progress was undeniable and, by the end of 1978, China had diplomatic relations with one hundred sixteen countries and regions (Chinese Foreign Ministry 1990, 467). China was no longer isolated and the humiliations of its earlier modern history became part of the past. With

economic development and an enhanced international position, China emerged as a weak but independent force in international relations.

Reform and Opening Up to the Outside World: China's Second Revolution Mao Zedong died in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated a year later. In late 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee was convened, and it established the Deng ideological line of "seeking truth from facts." This plenary session marked the beginning of a new period in China, the age of reform and opening up.

Reform and opening up to the outside world was China's second revolution; the first was the country's achievement of independence, sovereignty, and national emancipation. The aim of the second revolution was to promote economic modernization and turn China into a powerful and prosperous country. To achieve this purpose, the CCP's focus was adjusted, economic development was placed above other ideological and political aims, and the entire nation was to help develop the economy and raise the country's productivity. "Economic development is the central task" was the core of Deng Xiaoping thought and was China's basic goal after it adopted reform and opening up.

To attain sustained economic development, it was necessary to reform the planned economic system. Prior to reform, Chinese industry and GNP achieved considerable growth, but this was done by mobilizing virtually all the available resources and by curtailing consumption. As the state controlled the lion's share of resources through the planned economic system, enterprises were deprived of their independent interests and individuals of their enthusiasm in labor. While the economy was plagued by low efficiency, the government also chose mistaken policies—such as the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and ongoing class struggle—which resulted in colossal wastes of wealth and social disaster. It is estimated that US$1,200 billion was wasted in a thirty-year period (Zheng 1980, 110–126). The market virtually played no role at all, and both investment and consumer goods were in short supply. Hunger was a common problem (Zhang 1991, 260). In the vast rural areas that had subsidized urban industrialization, "many peasants did not have enough to eat and wear, and they had trouble making ends meet" (Song 1995, 377). State-controlled industrialization over the previous three decades had used up virtually all social resources

and the economic structure was seriously skewed. The system was untenable without reform.

Reform began in the rural areas. After successes there, industrial and urban reform were promoted. A three-step strategy for reform was mapped out: First, to double 1980 GNP and solve people's food and clothing problems; second, to quadruple 1980 GNP so that people could achieve initial affluence; and third, to attain the per capita GNP of a mid-ranked developed country, at which point modernization would basically be realized. After nearly twenty years of growth, China quadrupled its 1980 GNP by May 1995, people's income and living standards increased significantly, and growth in this period was the fastest ever in Chinese history. Barring drastic changes in the domestic and world situation, it is hoped that this trend of solid economic growth will continue. President Jiang Zemin announced further plans for China's development in his report to the Fifteenth National Party Congress. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the goal is to double GNP, thus ensuring the establishment of the socialist market economy; during the second decade, the economy is to be developed further by improving various systems so that by the year 2049—the centennial of the People's Republic—China will have realized modernization and will emerge as a prosperous, democratic, and civilized socialist country (Jiang 1997b).

With fast economic growth, the structure of Chinese society has entered a period of dramatic transition. From the early days of industrial development in modern China to the establishment of the People's Republic, the share of industry as a percentage of total GNP never exceeded 10–20 percent. From the birth of New China to the eve of reform and opening up, the proportionate share of GNP attributable to industrial output rose to approximately 40 percent, with no corresponding change in agriculture. Thirty years of intensive industrialization thus failed to bring about changes in the social structure (Zheng 1980, 420). However, Chinese economic development since the adoption of reform and opening up has precipitated tremendous changes in both the social and economic structures. By the end of 1995, the output value of secondary industry exceeded 49 percent of Chinese GNP, while the proportion of the labor force in agriculture dropped to 53 percent, suggesting the beginning of China's transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial one (see table 2).

The period since the beginning of reform has also seen fast urbanization rates, with the urban population of China doubling from 17.9

Table 2. Economic Growth and Changes in the Labor Structure of New China

	Output Structure			National Income Structure		Labor Structure		
	1952–1957	1975	1995	1952	1978	1952–1957	1975	1995
Primary industry	43.5	37.0	20.9	57.7	35.4	83.5	77.1	52.9
Secondary industry	33.5	38.0	49.2	23.1	52.9	7.4	13.3	23.0
Tertiary industry	23.1	25.0	29.9	19.2	13.7	9.1	8.7	24.1

SOURCES: Zheng (1980, 420); State Statistical Bureau (1981, 20) and (1996, 88).

percent in 1978 to 29 percent in 1995. With the addition of an estimated 50–80 million peasants doing business in urban areas or working in factories, China's real urban population now accounts for more than 30 percent of the total population (Zhou and Guo 1996, 19). Along with this trend, however, social mobility and disintegration have also accelerated. Yet the variety of trades and professions is increasing steadily, as are differences in social status, lifestyles, and income and consumption levels. The egalitarianism of the former planned economic period is fading fast. In the meantime, the number of laws has also increased. Since 1992, "the National People's Congress had promulgated a total of 95 laws and the framework of the socialist market economic legal system has taken shape" (Tian Jiyun 1997). After two decades of robust economic growth, Chinese society is transforming "from a self-sufficient and semi-self-sufficient commodity economy to a socialist market economy, from an agrarian society to an industrialized society, from a rural society to an urban society, from a monotonous society to a diversified society, from an ethics-based society to a law-based society, and from an isolated and semi-isolated society to an open society" (Lu and Jing 1992, 32).

