— 7 —

Changing Filipino Values and the Redemocratization of Governance

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WHY WAS THERE SUCH AN OUTCRY by Filipinos when Flor Contemplación was executed in Singapore in 1995 for the killing of fellow Filipina Delia Maga and Maga's Singaporean ward? Why was Imelda Marcos elected to Congress in 1992, just a few years after being driven out of the country with her husband, dictator Ferdinand Marcos? Why did separatist leader Nur Misuari become governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1996 and rebel leader Gringo Honasan win a seat in the Senate in 1995? Why did the people acquiesce in the Senate's rejection of the new Philippines-U.S. base agreement in 1991, which led to the removal of U.S. bases in the Philippines, even though they favored retention? These are some of the events in recent Philippine public affairs that have baffled foreigners. They are events that an understanding of Filipino values can help explain.

Talking about Filipino values is a risky business. Many scholars would hesitate to acknowledge the existence of such a thing as Filipino values that describe the total or even modal value orientations of the inhabitants of the Philippine archipelago. There are, after all, no fewer than eighty-seven distinct ethnolinguistic groupings in the Philippines, spread across 7,100 islands that are just beginning to be effectively linked through transportation and communication facilities (see table 1 for other pertinent statistics on the Philippines).

On the other hand, while many other observers acknowledge Filipino values, they cannot agree on what these values are. These observers have offered many interpretations, often contradictory. The most damning has been the "damaged culture" hypothesis of James Fallows,

Table 1. Philippines Facts and Figures (all data as of December 1998, except where noted)

Demography

Total land area (sq. km.)	300,076
Total population	72,600,000
Males	36,474,196
Females	36,125,804
Population growth rate	2.3%
Projected Philippine population by 2005	84,214,747
Population density (persons per sq. km.)	242
Average life expectancy	69.5 years
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	45.5
Maternal mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	16.8
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	6.1
No. of registered voters	34,163,465
No. of provinces*	79
No. of municipalities*	1,525
No. of cities*	83
No. of *barangays**	41,940
Average annual family income (1998)	₱100,673
Cost of living (family of six, as of Feb. 1998)	₱333.73

Health and Education

People per doctor	1,016
No. of hospitals (1998)	1,738
No. of annual cardiovascular deaths	85,540
Literacy rate (15 years and above)	90%
Total number of schools (SY 1996)	44,545
Total student population	16,309,556
Elementary	11,841,392
Secondary	4,468,164
Total number of graduates (SY 1996)	400,242
Cohort survival rate	
Elementary	72.13%
Secondary	71.39%
Teacher-pupil ratio	
Elementary	1:50
Secondary	1:56
No. of teachers needed in educational system	12,362
No. of Internet subscribers	150,000
No. of Internet service providers	130

Peace and Order

Total crime volume (no. of incidents)	71,966
No. of index crimes	39,071
No. of crimes against persons	24,908
No. of crimes against property	12,907
No. of rape cases	2,932
No. of kidnap-for-ransom cases reported	141
Average monthly crime rate	896
Total crime solution efficiency	90.59%
No. of armed forces personnel	110,500
No. of persons arrested in drug incidents (1996)	2,050

Labor and Employment

Labor force	30.625 million
Unemployment rate	8.7%
Underemployment rate	23.1%
Minimum wage	₱198.00
OCWs deployed	747,696
Land-based workers	559,227
Sea-based workers	188,469
OCW remittances	US$5.7 billion
No. of strikes	93
No. of labor cases handled	1,002

Economy

Real GDP growth	5.1%
GDP per capita (PPP)	US$3,020
GNP per capita (nominal, 1997)	US$1,203
Inflation CPI	5.1%
Foreign debt	US$45.4 billion
Foreign debt of private sector	US$18.47 billion
1998 national budget	P565.3 billion
Debt service as percentage of exports	11.3%
Export receipts	US$25.23 billion
Electronic exports	US$13.2 billion
Amount of exports to U.S.	US$8.8 billion
Value of agricultural exports	US$1,523 million
Total imports	US$35.94 billion
Trade deficit	US$10.71 billion
New foreign investments	US$2.4 billion
Year-end composite index	1,869
No. of listed companies	221
Total turnover of listed companies	P586.1 billion

Finance

Current account balance	–US$3.74 billion
Reserves excluding gold	US$8.6 billion
Savings % of GDP	16%
Average exchange rate	P29.471:US$1
Total bank branch network	5,758
Total assets of financial system (Nov. 1997)	P3,159 billion
Bank deposits (June 1997)	P1.4 trillion
Peso deposits	P970.1 billion
Foreign currency deposits	P438.3 billion

Infrastructure

Telephone density (per 100 persons)	8.06
No. of landlines	5.77 million
Average road density (kms. per 1,000 persons)	2.35
No. of registered motor vehicles	3.2 million
Total road network (kms.)	161,000
Length of national roads completed in 1997 (kms.)	3,855.22
Length of bridges completed in 1997 (kms.)	34,301.79
No. of newly registered motor vehicles	448,942
Length of national roads (kms.)	27,369.37
No. of registered airports (1966)	266
No. of flights by international carriers (1996)	43,512
No. of passengers carried on international flights (1996)	7,297,108
No. of cargo and container ships (1996)	566
Total cargo handled at ports (1996, tons)	140.1 million
Installed power-generating capacity (mw.)	11,183.7
Consumption of petroleum products (1996, in barrels)	131.6 million
Domestic crude oil production (barrels)	298,250
Electric energy consumption (kw/hr.)	36,686 million

Tourism

No. of visitor arrivals	2.22 million
No. of domestic tourists	13.8 million
Total visitor receipts	US$2.83 billion
Domestic tourism receipts	P46.08 million
Revenue generated from tourism	P14.8 billion
Tourism contribution to GDP	P217.66 billion
Average expenditure per visitor	US$1,366.35
Overall average hotel occupancy rate	69.13%
No. of hotel rooms available	12,362

SOURCE: *1999 Philippines Yearbook.*

* Changed by the author based on the April 1999 list of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision and the National Barangay Office.

GDP: gross domestic product; GNP: gross national product; PPP: purchasing power parity; CPI: Consumer Price Index; OCWs: Overseas contract workers.

an American journalist. Several Filipinos quickly remonstrated against this hypothesis. One problem besetting characterizations of Filipino values is overgeneralization based on an unrepresentative sample of observations. In describing the intangible features of a society of stark contrasts—between the subcultures of the elite and the masses, the metropolis and the periphery, the educated and the uneducated—a balanced perspective is crucial.

Yet we must assume that there is an underlying coherence to contemporary Filipino values. Since Filipino society has remained intact, we can assume that the value system is generally coherent, characterized by a sufficient consensus on its core values.[1] On the whole, more consensus than divisiveness has marked the behavior and collective decisions of Filipinos in matters of governance and foreign relations since the People Power Revolt of 1986.

This chapter posits that Filipino values have been undergoing clarification and transformation as old values have been challenged by emergent values that accompanied the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship and the restoration of democracy thirteen years ago. The tension among values held by different sectors, especially with regard to governance and international relations, was evident in the content and process of adopting the 1987 Constitution and subsequent efforts to amend it. It has also been manifested in the creation and operation of new political institutions, the devolution of power and authority (from central government to local government, from government to civil society), the election and appointment of public officials, and the adoption and implementation of new policies and programs.

The current tension among values has to do with the extent to which Filipinos are, or are not, shifting their political loyalty from the family to the state. In other words, it is about the extent to which Filipinos now put the nation above personal or familial interest. It is also about whether the structures of governance for "democracy with development" that Filipinos have built incrementally since 1986 will remain responsive to their needs and therefore endure well into the twenty-first century. The tension among values also reflects the tension of continuing fundamental fissures in Philippine society: the elite versus the masses; imperial Manila versus the periphery; government versus left, right, and separatist insurgencies; and regional and ethnolinguistic divisions.

The People Power Revolt was both a reflection and a source of value change. It created a rare opportunity for elites sympathetic to the

welfare of the masses to incorporate the values of democratization, decentralization, popular participation, liberalization, and deregulation in the Constitution. These values have been buttressed with laws and corresponding implementing rules and regulations, notably the Local Government Code of 1991. The values of participatory democracy are being propagated through structures and processes encapsulated in the 1987 Constitution.

The success of President Fidel Ramos (1992–1998) in "putting it all together" was a success both of personal leadership and of the structures and processes of governance that resulted from the People Power Revolt. His successor, Joseph Estrada, is extremely popular with the masses but so far has not demonstrated the strategic vision and management skills of Ramos. Many Filipinos are now concerned that the structures and processes of central governance are not working effectively under the new administration, especially in view of the repercussions of the East Asian economic crisis. Nevertheless, the majority of both the elite and ordinary citizens are confident that "life-threatening" challenges are now history. Whoever is president, the government will function effectively because the people have become stakeholders in the structure and process of governance, especially at the local level, and in the political, economic, and social reforms that the Ramos administration instituted.

AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF FILIPINO VALUES

My interpretation of Filipino values draws on the analysis of thoughtful Filipino academics on the changes in Filipino values inferred from the collective behavior and decisions taken by Filipinos on key public issues. Where possible, data from surveys are presented to indicate the contours of Filipino attitudes, preferences, and values. These values are presented within the context of a people that have peculiar geostrategic circumstances (Philippine constants; see table 2), that have experienced revolutionary events and conditions repeatedly over the last hundred years, and that initiated fundamental changes in governance in 1986. These values have been influenced by Filipinos' considerable success and confidence in pursuing a "Philippines 2000" vision and strategy to "pole-vault" the Philippines into the twenty-first century as a newly industrialized country (NIC).

