Japan and Multilateralism in Asia

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Far from being a passive regional actor as imagined by some, Japan has been a proactive player whose motives and actions have helped shape Asia’s regional architecture in ways deeper and more intimate than much of the existing scholarship on Asian multilateralism has hitherto acknowledged. Arguably, Japan’s contributions to multilateralism in Asia have differed according to the leaders (or leader types) who run Japanese foreign policy. Japan’s leader types have differed in terms of their aims for and approaches to Asian multilateralism.¹ For example, Japanese leaders wanting to engage China have sought to build regional institutions through which they can engage their Chinese counterparts in cooperative ways and to minimize or mitigate the negative consequences of strategic competition between their two countries. On the other hand, those seeking to balance China have treated regional institutions as arenas for building coalitions to counter (or, in extreme instances, conscribe) Chinese power and influence. Japan’s broader foreign policy has also differed among leader types. Backed by the Yoshida Doctrine, for decades Japan focused principally on economic development and regional integration while leaving its military security in the hands of its ally, the United States. Under this “Japan-as-peace-state” period, Japan relied largely on a foreign policy strategy of quiet diplomacy, soft power, and implicit regional leadership.² No less proactive, this form of diplomacy has also been termed “directional leadership,” “leadership by stealth,” and “leadership from behind.”³ However, with the growing influence of nationalist-minded leaders who see nothing inherently wrong with Japan aspiring to be a normal military power and pursuing a more assertive diplomacy,⁴ the era of strict adherence to an implicit approach to regional leadership might soon be a thing of the past.

Against this backdrop, this chapter provides a comparative review of Japan’s contributions to the shape and substance of Asian multilateralism.
Granted, given the pervasiveness of strategic hedging in the region, engagement and balancing behaviors by countries in the region clearly coexist within Asia’s multilateral institutions. While the growing shift from quiet diplomacy to a more assertive diplomacy does not fit snugly with policies of engagement and containment respectively—i.e., engagers preferring quiet diplomacy to the assertive approach of containers—there is reason to assume, with nationalist-minded leaders at the helm at a time of rising tensions with China, that Japan’s foreign policy style will inevitably change, particularly when its leaders perceive, rightly or otherwise, that Japan’s options for engagement with China have been exhausted. It certainly does not mean that Japan will henceforth abandon quiet diplomacy, not least when dealing with other East Asian countries, but it will use both quiet and assertive approaches as Tokyo sees fit. Under such conditions, what implications might the shift to a “normal” Japan hold for its future commitment to and involvement in Asian multilateralism?

Japan’s Contributions to Asian Multilateralism

The history of Japan’s postwar participation in Asia Pacific security can be described as a mix of entrenched bilateralism (the Japan-US security alliance) and incipient multilateralism (Japan’s active membership in and contributions to Asia’s regional institutions). Given the closeness of the Japan-US relationship, much of Japan’s involvement in Asian multilateralism has also been defined partly by the terms of its partnership with the United States. In that regard, Japan’s efforts to construct multilateral structures useful for its own interests have in a key sense been shaped by America’s attitude toward multilateralism. Whatever Japan’s contributions, past or potential, to multilateral institution building in post–Cold War Asia have been or could have been, America’s approval or sanction was often viewed as critical. This is best seen in America’s active participation in regional multilateral institutions that Japan had a hand in fostering, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the same vein, Japan’s proposal for an “Asian Monetary Fund” at the height of the 1997 financial crisis that rocked East Asia was dropped—despite strong support for the idea from hard-hit East Asian economies—following strident rebukes from the US Treasury and the International Monetary Fund. These illustrations underscore the constraining effect of Japan’s partnership with the United States on the former’s foreign policy. While this subaltern status suited the pragmatists of the Yoshida mold—some might have chafed at it...
but accepted it as the price for living under the extended military deterrence furnished by the Americans—"revisionists" from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on (and perhaps even earlier),\(^7\) including “normal nationalists”\(^8\) who believe the alliance with the United States is good for Japan and ought to be continued and even strengthened, have not only urged that the terms of the alliance be revised to make Japan an equal rather than junior partner to the United States, but have even sought at times to limit US influence and involvement in Asian multilateralism.

Japan's track record in multilateralism in Asia is a strong indictment of any crass caricature of Japan as a passive regional actor and serial “buck-passer.”\(^9\) It has rendered significant contributions to Asian multilateralism through the sort of implicit leadership style described above. There is no question about the importance of the Fukuda Doctrine—wherein Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda famously pledged that Japan would never become a military power—to Japan's policy toward Southeast Asia since that doctrine's enunciation in 1977. While it is debatable whether the doctrine played any role in guiding Japan's approach to Asian multilateralism—as Yukio Satoh recently recounted, more than three decades having passed since its pronouncement, the Fukuda Doctrine is rarely mentioned these days\(^10\)—it is perhaps noteworthy that ASEAN member states positively remember the doctrine as a watershed that transformed ASEAN-Japan relations.\(^11\) On the other hand, the successful reception by Southeast Asian audiences of the Fukuda Doctrine might not have been possible without the existence of the Yoshida Doctrine (never formally declared\(^12\)), which prioritized economic development while leaving Japan's military defense to the United States. If both the Yoshida and Fukuda Doctrines have facilitated Japan's directional leadership, they have been able to do so because of the military guarantee provided to Japan concerning its national security by the United States, and the broader US strategic assurance provided to East Asia concerning its regional security, in part through the curbing effect its alliance with Japan has (or is supposed to have) on unwelcome expansionist designs the latter may harbor.