Striving for a peaceful international environment was a major point in Deng Xiaoping's strategy for economic development, as well as a goal for Chinese foreign policy on its own terms. On January 1, 1979, China and the United States established official diplomatic relations, thereby ending thirty years of hostility between the two countries and enabling China to routinely engage the world's most developed country. Deng's subsequent successful visits to the United States and Japan helped create an unprecedented international environment for China to concentrate on modernization. Deng had formulated the idea of learning from the West by opening the doors of the country wide and had said that "no country could achieve development by shutting itself

up behind closed doors" (Deng 1993, 117). Under this new diplomatic principle and a call to learn from developed countries, China has steadily increased its openness. In the late 1970s, Special Economic Zones were established in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou, close to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. In 1984, fourteen seaboard cities, including Shanghai, were designated as open cities, thus opening up those coastal areas. Opening up rivers, other coastal areas, and hinterland provinces has proceeded in the 1990s.

China's increased openness to foreign trade and capital has facilitated China's economic growth. It has also provided the foundation for China to deepen its exchange and cooperation with the world community and to gradually conform to international practices and regulations. For instance, Chinese tariffs have been reduced from 80 percent in the early reform years to 23 percent in 1995 and 17 percent by October 1, 1997. The goal is to reduce them to 15 percent, the world average, by the year 2000.

Reform and opening up to the outside world have profoundly influenced China. Since 1978, economic growth occurred simultaneously with changes in the social structure, and both the country's comprehensive strength and people's living standards have increased markedly. Although per capita income was still low at around US$600 in 1996, China is already in the world's front ranks in terms of economic aggregates and volume of foreign trade. The smooth reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, greatly boosted China's international prestige and Chinese pride. Macao will be returned to China in 1999 and—with the exception of Taiwan—China will then have achieved territorial reunification. The nineteen years since the adoption of reform and opening up have seen the fastest economic development in Chinese history, while China's modernization has proceeded smoothly and successfully.

However, the rapidity and vastness of the changes in China's economic system, social structure, lifestyle, and people's values in this period have put society under tremendous stress, too. While China is riding the high tide of robust development, it is also dealing with difficult problems like tremendous unemployment, low industrial efficiency, low average educational levels, excessive population, sustained poverty, and, in particular, the sustained poverty of rural areas under harsh natural conditions (Bernstein and Munro 1997, 48). The Chinese government is worried about feeding and clothing fifty-eight million poor people in rural areas (a 1996 year-end figure), while coping with

worsening urban unemployment and fifteen million urban poor. Young Chinese are concerned about the serious problems confronting China, discussing issues such as those relating to the environment, education, state enterprises, regional disparities, the "floating population" of unemployed rural migrants, cultural conflicts, and crime (see Tian Huiming 1997 and Xu 1997). The press is also constantly describing these problems. All these problems have resulted from China's fast economic growth and modernization and pose immense challenges to China's future development.

Interrelation between Changing Values, Governance, and International Relations

Impact of Economic and Social Change on Domestic Politics and Basic Values

Compared with Western culture, values in traditional Chinese culture tend to be stationary rather than volatile. In other words, the Chinese favor stability and harmony over change. Only when there is no alternative will adjustments or changes be considered. In the process of modernizing, traditional Chinese values and governance have come under unprecedented pressure, as have the various strata of Chinese society. Prior to the founding of the People's Republic, such pressure came mainly from the onslaught of the West. The Chinese reacted then to salvage their national pride. While Chinese intellectuals favored Western democratic political forms such as democracy and republicanism, as well as political ideas such as freedom and equality based on the rule of law, after the overthrow of the feudal monarchy, only the shell of a democratic republic was set up. The deep-rooted nature of Chinese traditions made it impossible simply to establish a Western-style democratic political system and a society ruled by law.

After the founding of New China, foreign pressure ceased to be a major motivating force behind changes in China's economy and society. Under the CCP's leadership, China also did not choose political concepts and a political system patterned after Western bourgeois democracies. Rather, it was fiercely critical of the West. Mao Zedong resorted to mass mobilizations in trying to rectify snowballing problems, but these failed to solve systemic problems and instead precipitated major social turmoil.

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping switched the nation's attention to the central task of economic development.

Like Mao, he did not establish a Western-type democratic political system; indeed, he was vigilant against Western political influences. With modernization proceeding steadily, he advocated reform and opening up under the four cardinal principles while maintaining political stability. Since reform was adopted in the late 1970s, China witnessed repeated ideological struggles. These included the antispiritual pollution campaign of the early 1980s, the antibourgeois liberalism movement of the mid-1980s, and the Tiananmen Square incident of the late 1980s. All were counterattacks by the state in the name of stability and unity against those attempting to mechanically copy Western political concepts.

Before and after the founding of the People's Republic, China decided not to adopt Western political principles. Having achieved significant economic modernization since adopting reform and opening up, China has maintained a political system that, in the eyes of Westerners, fails to practice political freedom and democracy. The discrepancy in China between economic and social change on the one hand and "political democratization" on the other is perhaps confusing. Interestingly though, this same phenomenon has occurred in Singapore, Taiwan, and other East and Southeast Asian countries that have worked "economic wonders."

One theory about this phenomenon is that postmodern countries necessitate powerful government and government-initiated industrialization and modernization if they are to catch up and surpass the developed countries. Another theory postulates that democratization is one aspect—but not the most urgent aspect—of the modernization process. National salvation and rehabilitation was the central need of China in modern times, and political democracy itself was not the purpose but a condition or an ancillary goal. The suggestion is that the demand for a democratic political system under the rule of law will only grow after economic modernization is achieved. A third theory holds that Western parliamentary democracy, which evolved in the unique historical conditions of the West, is merely one form of democracy. A fourth theory attributes the phenomenon to Confucianism, with its emphasis on social responsibility and political stability to rally society. As Chinese in particular and Orientals in general cherish a sense of collective belonging and personal feelings more than the law, Western-style individualism and its stress on personal emancipation and freedom—which, it is felt, can lead to a weakened sense of belonging and social responsibility—would be difficult to accept. When

modernizing, China and other Asian countries thus seem to place more emphasis on government authority than on individual democracy and freedom. This seems to be the case even when modernization is proceeding smoothly.