We must also note that the Filipino values described here are being influenced by rapid changes in political, social, and economic

Table 2. Philippine Constants

Certain pressures and constraints on Philippine society most likely to remain over the next one or two generations can be identified and designated as "Philippine constants." They include realities of geography, resource endowments, and the culture which, for practical purposes, would remain basically unchanged for the next several decades. Filipino values, being persistent, can be regarded as part too of the Philippine constant. However, unlike other constants, values should be regarded not as constraints but as a moving force guiding future behavior. The major Philippine constants are the following:

1. Archipelago geography: terrestrial plus marine resource mix, 20 percent of marine waters being shallow continental shelves, similar geography with proximate southern nations, namely ASEAN states with which the country shares economic, cultural and political commodities;

2. Natural resources: declining quantity and quality of agricultural and forested land, insufficient indigenous energy resources, lack of high-quality coal and iron ore, uranium and thorium, but substantial reserves of gold, silver, copper, chromite and nickel;

3. High population growth, high population density, high growth of labor supply;

4. Ethno-linguistic and religious diversity, with English as lingua franca, mix of Eastern and Western cultural elements, coexistence of Christianity and Islam;

5. High literacy rate, well-developed educational infrastructure, high value placed on education and knowledge, high value placed on right human relations, strong family and kinship ties, strong religious/spiritual values, both indigenous and imported;

6. Net importer of hard technologies, high-level scientific manpower and research and development institutions well below critical mass for hard technologies but above critical mass for agriculture and applied social sciences, substantial pool of skilled managers; and

7. Strong historical, cultural, political, and economic ties with the United States, strong economic links with Japan, focus of trade with Pacific Basin countries.

SOURCE: Talisayon (1990, 27).

conditions in both the Philippines and the outside world. In turn, these values and the tensions among them are being reflected in Filipino domestic and foreign policy.

Serafin Talisayon defines values as "a mental image of future conditions held desirable by a group." These values need not be verbalized to exist. Values are norms, but can be studied and described objectively. "One need not prescribe values to study values" (1990, 7–8).

"Filipino values" simply mean the values inferred from observation of Filipinos and from manifestations of their formal and informal collective intentions. Collective formal intentions are articulated in documents and surveys.[2] Collective informal intents are manifested in collective behavior, as in people "voting with their feet." While intentions are crucial to understanding behavior, people's lives may not coincide exactly with their preferred way of life. An American

anthropologist states it well: "Our growing understanding of the part played by our values in cultural systems has thus helped to expose one of the crudities of conventional wisdom. This is the simple misconception that people everywhere live as they do because they prefer their actual mode of existence and its consequences. Indeed, there can be a few human situations that allow full enactment of cultural values in the practical world" (Valentine 1968, 7–8).

VALUES MANIFESTED IN THE PEOPLE POWER REVOLT

The main reference point for examining contemporary Filipino collective values is the People Power Revolt that overthrew Marcos in 1986. The revolt was an act of defiance against the president. It was triggered by several dramatic events, beginning with the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., in 1983 and culminating in the massive cheating in the February 1986 snap election.[3] The revolt was "spurred not by political ideology but by moral indignation." It showed the nonviolent and nonconfrontational nature of Filipinos. "Filipinos took two decades to act, and they acted only after a social trigger was pressed just as the Revolution of 1896 was primed by the execution of the three Filipino priests and finally set aflame by the execution of Jose Rizal" (Talisayon 1990, 36).

Filipinos are slow to take violent mass action, reacting only after a psychological trigger is squeezed—usually in the form of an action arousing moral indignation. The Philippine Revolution of 1896 and the People Power Revolt of 1986 reveal that even in violence Filipinos retain their moral and spiritual values (Talisayon 1990, 36). To some extent, the furor over the execution of Flor Contemplación reflected a similar indignation over what was widely perceived to be an injustice.

The People Power Revolt was a repudiation of Marcos's attempt, from 1972 to 1986, to reengineer Filipino society through constitutional authoritarianism. Despite his authoritarian methods, Marcos was unable to mold society forcibly into the contours of the "new Society" he wished to create despite the dictatorial powers of state he held. Thus, one writer has called him a "curiously flabby strongman."

Filipinos have valued civic order, economic development, democracy, social reforms, and national identity for over a century, regardless of who has been in power. They revolted repeatedly against Spain and waged war against first the United States and later Japan. They initially

acquiesced to the constitutional authoritarianism of Marcos because it promised all the above values. When it became clear that despite its rhetoric and symbolism the Marcos regime was not pursuing or delivering them, the people were alienated.

As Talisayon observes, governments generally attempt to reengineer the values of their peoples. But when values of the people clash with formal government policies, values eventually prevail over policies. "Governments are either changed peacefully or toppled violently if the directions and means they pursue differ much from those held desirable by the general public—the lag time being short in democratic systems (months in a parliamentary system), or long (years and decades) in totalitarian (socialist or theocratic) systems" (1990, 5).

While the Philippines today is on the opposite side of the "Asian values" debate from such East Asian countries as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, Marcos's constitutional authoritarianism supported the proposition that authoritarian regimes are superior to democracies in bringing about rapid economic development. Under martial law, Filipinos were familiar with the argument that external influences had to be sieved in order to preserve social harmony and political stability. Liberal and democratic values, for instance as reflected in a free press, were threats to the survival of governing elites and regimes.

For a time, authoritarianism appealed to many (but not a majority of) Filipinos as they took a wait-and-see attitude. The appeal of authoritarianism apparently lingered on even during the Corazon Aquino administration (1986–1992), as a series of attempted coups suggests. The vaunted success of the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean models may have given the authoritarian model a shot in the arm. But by 1993 Filipinos who rejected martial rule were in the majority (Mangahas 1994, 70). Recent political developments in Indonesia and Malaysia may have further convinced many Filipinos that "democracy with development" is best.

In retrospect, W. Scott Thompson suggests Marcos's martial rule may be seen as having accomplished the goal of innoculating the Filipino people against autocracy. "Someone had to break the eggs of the old Philippines; that was Marcos's one historically appointed and partially vindicating task" (1996, 99). Marcos was also the number one recruiter for insurgency movements and for the opposition nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that blossomed under martial rule.

While many of these movements and NGOs were united in opposing the Marcos dictatorship, once he was gone their sense of purpose and unity considerably slackened.

Carolina G. Hernandez argues that contrary to the view that Philippine political culture is authoritarian, it is in fact one of dissent. The country's oral and written history chronicles the people's resistance to colonial authority—Spanish, American, Japanese—and recently to Marcos. "Given this history of political dissent against repression whether local or foreign, it is likely that even if the Marcos regime were successful in bringing about economic development, the redemocratization of the Philippines would still have occurred sometime in the 1980s or soon thereafter" (1996, 123).

Summarizing ten years of surveys by Social Weather Stations (SWS), Mahar Mangahas reports that although the euphoria is gone, Filipinos are happy about the ouster of the Marcos regime and its replacement by new democratic institutions (1994, 45–46). They have not forgotten or forgiven Marcos's cronies, but they are aware that oligarchic elements of pre–martial law society have returned. Still, they look forward to political renewal through constitutional processes, especially elections.

The Transformation of Filipino Values

The fundamental shift in Philippine society as a result of the People Power Revolt has been the redemocratization of governance. This is not a return to the pre–martial law system of governance but a shift to a more decentralized, participatory mode in which local governments and civil society (NGOs, people's organizations [POs], the mass media, and the business sector) have a formal and increasingly substantial role to play in government decision making and implementation.

Two Philippine constitutions reflect the values and visions that have emerged from the People Power Revolt and the post-Marcos era. These are the 1986 Freedom Constitution promulgated by President Aquino as head of a revolutionary government in the aftermath of the People Power Revolt and the subsequent 1987 Constitution formulated by a Constitutional Convention and ratified by the people in a plebiscite. These values are also reflected in various institutions and structures of governance that have emerged since. The 1987 Constitution places high value on decentralization, local governance, and

participatory democracy; national self-reliance and an independent foreign policy; recognition of the role of women and youth; free enterprise; and ecological balance. It places negative value on war, nuclear weapons, military supremacy, degrading and inhumane punishment, political dynasties, graft and corruption, and monopolies.

The following sections elaborate on Filipino values relating to governance and international relations.

Participatory Democracy

Filipinos have always been committed to democracy as a form of governance. The 1899 Malolos Constitution of the First Republic was a democratic document. American colonial rule gave Filipinos a blueprint for governance that was closely patterned after the United States' presidential system. The system of governance under the 1987 Constitution remains similar to the American system.

Before Marcos declared martial law, the Third Republic (1946–1972) had institutionalized elections and strengthened commitment to constitutionalism. When Marcos imposed martial law, he was so conscious of the Filipino commitment to constitutionalism that he was ever careful to justify his actions using either or both the 1935 and 1973 constitutions.

Commitment to the formal processes of democratic governance has strengthened since the People Power Revolt. Despite coup attempts, power was transferred via the electoral process prescribed in the Constitution, from Aquino to Ramos in 1992 and from Ramos to Estrada in 1998. There have been congressional and local elections in 1987, 1992, 1995, and 1998. These elections have been peaceful and the turnout has usually been high, and on the whole Filipinos have been responsible voters. Contrary to the portrayal of Filipino voters as irresponsible, an SWS survey shows that only one of eight Filipino voters considers a vote for a losing candidate as a wasted vote (Mangahas 1994, 19).