Aimed at engaging China in the immediate post–Cold War environment, Japan's most important early contributions to Asian multilateralism have resulted arguably because of Tokyo's directional leadership and Washington's willing involvement (if only selectively so) in multilateralism.\(^13\) The formation of the APEC forum in the late 1980s is a well-traced story, particularly from the Australian angle, given the enormously important roles played by Prime Minister Bob Hawke and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. (Indeed, Japanese-Australian collaboration has been critical to the formation of not only APEC but also its three nonofficial
regional predecessors, the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the Pacific Trade and Development Conference [PAFTAD], and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council [PECC])

However, as Takashi Terada has pointed out, the lesser-known contributions by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry—and, for that matter, the regional vision of Japan’s former foreign minister and prime minister, Takeo Miki—were no less significant. According to Terada,

[APEC] was the common goal of Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, his Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the late 1980s. Bob Hawke publicly announced the idea in Seoul in January 1989, but his initiative was backed by a solid foundation of cooperation with Japan. In mid-1988, MITI has floated a proposal for regional meetings of economic ministers and DFAT’s strong interest in the idea urged coordination between the two countries. In March 1989 a MITI delegation visited the region to sound out reactions to its proposal and the Hawke initiative, and this laid the groundwork for the Hawke proposal’s relatively easy acceptance on the Australian delegation’s later visit in April and May. Both countries continued to coordinate their approaches toward the organization of the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Canberra in November 1989.

If both countries played equally significant parts in APEC’s formation, why is it that most accounts seem to credit Australia more so than Japan, if at all? Terada explains, “MITI’s proposal was eventually subsumed into the Hawke initiative, but MITI believed the successful establishment of APEC amounted to the success of its own proposal.” The willingness to fold its ideas within another country’s initiative, and to do so with as little fanfare and self-promotion as possible, seems to be at the core of Japan’s implicit leadership style. The focus here is on ensuring the success of the mission rather than getting the credit for it.

Fair or otherwise, one of the factors blamed for APEC’s inability to deepen trade liberalization and economic integration has been the apparent distraction of security-related concerns that have been added to the trade forum’s institutional agenda. US President George Bush’s use of the Shanghai summit in 2001, which took place weeks following the 9/11 attacks, to draw attention to the scourge of international terrorism was not the first time security matters had been raised in APEC. In this regard, APEC has also proved to be an equally useful multilateral platform for Japan through which to deliberate security issues. Indeed, given its experience with APEC as a useful forum for discussing issues such as the turmoil in East Timor at the end of the 1990s and North Korea’s missile program—the latter issue,
as Christopher W. Hughes has noted, was added to the APEC Statement at the Auckland summit in 1999—APEC has served as a framework through which the US commitment to the region could be sustained and strengthened. By the same token, APEC and other regional institutions have also proved useful to Japan as platforms to engage China; for instance, although Japan rejected Malaysia’s idea for an East Asian Economic Caucus because realization of the Malaysian proposal would have kept the United States out of East Asia, it subsequently helped form ASEAN+3. Certainly, the idea of APEC as an instrument of post–Cold War multilateral diplomacy to ensure the regular presence and responsible participation of the relevant big powers—particularly China and the United States—in regional security resonated with Australia, Japan’s co-sponsor of APEC. “Some people didn’t want China, and some people didn’t want the United States,” recalled Hawke as he reminisced about the political haggling over the proposed membership of the inaugural APEC meeting in 1989. “To my mind, this was absurdity. You couldn’t with any sense of intelligent purpose talk about the Asia-Pacific region without either of them not being part of it. And we had to do quite a bit of, not arm-twisting, you know, but a lot of discussion and negotiation to bring about a point where the organization that did emerge encompassed both.” It would also have resonated well with ASEAN leaders, for whom the regional institutional architecture of Asia that they would help to define downstream would be about the furnishing of “meeting places,” wherein the great powers and regional countries can interact according to ASEAN’s terms.

While the United States famously harbored reservations about the utility of multilateralism, it soon became clear that the Clinton administration found APEC sufficiently useful as an institutional platform through which America could engage Asia Pacific at the highest levels. Canberra and Tokyo might have gotten APEC off to a start, but it was President Bill Clinton who invited heads of government to the APEC meeting in Seattle, which eventuated in the upgrading of the trade forum from a gathering of economic ministers to a leaders’ summit. “We have to develop new institutional arrangements that support our national economic and security interests internationally,” Clinton noted in 1993. “We’re working to build a prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific region through our work here in APEC.” Indeed, by the time the Asian financial crisis struck in 1997, the region’s countries, stung by the painful economic restructuring imposed on them by international financial institutions and frustrated by US opposition to alternative proposals from the region (specifically from Japan), had come to view APEC (fairly or otherwise) as “a tool for US regional domination.”