Yet modernization is not just about revolutionizing technology or improving productivity. It involves commensurate changes in a society's economy, politics, culture, values, and laws. Since adopting reform and opening up, increased social imbalances or contradictions —such as heightened socioeconomic inequality and diversifying values—are present in China. Under the planned economic system, the two major social strata in China were the working class and the peasantry. The bourgeoisie disappeared and communist functionaries at all levels belonged to the working class. Generally speaking, the income gap between different strata was so insignificant that society was effectively egalitarian. Since reform began, the adjustment of the ownership system and the establishment of foreign-invested enterprises have resulted in China now having no fewer than ten classes, with employers and employees being the most conspicuous. There are now more than one million private or collective enterprises, and it is not uncommon to find wealthy enterpreneurs earning six-digit annual incomes. The Chinese middle class is expanding, but a tremendous number of people remain relatively or absolutely poor. China claims that the different classes share the same fundamental interests, but class polarization becomes more undeniable as the income gap widens. Class conflict is intensifying as a result of discrepancies in income, working conditions, and overall quality of life. This is especially the case vis-à-vis private and foreign-invested enterprises. Yet the most urgent and challenging task facing China today is reforming the state enterprises that have dominated the economy. As a sound social security system is yet to be established, the anticipated layoffs could trigger social disturbances or political unrest if handled poorly.

The impact of reform and opening up on traditional values, politics, and morality has been as penetrating as the economic effects—and maybe even more so. Present-day China is in a transitional period in which the search for new values and ethics to meet the demands of the socialist market economy is as profound as when the onslaught from the West first confronted traditional China. While the challenge of dealing with Western influences is still present, the task today is compounded by the conflicts within Chinese society. For instance, in traditional agrarian society and in the planned economy, egalitarianism

in distribution was greatly valued. The market economy, however, regards unequal private income as a necessary condition for economic development. The market economy also calls for individual responsibility and for people to be recognized as independent actors, but this often leads to individualism and other moral crises. Li Zhengang summarizes the five moral crises presently confronting China as follows: the loss of standards for assessing morality; the trend of declining values; rampant immorality, such as money worship and sexual promiscuity; weakened social control on morality; and distortions in the teaching of morality, such as conflicts between school education on the one hand, and the behavior of parents, teachers, and members of society at large on the other. To solve these problems, he suggests that market economic principles, as well as those of democratic politics and an open society, be critically inherited by or creatively transferred to traditional ethics and culture (quoted in Xu 1997, 456–461). Ma (1995) recommends that the government should popularize "subconscious" or minor culture created to meet the demand of modernization by drawing on progressive elements in traditional and Western cultures, so it becomes society's mainstream culture. Jiang Zemin (1997c) hopes that the traditional spirit of Chinese—marked by unity, independence, love of peace, and constant self-improvement—will be a major part of future mainstream Chinese culture. Scholars and state leaders alike recognize that establishing a mainstream culture that meets the needs of modernization is a difficult task.

The influence of socioeconomic change and changes in Chinese values on Chinese domestic politics is still evolving. Time is needed both to improve the socialist legal system—the rule of law is being added as economic development proceeds—and to ensure socialist democracy. Barring a major reversal in China's modernization, China will gradually become a country with the rule of law and sound democracy, although perhaps not in Western terms. Indeed, a Western democratic political system is not China's goal, and the collective and the state, rather than the individual, are likely to remain the preferred foundations of Chinese society and values for a long time.

Impact of Changes in Domestic Politics and Values on Foreign Policy and International Relations

In an open democratic political environment, domestic and foreign policies tend to be highly transparent, so it is relatively easy to speculate on such policies' future trends. In an isolated autocratic political system,

policies are subject to the whims of the lead policymaker and the clique around him, so they tend to be volatile and prone to unexpected change, making it difficult to predict future trends. Since the adoption of reform, improvements in the inner-Party system, progress in establishing socialist democracy and the rule of law, and appreciation of the need for rationales for policies have reduced the impact of leaders' impulses on state policy making. The increasing transparency and easier appraisal of the policy-making process in China is in line with the demands of modernization, international convention, and learning from past mistakes.

Given their poor educational attainments, the majority of Chinese workers and peasants do not have sophisticated assessments of government policies. So long as modernization proceeds smoothly and most benefit from the process, they are not likely to become major actors in trying to influence domestic or foreign policies. The Chinese government has adopted a series of measures to alleviate problems resulting from layoffs at state enterprises and to address the food and clothing problems of the poor, in the hope that these people will not be able to sway the political situation. Those who do speak their minds on policy making are mostly CCP and government functionaries and intellectuals. Given that they are direct beneficiaries of these policies, intellectuals are staunch supporters of reform and opening up. Many of them, especially younger intellectuals, are in favor of Western democracy and culture, but the majority of Chinese intellectuals, including young scholars, probably doubt that the Western system and its values can be directly transplanted to China. Intellectuals do seem to agree with the Chinese government on this point, even though they always complain about the slowness of Chinese progress toward democracy.

Chinese intellectuals have mixed feelings about China's foreign policy. On the one hand, they want China to quicken its pace of mingling with the world community so that China can quickly catch up with the developed countries by learning from them. They have been instrumental in promoting Sino-foreign cultural exchange and in prompting the Chinese government to change its closed-door policy. On the other hand, as patriots who have clear knowledge or memories of China's past humiliations, they are opposed to foreign lack of respect for Chinese sovereignty, as well as foreign interference in China's internal affairs. When China disagrees with foreign countries about matters of sovereignty or values, Chinese intellectuals may disagree amongst

themselves, but most would support the government in opposing foreign intrusion in Chinese affairs. Chinese intellectuals are often at center stage in China's exchanges with foreign countries, and they are most sensitive to foreign cultures, values, and political systems, as well as to foreign attitudes toward China. Therefore their opinions and perspectives do impact Chinese foreign policy.