The defining feature of Philippine democracy today is the increased participation of the people in governance.[4] This has been made possible through the thousands of NGOs and POs that emerged in opposition to Marcos's authoritarian rule. They have multiplied and metamorphosed into various types of organizations, networks, and coalitions equipped with a wide range of resources, techniques, and agendas for policy advocacy, program implementation, community mobilization, self-help, and other purposes. The Constitution and the Local

Government Code have created avenues for the effective participation of NGOs and POs in governance at both the national and local levels, sending representatives to local development councils and local special bodies.[5]

NGOs in particular have been a nursery for political and social leadership from which even the government has recruited.[6] They have developed expertise in policy issues and organizational and technical skills that have complemented the bureaucracy's human resource pool. NGOs have helped meet the basic needs of the people, both in partnership as well as in competition with government. They have also provided an alternative arena for mobilizing political and bureaucratic leadership. They have raised the consciousness of the people about such issues as the environment, labor, human rights, women, youth, senior citizen welfare, public order and safety, livelihood, housing, poverty, and ethnic communities. NGOs are crucial players in changing Filipino values in these issue areas.

The Constitution also provides mechanisms for the participation of individual citizens, not only in elections but also in referendums, plebiscites, consultations, initiatives, and recall. In initiatives, a certain percentage of voters can propose the enactment of ordinances and laws. In recall, voters can initiate the removal from office of erring elected public officials. The Constitution also mandates consultations with the people prior to the implementation of major government projects. Consultations have become normal processes in the work of various commissions (for example, the Commission on Human Rights and the Peace Commission) and departments. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources routinely consults the people about the environmental impact of proposed projects, and the National Economic and Development Authority consults NGOs in the formulation of development plans. Filipinos now demand consultations on matters that affect their lives the most. Government projects that do not begin with genuine consultations are widely regarded as defective.

The mass media have also helped make people aware of national and local issues and mobilize them for action. Often criticized as licentious, adversarial, and critical of government, they have nevertheless been credible. Daily newspaper and radio reports and commentaries exert tremendous and incessant influence on both government officials and the public. President Ramos made it a daily habit to scan the newspapers and trigger government action or reaction based on them,

his marginal notes and instructions on news clippings formalized into instructions to his cabinet.

Filipinos view NGOs and POs positively, although there are cases of fly-by-night NGOs. The presence of NGOs illustrates the Filipino values of self-help and dissent. NGOs have encouraged participatory modes of decision making. They have given people self-confidence in undertaking their own projects. They have served as opinion leaders and fiscalizers. They have provided alternative solutions to national as well as local problems. They have demonstrated new modes of mobilizing and engaging the people for their own welfare.

Political participation has gone far beyond mere involvement in election campaigns and voting. People routinely make their opinions known, and organizations and individuals are adept in getting their views in print and on broadcast media. The Filipino political scene has been hospitable to all kinds of public demonstrations and rallies on domestic and foreign policy issues and concerns. These include incinerators, kidnappings, Philippine hosting of meetings of regional organizations (such as the 1997 meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and policy toward other countries (for example Myanmar), independence and human rights in East Timor, the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, human rights violations, and antipersonnel land mines. Demonstrations, rallies, and public forums usually take place in Metro Manila and other metropolitan areas, such as Metro Cebu and Metro Davao, where major universities and the media operate.

Various survey organizations, such as the SWS and the Asia Research Organization, have increased and intensified their activities. This has helped the public to become conscious of its own collective opinion and to exert pressure on public officials and public issues.

Decentralization

The most dramatic shift in governance has been decentralization. Seventy-nine provinces, eighty-three cities, 1,525 municipalities, and 41,940 *barangays* now share power with the central government in agriculture, health, law and order, environment, livelihood and employment, education, and so on. The internal revenue allotment share of local governments used to be as low as 11 percent. Today it is 40 percent, and local governments have been encouraged by their success to demand a bigger share. Local governments have been empowered to generate their own taxes and other means of raising revenue, including

floating bonds and obtaining loans. They have also successfully entered into build-operate-transfer contracts with the private sector for infrastructure, such as public markets, roads, and bridges.

SWS conducted a survey in February 1992, a few months after the Local Government Code was passed, to find out whether Filipinos were ready for decentralization. Only 21 percent of respondents were aware of the code (of which 51 percent had only slight knowledge). Nevertheless, the people believed in the wisdom of the code. Two out of five respondents (40 percent) said the government would make fewer mistakes if the power of officials in Manila were reduced and the power of those in provinces and municipalities were increased. Only 22 percent said otherwise (Dayag and Lopez 1993).

Decentralization is now an irreversible trend. Local governments have begun to deliver basic services effectively to their constituencies. A creative, highly educated, idealistic, and sophisticated crop of governors and mayors has redefined the standards of leadership at the local level, providing exemplars that are inducing constituencies to boot out corrupt and ineffectual leaders. A few local and national officials are serving jail sentences for crimes and abuse of power.

Effective local government executives are increasingly seen as resource mobilizers and catalysts of trisectoral action by the government, NGOs, and the business community. Local governments, NGOs, and their constituents are demanding more powers and funds, and oppose any moves to return to a more centralized form of governance. The only possible exceptions are the metropolitan areas like Metro Manila, where people seek greater coordination among the local governments of the seventeen cities and municipalities so they can effectively deal with problems of law and order, traffic, garbage and sewerage, floods, and zoning.

Multiplication of Local Exemplars   There is increasing friendly competition among localities, in terms of progress in infrastructure development, livelihood generation, provision of basic services, and so on. This consciousness is supported by such programs as GalingPook, an annual nationwide contest for the best local government–initiated and –implemented programs. The contest monitors, documents, evaluates, and disseminates information on exemplars that other local governments are encouraged to emulate. The positive response of the people to GalingPook is indicated by the fact that mayors who are judged winners are invariably reelected. To be acknowledged as a good

leader or implementer of programs in environment, health, infrastructure, livelihood, housing, and so on is to win reelection hands down. This is why Mayor Edward Hagedorn of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and other mayors who have won awards for their environmental projects are convinced that a "green vote" has emerged in the Philippines.

Thanks to the shift of authority and resources to local governments, Filipinos are now more attentive to local political processes, where solutions to many of their problems are beginning to be addressed promptly. Local governments have also become increasingly accessible to constituents, and political careers have opened up to leaders in the nongovernmental and business sectors.

There has been a notable increase in political mobility. Candidates for national and local positions have increased. These candidates come from the bureaucracy, the military, the business sector, NGOs, the religious sector, academe, and even mass media and the entertainment industry, as President Estrada so dramatically illustrates. The increase in the number of candidates has enlivened Philippine electoral politics, mobilizing a larger number of voters and drawing a higher level of campaign participation by ordinary Filipinos.

Issues in Decentralization   The decentralization policy has been in effect since 1991, an insignificant period compared with the preceding four centuries of highly centralized governance. Tensions are still being played out with regard to decentralization. The main tension is between the national government and local authorities over sharing the costs of the devolution of functions, programs, and their personnel; "unfunded mandates";[7] lack of consultation on the implementation of national projects in local jurisdictions; and efforts to recentralize devolved functions.[8]

There is also tension between local governments and NGOs. The central government has exhibited some reluctance to devolve fully some of its functions to local governments. Many local governments in turn have refused to allow NGOs effective participation in local development councils and local special bodies as mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Central government departments, local governments, NGOs, and the business sector are now proposing amendments that would help resolve these tensions in the ongoing review of the Local Government Code by Congress. It is illustrative of the consultative and proactive

political dynamics at the local level that coalitions of NGOs and leagues of local government executives have agreed on proposed amendments to the code.

Good Governance

Filipinos clamor for good governance, but their political culture is just beginning to be hospitable to an effective and efficient bureaucracy. Over centuries of Spanish, American, Japanese, and Filipino governance, loyalty to family has been the main rival of loyalty to the state. To Filipinos, the family is the only truly dependable source of well-being. Considering the poor record of government in providing public services and promoting public welfare, government has often been considered the enemy by discontented sectors, tribes, and regional groupings. Many Filipinos think nothing of "privatizing public resources" for the sake of family survival and well-being.

The Philippine bureaucracy numbers 1.45 million personnel, or approximately one government employee for every fifty Filipinos. Many Filipinos consider the bureaucracy an "employment agency," which partly explains why the bureaucracy has been "overstaffed but undermanned." There have been periodic efforts to reduce the size of the bureaucracy and to exorcise "negative bureaucratic behavior."[9]

Public administration scholars point out that the ratio of government employees to total population is small, compared with that of neighboring countries. The Ramos administration began efforts to "reengineer" and "right-size" the bureaucracy and not simply reduce its absolute size. Reengineering the bureaucracy for good governance, however, requires a level of recruitment and resources that has traditionally been withheld by society. On the whole, government is not attracting the country's best talent. It continues to lose out to the private sector. Government personnel are grossly underpaid. Police officers, for example, have a base pay the equivalent of less than US$300 a month, rendering them particularly vulnerable to corruption.

This is clearly a problem of the political culture. Willingness to pay taxes is low. An SWS survey shows that between April 1990 and December 1995 willingness to pay more for services declined from a +23 percent margin to a −7 percent one. It is ironic that only in the lowest class (Class E) did the number remain positive. Thompson (1996, 92) observes that the people have not generally understood the relationship between state competence and taxation. This resistance to taxation is a reflection of the "culture of dissent" mentioned previously. It

is also a reflection of the alternative system of distributing the spoils of public office—the patron-client system. The latter is more dependable in delivering public goods and services. In the past, public works for a particular locality rose or fell in relation not to the amount of taxes a community paid but to the party affiliation of its local executives.