A contemporary parallel to APEC as a multilateral instrument
appropriated—"hijacked," some might say—by the United States for its own purposes might be the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade pact originally started by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in 2005 as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, but now very much viewed with suspicion by countries such as China as being part of the US pivot or rebalancing strategy to contain China.

If APEC’s formation hints of a Japanese contribution to Asian multilateralism that would attract America’s “buy-in,” then nowhere is this logic more apparent than in the lead-up to the formation of the ARF in 1994. The ARF has been credited (whether accurately or not) with helping to integrate and socialize a China that was initially suspicious of multilateralism as a tool of containment in a way that has allowed it to become a sophisticated user of multilateral diplomacy for its own ends. Yet the ARF might not even have been formed if not for Japanese intervention. At the July 1991 ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed that the PMC process should in the future become a forum for political dialogue aimed at discussing mutual security concerns facing Asia Pacific countries. As Nakayama explained,

If there is anything to add to the mechanisms and frameworks for cooperation in the three fields of economic cooperation, diplomacy and security, the first would be a forum for political dialogue where friendly countries in this region could engage in frank exchanges of opinion on matters of mutual interest . . . I believe it would be meaningful and timely to use the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference as a process of political discussions designed to improve the sense of security among us. In order for these discussions to be effective, it might be advisable to organize a senior officials’ meeting, which would then report its deliberations to the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference for future discussion.

While the ASEAN countries reacted coolly to Nakayama’s proposal, the United States reacted positively to it and officially accepted the principle of multilateral dialogue, thereby paving the way for the July 1993 agreement to establish the ARF. (But as the old saying goes, success has many fathers and others have sought to lay claim to having spawned or at least midwifed the ARF into existence.) Since then, Japan has actively participated in the ARF. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan Defense Agency officials have regularly participated in senior officials’ meetings, defense officials’ dialogues, and inter-sessional meetings on things ranging from confidence building and preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping. As Japan’s then Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Komura noted in 1999, “Japan has thought highly of ARF activities, and has proactively participated in
them. Japan will continue to maintain its proactive stance toward ARF activities in order to ensure that the Asian economic crisis, which began in the middle of 1997, will not slow down the efforts to promote such confidence-building.”

The Japanese contribution stands in sharp contrast to what the Australians sought to achieve with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposal in June 2008 for an “Asia-Pacific Community.” Ironically, the Rudd vision for an overhaul of the ASEAN-led regional security architecture was rendered out of concern that the ARF had become moribund and irrelevant to the region’s needs and hence a new security institution—“a new piece of architecture,” as Rudd’s foreign minister, Stephen Smith, put it—was deemed necessary. Rudd’s proposal—or at least succeeding iterations of it that argued for a concert of powers for co-managing regional order and architecture, presumably at ASEAN’s expense—proved way more controversial, and even more divisive, than Nakayama’s 1991 proposal. While both similarly elicited cool reactions from ASEAN, the crucial distinction seems to have been the nature of the American response. As we have seen, the ASEAN-PMC evolved into the ARF in no small part due to strong US support for Nakayama’s proposal, which created a fait accompli of sorts for ASEAN. On the other hand, Rudd’s idea for a revamped regional architecture failed to materialize not only because the ASEAN states rejected the proposal—strenuously, in Singapore’s case—but because both China and the United States also rejected it. In a not dissimilar fashion, the region’s hand was forced, in a sense, when US President Barack Obama committed the United States to membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS), leading advocates of Rudd’s vision, fair or otherwise, to lay claim to the enlarged EAS—crucially, with the Americans onboard—as the realization of that vision’s argument for a “leaders-level coordinating body.”

Another key but little-acknowledged contribution by Japan to the shape and substance of Asia’s regional architecture involves the vision and efforts behind the so-called “East Asian Community” (EAC), and the regional vehicles formed as the building blocks of the EAC, the ASEAN+3 and the EAS. It bears reminding that China, whose perceived dominance of ASEAN+3 and of East Asia more broadly has caused considerable alarm for Japan and other countries in the region, initially welcomed the proposal by Japan and others to form a summit-level gathering, believing its membership would comprise essentially the original “10+3” of ASEAN+3. But what Koizumi had in mind was a bigger grouping (which he referred to using the EAC nomenclature)—he sought the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in particular—out of concern that China’s power and influence needed a counterbalance. Hitoshi Tanaka, a former vice minister in MOFA, once
commented regarding Japan’s pursuit of Australian involvement in the proposed EAS, “In my heart I truly hope Australia will participate in the East Asia summit. We have worked very hard to make it possible. We are doing this not for Australia’s sake, but for Japan’s sake ... I have a very strong feeling about our cooperation with Australia and I have been advocating it for a very long time.”

Beyond the EAS, Japan also sought to balance China with its proposal for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) covering 16 countries—the ASEAN+3 states along with Australia, India, and New Zealand—that rivaled the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) championed by China. Unlike Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s subsequent and considerably hazier version of the EAC (discussed below), however, Koizumi’s version avoided any pretension of being a comprehensive overarching framework in the European Union mold and focused instead on building intraregional collaboration over a number of functional fronts such as energy, the economy, and the environment.