In the nearly twenty years of reform and opening up, a relatively affluent class has appeared in China. Entrepreneurs with close relations with foreign governments, intellectuals, and enterprises are a new force with influence on Chinese foreign policy. Foremost in these people's minds, though, is how to use China's domestic and foreign policies to further their economic interests in both Chinese and foreign markets. In terms of politics and sentiment, they probably hold similar views to most Chinese. Over the long term and with the deepening of reform and opening up, the size of the moneyed class will expand—as will their impact on Chinese policies.

In Chinese politics, relations between the central authorities and localities are crucial. China's multiethnicity also means that good relations with the other ethnic groups are paramount to ensuring political and social stability. Moreover, although China is a secular country, a wide range of religions do coexist within China. Narrowing regional disparities and handling ethnic and religious issues appropriately are major components of Chinese domestic and foreign policies as both influence China's stability and unity.

Values, Governance, and International Relations in Contemporary China

Values

Contemporary Chinese values are under siege due to the dramatic transformation taking place within Chinese society, whereas the earlier stress on Chinese values in modern times stemmed from the impact of the West on traditional China. The conflict between tradition and modernity in contemporary Chinese values manifests itself in every person, in every social stratum, and in the difference between urban and rural areas. Despite remarkable development and changes, the vast Chinese countryside trails far behind the cities, so that China's modern economy remains a "dual economy" and Chinese society a typical "dual society" (Guo et al. 1990, 7). Values are more "modern" in the cities, while tradition still plays a major role in the countryside.

As Chinese society disintegrates, the values of citizens on different rungs of the social ladder in urban and rural areas are increasingly divergent.

This anomaly is even more complicated within individuals and Chinese today are thought to be perplexed about their values. The current official Chinese value system attempts to combine the rational part of Mao Zedong thought with Deng Xiaoping theory; to absorb essential elements of traditional values—such as collectivism and authoritarianism—under the pretext of preserving the country's cultural traditions; and to assimilate forms and content from foreign cultures—such as enhancing the legal system to provide some protection for personal rights. In the conflict between the various concepts of values, most people find it difficult to make their own choices, tending to make different decisions depending on the situation and then accounting for their actions according to their own circumstances and needs. For example, a government functionary is asked to serve the people wholeheartedly, but his personal interests are condoned under the market economy. This conflict makes it difficult for him to know clearly what is acceptable behavior. All Chinese today are torn between selfish and altruistic values.

In interpreting the relationship between selfishness and altruism, traditional Chinese values build a bridge between the individual and the collective by emphasizing the clan and collectivism. To serve the collective is to achieve the goals of the individual, because "collectivism is nothing but an enlarged version of the self-interest of the individual" (Mao 1997, 295). The modern outcome of this concept of values is a focus on one's group interest in the name of collectivism, yielding bureaucratic infighting between departments and exceptionalism from the national law. The difference today is that departments and communities have modern organizational forms, whereas families and communities were traditionally sustained through blood relations, teacher-student bonds, geography, and other natural ties. In contemporary China, while collectivism is stressed, some personal rights are legally protected. This is certainly progress when compared with the past, but it is still not comparable with such Western cultural concepts as human rights, personal independence, and individual choice. This is because individual rights are not yet fully protected in China and many major choices in life are still conditioned by factors such as parents, leaders, organizations, and personal relations.

Yet economic growth and social transition provide excellent opportunities for China to probe for new values that are compatible with national characteristics. First, contemporary Chinese values will have to be comprehensive and their various elements mutually supplementary. Second, the new Chinese values should neither regard Chinese civilization as the "Middle Kingdom" nor disparage itself as being worthless by suggesting the wholesale assimilation of other countries' values. The majority of Chinese will practice elements of traditional values—such as the rules of conduct for personal relations—for a long time to come. Third, increasing the modern component of Chinese values would strengthen the rational faculty of the Chinese value system. It would also enhance the ability of Chinese to appreciate the worth and drawbacks of traditional values, and to make their own reasonable choices. Undesirable elements of traditional Chinese values that might need to change include the neglect of accuracy, conservatism, misunderstanding, lack of public spirit and sympathy, deception and fraud, vanity, undue emphasis on clout, insincerity, contempt for facts, lawlessness, and carelessness about life and personal comfort (Smith 1894, 1–2). Yet making these changes in values will be a slow process. Today, many Chinese scholars use scientific methods and perspectives from modern economics, sociology, and anthropology to assess traditional Chinese culture (see Mao 1997). Increasing rational analysis of traditional Chinese values will aid the evolution of a new concept of values. Fourth, foreign cultural influences are being actively absorbed and assimilated in contemporary China as international exchange grows daily and globalization intensifies. The difference between Chinese and Western concepts of values is diminishing, and the similarities between them are growing. Fifth, China's robust economic growth since the adoption of reform has deepened people's understanding of the need to adapt Chinese values to modern life and enhanced their awareness of the diverse ways to modernize. It has simultaneously also enhanced the influence and knowledge of Chinese culture and values in the world.

New values are present in embryonic form in China today. For example, in the West, individualism is universally recognized as respect for one's own basic rights and those of others. In China, where collectivism is often overemphasized, individualism is often condemned as being synonymous to being selfish, neglecting the overall interest, and benefiting oneself at the expense of others. Under the pretext of

criticizing individualism, the basic rights of individuals—especially those of ordinary people—are often not honored. Reform has resulted in tremendous changes in people's understanding of individualism, with some suggesting that traditional individualism should be replaced with "moderate individualism" or "self-improving-ism" so that basic personal rights can be respected (Xu 1997, 81). Others continue to stress collectivism, selflessness, and the Lei Feng spirit. Some also believe that criticism of individualism in China is actually positive because it encourages selflessness rather than benefiting oneself at others' expense (Ma et al. 1996, 310–311). That legislation has now been enacted with clauses protecting personal rights is undoubted progress against people who infringe upon others' individual rights under the pretext of collectivism. It goes without saying, however, that China lags far behind developed Western countries in protecting people's inalienable rights and that China has a long way to go to achieve a modern value system.