Apart from keeping the bureaucracy underpowered, Filipinos have traditionally been critical of their governments. Public satisfaction with any administration generally declines after the honeymoon period immediately following a presidential election. In recent times, the five areas with which the people have been most disappointed have been "fighting graft and corruption," "solving the foreign debt problem," "fighting crime," "making decisions quickly," and "keeping promises" (Mangahas 1994, 45–46). This critical attitude is fueled by the freewheeling Filipino media, which, while they keep government officials on their toes, also unduly nurture a negative public image of government.

Decentralized governance appears to be more successful in making the tax-performance linkage more tangible in the minds of the people. Decentralization distributes power to more than 1,500 municipal, city, and provincial executives, dissipating the exceedingly high expectations the public used to have of presidential performance under the former highly centralized setup. The increased opportunities for participation also appear to have given the people a more realistic understanding of the resource and procedural requirements and constraints of delivering basic services to the households, neighborhoods, and communities that make up the nation.

Leadership

Patricia Licuanan notes that research on Filipino culture and values identifies both democratic (e.g., *pakikipagkapwa-tao*, flexibility) and authoritarian (e.g., submissiveness to authority, in-group loyalty, status orientation) aspects. On the whole, she says, Filipino leaders, especially political leaders, have failed the people. On the other hand, present institutions and structures do not support the leadership needed by the country. "In other words, we have failed our leaders as well" (1996, 16D).

Filipinos have depended too much on their leaders to set things right, in government, in the economy, in society, without any real commitment, as followers, to help bring about the hoped-for performance.

Leaders, on the other hand, are too eager to make promises during election campaigns, projecting the capacity to redress centuries-old problems like poverty, insurgencies, lack of infrastructure, even lack of national unity. "Traditional politicians," however, did not have much of a choice; they could not very well admit to not be able to solve Sisyphean problems, for they would lose the election.

There is evidence Filipinos are now tired of traditional politicians —politicians who make promises and compromises and use "guns, goons, and gold" to get into and stay in office. Traditional politicians were known to be "unwinnable" as early as 1991. SWS surveys that year boosted the morale of the nontraditional candidates Fidel Ramos and Miriam Defensor-Santiago. This may also have been a factor in Aquino's anointment of Ramos as her successor (Mangahas 1994, 71). SWS survey data on government performance show that Filipino voters want tough, self-confident leaders. Mangahas notes: "They want a President who would be tough regarding enforcement of the law; tough in standing up to foreign banks; who is not wishy-washy, but is sure of what directions to take, and sees to it that he/she gets there." He provides empirical referents: "The people like a Miriam-type who actually puts law offenders behind bars. They like a Ramos-type and a [Rodolfo] Biazon-type for consistently fighting against military takeover. They like an Estrada-type not for what his stance on the US bases is, but for being definite about it ages ago. They like an [Ernesto] Herrera-type, fearless anti-drug campaign. They like an [Oscar] Orbos-type, action-*agad* style of management" (1994, 45–46).

Ramos was not a traditional politician, but he had hands-on public management experience and knew the ins and outs of the bureaucracy, having been vice chief of staff of the armed forces during the Marcos regime. And his role in the People Power Revolt and in defense of the Aquino government during the coup attempts gave him the popularity he needed to run for president against the traditional-politician candidates from Congress. Ramos established a new style of presidential governance that was strategic and systematic, results-oriented, and issues-driven and that was imbued with a sense of purpose. He had intelligent, patriotic men and women around him who helped him mobilize the bureaucracy, Congress, the business community, the NGOs, the elite, and the people behind his "Philippines 2000" initiative. His presidency demonstrated that with more effective political structures and a hospitable domestic and international environment, a more constructive relationship between government and citizenry

can emerge. Without the People Power Revolt and the leadership role that Ramos played in it, the rule of the traditional politicians would not have been broken.

If there is anything to rebut the "damaged culture" hypothesis, Filipinos' pursuit of a vision under President Ramos would be it. Thompson comments: "Surely the notion of 'Philippines 2000' was unique in the annals of statecraft; nations have goals just as individuals do, but this was a clearly articulated, sellable, and attractive goal around which the sectors of the country could arrange itself in mutually reinforcing work. It was reachable, realistic. It had the added value of inserting a new—and more salient—national threshold to sectoral thinking that had been absent too much in the past" (1996, 101).

Filipinos' immense satisfaction with the Ramos presidency ensures that they will continue to experiment with nontraditional candidates. In fact, they ranged far afield and chose the unlikely nontraditional politician Estrada as successor to Ramos. Estrada's election tells us much about Filipino values. The prospect of this movie actor who speaks in broken English being president shocked the elite. But the masses loved him, for he was one of them, or at least had portrayed himself so in myriad movies that had been shown across the archipelago. The important thing is that the people felt personally close to him. They would attend his rallies and call him by his nickname "Erap" and smile and laugh and stay until the wee hours of the morning.

Estrada does not put on airs. He admits, and even jokes about, being a college dropout, about being a womanizer, and about his poor English, and everybody loves it. Estrada is the first presidential choice of the masses who has won out over the choices of the rich, the educated, the elite. The pro-Estrada groundswell was so palpable that supporters of Ramos wanted to amend the Constitution to enable him to run for reelection. Only Ramos could have beaten Estrada. But Estrada has demonstrated the same self-confidence as Ramos. He has his own convictions, demonstrated early in his stance against retention of U.S. bases. He even made a movie with a female senator on the ills of retaining the bases. Estrada has been portrayed variously as a tough labor leader, a community leader, and a law enforcer in his movies. President Ramos gave him a role he excelled in, as head of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, which earned the reputation of being a no-nonsense crime-busting unit.

Estrada, like Ramos, has not been linked to charges of graft and corruption. He was not entirely new to government service; he had served as vice-president, as a senator, and as mayor of the municipality of San

Juan in Metro Manila. He campaigned on a platform of uplifting the poor. His battle cry was *"Erap para sa mahirap"* (Erap for the Poor), which, from the point of view of marketing campaigns, was very clever. The masses' identification with him was total. It was as if the magic of the movies and television has given him a personal relationship with each and every voter.

One insight on the Estrada presidency, especially in view of the Bill Clinton–Monica Lewinsky case in the United States, is that extramarital relationships are not much of a liability in the Philippines. Marcos and Ramos before Estrada were known to have had extramarital relationships that were openly written about in the media and discussed by the people. The same is true of many elected and appointed government officials. For Filipinos, unless the relationship interferes with public duties, extramarital relationships on the part of their leaders (at least male leaders), including the president, are tolerated. To many Filipinos, it even enhances the leader's "manliness," translating into greater respect from his subordinates.

Now Filipinos are learning to live with the Estrada presidency, and, vice versa, Estrada is learning to live with the values of the masses. Immediately after being elected president with an overwhelming majority of the vote, he was surprised by the people's opposition to his decision to allow the body of Marcos finally to be buried at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (Heroes' Cemetery) and had to backtrack.

Filipinos can have very strong feelings—positive or negative—about personalities. That is not the case, however, when it comes to more complex and nebulous issues of domestic policy, such as economic and financial matters. This lack of strong public sentiment is all the more pronounced in foreign policy matters, where the political leaders have greater discretion,[10] as illustrated by public opinion on the U.S. bases issue. SWS surveys tracked public opinion on retention of the bases in 1991. When the Philippine-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security was drafted and signed in 1991, public opinion favored retention. When the Senate, exercising its treaty ratification powers, rejected the agreement, people had hopes the rejection could still be reversed. A year later, in September 1992, 82 percent of adults nationwide favored respecting the Senate decision, while 17 percent continued to reject it. To Mangahas this suggests that "there is considerable elbow-room for the leadership—after having scientifically ascertained the state of public opinion—to consider it more as a guide than as a restraint" (1994, 49).

A new breed of nontraditional leaders is now emerging in the government, NGO, and business sectors, and there is intersectoral fertilization. Awards such as GalingPook and The Outstanding Filipinos (TOFI) are generating success stories and exemplars that make even cynics take notice. People are realizing that leadership at various levels requires different types of qualities and skills. Organizational, management, financial, and even engineering and entrepreneurial skills and backgrounds are now seen as crucial in jump-starting local economies. A consultative orientation and skills are crucial in coaxing people out of their cynicism and apathy to contribute information, knowledge, manpower, and resources to solve community problems. Heightened awareness of the different qualities of leaders, especially nontraditional leaders, has made Filipinos more discerning of the qualities required of leaders and is honing their ability to choose leaders well in the elections that occur every three years.

National Identification

The People Power Revolt changed Filipinos' sense of identification with their country. When Luisa Doronila studied elementary and high school students in 1982, she found that they would prefer to have been born with a foreign nationality. She was struck by the contrast in her 1986 survey. Her sample from the same group of people showed that the majority of respondents now preferred Philippine nationality. "In all communities, the trend is towards increased personal identification with the nation in terms of symbolic identification, social distance and food preferences, role models, values and traits, and appreciation for cultural products, in that order" (Tapales and Alfiler 1993, 626).

THE FAMILY VERSUS THE STATE

One of the key observations of Talisayon's 1990 study is that the most deeply held values of Filipinos—their "core values"—revolve around family solidarity and *pakikipagkapwa-tao* (getting along well with others, or smooth interpersonal relationships). The weakest cluster of values relates to nationalism and interests that transcend family or clan ties. Consistent with this observation, regional and ethnic loyalties often overpower national loyalties. While many Filipinos find it easy to decide to change citizenship if they settle in, say, the United States, their provincial and ethnic loyalties remain intact.

A Damaged Culture?