In other words, the “variable geometric” approach that has come to characterize Asia’s regional architecture—usually diagramed as a dizzying complex or patchwork of overlapping circles and ovals—is as much the contribution of Japan as anyone else. Japan actively supported the ad hoc formation of multiple regional institutions in East Asia out of worry that ASEAN+3 might end up as the only framework for Japan to deal with China. Thus understood, the oversupply of institutions for which ASEAN, as the self-professed occupant of the “driver’s seat” in Asian multilateralism, is often criticized, is in fact equally attributable to efforts by Japan to create strategic space for managing China. According to this view, Japan has actively sought to build regional institutions because they have become, in Tokyo’s view, the preferred grounds on which Japan’s political competition with China should take place. If Yoshida-type pragmatists worried over the potential exclusion of the United States from Asian multilateralism, Koizumi-type revisionists cum nationalists who chafed at Japan’s junior partner status in its alliance with the United States did not seem overly perturbed at the prospect of America’s exclusion from at least one regional institution, the EAS (before its enlargement in 2011, when the United States eventually joined). If anything, the Japanese leadership appeared to work toward that end, according to one eminent analyst of Japanese foreign policy. Richard Samuels has noted, “Japan responded to the threat of Chinese regional dominance with characteristic ambiguity and a studied ambivalence about its continued dependence on the United States.”

Yet another example of a policy idea contributed by a Japanese official that was met initially with reservations in ASEAN circles, but subsequently proved revolutionary, is that of a regional forum for defense ministers. In
March 2002, Gen Nakatani, the director of the Japan Defense Agency—the precursor to the Japan Ministry of Defense—suggested that the ARF, predominantly a forum driven by the region's foreign policy establishments, could perhaps be complemented by a parallel defense forum. Nakatani had in mind the newly formed Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual nonofficial defense meeting convened by the London-based think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as a basis for what could evolve into an Asian defense ministerial meeting. ⁴¹ Again, as in the case of the Nakayama proposal in 1991, the proposal for a defense forum was met with a cool reaction from the ASEAN states. It would take another eight years before the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), comprising the 10 ASEAN states that had formed the ADMM in 2006 and 8 ASEAN dialogue partners—Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States—would be established in 2010. ⁴²

Finally, Japan has been a diligent participant in nonofficial multilateral diplomacy in regional security affairs. At the Track 2 level, Japan, through the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a think tank long affiliated with Japan’s MOFA until recently, has actively been involved in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). ⁴³ For that matter, Japan has provided arguably the most substantial funding for CSCAP activities, including financing the involvement of North Korean officials (acting in their private capacity, as the Track 2 mantra goes) at CSCAP meetings. Japan has also had strong representation at other semi- and nonofficial epistemic networks such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue and the Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security.

What the foregoing illustrations highlight is a long Japanese tradition of furnishing viable and actionable policy recommendations and, should the political conditions prove felicitous, a concomitant willingness to facilitate their fulfillment with apparent little interest in self-promotion or self-aggrandizement. Furthermore, the illustrations also underscore a key ingredient for multilateralism in Asia, namely, America’s buy-in, although as our discussion on Koizumi’s efforts to implement his EAC vision has shown, Japan has at times proved ambivalent in its attitude toward its principal ally and has even sought to exclude it from particular regional arrangements—despite, crucially, Tokyo’s perceived need to balance against Beijing in a specific multilateral institutional context. Granted, US membership in all of Asia’s regional institutions is not absolutely vital; ASEAN+3 is a good example. Even then, ASEAN+3 could be considered a sui generis case in that it was as much an East Asian reaction to perceived US unfairness toward the region in the wake of the 1997–1998 financial crisis as it was an attempt to formulate a regional mechanism for responding to crisis. Moreover, that
the EAS emerged partly out of the region’s concern that ASEAN+3 was at risk of being dominated by China only underscores the importance of US involvement in Asian multilateralism, whether to lend it greater legitimacy or to act as a counterbalance against China or other powers wishing to control the multilateral agenda. In contrast to the APEC and ARF illustrations, Hatoyama’s 2009 proposal to establish a European Union–like institution in East Asia faced a similar fate as the Australian proposal because, unlike the MITI and Nakayama proposals, it earned highly ambivalent reactions from the United States, China, and ASEAN. Moreover, to the extent that Hatoyama’s proposal could have been motivated at all by concern over Asia’s underperforming regional architecture—the reasons behind the proposal, along with the proposal itself, remained unclear—it poses a potential conundrum for Japanese foreign policy since in sum, where Japan’s contributions to Asia’s post–Cold War multilateralism have proved most effective and relevant, they have been achieved through a mix of strong US interest and support and a readiness by Japan to play second fiddle even if its actual role has been considerable. In other words, while Tokyo’s involvement in multilateralism goes only as far as Washington is prepared to allow it, Tokyo, partly by resisting Washington’s call for it to assume more responsibilities and play a more explicit role in regional leadership, has succeeded in its efforts to define the shape and substance of multilateralism in Asia.