Governance

Contemporary China's political system and governance is neither a traditional Chinese monarchy nor a Western democracy. Although China became a republic after the Revolution of 1911, the Chinese political system is not democratic in the Western sense where the people exercise sovereign rights through democratic elections to choose those who rule them.

The political system of contemporary China came into being against the background of revolution. Since the establishment of New China in 1949, the CCP has remained the country's largest—and supreme—political party. Eight relatively weak democratic parties join the communists in running the government in a uniquely Chinese arrangement of multiparty cooperation and consultation under CCP leadership. In the reform years, this system of political consultations has developed so that all levels of the Political Consultative Conference participate in state affairs and exercise democratic supervision. Although the Political Consultative Conference plays an increasing role in policy formation, it does not have decision-making power.

The system of people's congresses is fundamental to contemporary Chinese politics. The National People's Congress is the supreme legislative body of the country, while its Standing Committee is responsible for drafting national legislation and examining related work. Deputies to the various levels of people's congresses are elected from

the bottom to the top, with the congresses higher up retaining the power to appoint nominees. This is China's type of democracy and, although it is different from the parliamentary elections and procedures of Western countries, some believe that the process of electing National People's Congress deputies is essentially very democratic (Brahm 1997, 86).

The State Council under the National People's Congress is the administrative organ of both the state and the government. China's government comprises twenty-nine ministries and commissions, including the central bank and the state auditing administration, which report directly to the State Council. Under the planned economic system, government departments were responsible for managing state enterprises, yet government functions like administering social security were not handled properly. To remedy the situation, the Chinese government reorganized itself on many occasions, but problems such as overstaffing and confused functional responsibilities continued. The need to establish a basic framework for the socialist market economy and to deepen the reform of state enterprises prompted the Ninth National People's Congress, held in March 1998, to reduce the number of departments involved in economics and to strengthen the government's macroeconomic and social management functions. As a result, the number of government departments was reduced to twenty-nine in 1998 from forty in 1995 (see table 3).

Table 3. The Number of China's Central Government Administrative Institutions

Year	Ministries	Subordinate Departments	Non-standing Organizations	Total
1949	35	4	–	39
1954	35	29	–	64
1956	48	33	–	81
1959	39	21	–	60
1965	45	32	–	77
1970	26	7	–	33
1975	29	23	–	52
1978	37	39	–	76
1981	52	48	–	100
1982	43	18	–	61
1988	42	40	44	126
1992	41	45	85	171
1995	40	19	26	85
1998	29	–	–	n.a.

SOURCE: Ma (1996, 416).

In Western countries, judicial organs are independent. In China, however, the judiciary is subordinate to the government at all levels, although the Chinese government stresses mutual supervision of judicial organs and has fortified the supervisory roles of the disciplinary supervision commission of the CCP and the legal supervision department of the National People's Congress. In the reform years, China has tightened up its legal system and promulgated some laws and regulations that compare favorably with their counterparts in developed countries in terms of sophistication and fairness. However, the influence of traditional values makes enforcement of these laws rather difficult. It is not uncommon for the law to be bypassed, offenders not to be brought to justice, law enforcement officers to violate the law, and the law to be regarded as a mere trifle. Although China has shown it is capable of formulating sophisticated laws, whether or not it can institute the rule of law within the framework of the current political system is a tough test for Chinese governance.

Even with the use of Western concepts of values and political principles, aspects of governance in contemporary China do not measure up to democratic political standards. For example, the Chinese Constitution stipulates the leading position of the CCP, the power hierarchy nominates deputies to the people's congresses and the political consultative conferences, and the judiciary lacks independence. However, this situation is China's own historical choice and it represents the extent to which political democratization can proceed in present-day China. While the party in power has come to see the importance of the rule of law, as well as the need to democratize Chinese politics, China is likely to continue to give higher priority to economic growth for the foreseeable future. Governance in a modernizing China has to compromise between the ideal of democratic politics and China's history and reality.

International Relations

In the 1970s, China adjusted its foreign policy to support a peaceful and stable international environment for its economic development. China has enjoyed two decades of peace and fast economic growth since improving its relations with the United States, Japan, the European Union, and peripheral countries and regions; opening up the Chinese market to the world; and vigorously boosting international exchange and cooperation.

With the end of the cold war, the world has entered a new period of

historical development and China has found itself in an entirely different international environment. As a big country on the ascendancy, China has commanded worldwide attention for its fast economic growth, its increase in comprehensive strength, and its enhanced regional and global influence. As China's economy develops further, many countries are concerned about what global role China will play and how it will impact current international relations.

There are many different perceptions of an ascending China's influence on the world order. Many hope that the Chinese economy will develop further to continue raising the living standards of the majority of Chinese while also providing countries with a huge market to enhance the integration of the world economy. However, there are also those who think that China's awakening is a challenge to the world order. Four theories typify this perspective: One view is of a conflict between civilizations. Samuel Huntington (1993) believes that the major contradiction after the cold war is the conflict between Western and non-Western civilizations, in which Confucianism as a major non-Western civilization will be an obvious force. A second perspective is that of China as a threat. Gerald Segal (1996) and others believe that the rise of a large nation has historically caused disorder in the world and the rise of China will be no exception. A third theory concerns Sino-American conflict. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro (1997) contend that differences in areas such as ideology, trade, human rights, armament sales, the South China Sea, and the transfer of high technology will precipitate conflict between China and the United States, and that Taiwan will be the fuse—witness the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996. A fourth view sees a China in crisis. Sustained fast economic growth will make China the world's largest economic entity, and with its huge population, this will put tremendous pressure on global energy and grain supplies in particular and the global ecological balance in general.