Filipino researchers have long recognized that Filipinos put family at the top of their priorities and that the family is the main rival of government for political loyalty. Filipinos have strategies for individual and family survival, but seemingly none for collective survival. Nevertheless, educated Filipinos howled in protest against James Fallows's article "A Damaged Culture" (*Atlantic Monthly*, November 1987). Fallows wrote at a time when President Aquino was besieged by coup attempts, shortly after she had been ushered into office by the People Power Revolt. He used the term to suggest that Filipino society was incapable of effectively pursuing collective goals despite all its educational and civic attributes and its tutelage by the United States. Lachica calls the Fallows article "one of the most hurtful put-downs of Philippine society" (1996, 74).

Fallows wrote: "Individual Filipinos are at least as brave, kind and noble-spirited as individual Japanese, but their culture draws the boundaries of decent treatment more narrowly. Because these boundaries are limited to the family or tribe, they exclude at any given moment 99 percent of the other people in the country. Because of this fragmentation, this lack of useful nationalism, people treat each other worse in the Philippines than in any other Asian country that I have seen" (quoted in Lachica 1996, 74). Lachica notes that similar observations have been made by another American, David Timberman, who, in his book *A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in the Philippines*, identifies the cultural obstacles to change as Filipinos' high degree of personalism, large disparities in wealth and income, an immediate rather than a future orientation, and a focus on short-term gains for self, family, and group rather than class or nation.

Studies of Filipino Values

The Fallows critique spawned a veritable "values industry" of commissioned studies and surveys into Filipino values and how they can be harnessed for national development, in both the Aquino and Ramos administrations. Two of these studies were the 1988 Ateneo Study on the Moral Recovery Program (MRP) and the 1994 Ateneo–National Statistics Office Survey of Contemporary Philippine Values.

The Ateneo Study on the MRP consciously sought a basis for social change and nation building. It was spearheaded by Senator Leticia Shahani and initiated jointly by the Senate Committee on Education, Arts and Culture and the Senate Committee on Social Justice, Welfare

and Development. The study was commissioned to Ateneo de Manila University. Its major conclusion was an identification of strengths and weaknesses of the Filipino character. The main strengths, according to the study (see Talisayon 1990), are (1) *pakikipagkapwa-tao* and family orientation; (2) joy and humor; (3) flexibility, adaptability, and creativity; (4) hard work and industry; (5) faith and religiosity, and (6) ability to survive. The weaknesses of the Filipino character are (1) extreme personalism, (2) extreme family centeredness, (3) lack of discipline, (4) passivity and lack of initiative, (5) a colonial mentality, (6) *kanya-kanya* syndrome,[11] and (7) lack of self-analysis and self-reflection.

Based on these strengths and weaknesses, the study proposed that value-development programs should aim to develop in the Filipinos the following: (1) a sense of patriotism and national pride—a genuine love for, appreciation of, and commitment to the Philippines and things Filipino; (2) a sense of the common good—the ability to look beyond selfish interests, a sense of justice, and a sense of outrage at its violation; (3) a sense of integrity and accountability—an aversion to graft and corruption in society and an avoidance of the practice in one's daily life; (4) the value and habits of discipline and hard work; and (5) the value and habits of self-analysis and self-reflection, the internalization of spiritual values, and an emphasis on essence rather than form (Licuanan 1996, 159).

The SWS general survey of March 1988 contributed to the testing of the "damaged culture" hypothesis. This survey covered Metro Manila and had a 6 percent margin of error. It included three survey items on cultural values related to three of the seven weaknesses identified by the MRP study. Each item was a test statement on Filipino character; the survey respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with it.

The matter of "extreme family centeredness" was tested by the item "Most Filipinos are capable of breaking the law for the benefit of their friends and relatives." Some 38 percent of respondents agreed, 37 percent disagreed, and the rest were undecided or did not answer. The data do not indicate that putting the family above the law is a dominant trait among Filipinos. The trait is, however, significant. The "passivity" question was "Filipinos are used to being commanded by high officials and so they just follow without question." The responses were 29 percent versus 47 percent, indicating that the dominant view of Metro Manilans is that Filipinos do not obey blindly. The *kanya-kanya*

question was "Filipinos easily sacrifice their personal benefit for the sake of the common interest." The responses were 51 percent versus 22 percent, indicating that Metro Manilans believe Filipinos are capable of self-sacrifice for the common good (Mangahas 1994, 155).

Mangahas concluded that the survey results did not support the "damaged culture" allegation. However, based on a comparison of class responses, he found that the upper class (AB group) perceived "damage" in regard to all three test items. On whether Filipinos put the family above the law, the AB group's score was 45 percent versus 27 percent, compared with the overall 38 percent versus 37 percent. On the matter of blind obedience, the AB score was 39 percent versus 27 percent, as against the overall 29 percent versus 47 percent. On the matter of self-sacrifice for the common good, the AB score was 30 percent versus 39 percent, as opposed to 51 percent versus 22 percent (1994, 154–155).

Values for Development

In the 1994 Survey of Contemporary Philippine Values, eight clusters of values were identified as crucial to national development. These were (1) love of country; (2) social responsibility and a sense of the common good, *pakikipagkapwa-tao*, and egalitarianism; (3) honesty, integrity, and accountability; (4) hard work, industry, self-reliance, and discipline; (5) solidarity and teamwork; (6) self-analysis and self-reflection and a sense of self-worth; (7) peace; and (8) faith in God, a family orientation, and other core values.

Licuanan explains how Filipino values can be double-edged swords:

As a people we are person-oriented and relationships with others are a very important part of our lives. This gives us the capability for much caring and concern for others. On the other hand, our person-orientation in the extreme leads to lack of objectivity and the disregard for universal rules and procedures where everyone, regardless of our relationship with them, is treated equally. Our family orientation is both a strength and a weakness. It gives us a sense of rootedness and security which are both essential to any form of reaching out to others but at the same time it develops in us an in-group orientation that prevents us from reaching out beyond the family to the larger community and the nation. Family can become a serious stumbling block to social responsibility.... Our adaptability, flexibility and creativity is a strength that allows us to adjust to any set of circumstances and to make

the best of any situation. But this ability to "play things by ear" leads us to compromise on the discipline and precision that are necessary to accomplish many work-oriented goals. Our sense of joy and humor serve us well in difficult times and makes life more pleasant but serious problems do need serious analysis and humor can be distracting and unconstructive (1996, 158–159).

Overseas Employment as a Challenge to the Family

The family is Filipinos' motive force for survival and development. The family has become the most important rival of government for the loyalty of its citizens because the family delivers when nothing else can. Family ties are so powerful that people will sacrifice their careers and even put themselves in harm's way to help their families survive and develop. This is what many overseas contract workers (OCWs) do.

While the family has been extolled, there are indications this institution is beleaguered. As Licuanan notes: "A McCann-Erickson Youth Survey (1994) revealed that barely two-thirds of 12–21 year olds in Metro Manila live with both mother and father. In addition to single parents and marital split-ups, overseas employment of parents has the biggest impact on this statistic. Father absence not just physically but also in involvement as well as increasing mother absence due to the feminization of overseas employment is leading to the diminishing of parental authority" (1996, 157). Licuanan says the Filipino family has been taken for granted over the past two decades and there is a need to review seriously the Philippines' overseas employment policy and its long-term human costs.

Filipino Values in Overseas Employment   Asis (1994, 16) reports that the Commission on Filipinos Overseas estimates there are some six million Filipinos abroad, of which the majority, 4.24 million, are migrant workers and 1.76 million are emigrants. Of these 4.24 million migrant workers, 2.45 million are documented, while 1.79 million (42 percent) are undocumented. A 1995 SWS survey on government assistance to overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) indicated that no less than 15 percent of Filipino households had family members who were temporarily abroad. The breakdown by country is as follows: United States 32 percent, Saudi Arabia 23 percent, Hong Kong 8 percent, Japan 7 percent, Canada 5 percent, Italy 4 percent, Taiwan 4 percent, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 4 percent (Mangahas 1995).

Filipino overseas employment began in the 1970s. Faced with increasing unemployment and decreasing foreign currency reserves, the government sought to cash in on the demand for labor in the oil-rich Gulf countries. Deployment of OFWs was intended as a temporary measure. Between 1975 and 1979, deployment averaged 77,765 annually; in the 1980s the yearly average was 380,305. The 1990s yearly average of 630,402 suggests that overseas employment will continue for some time (Asis 1994, 17)

Given the economic situation and the well-entrenched position of elite families in the Philippines, ordinary families have little chance for social mobility. Overseas employment has emerged as an effective vehicle for survival or social mobility for many families. Some people see migration as their only escape from poverty. Many poor Filipino families have adopted a two-pronged strategy for survival. One is to send one or two members to Manila to earn money to send to the family in the provinces (low risk, poor payoff). The other is to go for higher stakes and send a member of the family abroad to work as a domestic or contract worker (high risk, high payoff). This trend has created concerns about children growing up without fathers, mothers, or both parents and about the stresses that migration imposes on marital relations and the stability of the family as the basic unit of society, and even the communities left behind by OFWs.

The Contemplación and Balabagan Cases   The Flor Contemplación tragedy put into focus all the things that can go wrong when families are separated by migration, among them infidelity on the part of spouses, early marriage, teenage pregnancy, and estrangement on the part of growing children (Asis 1994, 17). Contemplación was a Filipina domestic helper in Singapore. She was hanged in 1995 for the murder of Delia Maga, also a Filipina domestic helper, and Maga's Singaporean ward, Nicholas Huang. Contemplación's execution sparked massive protests in the Philippines. Many Filipinos believed her to be innocent.