Normalizing Japan under Abe: Implications for Multilateralism

Among analysts of Japan’s defense and foreign policy, there is strong agreement that Japan is seeking to become a normal military power, but has no intention of exiting its longstanding security alliance with the United States. For example, Michael Green has written about Japan as a “reluctant” realist state that, with the end of the Cold War, has been compelled by circumstances to alter its foreign policy approach. No longer able to rely solely on economic power to insure its regional dominance, Green argues that Japan has begun to assert its power—reluctantly in his view—commensurate with its growing concerns over China’s growing military power, its increased anxiety about external security threats, and its apparent readiness to disagree with US policy, especially over East Asia. Green concludes, however, that these changes ought to foster rather than hinder closer coordination between Japanese and US policy. In a not dissimilar vein, Christopher W. Hughes has argued that Japan is seeking to become a more assertive military power, and that this trend has been accelerated in
the post-9/11 period. However, he believes that rather than striking out on its own and pursuing options for greater autonomy or multilateralism, Japan will opt to integrate its growing military capabilities into its alliance with the United States. Japan's strengthened role will allow it to be the “defensive shield” to America’s “offensive sword,” thereby bolstering US military hegemony in East Asia and globally. For his part, Tang Siew Mun, tracing the transition in Japanese grand strategy from the Yoshida premiership to the Koizumi premiership, detects in the latter a concern with achieving structural power, preserving national tranquility, and maintaining Japan's economic competitiveness. The shift “from the Yoshida Doctrine to the Koizumi Doctrine,” as Tang sees it, has arisen out of “Japan's aspirations and perception of vulnerabilities in the context of domestic and international developments.” Finally, Bhubhindar Singh, using national identity as a handle, argues that Japan’s image of itself has evolved from a “peace state” to an “international state.”

There is no denying Japan’s normalizing “imperative” is a long-term development. But while a “normal” Japan is more likely than not to pursue closer political-military ties with the United States, there is evidence to suggest that the diplomatic assertiveness expected of Tokyo—the “new normal” of a normal Japan, if you will—might not be fully appreciated by Washington, particularly if rising tensions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands pose an entrapment problem for America. The current Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, reportedly a nationalist, has pledged to turn his nation's economy around and strengthen its armed forces. To that end, Japan has established a US-style national security council and will increase defense spending to record levels, ostensibly to counter China.

As noted in a New York Times article published at the end of 2013,

Shinzo Abe’s past year as prime minister has concentrated chiefly on reviving Japan’s long-ailing economy. Yet in Mr. Abe’s mind, the country’s newfound economic prowess is a means to an end: to build a more powerful, assertive Japan, complete with a full-fledged military, as well as pride in its World War II–era past.

In the same way US unilateralism during the first term of George W. Bush’s presidency, heavily criticized for its neoconservative orientation, in fact built on the Clinton presidency’s equally unilateral foreign policy, Abe’s aspiration for a militarily strong Japan is not an ex nihilo development but one that builds on what one analyst has referred to as Japan’s enduring “quest for normalcy”—one that began well before Abe’s emergence. Crucially, this quest for normalcy does not necessarily imply an assertion of greater Japanese autonomy from US power and influence, even as it changes the
terms of their bilateral relationship. In a key sense, Abe’s aim to balance against China is clearly shared by the United States—the pivot/rebalancing to Asia strategy of the Obama administration being the latest manifestation of US intent—and closer Japan-US military cooperation toward that end is a logical consequence. As one analyst has noted,

The result of Japan’s perceived exhaustion of its options for engagement, despite its strenuous and innovative regional and global activity, and thus to assert an active hold on China’s rise, could be to force it on the defensive and to shift precipitously to a default policy of containment. Japan has already shown signs of this containment founded inevitably on the further enhancement of its own military power, tighter US-Japan security cooperation, and active, if quiet, balancing against China.56

While efforts to revive Japan’s economy are welcomed, not everyone in Japan has necessarily agreed with Abe and his fellow revisionists’ logic regarding normalization, not least when it leads to problems with China and South Korea.57 In December 2013, Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine aroused both Beijing and Seoul’s ire. In response, the US Department of State also released a statement on the website of its embassy in Tokyo, noting Washington’s disappointment with the Japanese leadership for having “taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.”58 Reportedly, the US rejoinder came after Tokyo had evidently ignored Washington’s attempt to prevent the visit. Yet it is experiences such as this that highlight the limits of US military support for Japan should tensions escalate in the East China Sea, making conflict with China a real possibility. And if Washington’s irritation with Tokyo stems from the former’s worry over entrapment, then it is certainly not inconceivable that the latter be worried about possible abandonment by Washington should a shooting war break out between China and Japan over their islands dispute or for some other reason. Despite Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s assurance in 2012 that the Senkakus are covered by the US-Japan mutual defense treaty, the fact that a number of US policy experts have voiced concerns that such a commitment goes too far and risks a conflict between China and the United States over a useless “pile of rocks” has raised Japanese fears of US abandonment.59 As a New York Times editorial has tersely noted, “Japan’s military adventures are only possible with American support; the United States needs to make it clear that Mr. Abe’s agenda is not in the region’s interest.”60 Nor is it in the interest of America, as the “hub” of its alliance system, to see that system rocked by strife between the “spokes,” Japan and South Korea.

Prime Minister Abe’s “five principles” of Japanese diplomacy, fairly or otherwise, have been touted by some as Japan’s first major diplomatic
policy since the Fukuda Doctrine. Among the principles identified in the so-called Abe Doctrine were protecting the freedom of thought, expression, and speech in Southeast Asia and ensuring that the seas (“the most vital commons to us all”) are governed by international law. Abe noted that with regard to these two principles in particular, Japan shared a common cause with the US rebalancing policy. But as a recent Asahi Shimbun editorial has pointed out, at the Japan-ASEAN Summit that took place in mid-December 2013 in Tokyo, Abe advocated the importance of the rule of law in the seas and skies but evidently failed to mention the promotion of human rights and democratization. Abe’s selective emphasis raises the prospect that his doctrine is principally about balancing, if not containing, China. A recent study by the Tokyo Foundation suggests that ASEAN states “are reluctant to define the US role as an external balancer against China in the light of deep, ASEAN-China economic interdependence.” As a consequence, ASEAN, from Japan’s perspective, requires external assistance to build its “own strength and resilience against China’s growing maritime pressure [as] an important vanguard for denying China’s creeping expansion to the contested territorial waters [in the South China Sea].” If so, Abe’s policy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN could be at risk of being overly focused on China—an emphasis the ASEAN countries, despite their own strategic worries, might not fully appreciate.

A normal and decidedly more assertive Japan—“the return of the Samurai,” as a Time article dubbed it—would clearly pose challenges for Japan’s future participation in Asian multilateralism. On the one hand, it deepens an already entrenched Japan-US security bilateralism at the possible expense of multilateralism. On the other hand, should Japan persist on its current trajectory under Abe’s leadership and further aggravate Japan’s ties with China, South Korea, and others, there is an outside chance that it could alienate the United States and the ASEAN states. Given, as shown earlier, the importance of the United States to getting most of Asia’s multilateral mechanisms off the ground, and given ASEAN’s place in the “driver’s seat” of Asia’s regional architecture, an increasingly isolated Japan might opt out of Asian multilateralism altogether, particularly if the Japanese leadership adopts a neo-autonomist orientation. In this regard, the judicious appropriation of diplomatic strategies by the Abe government—cue Abe’s somewhat dubious explanation for his recent shrine visit: he felt Japan’s ties with China and South Korea could not get any worse than they already were—would be of utmost importance to improving Japan’s relations with its neighbors and winning the region’s trust. As Terada has argued, what proved crucial in winning friends and supporters throughout the region, and especially among the ASEAN states, to Japan’s approach to regional diplomacy in the
past was Tokyo’s robust emphasis on multilateralism and its consultative approach to regional economic and security cooperation. This implies, on the one hand, that directional leadership—which was once Japan’s hallmark and was so crucial to Japan’s contributions to multilateralism in Asia, but is now increasingly replaced by assertive diplomacy—still has a key part to play. On the other hand, despite its many flaws and the perceived obstacles it may place in the way of Japan’s realization of its interests, Asian multilateralism still has something to offer.

Conclusion

This chapter has made three related arguments. First, Japan has played an instrumental role in helping to define the shape and substance of multilateralism in Asia, the perceived utility of which for Japan has included engaging and balancing against China. Second, Japan has been able to achieve this thanks in no small part to two things: US support for Asian multilateralism and Japan’s security interests, and Japan’s quiet diplomacy and “directional leadership.” At the same time, however, Japan’s role in Asian multilateralism has also reflected its ambivalence over its dependence on the United States. Third, Japan’s ongoing quest to become a normal military power and its adoption of a more assertive policy toward China are likely to deepen Japan-US security ties with negative consequences for Asian multilateralism. Japanese leaders are all too aware that multilateralism in Asia is ultimately limited in what it can achieve. As has been frequently noted, the limited contribution of regional institutions to the region’s security is due to their institutional design and aim as cooperative dialogue forums—talk shops, as the criticism goes—rather than collective defense arrangements. For instance, the constraining behavior of the idealists, as opposed to that of the conservatives, in the ARF has arguably held that security institution back from advancing beyond confidence building to preventive diplomacy.

China’s strident objections to the “internationalization” of issues that it regards as core concerns—its relations with Taiwan, its Tibet challenge, and most recently its territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas—has also meant the limited relevance of the ARF as a security institution. On the other hand, Japan’s continued commitment to the Japan-US security alliance has meant that any inherent design for deepening multilateralism that Japan might have harbored has had to contend with American pressures to prioritize their security bilateralism. Efforts in 1994 by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa’s Advisory Committee on Defense Issues (Boei Mondai Kondankai) to prioritize Japanese participation in
multilateral security arrangements over the alliance with the United States were effectively quashed by US objections.\textsuperscript{70}

Despite the fundamental importance of the Japan-US security alliance to Japan’s postwar security as well as its international legitimacy, hewing too close to the United States might not be helpful to the cause of multilateralism. This happened during the period of US unilateralism under President George W. Bush (although US unilateralism in the post–Cold War era arguably began with the Clinton administration\textsuperscript{71}). The refusal by the Bush administration to accept the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and its struggle with the United Nations Security Council over the question of Iraq clearly rendered international support for the United States difficult, even—or perhaps especially—for an ally such as Japan, known for its strong advocacy of multilateralism. Nor, for that matter, is sole reliance on the United States the optimal solution for the management if not resolution of the Korean Peninsula’s security problems, not least where Japan’s relations with China, Russia, and South Korea are concerned. Despite the difficulties of a multilateral approach to the North Korean nuclear question—the frustrations of the Six-Party Talks are well known—it arguably still constitutes the best way forward for Japan, if only to ensure that the lingering strategic distrust Japan’s neighbors have for it is not exacerbated further by misperceptions of Japanese intentions regarding regional security.\textsuperscript{72} “If Japan gives precedence to US relations, international organizations will grow weaker, further eroding international cooperation,” as Kiichi Fujiwara has argued. “This is not a wise choice for Japan, which attaches equal importance to the United Nations as it does to US relations as the basis of its foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{73}

Will Japan continue to contribute to multilateralism in Asia as it has done? As Japan matures into its new identity as a normal military power that is no longer shy about its newfound diplomatic assertiveness, do the things that made Japan such an important contributor to multilateralism in Asia, such as its directional leadership, still have a place? The answer lies with whether Japan still regards multilateralism as useful to its relations with Asian countries, not least of which is China. Ultimately, how Japan balances its normalization with a continued engagement with multilateralism could be the key to a stable and secure Asia.

With this in mind, Japan and ASEAN should jointly ensure that Asia’s multilateral mechanisms remain vibrant and useful for fostering peaceful and responsible behavior from all stakeholders. Japan has played an instrumental role in helping to define the shape and substance of multilateralism in Asia in ways largely welcomed and supported by ASEAN. Not unlike the ASEAN states, a key driving force behind Japan’s contributions has been the perceived utility of multilateralism in facilitating Japan’s engagement
of and balancing against China. However, whether Japan will continue to support the regional institutions that it and ASEAN have mutually worked to establish will likely depend on whether Tokyo still believes Asian multilateralism serves its interests vis-à-vis China’s growing power and influence. Be that as it may, it still behooves Japan and all countries in the region to continue investing in Asian multilateralism given that the potential utility of such supplementary platforms for managing interstate tensions cannot be discounted.

Furthermore, Japan, the United States, and ASEAN need to rediscover their shared stakes and common bonds or, failing that, find new ones on which Asian multilateralism can more assuredly rest. Japan has been able to render significant contributions to Asian multilateralism because of the United States’ growing acceptance of multilateral diplomacy and its support for Japanese security interests. In the immediate post–Cold War period, Japan facilitated US participation in regional arrangements such as APEC and the ARF. But Japanese ambivalence over its dependence on the United States was also apparent in Tokyo’s attempts to exclude Washington from the newly formed EAS in late 2005, despite Japan’s perceived need to balance China. The future of Asian multilateralism could well depend on whether there is sufficient congruence in interests and policy between Japan, the United States, and ASEAN. In this regard, the enlarged EAS, with Russian and American participation, has arguably emerged as the framework du jour on which the Japanese, Americans, and Southeast Asians (and other regional stakeholders) could build relevant and sustained regional cooperation. This point was underscored in the US-Japan Joint Statement released on April 25, 2014:

The United States and Japan renew our commitment to deepening diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), recognizing the importance of ASEAN unity and centrality to regional security and prosperity. We are coordinating closely to support ASEAN and its affiliated fora as its members seek to build a regional economic community and address trans-border challenges, including cybersecurity and cybercrime. In this context, the two countries view the East Asia Summit as the premier political and security forum in the region.74

For his part, Prime Minister Abe, in his speech at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, also proposed the role the EAS could play in facilitating military transparency as a confidence- and trust-building measure:

There is no stage that outshines the East Asia Summit as a venue for heads of state and government to come together and discuss the order that is desirable.
Keeping military expansion in check and making military budgets transparent, as well as enlarging the number of countries that conclude the Arms Trade Treaty and improving mutual understanding between authorities in charge of national defense—there is no lack of issues those of us national leaders ought to take up, applying peer pressure on each other. I urge the further enhancement of the East Asia Summit, as the premier forum taking up regional politics and security. I propose that we first create a permanent committee comprised of permanent representatives to ASEAN from the member countries and then prepare a road map to bring renewed vitality to the Summit itself, while also making the Summit along with the ARF and the ADMM-Plus function in a multilayered fashion.  

Notwithstanding these affirmations of the EAS’s putative relevance, a nagging concern for ASEAN and its member states is what such inordinate focus on the EAS might mean for their part and place in Asian multilateralism. Both the US-Japan Joint Statement and Abe’s remarks were careful to emphasize the import of ASEAN’s centrality. At the same time, however, ASEAN’s weakness and disunity are seen by many, fairly or otherwise, as a root cause of the relative ineffectiveness of Asian multilateralism. It has been proposed that the EAS should be empowered with the capacity to steer the various regional modalities available (a point that Abe also noted). Mindful of the problems Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community proposal had with regional anxieties over the prospect of the region being co-managed by a concert of powers, Rizal Sukma, one of Indonesia’s preeminent policy intellectuals, has argued,

The EAS should function as a sort of steering committee for the Asia-Pacific region in two inter-related ways. First, it should be allowed to function as a steering committee for coordinating various regional institutions in the region such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Second, there is also the need for the EAS members of the G20 to form an informal caucus to coordinate their policies and interests at the global level.  

It is debatable whether other ASEAN states—with the exception of Indonesia, the only Southeast Asian member of the G20—would accept the preceding idea. The challenge for Japan, the United States, and other powers will be to ensure, in the collective quest to enhance the EAS, that the concerns and interests of the smaller players are not ignored. 

Finally, Japan’s quest for military normalization should not come at the expense of its long association with soft power and quiet diplomacy. In light
of Japan’s longstanding aim to become a normal military power and adopt a more assertive policy toward China, Japan-US security ties are likely to deepen with negative consequences for Asian multilateralism. However, if Japan’s relations with China and South Korea worsen over their island disputes in the East China Sea, Japan risks undermining its relations with the United States. Japan’s ability to balance its normalization with a continued engagement with multilateralism will be crucial to a stable and secure Asia. Japan’s reliance on quiet diplomacy and an implicit regional leadership has equally been instrumental to its achievements in regional integration. Whether and how Japanese leaders are able to combine military normalization with Tokyo’s tried-and-true style of regional engagement in a way that contributes to the peace and stability of the region will be a fundamental test of Japan’s regional leadership.

Notes

3. Respectively, in Takashi Terada, “Directional Leadership in Institution-Building: Japan’s Approaches to ASEAN in the Establishment of PECC and APEC,” Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 195–220; Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century: From Economic Superpower to What Power? (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); and Alan Rix, “Japan and the Region: Leading from Behind,” in Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?, ed. Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 65. Non-military in orientation, directional leadership is an implicit political strategy saddled with security implications, which Japan has been able to pursue relatively unopposed because of its traditional self-image as a “peace state.” And though postwar Japanese society has been depicted as antimilitaristic—Article 9 of Japan’s postwar constitution is regularly invoked by observers as the embodiment of that national sentiment—Japan has presumably been able to maintain such a stance because of its alliance with the United States. See, Bhubhindar Singh, Japan’s Security Identity: From a Peace State to an International State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); and Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 92–121.


9. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?”


12. As Paul Midford has explained, it is difficult to date the start of the Yoshida Doctrine since Prime Minister Yoshida never formally announced his strategy much less suggested it was his own. Midford further provides a useful distinction between the Yoshida and Fukuda doctrines: the first (Yoshida Doctrine) is an implicit grand strategy, whereas the second (Fukuda Doctrine) is an explicit diplomatic doctrine. Paul Midford, *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 193.


17. Ibid.


22. The term is used in Evelyn Goh and Amitav Acharya, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and US-China Relations: Comparing Chinese and American Positions,” in *Fifth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable on Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2002).


27. Quoted in Kuniko Ashizawa, Japan, the US, and Regional Institution-Building in the New Asia: When Identity Matters (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 125.


33. Notably, Koizumi first proposed the EAC idea in 2002, but Malaysia rejected it due to Koizumi’s inclusion of Australia at a time when there were brewing political tensions between Kuala Lumpur and Canberra, not least those caused by travel warnings covering certain Southeast Asian countries issued by Canberra following the Bali bombings in October 2002.

34. Quoted in Takashi Terada, “Security Partnership: Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance with the United States?” in The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Takashi Inoguchi, Yoichiro Sato (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 222. The bilateral goodwill was reciprocated as recently as October 2013, when Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop noted that her government welcomes “the direction that the Abe government has taken in terms of having a more normal defense posture and being able to take a constructive role in regional and global security.” Quoted in Kirk Spitzer, “Why Japan Wants to Break Free of Its Pacifist Past,” Time, October 22, 2013.

35. Japan-sponsored organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) produced comparative studies on the anticipated economic benefits of the CEPEA and the EAFTA. One such study by two eminent economists from the Tokyo-based ADB Institute concluded, unsurprisingly, that ‘consolidation into a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia at the ASEAN+6 level would yield the largest gains


38. Samuels, Securing Japan, 165.

39. Ibid., 165–6.

40. Ibid., 166.


46. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism.

47. Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or a Radical Leap?” CSGR (Warwick University) Working Paper no. 104/02 (August 2002).

48. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power.


50. Singh, Japan’s Security Identity.


52. Linda Sieg and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan to Bolster Military, Boost Asia Ties to Counter China,” Reuters, December 17, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-japan-security-idUSBRE9BGo2S20131217. Abe pledged at the December 2012 elections, which he won, to implement a more assertive foreign policy and to build a stronger...


56. Hughes, “Japan’s Response to China’s Rise.”

57. Memorably, Abe’s first stint in office in 2006–2007 was cut short because of this larger agenda. Tabuchi, “With Shrine Visit, Leader Asserts Japan’s Track From Pacifism.”


59. Bosco, “Entrapment and Abandonment in Asia.”


61. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda famously pledged that Japan would never become a military power.


65. Ibid.


68. Terada, “Directional Leadership in Institution-Building.”


70. Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations, 219.


73. Ibid.