With these scenarios in mind, the United States and other developed countries have adjusted their China policies. In the case of the United States, contact and containment—especially the latter—have been the focus of U.S. policy toward China in the 1990s. The reaction of the Chinese government and intellectuals is that, in the post–cold war era, China needs to adjust its international strategy and foreign policy to "design a new framework which will bring a longer period of peace as a guarantee for China's development" (Wang et al. 1996, 196).

Since the mid-1990s, based on China's tremendous economic

potential, the third-generation leadership has begun to change the way in which the country deals with challenges from the outside world from one of passive reaction to a pro-active stance. In a strategic move which testifies to this leadership's growing maturity, it has taken the initiative in developing foreign economic and diplomatic relations to secure long-term peaceful international relations for China's economic growth. The main points of Chinese foreign policy are: (1) actively advocating the multipolarity of the world order; (2) actively developing dialogue, cooperation, and strategic partnerships with Russia, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and other major power centers in the world, and participating in establishing a new world order; (3) vigorously developing cooperation and exchange with peripheral countries in eastern Mongolia, central Asia, and the Korean peninsula; (4) actively developing cooperative relations with other regions in the world; (5) resolutely safeguarding state sovereignty over issues such as Taiwan and Tibet; (6) gradually replacing political confrontation with dialogue in the field of human rights; (7) actively promoting exchange and cooperation with other countries in energy, grain, ecology, and other fields; (8) continuing to vigorously promote foreign economic relations, participate in international economic integration, and—with a view to the pernicious influence of the Asian financial crisis on Chinese exports—diversify its exports; (9) easing peripheral countries' fears about a "China threat" theory by, for example, participating in multilateral talks on the South China Sea issue; and (10) actively participating in multilateral cooperation and dialogue organized by various international or regional organizations, such as striving to participate in the World Trade Organization (Weng et al. 1998, 466–473).

China's foreign relations in the 1990s are in the process of dramatic adjustment and change and are far from stable, both in terms of strategic conception and policy measures. Yet current foreign relations are more active and have the best-defined goals in history as China seeks to create a relatively peaceful and stable international environment for its economic growth. However, given its low level of economic development, its host of domestic problems, and its lack of experience in modern international relations, China will continue to keep a low profile in international affairs and is unlikely to pose a real challenge for the existing world order for a considerably long time. Indeed, China is in fact actively trying to fit into this world order. China has turned itself from a fossilized, self-styled "Middle Kingdom" and a destitute

and enfeebled nation into a full-fledged member of the modern world community. From treating others unequally in ancient times and being treated unequally in modern times to becoming a member of equal standing in the world community, China presents a case of transition in international relations.

Conclusion

The changes that have taken place in Chinese tradition under the influence of both domestic and foreign factors indicate that systemic Western material, cultural, and spiritual principles are a major force pounding on China's traditions. Nevertheless, the road of development that China is taking is the result of choices made according to its own conditions. This is a rather complicated, contradiction-ridden process.

The period in China's modernization since the adoption of reform and opening up is characterized by the smoothest progress in China's history. This is so even though this is also a period of wrenching economic and social transformation as China changes from a traditional agrarian society to a modern industrial or even postindustrial society. In building a modern country, China still has a long way to go in terms of adapting its values, political democratization, the rule of law, and international relations. But it has, after all, taken a number of solid steps. This fills the Chinese people with confidence in their future.

A period of dramatic social and economic change fundamentally influences values and domestic politics, and the direction of a country's foreign policy and relations is conditioned by the changes in values and domestic politics. However, from a long-term point of view, concepts of economics, politics, values, and foreign relations are mutually reinforcing, even though each factor does not necessarily play the same role.

As globalization increasingly connects different economies, politics, cultures, and values into a whole, the political and economic systems of various countries, as well as the different concepts of culture and values, will have varying impacts and play different roles. Despite the many differences and contradictions between them, they are all the outcome of history and integral components of global civilization. So long as we treat these differences sensitively, rationally, and magnanimously, civilizations will intermingle rather than confront each other.

Notes

1. "The Way" is a Daoist philosophy concept. It means the nature or principles of the world. Combined with the Confucian concept of "the Sky," "the Way" means people should obey nothing but the law of nature or the principles of "the Sky."

2. There are many studies by Chinese and other scholars on China's strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, how the United States "lost" China, and how the Korean War was the last straw in making China close itself off to the West. See, for example, Ru et al. (1991), Schaller (1982), and Zi (1987).

Bibliography

Barnett, A. Doak. 1967. *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China.* New York: Columbia University Press.

———, ed. 1986. *Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. 1997. *Ji jiang dao lai de zhong mei chong tu.* Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe. Chinese translation of *The Coming Conflict with China*, originally published by Alfred A. Knopf in 1996.

Brahm, Laurence J. 1997. *Zhong guo di yi* (China as no. 1). Beijing: Qiye Guanli Chubanshe.

Cao Weijing and Wei Chengsi, eds. 1992. *Zhong guo 80 nian dai ren wen si chao* (Trends in Chinese humane studies in the 1980s). Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe.

Chen Guying. 1984. *Lao Tzu zhu shi ji ping jie* (Study on the book of Lao Tzu). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

Chen Zhiliang and Jia Runguo. 1996. *Zhong guo ru jia* (Chinese Confucianists). Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe.

Chinese Foreign Ministry. 1990. *Zhong guo wai jiao* (Yearbook of Chinese foreign affairs). Beijing: Waijiao Chubanshe.

Deng Xiaoping. 1993. *Deng Xiaoping wen xuan* (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping). Vol. 3 of Zhong gong zhong yang wen xian yan jiu shi bian (Research Center for Chinese Communist Party Leaders' Works), ed. *Deng Xiaoping wen xuan* (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.