In another incident Sarah Balabagan, a fifteen-year-old Filipina domestic helper, was sentenced to death on September 16, 1995, by a UAE court for the murder of her rapist-employer. She was released in December owing to a combination of monetary settlement, diplomatic intercession, and pressure of world public opinion. Balabagan's saga is demonstrative of the "preentrepreneurial" orientation of many poor Filipinos. Even when they have sufficient capital, they do not have the

knowledge, skills, and experience to start and sustain a livelihood project successfully. Although reported to have received P2 million (about US$50,000 at the 1998 foreign exchange rate) in donations and an educational trust fund, Balabagan works as a "desk officer" in the office of Senetor Nikki Coseteng (as of June 1997) "to make ends meet." According to reports confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Balabagan gave away most of her money to relatives in need; a large chunk of her windfall was used to "fund a fiesta in her hometown" (*1998 Philippines Yearbook*, 40).

Remittances by OFWs enable ordinary families and households to acquire resources in a short time—new houses, education for children and siblings, purchase of appliances, and even capital to start small businesses. The mobility of families of OFWs contrasts starkly with the grinding poverty of the rest of their communities. There are drawbacks, however. Women who leave their families to work abroad, especially mothers, defy the traditional cultural prescription of mothers to be homemakers. And in many cases, OFWs have to continue working abroad to maintain the raised standards of living of their families (Asis 1994, 17, 19). OFWs provide for the economic needs of their families. In their absence, other family members assume the reproductive tasks needed to maintain the family as a unit. Adjusting to migration has basically been the burden of the family, without much real help from other social institutions (Asis 1994, 23).

Effects of OFWs on Government   The strong public reaction to the Contemplación and Balabagan cases put government officials and bureaucrats on notice. Republic Act 8042, known as the Magna Carta for Filipino Overseas Workers, was enacted into law in June 1995. The act aims to balance economic demands and the protection of OFWs. It mandates the government to adopt mechanisms and safeguards and to conduct diplomatic initiatives to protect OFWs from abuse and unjust and unfair treatment in foreign lands. The capabilities and sensitivity of the personnel of the Department of Foreign Affairs have also significantly increased. Department officials now put consular duties and protection of nationals abroad second in their list of priorities.

The continuing deployment of hundreds of thousands of OFWs has increased the awareness and interest of Filipinos in foreign affairs, especially since the Contemplación and Balabagan cases. These cases were dramatic, but were not the last of their kind. There are new cases of abuse, incarceration, accidental death, and execution of OFWs. Many

returning OFWs bring back preferences, values, and practices learned in their working environments. Many of them exercise influence in their communities, given their resources and experience abroad.

Effect of OFWs on Values in Host Countries   OFWs also have effects on the values and cultures of their host countries. Yun Hing Ai provides an insight into the case of Singapore:

> Foreign domestic labor has allowed Singaporean middle-class families to continue the reproduction of the "home as haven" ideology. . . . Unlike the working class women, middle class wives could avoid becoming servants in their own homes, thanks largely to the availability of Filipino maids at a discount. One consequence is the closer identification between lower class women and sexuality, the logic of which can be seen replayed in the sexual trysts between maids and male members of the household. . . . Despite regular loud refrains broadcasting to the Republic's identity as a Confucian society by the previous Prime Minister, his idea linking home as the natural place of women approximates closely the dominant gender ideology throughout Victorian Britain. . . . (Yun 1996, 51)

The Family and NGOs and POs

Filipinos' attachment to the family has positive and negative aspects. The family has been in the service of exploitative ruling elites, but it has also been in the service of the opposition. It has created "pillars" of patron-client relationships, but it has also created self-help organizations, such as NGOs. President Marcos created a situation in which survival meant the creative enlargement of the family as a political player. The rise of NGOs and POs may be in part an expression and extension of Filipino family values. Initially, NGOs helped provide basic needs that government could not. But eventually they moved on to become what David Korten calls fourth-generation NGOs—NGOs that would attempt a restructuring of society itself (Romero and Bautista 1995).

It is possible that with decentralization and real decision making at the *barangay* level, Filipinos' loyalty to the family may not contend with but in fact strengthen their loyalty to government. The neighborhood, the *barangay*, and to a lesser extent the municipality, are the meeting points of family and government. This is where transference

can happen. This is where loyalty to the family can be transferred to loyalty to government. The device for this is participatory decision making. If decision making is not participatory, musical-chair politics and episodic participation based on the "pillarization" of participation and benefits will continue.

TENSIONS AMONG FILIPINOS AS TENSIONS AMONG VALUES

In the aftermath of the People Power Revolt there was contention among values. There was contention over policy, the substance of decision making. There was contention over process, the form of decision making. There were coup attempts against President Aquino. Yet in the end the people were the arbiters. No group, in or out of government, could wield power without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the great majority of the people.

The Elite versus the Masses

In the Philippines as elsewhere, the values of the governing elite are often presumed—or represented—to be mass values. However, there is ample evidence that elite and mass values do not agree. Philippine history is replete with moments of unity in crisis and disunity after victory. As Renato Constantino recounts, during the U.S. regime the masses retained their revolutionary fervor even after the elite had abandoned the united front, going over to the American side. It then became easy for the Americans to dismantle Filipinos' revolutionary consciousness gradually. Similarly, the unity between the elite and the people against the Japanese broke down when freedom was attained and the elite regained power. The unity demonstrated in the People Power Revolt in 1986 was destroyed by elements that were themselves active in the struggle.

Why is unity so transitory? Zeus Salazar offers the explanation that the core Filipino value of *kapwa* (fellowman) does not have exactly the same degree of meaning to the elite and the masses. For the elite, *kapwa* connotes *pakikitungo* (getting along with). On the other hand, *kapwa* for the masses connotes the larger concept of sharing or *pakikibahagi* (Tapales and Alfiler 1993, 616).

Even President Aquino was not exempt from charges that she had acted in her family's interest as owner of Hacienda Luisita, one of

the country's largest landholdings. Doronila (1996, 114) recounts that while Aquino used her revolutionary powers under the 1986 People Power Constitution to sequester Marcos cronies' assets, deregulate the economy, and strike at monopolies and protectionism, she left policy on agrarian reform to a future landlord-dominated Congress.

Differences among social classes is evident in people's appreciation of government performance. The upper class, class AB, is the hardest to please, while the lower classes, classes D and E, are the most appreciative (Mangahas 1994, 5). Moreover, economic growth benefits the rich more than the poor. The sense of economic well-being of the poor rises and falls with inflation (Mangahas 1994, 70).

Rebel Groups versus the Government

The insurgencies in the Philippines point to major tensions in Filipino values. The communist insurgency is rooted in the poverty, inequality, and feelings of exploitation and deprivation felt by the masses. The Moro separatist insurgency is rooted in the neglect by government and exploitation by the Christian majority of the Muslim communities in the Philippine south. The rightist military rebellion is rooted in the dislocation of the military from its privileged status under the Marcos regime, as well as in real demands for organizational reform in the armed forces and the government and structural reform in society. Noting the deep social roots of these rebellions, Talisayon (1990, 36) observes that tensions among values cannot be resolved or values transformed quickly by formal, structural, or even legal and military means.

Filipinos acknowledge the validity of the complaints of rebel groups —the persistence of oligarchic elements, the pervasiveness of graft and corruption, and economic difficulties. However, they do not accept the armed-struggle approach to solving these problems (Mangahas 1994, 45–46). For this reason, the various rebel groups have had very little public support. The National Democratic Front (NPF)–Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)–New People's Army (NPA) group has the most public sympathy, yet its supporters are clearly a minority, and their number is declining.

In 1993, all three rebel leaders were distrusted by the people, Nur Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) the most, followed by Jose Sison of the CPP, and then Gringo Honasan of the military rebel group Rebolusyonaryong Alyansiyang Makabayan (RAM,

Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance). The public has generally looked forward to peaceful settlement of these conflicts and has been satisfied with the government's reconciliation programs (Mangahas 1994, 68). Honasan was elected to the Senate in 1995, ranking tenth of the twelve senators elected that year. Many people understood, and accepted, that the support he received from the Ramos administration was an effort to bring him back into the mainstream of society. His election, however, was tainted with charges that he benefited from the Dagdag-Bawas vote-padding electoral fraud that marred the election.[12] Talks with communist leader Sison, who is based in the Netherlands, have progressed beyond procedural issues and are focused on substantive ones. Meanwhile, the communist rebels have fragmented into several factions and are currently almost dormant.

The foundation for the solution of the separatist problem was in the form of the ARMM, formed in 1989 and inaugurated in 1990 following a plebiscite in which four provinces with predominantly Muslim populations opted to constitute the region: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The creation of the ARMM was in line with the 1987 Constitution's stipulation that "the State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments" (Article 2, Section 25), thus authorizing the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Misuari's appointment as governor of the ARMM in 1996, after having been appointed to the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development by President Ramos, has practically solved the MNLF problem. As in the Honasan case, the support of the Ramos administration in making Misuari governor of the ARMM was understood and accepted as a necessary compromise toward ending the separatist insurgency. While Ramos reached a peace agreement with the MNLF, the underlying tension that generated the insurgency is likely to remain for some time. The government is still negotiating with the other main separatist group, the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front, as it continues sporadic ambushes, kidnappings, and threats of separatism.

Military-civilian tensions also remain. Hernandez (1996, 134–35) articulates the worry of many Filipinos that Ramos appointed too many retired military officers to top civilian posts despite the availability of equally able civilian candidates. This was tantamount to the "militarization" of politics, contrary to the constitutional principle of civilian control. She calls for definition of the role of the military in Philippine society.

The Old Regime versus the New Regime

The return to politics of Imelda Marcos and her son, Ferdinand (Bong-bong) Marcos, Jr., in 1992 is an interesting reflection of political values and sentiments and the nature of Filipino democracy. Some foreigners cannot understand how the Marcos family could come home just five years after being driven out of the country by an enraged public, let alone how Imelda and Bongbong could be elected to public office. Bong-bong was elected representative of his late father's home district of Ilcos Norte, while Imelda was elected representative of her home district of Leyte del Norte. The answer is simple: Marcos loyalists still constituted the majority in these districts at the time of the election, although they were minorities when compared to the sentiment of the general population. This is demonstrated by Imelda's fifth-place showing in the 1992 presidential election, behind Ramos, Defensor-Santiago, Eduardo Cojuangco, and Ramon Mitra. Likewise, Bongbong lost in the Senate election of 1995, placing fifteenth (only twelve candidates could be elected). Presidential and senatorial positions are contested nationwide, while House districts are contested only in a few component municipalities.

A quantitative gauge of the people's opinion of the Marcoses is a 1990 SWS survey that elicited Metro Manila adults' opinion on Imelda's return. Seventy percent of respondents believed the graft charges against Imelda had a factual basis (Mangahas 1994, 78). The Philippine government's efforts to recover the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth keeps the tension between the old and new regimes alive. Without restitution, Filipinos will find reconciliation with the Marcoses, their cronies, and their loyalists difficult.

Church versus State

Filipinos are a very religious people. This is apparent in the widespread popularity of prayer groups, charismatic Christian groups, basic Christian communities, and family rosary circles in suburban neighborhoods. It is also documented in the MRP study and the 1987 Constitution. The behavior of Filipinos during the People Power Revolt demonstrated this religiosity. A cross-cultural study of values in thirteen developing and industrialized countries conducted by Gallup Polls in 1979 confirmed the high value Filipinos place on education and spirituality (Talisayon 1990, 15).

Religiosity, however, does not create church influence over elections. SWS surveys caution that the people resent church interference

in their electoral choices (Mangahas 1994, 45–46). This is also true with regard to the issue of family planning, which the Catholic Church opposes (Mangahas 1994, 71).

The United States: A Special or Normal Relationship

Under Senate President Jovito Salonga the Senate rejected the Aquino-sponsored Philippine-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security in September 1991 by a vote of twelve to eleven. This act not only ended the U.S. military presence in the Philippines dating back to 1898 but also terminated over four hundred years of foreign military presence in the Philippines.

Filipinos remain warm to the American people but often skeptical of the U.S. government.[13] They initially opposed the Senate rejection of the treaty, but a year later they acquiesced in the termination of U.S. bases, since the economic dislocation they had feared had not materialized (Mangahas 1994, 71). Even the Philippine military, which had balked at the U.S. pullout, eventually came around. The military is now undertaking an unprecedented modernization program, no doubt influenced by the perceived absence of the American security umbrella.

The reorientation of Philippine foreign policy away from the special relationship with the United States symbolized by military bases and the strengthening of ties with new or restored democracies can be attributed to the people's assertion of their power in the People Power Revolt. Decoupling from the United States also paved the way for the Philippines to be more closely associated with the economically dynamic Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region (Lachica 1996, 71).

Before the 1990s, the United States viewed the Philippines largely in the context of the cold war. For most Americans, the connection was the existence of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. The removal of the bases has meant the loss of a tangible reference point with the Philippines for Americans. This has reduced American interest in the Philippines, facilitated by Filipinos' own reduction of U.S. influence on Philippine policies.

Regional and Ethnolinguistic Tensions

Regional and ethnolinguistic tensions include tensions relating to "Imperial Manila's" dominance over the life of the country. Despite decentralization, the central bureaucracy and political institutions are still heavily centered in Metro Manila. The outlying regions, especially

on Mindanao, where Christian and Muslims have both felt decades of neglect by government, have increasingly complained about their disproportionately low share of government attention and resources despite attempts by the Aquino and Ramos administrations to equalize attention. Economic development on Mindanao benefits the Christian population more than the Muslim population, because of the former's better resources, education, and entrepreneurial skills, but tensions between Christians and Muslims have lessened with Misuari's return to the fold and his ascent to authority as governor of the ARMM.

Regional and ethnic loyalties continue to overshadow national loyalties. Many Filipinos emigrate and change citizenship. Paradoxically, this strengthens their regional and provincial loyalties, leading to fragmentation and competition among Filipino factions in the same metropolitan areas.

Ethnolinguistic tensions manifest themselves in other ways, as well. When President Aquino issued an executive order mandating the use of Filipino in government transactions, the Cebu City government defied it by passing an ordinance requiring Cebuano. However, Filipino has effectively gained acceptance nationwide, with the exception of Cebu City and to a lesser extent the rest of Cebu Province. Filipino is spoken by over 90 percent of the population and is acknowledged to be required in media, legal, and other professions (Gonzalez 1996, 64).

Another tension is between Filipino and English as the language of instruction in schools. One group argues that Filipino should be more assiduously promoted as the national language, with English as a second language. "Psychological studies make a strong case for the need to think well in at least one language in order to think well at all. The present ambiguity and indecisiveness with regard to language is resulting in Filipinos being unable to think well in any language. Developing a strong national language will serve to bridge the cultural gaps that exist within the country" (Licuanan 1996, 164).

The opposing group contends that "few people would take the Philippines seriously if it supplants English as a language of instruction with Pilipino just for the sake of national identity. Not when everybody else in Asia is working hard to learn English, the lingua franca of world business" (Lachica 1996, 77).

The choice of the language of instruction has nothing to do with nationalism. Pragmatism and economic considerations take priority over the symbolic uses of language. Surveys indicate that Filipinos do

not consider themselves any less patriotic if they do not favor the sole use of Filipino as the medium of instruction in schools (Gonzalez 1996, 64).

The Crystallization of Filipino Culture

The ferment in Filipino values as a result of political, social, and economic transformation, especially over the past century, may have given foreigners, and the Filipinos themselves, the impression that the Filipino identity has remained unformed. Thompson argues that the new Filipino identity is perhaps more solid than the Thai identity, despite the former's modest foundation: "Precisely because Filipino identity always had had to be preserved against formidable assaults—none ever more than the doctrine of the Spanish Catholic Church, but to which the guile and wiles of Americanism could be added—it had survived rather proud of itself as it emerged into the international light of day and at the end of the century. In that sense, the central Thai had always had too easy a time of it; even in creating NIChood. The Filipinos had considerable Added Value to their credit" (1996, 100).

The successful constitutional transfer of power from Aquino to Ramos can be seen as marking the beginning of the crystallization of Filipino culture or of "cultural repair" (assuming a damaged culture). Filipinos have increasingly gained confidence that the 1987 Constitution has finally overcome challenges to it and taken strong root. The six-year administration of Ramos was an eye-opener for both Filipinos and foreigners, demonstrating that Filipinos could put it all together, given the right leadership and political structures.

Jose T. Almonte summarizes the contributions of the Ramos administration to Filipino political development as follows:

1. *New politics.* One crucial factor for the creditable performance of the polity under the leadership of President Ramos is the fact that he did not have "debilitating ties to the traditional elite," a first in Philippine history (1996, 15).

2. *Politics of performance, reform, and reconciliation.* The relative autonomy that President Ramos enjoyed translated into decisional efficacy, sincerity, and seriousness of purpose, inducing armed dissidents to return to the fold of the law.

3. *Politics of confidence.* The level of performance of the Ramos administration demonstrated to Filipinos that their difficulties "do not

arise out of some deep-rooted cultural flaw—out of a 'damaged culture.' Our difficulties have risen merely from policy mistakes that intelligence and political will can set right" (1996, 21).

4. *Participatory politics*. The Ramos administration ensured that its policies had popular support. The government welcomed opposition, which meant delays in decision making, in the hope that in so doing new political institutions would endure. In fact, the Ramos administration habitually used the "free press as an 'early warning system' for correcting policy mistakes and for keeping the bureaucracy on its toes" (1996, 14). Democratic reform has been reform the hard way, but the hard way to reform may also be the way that endures and takes hold.

The MRP study identified Filipino values that need to be developed and strengthened. Following are the main tasks in the political field:

1. *Promoting the idea of citizenship*. Filipino political tradition has emphasized individual rights more than civic responsibility. Filipinos must accept civic duty as the price of freedom.

2. *Building mechanisms for popular participation*. Filipinos need to extend and intensify popular participation. Poor and marginalized groups need to be empowered so that they can present the government with coherent demands. Local communities need control over local affairs and local resources. They need to take part in national decisions that directly affect their lives.

3. *Imbuing the elite with civic responsibility*. The elite must be imbued with a stronger sense of civic responsibility.

In addition, Filipinos must outgrow their sense of victimization and their complex about their colonial past, and forget the idea that anyone owes them a living. "The Philippines may be seen then as a serious country if it looks ahead to redefining itself in the next century rather than back to the tortured nationalism of the past" (Lachica 1996, 78). And the quality of life must be improved to promote love of country. The internal gaps among Filipinos must be bridged to improve national unity, and the external gaps between the Philippines and other countries must be bridged to enhance national self-esteem (Licuanan 1996, 164).