Du Weiming. 1987. "Zhong guo ru xue de di san ci fu xing" (Issues on prospects of third-stage development of Confucianism). In Vol. 2 of Gan Yang, ed. *Wen hua: Zhong guo yu shi jie di er ji* (Culture: China and the world). Beijing: Sanlian Shudian.

Fei Xiaotong. 1985. *Xiang tu Zhong guo* (Earthbound China). Beijing: Shenghuo, Dushu, Xinzhi Sanlian Shudian.

———. 1988. "Zhong hua min zu de duo yuan yi ti ge ju" (The plural and unified pattern of the Chinese nation). In Fei Xiaotong, ed. *Fei Xiaotong xuan ji* (Selected works of Fei Xiaotong). 1996. Fuzhou: Haixia Wenyi Chubanshe.

Gu Hailiang et al. 1996. *Deng Xiaoping de jing ji si xiang* (Deng Xiaoping's economic thinking). Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe.

Guo Shutian et al. 1990. *Shi heng de Zhong guo* (China in disequilibrium). Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin Chubanshe.

Hong Ye et al. 1983. *Li ji yin de* (Study on the Book of Rites). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe.

Hu Shi. 1935. "Chong fen shi jie hua yu quan pan xi hua" (Complete globalization and wholesale westernization). *Da Gong Daily* (23 June): 1.

Huang, Ray. 1981. *Wan li shi wu nian* (The year of wanli 15). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilization?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22–49.

Jian Bozan, ed. 1983. *Zhong guo shi gang yao* (An outline programme of Chinese history). Vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.

Jiang Yihua et al. 1987. *Gang tai ji hai wai xue zhe lun jin dai zhong guo wen hua* (Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas scholars on modern Chinese culture). Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe.

Jiang Zemin. 1997a. "Gao ju Deng Xiaoping li lun wei da qi zhi, ba jian she you zhong guo te se she hui zhu yi shi ye quan mian tui xiang 21 shi ji" (Upholding the great banner of Deng Xiaoping theory and promoting the construction of the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics to the 21st century). In *Zhong guo gong chan dang di shi wu ci dai biao da hui wen jian hui bian* (Documents of the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.

———. 1997b. "Zai mei zhong mao yi quan guo wei yuan hui he mei guo zhong guo shang hui ju xing de wan yan shang de yan jiang" (Speech to the evening banquet held by the U.S.-China Trade National Committee and the U.S. Chinese Chamber of Commerce). 31 October. *Renmin Ribao* (2 November).

———. 1997c. "Zai ha fu da xue de yan jiang" (Speech at Harvard University). 1 November. Beijing: *Jingji Ribao* (2 November).

Kessing, Roger M. 1976. *Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective*. Hong Kong: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

King, Ambrose Y. C. 1988. *Zhong guo ren de san ge zheng zhi* (The politics of three Chinese societies). Taipei: Jingji Yu Shenghuo Chuban Gongsi.

Levenson, Joseph R. 1965. *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Li Guihai. 1987. *Zhong guo feng jian jie gou tan yao* (Study on the social structure of Chinese feudal society). Shenyang: Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe.

Li Ming. 1996. *Wen ren xing* (On human nature). Beijing: Tuanjie Chubanshe.

Li Zehou. 1986. "Guan yu ru xue he xian dai xin ru xue" (On Confucianism and modern Neo-Confucianism). *Wen Hui Bao* (28 January).

Liang Shuming. 1987. *Zhong guo wen hua yao yi* (The spirit of Chinese culture). Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe.

Liu Ducai. 1994. *Ji quan yu te quan* (The centralization of state power and privileged position). Shenyang: Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe.

Lu Xueyi and Jing Qingqui, eds. 1992. *Zhuan xing zhong de zhong guo she hui* (Chinese society in transition). Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe.

Lu Yulin et al. 1996. *Zhong guo dao jia* (Chinese Taoists). Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe.

Luo Rongqu. 1993. *Xian dai hua xin lun: Shi jie yu zhong guo de xian dai hua jin cheng* (New theories on modernization: The world and the Chinese modernization process). Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe.

———. 1996. "Zhong guo xian dai hua zhi lu" (The Chinese road to modernization). *Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue Ji Kan* 17(winter): 43–53.

Ma Jianxing et al. 1996. *Zhong guo shi chang jing ji ti zhi yu jing ji she hui zheng zhi jie gou de bian hua* (China's market economic system and changes in its economic, social and political structures). Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe.

Ma Rong. 1995. "Chong jian zhong guo de she hui zhu ti wen hua" (Rebuilding the social mainstream culture in China). In Qiao Jian and Pan Naigu, eds. *Zhong guo ren de guan nian yu xing wei* (The Chinese concept and behavior). Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe.

Mao Yushi. 1997. *Zhong guo ren de dao de qian jing* (Chinese moral prospects). Guangzhou: Jinan Daxue Chubanshe.

Mao Zedong. 1991. *Mao Zedong xuan ji, di er juan* (Selected works of Mao Zedong). Vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.

Mencius. 1987. *Meng Zi* (Mencius). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe.

Needham, Joseph. 1957. *Zhong guo ke xue ji shu shi di yi juan* (The history of Chinese science and technology). Vol. 1 of *Zhong guo ke xue ji shu shi* (The history of Chinese science and technology). Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe.

Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1996. *Zai zhao zheng fu: Ru he yong qi ye jia jing shen gai zhao gong gong bu men* (Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector). Shanghai: Shanghai Yiwen Press. Chinese translation of *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector*, originally published by Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. in 1992.

Qiao Jian and Pan Neigu, eds. 1995. *Zhong guo ren de guan nian yu xing wei* (The Chinese concept and behavior). Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe.

Rozman, Gilbert, ed. 1989. *Zhong guo de xian dai hua* (The modernization of China). Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe. Chinese translation of

The Modernization of China, originally published by The Free Press in 1989.