FILIPINO VALUES AS ASIAN VALUES

There was a time when Filipinos were regarded as "little brown Americans," too Western-oriented to be Asians. Their cultural traits, traditions, and practices were more similar to these of Latin American

peoples, because of their common Spanish heritage. The closer identification of Filipinos with Asia has come through the Philippines'
membership and participation in ASEAN. ASEAN has loomed large
in Philippine foreign policy considerations since the 1970s, and
ASEAN events have been prominently featured in the Philippine mass
media. An SWS survey conducted jointly with Eurobarometer in 1993
showed that "the Filipino sense of identification with the ASEAN region is no different from the average European's sense of identification
with Europe as a whole" (Mangahas 1996, 211). Awareness of the country's Asian neighbors was high, with Brunei and Singapore receiving
positive net trust ratings and Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand gaining a significant improvement in their ratings over earlier surveys
(Mangalindan and Samson 1994).

The Philippines has been active in ASEAN. Initially this reflected a
governing- and bureaucratic-elite value, promoted especially by those
in the Philippine foreign affairs community, but the government's regional cooperation and integration policy has also had wide support
from the people. The ASEAN framework has successfully kept in check
the excessive emotional undertones of the Sabah issue with Malaysia
and the Moro separatist insurgency.

There are, however, obvious differences in governance values and
practices between Filipinos and other Asians. Filipinos' repudiation of
Marcos's martial rule in 1986 "innoculated" them against autocracy.
They have a more flexible posture in the Asian values debate. Moreover, the Philippines does not have to follow the Asian model to economic development. While not cut out to be a major industrial producer
like South Korea or Taiwan, the reputation of the Philippines as a source
of skilled professionals gives it a leadership niche in service industries.

The Asian way of doing things, validated and made successful at the
international regional level, seems to have given the Philippine government the confidence to do the same thing in the domestic field. The
hard-line stance of the government under the Marcos regime has given
way to more conciliatory, consultative modes of interaction between
the government and rebel groups. The incrementalist mode of conflict
resolution has also proven effective. The Ramos government talked
peace first with the least ideologically differentiated group, the RAM,
and went on to the most ideologically different groups, the MNLF and
the NDF-CPP-NPA.

The communist and Moro insurgencies have prompted profound

changes in Philippine foreign relations. Marcos established diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s precisely to neutralize the local communists. He also backpedaled from a pro-Israel stance and moved toward a more balanced stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of the Moro insurgency, as well as the oil crises in the 1970s. These, of course, helped changed the pivot of Philippine foreign relations from a special relationship with the United States to identification with ASEAN. ASEAN and the "ASEAN way" gave the Philippines the confidence to deal with Honasan, Misuari, and Sison consultatively and diplomatically. Filipinos' trust in ASEAN was demonstrated when the Philippines looked to neighboring Indonesia to help monitor and broker the peace process with the MNLF on Mindanao.

Filipinos give the government elbow room to make hard domestic and foreign policy choices. But once the people have strong sentiments about a particular person, event, or action, the government has to heed the people's opinion.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, Filipinos gave their loyalty more to the family than the state. This was the result of their attempt to mitigate the harshness—or neglect—of colonial occupation. When finally they gained independence, they continued to regard government with suspicion, as an institution subject to exploitation for the benefit of families. They were not above "privatizing" public resources. This was accepted, since it was done in the name of family survival.

Marcos attempted to reengineer Philippine society through a "revolution from the center." In the end, he succumbed to the exploitation of the country by his family, relatives, and cronies. The 1986 People Power Revolt repudiated autocratic rule, unleashing forces and tensions that needed to be resolved in aftershocks. These clarificatory aftershocks disappointed both Filipinos and foreigners, who read them as Filipinos' inability to get a good show going.

The clarification process upheld the 1987 Constitution and the values that it represented—participatory democracy, decentralization, and civilian supremacy over the military. Aquino's administration was turbulent, but it delivered the polity intact and along a constitutional path to her successor, Ramos. Ramos was able to set forth a

"Philippines 2000" vision, got the government, private sector, and NGOs working together, and presided over the activation of local governments.

The people collectively demonstrated their values. They supported the government against coup attempts directed at Aquino. They chose Ramos, a nontraditional politician, as her successor over traditional politicians like Mitra. They responded well to the demands of decentralization and the activation of local governments. They favored retention of U.S. bases but eventually supported the Senate rejection. They did not support efforts to clear the way for a Ramos second term but elected Estrada, a clear signal that they wanted a president who was closely identified with the masses, was confident, and was not afraid to take a stand.

Values continue to contend in the Philippines, but the People Power Revolt and its aftershocks have put Filipinos on a path that allows them to define a collective strategy for survival and development. The tensions between the elite and the masses, central and local government, military and civilian authorities, church and state, metropolitan centers and the periphery, and the Christian majority and the Muslim minority will be played out and resolved within the constitutional framework. In short, the People Power Revolt and its aftermath constituted the birth of a new Filipino polity. The associated blood and pain are often mistaken for decay and retrogression, not the emergence of new political institutions and a rise in the self-confidence of the people.

The above trends are not as tangible as they may appear, because Filipinos are a relatively heterogenous people. Filipinos are increasingly becoming cosmopolitan, learning to deal with a world that is fast experiencing globalization. OFWs serve as the Philippines' cultural messengers to the world. They also serve as conduits by which the outside world influences the rural villages where most OFWs come from.

Filipinos have been weaned from their special ties with the United States. This has hastened their identification with ASEAN. Nevertheless, they are not afraid to cut their own path toward NIChood. They have committed themselves to democracy; while conceding that it may be slow in generating economic development, they will not have it any other way.

Recent events in Indonesia and Malaysia demonstrate the fragility of authoritarian regimes when deep economic crises occur. Justified on

the basis of economic performance, they dissemble when economic hardships fall on the people. The Philippine approach to reform may be hard, but the hard way may be the way that endures.

On balance, Filipinos are learning to transfer political loyalty from the family to the state. The decentralization policy has given the *barangay*, the municipality, the city, and the province more autonomy and decision-making powers. This empowerment of local governments, and the intermediation of NGOs and POs, enables Filipinos to see and help realize the synchrony of familial and community interests.

Almost twelve years after the "damaged culture" hypothesis was advanced, Filipinos have begun to demonstrate their ability to adopt a collective strategy for survival and development. In fact, the Filipino approach, the result of the interplay of Filipino values, appears useful as a model for the rest of East Asia and other developing countries around the world.

Notes

1. "If conflict in values—especially in religious or political values—is too severe, the society or nation is likely to break up into two or more new groups which by themselves are more coherent, stable than the original" (Talisayon 1990, 22).

2. Talisayon (1990) suggests that formal intentions, as representations of values, have varying shelf lives. Preelection surveys based on voting intentions may be accurate over several days, industry surveys of executives' expectations may be accurate over months, and analyses of plans and similar documents formally embodying group intents, such as military and corporate plans, may be accurate over years.

3. For the record, preelection surveys by the Asia Research Organization (revealed only in 1991) and postelection surveys by Social Weather Stations indicate that Corazon Aquino really won the February 1986 snap election (Mangahas 1994, 70).

4. While there is pronounced overall political participation and an increase in the number of politically active people across the archipelago, the masses themselves have not been as participative. A 1990 study of selected high school and university students and their parents in four areas of Luzon concluded that the political orientation of Filipinos at that time was not conducive to greater political participation. The survey found that there was little knowledge of the 1987 Constitution, there was no real support for issue-oriented

politics, political participation was predominantly election oriented, the extended family remained the focus of political loyalty and the framework of political activity, and there was low trust in government (Romero 1990, 280–322).

5. Local special bodies include peace and order councils, prequalifications and bid committees, school boards, health boards, and other councils that may be added by local governments.

6. Former Secretary of Health Juan Flavier (now a senator) was recruited by President Ramos from the NGO sector and became one of the most effective and popular members of his cabinet. One of the longest-serving cabinet members of the Ramos administration was Secretary of Agrarian Reform Ernesto Garilao, also from the NGO sector, as is President Estrada's secretary of agrarian reform, Horacio Morales.

7. Unfunded mandates are laws passed by Congress or executive orders directing local executives to undertake programs and projects without appropriating the corresponding funds. These are seen as an undue encroachment on local governments' control over their funds.

8. Congress passed a bill in 1997 that sought to recentralize health services, in response to allegations that standards of health services had deteriorated as a result of devolution. President Ramos vetoed the measure.

9. See Leveriza (1990) for a discussion of Filipino negative bureaucratic behavior.

10. Senator Blas Ople laments this discretion: "Foreign policy has about it an air of mystification it does not deserve. This is not a special province of arcane knowledge that only a few experts are able to grasp. Our policies in international affairs should grow out of our own fundamental concerns and the vital interests of the Filipino people" (Ople 1997, xii). An illustration of ordinary Filipinos' low awareness of foreign policy issues can be gleaned from SWS surveys. A December 1994 survey, for example, found that only a third of Filipinos were aware of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was prominent in the news at the time. Of those aware, a plurality admitted not having enough knowledge to form an opinion on whether they favored it. When asked what sectors would benefit from GATT, more than half could not say, and when asked which sectors would be disadvantaged by GATT, a large majority did not know (Mangalindan and Samson 1994).

11. *Kanya-kanya* means "to each his own" or "going separate ways." *Kanya-kanya* syndrome refers to the failure or refusal of affected parties to take a cooperative or collective approach to a problem.

12. Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed a protest with the Senate Electoral Tribunal against Honasan and others who allegedly benefited from Dagdag-Bawas ("How Dagdag-Bawas Was Done" 1998, 35). *Dagdag-Bawas* refers to the vote-padding and vote-shaving tactics of crooked electoral officials in charge of tallying votes.

13. The United States, along with Japan, is still the most preferred foreign investor, according to a December 1994 SWS survey. Nevertheless, more than half of respondents felt that no country should be prevented from investing in the Philippines (Mangalindan and Samson 1994).

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