Ru Jiangzhao et al. 1991. *Ju da de zhuan bian: Mei guo yu dong ya 1931–1945* (The tremendous transformation: The U.S. and East Asia 1931–1945). Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe.

Schaller, Michel. 1982. *The U.S. Crossed in China*. Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan.

Segal, Gerald. 1996. "Helping Shape Regional Security and Stability in Asia Pacific." Paper for conference on "Europe in Asia Pacific" in Bali, Indonesia, 28–30 May.

Sha Lianxiang. 1990. *Zhong quo min zu xing, di er ji* (Chinese national characteristics). Vol. 2 of Sha Lianxiang. *Zhong quo min zu xing, di er ji* (Chinese national characteristics). Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe.

Smith, Arthur. H. 1894. *Chinese Characteristics*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company.

Song Linfei. 1995. "Lun zhong guo she hui jie gou de zhuan xing ji qi ji zhi" (On the transformation of the Chinese social structure and its mechanisms). In Qiao Jian and Pan Naigu, eds. *Zhong guo ren de guan nian yu xing wei* (The Chinese concept and behavior). Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe.

State Statistical Bureau. 1981. *Zhong guo tong ji nian jian* (China statistical yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.

———. 1996. *Zhong guo tong ji nian jian* (China statistical yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.

Sun Yat-sen. 1981. *Sun zhong shan quan ji* (Collected works of Sun Yat-sen). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

Tao Xisheng et al. 1935. "Zhong guo ben wei de wen hua jian she xuan yan" (Declaration on building China's mainstay culture). *Wenhua Jianshe, Di Yi Juan, Di Shi Qi* 1(4): 1–5.

Tian Huiming, ed. 1997. *Zhong guo jing ji re dian tou shi* (Perspectives of the economic hot spots in China). Beijing: Zhongguo Chengshi Chubanshe.

Tian Jiyun. 1997. "Di ba jie quan guo ren min dai biao da hui chang wu wei yuan hui di wu ci hui yi gong zuo bao gao" (Work report to the Standing Committee of the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress, 9 March). *Jingji Ribao* (11 March).

Wang Jinglun. 1994. *Zou jin dong fang de feng: mei guo de zhong guo guan* (The American people's concept of China). Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe.

Wang Shaoguang et al. 1996. *Challenges Faced by Jiang Zemin*. New York: Mirror Books.

Wang Yanzhong. 1991. "Qi ye ban she hui yan jiu—zhong guo de gong chang yu zhi gong sheng huo" (A study of an enterprise-run society—enterprises and workers' lives in China). Doctoral dissertation, Peking University.

———. 1997. *Jing ji zu zhi yu cheng xiang fa zan* (Economic organizations and urban and rural development). Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe.

Weng Jieming et al. 1998. *Zhong guo fa zhan bao gao shu* (China: Development in 1998 and future trends). Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe.

Wright, Arthur F. 1962. "Values, Roles and Personalities." In A. F. Wright and D. Switchett, eds. *Confucian Personalities*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Wright, Mary C. 1957. *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tu'ng-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Wu Shuchen et al. 1994. *Zhong guo chuan tong fa lu wen hua* (China's traditional Legalism culture). Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe.

Xiong Yuezhi. 1994. *Xi xue dong jian yu wan qing she hui* (Eastern transition of Western learning and Chinese society in the late Qing dynasty). Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe.

Xu Ming, ed. 1997. *Guan jian shi ke: Dang dai zhong guo ji dai jie jue de 27 ge wen ti* (The crucial moment: Twenty-seven problems calling for urgent solution in contemporary China). Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo Chubanshe.

Yan Lixian. 1997. "Jin bai nian zhong guo she hui bian ge xin tan suo" (New exploration of the social changes in China over the last century). In Beijing da xue shi jie xian dai hua jin cheng yan jiu zhing xin (Research Center for the World Process to Modernization, Beijing University), ed. *Luo Rong Qu yu zhong guo xian dai hua yan jiu* (Luo Rongqu and studies of Chinese modernization). Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe.

Ye Qizheng. 1984. "Chuan tong' gai nian de she hui xue fen xi" (A sociological analysis of the definition of "tradition"). In Ye Qizheng, ed. *She hui, wen hua he zhi shi fen zi* (Society, culture, and intellectuals). Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi.

Yi Zhongtian. 1996. *Xian hua zhong guo ren* (Random remarks on the Chinese). Beijing: Hualing Chubanshe.

Yin Haiguang. 1988. *Zhong guo wen hua de zhan wang* (Prospects of Chinese culture). Taipei: Guiguan Tushu Gufen Youxian Gongsi.

Zhang Chun'an. 1996. *Guan li zhong guo ren* (Running the Chinese). Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe.

Zhang Dainian and Cheng Yishan. 1990. *Zhong guo wen hua yu wen hua lun zheng* (Chinese culture and cultural disputes). Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe.

Zhang, David W. 1991. *Deng Xiaoping ling dao xia de zhong guo* (China under Deng Xiaoping's leadership). Beijing: Falu Chubanshe.

Zhang Yunling et al. 1997. *Zhuan bian zhong de zhong, mei, ri guan xi* (Relations between China, the United States and Japan in transition). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehvi Kexue Chubanshe.

Zheng Zhuyuan. 1980. *Zhong guo de jing ji fa zhan* (Economic development in communist China). Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi.

———. 1985. *Tai wan hai xia liang an de jing ji fa zhan* (Economic development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait). Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi.

Zhou Shulian and Guo Kesha, eds. 1996. *Zhong guo cheng xiang jing ji ji she hui xie tiao fa zhan yan jiu* (The coordinated development of economy and society in China's urban and rural areas). Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe.

Zhu Guanglei. 1997. *Dang dai zhong guo zgeng fu guo cheng* (Governance process in contemporary China). Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe.

Zi Zhongyun. 1987. *Mei guo dui hua zheng ce de yuan qi yu fa zhan* (The origin and development of America's policies toward China). Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe.