

COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS FOR THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA



SEMINAR

OKINAWA REVERSION:
ITS LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS
—PAST AND FUTURE—
MAY 13—14, 1992 HOTEL OKURA, TOKYO, JAPAN

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The Significance of the Seminar on the Commemoration of the Reversion of Okinawa

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The Battle of Okinawa, fought over an 80-day period in April-June 1945, was one of the major historical events symbolically marking the closing days of the Pacific War (1936-1945). Many of the fierce battles fought during that war have earned special recognition in the annals of military history, and each and every one of them has been deeply engraved into the Japanese consciousness. The Battle of Okinawa, however, having been fought within the frontiers of Japan itself and having ensnared many ordinary citizens in its maelstrom, has an extraordinary and unequalled significance for the Japanese. Furthermore, the fact that Okinawa remained under the control of the U.S. military so long after the war has given the name 'Okinawa' an even greater symbolic place in Japanese memories of the Pacific War: A considerable amount of time passed before Japan's post-war history was able to move beyond the page headed 'the Battle of Okinawa'. In the summer of 1965, Sato Eisaku, the first Japanese Prime Minister ever to visit Okinawa, proclaimed that "without the reversion of Okinawa [to Japanese control] there can be no end to 'the post-war period'", and he certainly spoke for a great number of Japanese citizens of similar conviction.

Japan was officially released from occupation by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and on 28 April 1952 it rejoined the international community. Twenty years later, on 15 May 1972, Okinawa was returned to Japan. With the passage of yet another two decades, we scheduled an academic seminar for May 1992 to provide both American and Japanese scholars an

opportunity to reconsider from a variety of angles the significance of the reversion of Okinawa. Today, forty years after the conclusion of the peace treaty marking the end of the Pacific War, Japan occupies a very important place both globally and within Asia. As the international community undertakes the fashioning of a new world order, we believe it important to examine post-war Japanese diplomacy, U.S.-Japan relations, and the history of international relations in Asia as a whole in looking back upon how the road was paved for Okinawa's reversion and what impact that episode has had on U.S.-Japan relations and international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. From an academic standpoint, this 20th anniversary was a one-time opportunity to conduct interviews with persons directly involved in the reversion and to organize essential documentation an opportunity that we could not afford to let pass.

Naturally, numerous approaches can be taken in assessing the historical significance of Okinawa's reversion. The question of the place of the Okinawa problem in the context of Japan's post-war history has already been mentioned. Quite frankly, Okinawa was one of the post-war issues that should have been resolved in the peace treaty with Japan but was not. Unlike other problems of the post-war period, this issue was one tied very closely to U.S.-Japan relations after the peace treaty. Though the call of the residents of Okinawa for a 'return to the motherland' went unheeded during ratification of the peace treaty, the treaty's recognition of Japan's 'potential sovereignty' left the door

partially open. Final settlement of the issue of Okinawa's status, however, was left to the future of U.S.-Japan relations. In other words, the leaders of both Japan and the U.S. linked the fate of Okinawa to future developments in relations between the two countries. For that reason alone, the story of Okinawa is itself the story of post-war U.S.-Japan relations.

How should one interpret, from such a standpoint, the reversion of Okinawa two decades after the peace treaty? For the residents of Okinawa these years undoubtedly meant extremely long perseverance. If one accepts that it is the duty of the state to treat its people without discrimination, then the fact that this duty went unfulfilled for a period of 20 years clearly leaves only Japan to blame. The special efforts expended by the Japanese government since reversion to bring *hondo-nami* (mainland standards) to Okinawa—as a first step in its Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan—stem from the past inability to support Okinawa.

Was there really no way of dealing with this issue after the peace treaty other than thrusting Okinawa into the context of U.S.-Japan relations and leaving it under the continued control of the U.S.? From the very start, there were people in both the U.S. and Japan who advocated the return of Okinawa to Japanese administrative authority, asserting that American possession of military bases on Okinawa in compliance with the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement, as with its bases in 'mainland' Japan, would sufficiently protect American military interests. Unrestricted use of the Okinawa bases, free from any political considerations due an autonomous Japan, however, was seen by the U.S. as incomparably valuable to its Cold War aims. In addition, the perceptions of American political leaders regarding Japan's reservations about the U.S.' military role, even within the basic framework of the U.S.-Japan Friendship Treaty, made the U.S. increasingly reluctant to give up unrestricted use of its Okinawa bases. Consequently, the keystone of the U.S.' Okinawa policy was that Okinawa could not be turned over to Japan until the dark clouds of danger over the free world dispersed and a clear sky appeared on the Far East horizon. This was

the political atmosphere in Washington when in 1965 Prime Minister Sato, during his visit to Naha, gave voice to the Japanese people's hopes for Okinawa's reversion.

The Sato-Johnson Joint Communiqué of 1967 promised to decide the timing of a reversion of Okinawa "within a few years"; after two or three years"; after two years had passed, a basic consensus was reached in the 1969 Sato-Nixon meetings on a 'non-nuclear/hondo nami' reversion. These were indeed remarkable developments. The conclusive factor behind the American decision was a recognition that any immediate benefits to be gained by insisting on the unrestricted use of Okinawa would be far outweighed by the problems this would likely cause the maintenance of sound U.S.-Japan relations. For the rationalists, who believed that this was the proper course for U.S.-Japan relations, the resolution of the Okinawa issue in this fashion was perhaps no more than what should have been done?. Nevertheless, it is not an easy thing to abandon benefits already in hand in the hopes of gaining vague and uncertain long-term benefits, even more so when the interests of such an enormous organization as the U.S. military are involved.

From the vantage of hindsight, one notices that just about the time that American political decision makers commenced secret preparations to make the reversion of Okinawa the next item on the U.S.-Japan agenda, U.S. relations with China began to see improvement. It would not be in the least unusual to imagine that some connection existed between these two occurrences. However, as far as we have been able to confirm with American government officials at that time, including Secretary of State Kissinger, there is no evidence for the existence of any such 'rational model' of political decision making; the Okinawa issue was always confined within the limits of U.S.-Japan relations. This means, therefore, that improved Sino-U.S. relations and the subsequent appearance of blue skies on the Far East horizon were not directly responsible for making the reversion of Okinawa possible. Indeed, from the standpoint of U.S. military authorities still bogged down in the

Vietnam war, any policy change that would endanger the military value of Okinawa was certainly out of the question.

The withdrawal of nuclear weapons (Mace B) deployed in Okinawa was a similar issue. We know today that the utility of this type of nuclear weapon had already dropped considerably by this time and that this fact was common knowledge among specialists in the field and even known to some degree outside the field. In other words, the military technological obstacles to the reversion of a non-nuclear Okinawa had already been lowered. While this was certainly so, again things did not proceed along a straight line plotted by some 'rational model' of political decision-making.

Pointing out the objective factors (related to the international atmosphere and military technology) that accelerated progress towards a reversion of Okinawa, even if we suppose that political decision makers were aware of these factors but did not act on them, in and of itself has meaning. More important, though, is the ability of political leaders to take advantage of the opportunities born of the changes in these objective factors (such opportunities normally seem insignificant at first), to set a definite course, and to bring the issue to a clear outcome. In the shadows of the accomplishments of these political leaders, though, stand the uncelebrated devotion and talent of the countless people who assisted them. Walking back along the road to Okinawa's reversion, one is deeply impressed by the presence of these people and the major and minor dramas in which they acted. The processes leading up to the diplomatic negotiations on Okinawa's reversion required extremely delicate handling, bringing to mind a number of surgeons at work. Just as in surgery, where it is practically impossible to create a completely germ-free environment, success in diplomatic relations often relies a great deal on luck.

Continuing with this analogy, how should the results of the reversion negotiations be evaluated? In the sense that the surgeons were able to remove a potentially cancerous growth from the U.S.-Japan relationship before it was too late, the operation was a success. In light of

the various frictions that have arisen since, what would have happened to U.S.-Japan relations had the Okinawa problem been left unresolved? (One can well imagine the effects on U.S.-Japan relations if, given such a situation, the U.S. military commander at Okinawa were to announce that a continued American military presence in post-Cold War Asia was needed to prevent the military resurgence of Japan) The series of accords and agreements resulting from the Okinawa negotiations was, like most diplomatic negotiations, the product of difficult compromises, and if one looks hard enough it would not be difficult to find some imperfect sutures. The Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam clauses and the vague wording on the redeployment of nuclear weapons were all subjects of debate at the time. These external factors were certainly capable of inflaming the sutures, but with time these stitches healed over to become relatively unnoticed scars. In the end, the results of diplomatic negotiations, as those of surgery, are determined by the recuperative state of the patient, and success or failure must be evaluated from a long-term perspective.

How, then, did U.S.-Japan relations fare after this major surgery? As mentioned earlier, the Okinawa reversion lies at the midpoint of the 40-year history of post-treaty U.S.-Japan relations. Comparing U.S.-Japan relations before and after Okinawa's reversion, one can quickly conclude that Japan's political role in the Asia-Pacific region has seen remarkable expansion; U.S. expectations of a more active role for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region entered greatly into the decision to return Okinawa. In a manner of speaking, the Okinawa reversion signified the U.S.' choice of a trusting relationship with Japan as the basis of its future Asian policy. Such a U.S.-Japan partnership was in itself an expression of the expectations that U.S. leaders had of Japan, using the Okinawa reversion as collateral. Naturally the specific nature of the partnership was not clearly determined at the onset, and was indeed something that would have to be gradually defined through later developments in U.S.-Japan relations. This is an ongoing process, and no final judgment can yet be handed down on the

consequences. However, it is evident that Japan has accepted more political responsibility in Asia since the reversion and that the U.S.-Japan partnership has taken on even greater importance for international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

Social and economic changes in Okinawa in the 20 years since reversion have on the whole been for the better, though Okinawa does continue to host an enormous American military base. Most importantly, Okinawa has been restored to its status as a prefecture of Japan,

giving its people a feeling of contentment as well as of pride. In this sense, too, the operation can be deemed a success. Today, as Japan attempts to fulfill an important role in the Asia-Pacific region, hopes are high that its southernmost prefecture, Okinawa, will lend the vigor of its own historical and cultural heritage to this task.

I have attempted in this very limited space to comment on the final report and accompanying documentation from the U.S.-Japan Academic Seminar; I sincerely hope that readers will find it useful.

CHAPTER 1

The Cold War in Asia

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1. Europe and Asia

The Cold War began and ended in Europe. The Cold War is a term most suitable to describe the characteristics of European (European-Atlantic) international relations of some forty years that took shape soon after the end of World War II. How suitable it is as a concept for Asian (Asia-Pacific) international relations is another matter. In European international relations, there was a symmetry of the two blocs, the western bloc led by the United States and the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. The conflict and rivalry of those two blocs dominated international issues in Europe, and these conflicts remained "cold," sparing Europe from war for more than forty years. Thus the Cold War era in Europe, which we may consider continued from 1947 to 1989, was a period of "long peace."

During the Cold War era, the situation in Asia was quite different from Europe, and it still is. Although the conflict and rivalry between the two superpowers spread into Asia, this rivalry was not as dominant as in Europe. In Asia, there was no solid U.S. or Soviet bloc. There was no unity among the U.S. allies in Asia. They were a heterogeneous group of countries tied only with the United States through bilateral arrangements. Unlike the American allies in Europe, which were blessed with stable liberal democratic regimes, most of the American allies in Asia maintained authoritarian regimes. Moreover, some of America's Asian allies, such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, did not get along well with each other because of the memory of Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Union did not dominate the communist countries in Asia as it

did in Eastern Europe. Unlike in Europe, the largest, most populous country in the region, the People's Republic of China, soon became a giant in the Communist world. Rivalries between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China soon developed, and the two lesser communist countries in Asia, North Korea and former North Vietnam, were therefore able to maintain more independence than their European counterparts.

There were two cold wars in Asia. The U.S.-Chinese cold war as well as the Asian dimension of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. If the term "cold war" can be applied to a hostile power struggle between powers with similar ideologies, we may say there was a third cold war in Asia, the Sino-Soviet cold war which developed by the 1970s.

The most populous country in Asia, China experienced a large-scale revolutionary civil war between the Nationalist regime and the Communist forces, and several other countries were confronted with armed revolutionary movements from time to time. In addition, there were two "hot" wars in which U.S. military forces were directly involved, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In contrast with Europe, where no country experienced an internal armed conflict (excepting Greece), Asia was beset with such conflicts, and two full-fledged wars were fought with the United States as a major participant. The Cold War in Asia is a misnomer unless it means simply that the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a power struggle in Asia but avoided, as in Europe, a direct military engagement.

Since most of America's European allies

had a liberal democratic regime, the United States could certainly claim that its role in the Cold War in Europe was the defense of liberal democratic values. In Asia, many of America's allies appeared to represent reactionary forces, while her adversaries often seemed to represent forces of national liberation and progress. Thus the United States often seemed to be a defender of corrupt and conservative regimes rather than a champion of liberal democracy. The criticism of the American posture in Asia was very strong among the Japanese left and liberals who were pacifists and posed as faithful defenders of the War-renouncing Constitution. They were opposed to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system and fought bitterly against the security treaty revision of 1960, which appeared to make Japan a more active military partner of the United States. The Cold War in Asia divided the Japanese between the pro-American conservatives and the anti-American left. Opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system and America's Asian policy was particularly strong in Okinawa, which remained under U.S. military control.

The status of Okinawa as a territory administered by the United States was unique. There was no equivalent in Europe. The status of Okinawa was a symbol of the hegemonic position of the United States in the Pacific. Even when official Washington considered the U.S. presence in Europe to be temporary, it intended to make the Pacific an "American lake." It was Washington's postwar plan to control the former Japanese mandates as strategic trust territories. Okinawa, too, was considered as a possible trust territory. When the Pacific War ended, the U.S. military was considering retaining Okinawa permanently for military purposes. The United States separated the administration of Okinawa from that of mainland Japan from the beginning, firmly kept the islands under the military control, and tried to foster Okinawan separatism for a while. Although the United States practically lost interest in making Okinawa a U.S. trust territory by 1951, Article Three of the San Francisco Peace Treaty reflected America's earlier interest in trusteeship.

2. The Coming of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War in Asia

Because the Cold War was not a real war, it cannot be exactly determined when it started and when it ended. The question of its beginning and ending dates is closely related to the question of its definition. As a matter of fact, the state of Cold War was declared by international journalism, not by the two superpowers. Although most historians agree that the Cold War began soon after World War II and had definitely begun by the time of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, their opinions vary with regard to its end. Every time there was a certain degree of détente between the two superpowers, it was said that the Cold War was over. It was said in 1955, when an East-West summit was held ten years after the end of World War II; in 1963, when the partial nuclear test-ban treaty was signed; and in 1972, when Richard Nixon visited both Beijing and Moscow and agreed with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to develop U.S.-Soviet relations. I once wrote that the Cold War was over in 1972. Each time détente deteriorated later. In 1989, however, the communist regimes in most of the East European countries collapsed and the Berlin Wall came down. People began to say that the Cold War had come to an end at last. It may be said that the fall of the Wall, the symbol of Cold War stability, symbolically marked the end of the Cold War and opened a new hopeful, but turbulent, era for Europe. Even if some suspected the Cold War had not ended in 1989, it certainly ended in 1991 when the Communist party was disbanded in the Soviet Union and subsequently the Soviet Union itself was dissolved.

Instead of mere détente, a great structural change took place this time. Formerly, the Cold War was defined in terms of mutual perceptions of U.S.-Soviet relations. Professor Yonosuke Nagai, for instance, defined the Cold War as a hostile relationship in which both sides recognized the impossibility of a negotiated settlement of their conflicts and attempted to defend their respective interests through unilateral actions. If this definition is adopted, the end of the Cold War should be dated early, perhaps in 1955. If we set the end of the Cold

War in 1989, we must define the Cold War in terms of the structure of international relations: the rivalry between the U.S.-led Western liberal democratic bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern communist bloc which shaped the basic structure of international relations. The rivalry was sometimes very intense, sometimes more relaxed; nevertheless, it always existed as the fundamental condition of international relations. Such a structure existed in Europe, but not in Asia.

The beginning of the Cold War made it difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on Asian issues as well as European issues. They disagreed over problems relating to the administration of Korea and the occupation policy toward Japan. Because of their disagreement, the creation of two Koreas became inevitable. In Japan, the United States was able to ignore Soviet opposition and reorient occupation policy toward rebuilding Japan as a potential ally. In this sense, the Cold War spread to Asia. But the United States did not draw the line against Communist expansion in Asia for a while. Although the United States and the Soviet Union established rival regimes in Korea, they were able to agree at least to withdraw their respective military forces from the peninsula. When a civil war developed in China between the Nationalist government and the Communist forces, Washington did not invoke the Truman Doctrine to aid the former. Instead, Washington pursued a policy of giving minimum aid to the Nationalists just to placate the pro-Nationalists in Congress.

It was in respect to Europe that Harry S. Truman had to create a Cold War atmosphere at home with his famous address to launch a new policy to contain Soviet expansion. In Asia, he saw no necessity for a dramatic policy change. He rather resisted pressure to apply the framework of the Cold War to the Chinese civil war. The United States would not try to prevent the Chinese Communists from winning the civil war. Even if it was possible, it would be very costly for the United States, and the Truman administration did not consider it a sensible policy to divert to China excessive resources, which were needed in more vitally important

Europe. When the Nationalists seemed doomed, Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson only hoped that the Communists, the new masters of China, would pursue a policy independent from the Soviet Union.

As Acheson stated in January 1950, America's defensive perimeter in the Pacific ran from the Aleutians to the Philippines, through Japan and Okinawa. Because of her industrial and military potential, Japan was the most important asset for the United States in Asia. Okinawa was also very important, because it offered strategic bases for the U.S. military. Once Okinawa had been eyed as a future U.S. outpost to keep postwar Japan on a leash. But the island chain became a keystone in the defensive perimeter against the Communist countries in Asia. Neither South Korea nor Taiwan, on the other hand, was included within the perimeter. It was unclear whether the United States would defend South Korea if it was attacked by communist forces. As for Taiwan, in January 1950 Truman declared the United States would not intervene if the island was attacked by the Chinese Communists, hoping the Chinese would pursue an independent policy. The theme of the famous Acheson speech in which he mentioned the defensive perimeter was U.S. respect for Asian nationalism. It was a message to Beijing that, if Beijing was not going to align itself with Moscow, Washington would not take a hostile attitude toward Beijing. But Beijing concluded an alliance with Moscow in February 1950. Washington's hope for a more or less neutral China was lost, at least for the time being.

3. The United States and the Korea War

The Cold War era roughly corresponds to the Pax Americana. It was the age during which the United States played the role of the global policeman. The Soviet Union played the role of policeman only within its own bloc. It used its military forces to crush rebellions in Hungary in 1955 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Until the Soviet Union intervened in 1979 in Afghanistan, which it considered within its sphere, its forces had not engaged in a protracted war. U.S. military forces were more active in the Cold War world. First they fought a limited but full-fledged

war in Korea from 1950 through 1953. In 1954, the United States was on the verge of another war in Indochina. It did not actually fight that time, but 11 years later it involved itself in a long, bitter war in Vietnam.

Because the Soviet diplomatic archives are in the process of being opened to historians, the degree of Soviet involvement in the decision to instigate a war in Korea may soon be known. Probably the initiative to make war against the South came from Pyong-yang. But Moscow was certainly consulted and approved the plan. If the North Koreans were successful, it would enhance Soviet prestige in Asia. If they failed, it would not affect the vital interests of the Soviet Union. Both North Korea and the Soviet Union gambled on a quick military conquest of South Korea. Since the North Koreans aimed to create a fait accompli before the United States could begin any effective counteraction, they could not wait too long. The United States was planning to strengthen its military position in East Asia: it had concluded a mutual security assistance agreement with South Korea; it was to begin negotiating a separate peace treaty with Japan to make the latter an American ally; and it had begun improving military bases in Okinawa. But the United States did not yet appear prepared to take speedy military action in Korea. Therefore, June 1950 may have seemed to the North Koreans to be a good time to begin a war.

The concept of a defensive perimeter was a product of the military thinking that anticipated a third world war whose main theatre would be Europe. Thus official Washington was confronted with a new situation it had not anticipated. But Washington quickly responded to the outbreak of war in Korea. Because North Korea began the war with an all-out offensive, it was a clear case of military aggression. The United States could not remain inactive in the face of such an act of overt aggression. Its inaction would weaken U.S. prestige in Asia, particularly in Japan and the Philippines. The failure of the United States to act promptly in the face of communist aggression against its own client state might affect the confidence of Western European nations in the United States. Thus the Truman administration acted quickly.

Thanks to the absence of a Soviet representative in the U.N. Security Council, U.S. forces were able to act under the banner of the United Nations in accordance with a resolution of the Security Council.

As an orthodox war between regular armed forces, the Korea War was the kind of conflict the United States had become accustomed to fighting in the two world wars. Thus U.S. forces were soon able to turn the tide of war against North Korea. When U.S. forces seemed to be able to pacify the northern part of the peninsula, the Chinese army massively intervened, and U.S. forces were forced to retreat to the southern edge of the peninsula. But the U.S. side was able to resume an offensive to stabilize the front line around the 38th parallel by the spring of 1951. The new feature of the Korean War in the American experience was its nature as a limited war. Even when U.S. troops were forced to retreat to the southern edge of the peninsula, Washington did not want to extend the war into Chinese territory. It did not want to get involved in a large-scale war in Asia against a secondary enemy and weaken its position in Europe against its primary adversary, the Soviet Union.

The outbreak of the Korean War changed U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The United States sent the 7th fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent attack from the continent. The action was called "neutralization" of the strait so as not to unduly antagonize the People's Republic. When Chinese troops intervened in the Korean War, the People's Republic became an enemy of the United States. The fact that the United States and the People's Republic fought a "hot" war in Korea was the most important determinant of the nature of the Sino-American cold war. It became out of the question for Washington to recognize the Beijing regime. It was significant that Chinese, not Soviet, forces entered the war when North Korea was about to fall under U.S. military control. Washington understood that the Soviet Union would not employ its own military forces, only those of its proxies to achieve its expansionist aims in East Asia. In Washington's view, China was a Soviet junior partner that was willing to play a more active role than the Soviet Union in communist military expansion in Asia.

The United States became even more hostile toward the People's Republic, whose army had been engaged with U.S. forces in fierce battles in Korea, than toward the Soviet Union.

The outbreak of the Korean War did not delay the peace settlement with Japan. It became more urgent than ever for the United States to have Japan as a partner in East Asia. Thus the San Francisco Peace Conference was called in September 1951. It was not simply an occasion to end the Pacific War formally. The purpose of the peace settlement was to make Japan an American ally. The United States persuaded most of Japan's former enemies to grant Japan a generous peace. But it was not a comprehensive peace. Because of the cold- and hot-war situation, no Chinese government was invited to the conference, and neither the Soviet Union nor its East European allies signed the peace treaty. The Korean War strengthened the desire of the U.S. military to maintain bases it could use a freely in territory under its own administration. Thus the peace treaty granted the United States the right to administer Okinawa, although the United States did not deny Japan's residual sovereignty over Okinawa. Because the United States intended to make Japan a partner in the Cold War, it became unwise for the United States to detach Okinawa from her permanently. American officials suggested that the United States would return the islands to Japan in some future in spite of the provision of the Okinawa article of the peace treaty. The United States wanted to administer the islands indefinitely while placating Japanese irredentism.

4. The United States and the Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was quite different from the Korean War. It developed in dissimilar circumstances and differed in nature. The Cold War in Europe stabilized after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations, which had reached a peak during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, were greatly reduced in 1963, when the partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Many spoke of the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet relations had visibly deteriorated. Since

China was more openly hostile to the United States, U.S. leaders began to single out China as the major menace to be contained in East Asia in 1963.

In the mid-1960s, Americans did not have a sense of crisis comparable to that which had prevailed at the outbreak of the Korean War, since there was no longer a monolithic Communist bloc. Everyone had assumed a Soviet decision was behind the North Korean attack, but no one believed that North Vietnam was an agent of the Soviet Union. In view of China's advocacy of anti-American revolutions for national liberation, it was more plausible to argue that the North Vietnamese and their southern allies were under Chinese influence. But this was not convincing because of the very limited Chinese aid to North Vietnam and because of Vietnam's historic animosity toward China. North Vietnam seemed really to be an independent actor. Thus officially, Washington was able to emphasize only North Vietnamese aggression toward South Vietnam. But this was not so apparent either, since the war in Vietnam was a guerilla war. There was no dramatic invasion of the South by regular Vietnamese troops. Most of the North Vietnamese soldiers sneaked into South Vietnam under the guise of South Vietnamese National Liberation fighters.

The United States public and the Congress supported military involvement in Vietnam at first despite the lack of a sense of serious threat or of overt aggression from North Vietnam, because Americans had been accustomed by that time to the use of American military forces to contain communist expansion in various parts of the world. Because of the absence of a sense of serious threat, however, they could not support a large-scale war in Vietnam for long, particularly a war fought with a large army of drafted youths. Because a guerilla war was not the kind of war the United States could fight with skill, the United States was unable to win the war. Although the United States had at one time more than 500,000 soldiers in South Vietnam, it failed in its pacifying mission. Americans began to question the moral and practical basis of the Vietnam War. To cope with the rise of a vigorous antiwar movement and the decline of

domestic support for the war, the Nixon administration found it necessary to substantially reduce U.S. forces in Vietnam well before the armistice agreement was finally signed in January 1973. The armistice was really a victory for the North Vietnamese. They succeeded in absorbing South Vietnam in little more than two years. But their victory turned out to be an empty one. They went on to wage a war in Cambodia to install a government of their choice. Meanwhile, they let many Vietnamese leave the country as "boat people." Engaged in war perpetually and isolated from the world (except for the Soviet Union), the Vietnamese remained mired in a poverty that contrasted sharply with the prosperity the ASEAN nations achieved in the 1980s. Vietnamese victory was the last hurrah for revolutions of national liberation. After Vietnam, such revolutions lost their charm for the Third World. The Americans wasted sizable resources in the Vietnam War, but the Vietnamese lost much more for a vain victory. This was the tragic irony of the Vietnam War.

Just as the outbreak of the Korean War had triggered the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, failure in Vietnam led to a degree of demilitarization. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger began a new policy toward the Communist World, which emphasized the use of creative diplomacy as its instrument. During the Vietnam War, the United States did not call on Japan to make an active military contribution to the Vietnam War, understanding the latter's constitutional limitations. But it needed more active political support from Japan for its East Asian policy. Partly to secure Japan as a permanent ally, the Johnson administration promised Japan that the United States would return Okinawa to Japan in the near future. Nixon's decision to disengage gradually from Vietnam facilitated the early reversion of Okinawa. Thus the two "hot" wars in Asia had considerable impact upon the political fate of Okinawa. The reversion, however, did not completely satisfy the Okinawans who wished to see U.S. bases much reduced in the islands. Nevertheless, it tamed the anti-American movement in both Okinawa and Japan proper.

5. 1972—A Great Turning Point in Asia-Pacific International Relations

In 1972, Nixon's new policy toward the Communist World marked a dramatic development. His visit to China signaled the end of the U.S.-Chinese cold war. His summit with Brezhnev opened a new phase of U.S.-Soviet détente. The impact of Nixon's new policy was limited in Europe, for West European countries had achieved their own détente with the Soviet Union and other East European neighbors. Its impact was much greater in East Asia, for Sino-American antagonism has been a very important factor in East Asian international relations.

The sudden announcement of what appeared to be Sino-American rapprochement without any prior notice or consultation in 1971 was a shock to Japan and other American allies in East Asia. But the Chinese leadership was interested in building up relations with Japan as well as the United States to improve the diplomatic position of their country, which was in a cold war with the Soviet Union. Because of the Sino-American rapprochement, Japan felt free to seek to establish formal diplomatic relation with the People's Republic of China, severing its diplomatic relationship with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. With the establishment of diplomatic relations in September 1972, the period in which the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty had been incompatible with Sino-Japanese friendship was over. This change also mellowed the conflicts in Japanese domestic politics. The only remaining cold war in East Asia appeared to be the Sino-Soviet cold war. Indochina after the Vietnam War became a theater of this Sino-Soviet conflict, in which the Soviet Union came to support Vietnamese expansionism while China was vigorously opposed to it.

6. The Impact of the End of the European Cold War on Asia

Taking advantage of the reluctance of post-Vietnam United States intervene in Third World countries, the Soviet Union tried actively to extend its influence in the Third World, involving itself in conflicts in Third World countries. Such a policy seemed to extend the

Soviet sphere. But it also increased the country's financial burden and, in the case of Afghanistan, led the Soviets into a prolonged anti-guerilla war. The Soviet expansionist drive of the 1970s, which reached its culmination in the Afghanistan intervention, provoked the United States to increase its defense expenditures again and take countermeasures in the Third World. Thus U.S.-Soviet relations fell into a state one might term a "new cold war." in the first half of the 1980s. The United States pursued a policy of destabilizing the Soviet-supported regimes in the various countries, trading places with the Soviet Union, which had previously helped revolutionary forces destabilize U.S.-supported regimes.

Meanwhile, considerable change was taking place in the domestic and foreign economic policy of the People's Republic. It began to develop trade relations vigorously with the capitalist nations and build up a market-oriented domestic economy. The planned economy of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was rather stagnant in the 1970s and 1980s. When the economies of industrial democracies began to recover from the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the gaps in technological and productive capability between the West and the Soviet Union became visible. The rude awakening of the Soviet leadership to this fact brought forth the Gorbachev Revolution, the unexpected development of which finally resulted in the demise not only of the Soviet bloc but also of the Soviet Union itself.

This development fundamentally changed the structure of international relations in Europe. Its impact on international relations in East Asia was considerable, but very limited in scope compared with the great change in Europe. After all, the presence of the Soviet Union was much less important in East Asia than in Europe. U.S.-Soviet rivalry was only part of the whole picture of international relations in East Asia. The end of the Cold War removed this source of tension in East Asian international relations. Gorbachev's reorientation of Soviet foreign policy in a peaceful direction also brought forth the end of the Soviet-Chinese cold war. The future of the countries which inherited the various portions of

the Soviet Union is still uncertain. Whatever happens, however, it will not shake East Asia so profoundly as it will shake Europe.

Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did not bring similar changes among the communist states in Asia. Only Mongolia, which had been a client state of the Soviet Union, experienced a democratic revolution which ended the one-party control of the Communists. China was affected by the fever of democracy, but it managed to maintain the authoritarian regime of the Communist Party by suppressing the democratic activists. Although the West imposed mild economic sanctions upon China after the Tiananmen massacre, the Chinese leadership continued the policy of developing a market economy, and recently has confirmed its commitment to the policy.

One-party rule has survived also in North Korea and Vietnam. However, this does not mean that the end of the Cold War did not affect North Korea and Vietnam. The Soviet Union, later Russia, and East European countries developed relations with South Korea, and the People's Republic, too, began to trade with the South Koreans. Spurred by these developments, politically isolated and economically stagnant North Korea began to attempt to improve its relations with the United States and Japan. It became more serious about developing dialogue with the republic in the south. Vietnam, which had been involved in a war in Cambodia with Soviet aid, began to pursue a more peaceful policy in Cambodia and a policy of economic development at home. The poverty of war-weary Vietnam has contrasted sharply with the prosperous ASEAN countries in the past decade. In recent years, Vietnam has improved its relations with ASEAN countries and Japan and expressed its hope to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. Thus tensions have been reduced in both the Korean peninsula and Indochina.

Since the United States no longer regards the Russian navy as a menace in the Pacific, Washington has lost interest in securing the military bases in the Philippines at a high price. Washington appears to think it can afford a partial military withdrawal from Asia. In this

situation, Washington had better consider scaling down the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. As the Filipinos were more inclined to end the U.S. military presence after the end of the Cold War, the passing of the Cold War era has certainly strengthened the desire of the people in Okinawa to reduce the size of the U.S. military facilities which still occupy much of their land.

The end of the Cold War did not bring to East Asia such a victory of liberal democratic ideals as Europe witnessed. Even among the non-communist states, liberal democracy does not yet prevail. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War has not produced in East Asia such a state of profound confusion as now exists in Yugoslavia or such political instability as now threatens Russia. Thus the international scene in East Asia seems to be more serene than that of Europe. But Europe has a framework of cooperation in the forms of the European Community and NATO, which developed during the Cold War era. The importance of NATO is declining, but the EC will remain as the core stabilizing force in post-Cold War Europe. Non-communist countries in East Asia did not develop a solid general framework of cooperation which can serve as the core stabilizing force. Besides, countries in East Asia do not share a common political and cultural tradition. Although there are some promising developments, such as APEC, it is more difficult to institutionalize cooperative relations in East

Asia. Therefore it is important for Japan and the United States to maintain cooperative relations as the core stabilizing force in post-Cold War East Asia. However, the end of the Cold War deprived U.S.-Japanese relations of a lid on economic friction. Given the increasingly inward-looking tendency of the American public, it is somewhat doubtful whether the United States will have much interest in forming a cooperative framework for Asia-Pacific international relations in the future. The end of the Cold War also removed a strategic link from U.S.-Chinese relations. Together with the Tiananmen incident, the end of the Cold War weakened U.S. interest in close relations with China. Having improved relations with Russia, China, too, considers friendly relations with the United States less important. While there are movements for closer relationships among nations in the Asia-Pacific region, there are also centrifugal forces affecting once closer relationships among them. Although there is now no acute crisis in East Asia, there are clouds which make the future shape of Asia-Pacific international relations uncertain.

Note: In this paper, the Cold War between U.S.-led western bloc and Soviet-led communist bloc is capitalized. When the term is used in such a context as the 'U.S.-Chinese cold war' or the 'Sino-Soviet cold war,' it is written in small letters.

CHAPTER 2

Vietnam: Reflections and Lessons

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My assigned topic is the disastrous war in Vietnam: what lessons, if any, came out of that war and have we in fact learned those lessons?

The overall framework for this session is the Cold War in Asia, and it is fitting that my topic comes under that heading: the most salient characteristic of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam was that two U.S. administrations, the Lyndon Johnson and the Richard Nixon administrations, saw the initial Viet Cong insurgency and the later full scale military engagement with North Vietnamese forces as an integral part of the Cold War. A senior member of Lyndon Johnson's staff explained to me that the 17th parallel was an extension of the Potsdam agreement. We were committed to holding the line at that parallel just as we were committed to hold the line at the Elbe or at the border between Greece and Bulgaria.

Strangely, this conception appeared to entail the view not only that the war was an integral part of the Cold War, but that North Vietnam was an integral part of a monolithic and almost seamless Communist block. And this was even after the split between China and the Soviet Union had become visible to the outside world as both bitter and probably irreversible.

I doubt whether the North Vietnamese were much concerned with whether they were part of the Cold War or not. However willing and eager they were to receive material assistance from the Soviet Union, they were unlikely to think of themselves as any kind of satellite, or even as another Cuba. Their own relations with China were clearly incompatible with any thought of a Moscow-Beijing-Hanoi axis. Any interests they

had in Cambodia and other neighboring nations were surely interests of their own, not interests subordinate to the interests of Moscow. And they could only have shaken their heads in puzzlement if told that the 17th parallel created in the 1950s as a national boundary was in any way a spiritual descendant of the conference at Potsdam.

That the North Vietnamese construed the stakes and the issues altogether differently from the way the U.S. government construed them, especially in identifying the struggle in Vietnam with the Cold War, does not itself invalidate an American interpretation at the time that what was at stake at the 17th parallel was exactly what was at stake at the 38th parallel twenty years earlier. But it does raise the question whether the United States was obliged to see that connection and to respond accordingly. And it prompts the question whether, if indeed the 17th parallel acquired the symbolic status of the 38th parallel, it had already acquired that status at the time Indochina was divided in the 1950s or it had acquired that status as a consequence of the U.S. involvement—even as a result of the U.S. government's choice to construe the struggle in Vietnam as part of the Cold War.

The issue here is one of expectations and interpretations: whether the United States had to defend its honor, its reputation, and its commitments to allies around the world by defending South Vietnam at whatever cost is largely a matter of whether Germans and Greeks and South Koreans and Russians and Chinese perceive the struggle in that fashion. And if they did, that must be because the United States

government manifested and articulated that symbolism and that interpretation just as Ho Chi Minh articulated the struggle as a test whether a poor Asian socialist country could outlast a rich American capitalist in a test of military stamina. U.S. leaders called attention to themselves as responding to a Cold War challenge to a seamless boundary surrounding the Soviet bloc.

I belabor the issue because it is a key to the question whether the United States cultivated an unnecessary sense of commitment when it elected to construe the attempts to subvert and invade South Vietnam as part of the Moscow—inspired and Moscow—led Cold War. What “escalated” in Vietnam was not only the commitment of resources and the level of violence and the area of involvement; what escalated also were the stakes in the contest.

It is important to understand how the stakes can come to be raised so high. I perceive at least two mechanisms, mechanisms that work together. One is ‘justification’, the other is ‘deterrence’.

The involvement is justified on grounds that the conflict is not local but worldwide, that the U.S. must meet its commitments here or have its commitments doubted in other places, that as leader of the free world the U.S. has no choice, that this struggle has ramifications for the entire region through a domino process, and has ramifications as far away as Berlin, Greece, and Cuba. The deterrence dimension is the hope of making it clear to the other side that the U.S. commitment is so immense and so obligatory and so unavoidable that the United States has no choice but to stick to the end at whatever cost, the hope being that the other side will recognize the fruitlessness of trying to outlast the United States.

The Cold War is over, and maybe we needn't worry about repeating mistakes that our Cold War thinking led us into. But I am not sure that our Cold War thinking was peculiar to the Cold War. It will almost always be the case when the United States, or an alliance led by the United States contemplates, or engages in, military action that the action contemplated or engaged in has to be justified; and the justification will almost certainly adduce

principles that transcend the concrete local issues. Exalting those principles and dedicating the nation to those principles will almost certainly enlarge the stakes in the game. And usually also, to persuade the opponent that the United States must act unless demands are met or must stay in the contest until some kind of victory is achieved, the United States will have to display and advertise that if it does not rise to the occasion here, other aggressors will be emboldened in other times and places, threatened nations will submit rather than count on American help, and any kind of new world order will lose its infrastructure.

This is a genuine dilemma. The need to find justification in broad principles rather than local interests is genuine and legitimate, and the importance of providing grounds for the belief that the United States and its allies cannot afford to back down should not be minimized. But these two needs are met only at great risk. I can only call attention to the dilemma, I cannot resolve it until I know whether the next occasion is going to be Panmunjom, the 17th parallel, Berlin, Cuba or the Persian Gulf.

A stunning feature of the war in Vietnam was the extraordinary stability of U.S.-Chinese and U.S.-Soviet relations during that entire war. I spent the spring of 1965 in London, reading editorials in *The London Times* and *The Financial Times* and talking with people in government. The most widespread objection to the bombing of North Vietnam was that the bombing so greatly raised the probability that Communist China would intervene; specifically it was almost universally argued that if American aircraft ever went north of Hanoi the Chinese would be impelled to intervene. But the United States regularly had military aircraft within 5 or 10 seconds' flying time of the Chinese border, and I believe there were at least a hundred border crossings recorded in the newspapers, and never a sign that the Chinese would let themselves be provoked into an imprudent military intervention.

It was during that war that U.S. relations with China improved dramatically. And the fact that we were in a bitter and expensive war with a

Soviet ally that the Soviets were materially supporting seemed to have no influence on Soviet-American relations. The Soviets obliged by trying to present no embarrassing targets to American aircraft or naval vessels, and both sides were able to pretend that there was no Soviet personnel at North Vietnamese anti-aircraft sites.

In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis of 1962 the era of Soviet-American or Soviet-NATO crisis was simply over. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 temporarily postponed SALT negotiations, but the war in Vietnam did not keep them from resuming. The imperturbability of both China and the Soviet Union during this period is one of the period's most stunning features.

Similarly striking and significant, though not nearly so astonishing, is the role that nuclear weapons did not play. Remember that early in the Korean War the Prime Minister of Great Britain flew to Washington to beseech President Truman not to consider using nuclear weapons in Korea. Nobody had to importune Lyndon Johnson not to use such weapons in Vietnam. We had come a long way since 1953, when President Eisenhower approved a policy statement, "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." And in 1954, "such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become conventional." And in 1955, "in any combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else."

Ten years later, in September 1964, Lyndon Johnson said, "Make no mistake. There is no such thing as a conventional nuclear weapon. For nineteen peril-filled years no nation has loosed the atom against another. To do so now is a political decision of the highest order." I confess I do not believe that President Eisenhower really meant what he said, but surely by the 1960s almost nobody expected nuclear weapons to be pertinent unless the war escalated way beyond Vietnam.

It is indeed a tribute to how far nuclear expectations had traveled in that decade that hardly anybody remarked, during Vietnam, on the absence of debate about possible use of nuclear weapons. Of course, there may not have been targets that demanded nuclear attacks. But if nuclear weapons were, in Eisenhower's words, "as available for use as other munitions," we should have heard arguments or reports of arguments about targets, means of delivery, yields and burst elevations. No, they were simply not available.

Vietnam reminds us of how exceptionally difficult it can be to get out of a war that one would prefer not to continue. There may be very few points, if any, at which a government can turn around and get out, declaring victory (or defeat) but getting out. Is there any way to identify one of those rare moments? The late spring of 1968 may have been one. Right after the Tet offensive, Washington was full of people who had appeared enthusiasts of the war for several years who were discovering that they had really been against it since even before the Tet offensive. This was a wholly demoralizing setback, particularly to the aspirations and pretensions of military intelligence. It was an easy time to come out and say, "I told you so." Maybe it was unfortunate that it turned out to have been enough of a setback for the other side, too, so that nobody could take advantage of the occasion to develop a consensus and go to the President and say it was time to get out.

President Johnson indeed gave President Nixon an opportunity, and Nixon acted wrongly, not necessarily unwisely, but wrongly in the event. I think he recognized the opportunity; but he wanted to do the right thing, and the right thing meant nothing precipitous, nothing disgraceful, only getting out "with honor." That approach may be just as much of a quagmire as getting in in the first place. If you are flying in the clouds and running out of fuel and don't dare to descend for fear the clouds reach the ground, if you ever see an opening, dive! Probably when there is an opportunity to get out of a war one has to be grasp it promptly, as President Nixon did not.

The lesson that may need to be learned over and over, a lesson that possibly no one can ever apply, is the extraordinary difficulty of pulling out of a situation in which one has invested heavily. Whatever the reasons why the United States got into Vietnam, the ultimate reasons that we were there from late 1965 until the time we finally evacuated was that nobody could persuasively invent a graceful way of getting out. Lyndon Johnson came as close as one might to demonstrating a principle that I have quoted from Ernest May on a number of occasions. That is that "governments" never surrender the wars they fight. New governments have to come in to do the surrendering. Lyndon Johnson let a new government in, and it failed to take advantage.

I do not think the U.S. Government ever seriously studied the option of getting out of Vietnam. The reason I do not think so is not that I have not heard about plans but that I think planning for that kind of contingency is something that governments are almost constitutionally incapable of, probably all governments and not just governments like ours in the United States. To officially and seriously ask people during Vietnam to make plans to pull the rug out from under those who were over there fighting would be terribly risky—not only with respect to what leaks to the enemy, but what leaks to one's own people, and to one's political opponents. To acknowledge withdrawal as a responsible option to study plays into the hands of those who already want to get out and who want an admission in principle that it is a legitimate option, thereby giving them bargaining power.

For that reason, to talk about the need to set up a procedure in which you will always

examine that option is to ask the impossible. A leader cannot permit that. Any hint that such an option is being taken seriously could seriously demoralize the military officers responsible for conducting the war. Perhaps such studies can only be done unofficially. Somebody has to volunteer to go off and study the problems saying, "I know that my President could never acquiesce in my doing this at his request; I won't even ask him if he wants it done, because it would be unfair to require the President to give an answer, and his answer would have to be negative."

It occurs to me as I write this that I may incur disfavor somewhere by even hinting that the United States will ever again need to turn around and get out. But the difficulty of turning around and getting out should go into that calculation of risks that I mentioned earlier, the calculation whether to raise the stakes to justify the action and to create that credible commitment.

Khrushchev in 1960 said that democracies were too soft to fight in wars of national liberation. "Soft" is too simple a diagnosis, but I think a dozen years later we knew what he meant and grudgingly conceded he had a point. What we didn't know and what he didn't know was that the Soviet Union's kind of socialism and despotism could prove just as soft. He died before Afghanistan could show up his misplaced confidence.

And the Soviet Union didn't even have the Cold War to cement their commitment in Afghanistan or to justify it. Vietnam and its many post mortem analyses invite reexamination in the light of the Soviet fiasco in Afghanistan, but I am not the one to provide it.

CHAPTER 3
**Okinawa Reversion as a Turning Point
 in Postwar U.S. - Japan Relations**

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In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was politically vulnerable. It was a constant target—often *the* primary target—of opposition parties seeking to dislodge the LDP from its Diet majority. It was the cause célèbre for student activists, Japan's presumed future generation of leaders. And it was the policy achievement about which Tokyo government leaders spoke most reluctantly. Indeed, they avoided anything that might resemble, even faintly, the public political-military consultation and the close operational cooperation that characterized America's other trans-oceanic alliance.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance was politically solid. Opposition parties first muted their attacks, then moved increasingly to other issue terrain. Students stopped caring. Government leaders spoke more regularly about the American alliance. Though one Prime Minister's characterization of his nation as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" spurred criticism, he continued in office several years thereafter, even pushing Japan's defense spending (temporarily) through the hitherto sacrosanct ceiling of 1% of GDP. And joint military activities increased markedly. Of course, economic conflicts could and did multiply. But political-security relations merited the characterization which officials repeatedly employed: they had "never been better."

Between these very different twenty-year periods came, of course, Okinawa reversion. President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister

Eisaku Sato agreed to return the islands to Japanese control at the White House in November 1969; the actual transfer of administration took place two-and-one-half years later, an event this conference commemorates. Not only did reversion separate the two periods chronologically, but it was one important reason why U.S.-Japan security relations were so much smoother from the 1970s onward.

Maintaining and strengthening those security relations was a central goal of those in both nations who conspired to bring about reversion. One way they pursued this goal was to use the negotiations to buttress Japan's security commitments. They could and did exploit a logical connection: since return of the Ryukyus made Japan fully sovereign over all its territory, it was reasonable that Tokyo should now bear more responsibility for the security of East Asia. Sato was personally in favor of doing so; the reversion agreement gave him a perfect rationale. One result was Tokyo's public recognition, for the first time in the postwar period, that South Korea was "essential" to Japanese security.

More importantly, reversion buttressed the security relationship through crisis avoidance. While few could have foreseen, in 1969, the peace that would descend upon the alliance thereafter, almost all of those who worked for reversion feared the opposite: that failure to achieve timely reversion could well prove disastrous. Their nightmare was all too plausible. The campaign for reversion in Japan would grow, bringing thousands of protesters to the streets, forcing the Tokyo government to intensify its demands.

pressing it to commit to a reversion formula that would severely restrict the freedom of action of U.S. forces based on Okinawa. The U.S. military position would stiffen in response. The White House—enmeshed in the protracted war in Vietnam—would not feel able to confront the Pentagon on this issue.

The resulting Okinawa crisis would peak around 1970, when the initial ten-year term of the revised security treaty ran out. And unlike the flare-up of 1960, it would not be possible to resolve this one through a prime minister's forced resignation. Meeting Japanese needs would now require a humiliating American retreat, one for which no U.S. President would wish to take responsibility, and one which the Senate was unlikely to endorse with the two-thirds majority required for treaty ratification. Yet it would be hard to think of a better way to undermine the alliance than for the United States to keep occupying Okinawa against active, assertive Japanese opposition.

Fortunately, as other papers presented to this conference will recount, events did not play themselves out in this fashion. Together the two nations accomplished a political rarity: action in advance to avert a crisis that was not yet certain, not yet broadly visible, and therefore not yet exerting strong pressure on the politicians in the nation that needed to be moved.

How and why did Japan and America accomplish this? Critical, of course, was the role of political leaders. Lyndon B. Johnson was willing to move things forward in 1967; Richard M. Nixon made the final key decision in 1969. Critical also was Eisaku Sato's persistence and prudence. He underscored reversion's importance by staking his reputation and career on resolving it, but he recognized the need for consensus in both capitals, and took care not to get too far ahead of the process in either one.

Important also was the crisis that *had* happened in 1960, and widespread concerns over a recurrence. History may seldom repeat itself, but sophisticated people frequently fear that it will, and this danger can be used by those seeking change. If Tokyo had been turned upside down by a treaty revision which actually strengthened Japan's relative position, how much

more might the alliance be threatened by a U.S. insistence on retaining control of territory even John Foster Dulles had recognized as Japanese! And the revised security treaty made 1970 a natural target date—its initial term was ten years, after which either nation could withdraw on twelve months' notice. If an Okinawa crisis was festering then, it would surely give potency to opposition demands that Japan take that very action.

Articulating these concerns—and skillfully exploiting them, was an atypically strong and forward-looking group of middle-level officials in Washington: Richard Sneider, Japan Country Director at State¹; John McNaughton and Morton Halperin as co-conspirators at Defense. Under their leadership, it was possible beginning in 1966 to get civilian and military officials to focus on the problem—political pressures in Okinawa and Japan—to develop broad recognition of the need for a resolution by 1970, and to achieve general agreement on the U.S. bottom line: flexibility in use of the bases within a strong Japanese alliance.

This led logically to the need to move expeditiously toward reversion, and for the U.S. military command to take initial steps in this direction. Through this process, U.S. military leaders were encouraged to explore conditions under which reversion might be consistent with their basic needs. In Japan, U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson worked to pave the way with General Ferdinand Unger, the High Commissioner who governed Okinawa. And as the bilateral dialogue developed, Japanese officials took U.S. military sensitivities into account in how they pressed the issue and in what they sought.²

When the Nixon administration came to power, key officials moved into even more important positions. Johnson became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Sneider and Halperin were invited to join Henry Kissinger's NSC staff, where they could take the lead in a comprehensive review of relations with Japan, one of the first of the broad national security studies initiated by the new regime. Around mid-year, Sneider would then move to Tokyo as Deputy Chief of Mission. With a

President sympathetic to Japan and sensitive to the basic issues, it proved possible for the United States to make *the* crucial compromise, to promise that the same rules would govern nuclear weapons on the Ryukyus as applied to U.S. deployments in Japan proper. This was generally interpreted as meaning there would be no such weapons present when reversion took place.

So reversion was achieved, on statesmanlike terms. But while it clearly averted a new security treaty crisis, it did not lead immediately to an era of good feelings across the Pacific. The immediate reason was the textile issue, "unconnected with Okinawa but destined to be intimately linked to it"³ Nixon (and Kissinger) could not resist the opportunity to use Sato's need for reversion as leverage for an agreement which would deliver on Nixon's campaign promise to the U.S. textile industry. And Sato played along, dispatching an emissary to work out the details and promising Nixon—face-to-face, twice—to conclude an agreement imposing comprehensive curbs on Japanese sales of textiles and apparel to the American market.⁴ When Sato twice failed to deliver, relations were embittered. There followed the two "Nixon shocks" of summer 1971—the breakthrough in U.S. relations with mainland China, and the decision to stop supporting the dollar through sales of gold.

The humiliating way Sato learned of Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing is well known: "via a phone call from his [Washington] Ambassador, just as Nixon's statement [announcing the breakthrough] was being carried on the wires"⁵ In retrospect, the secrecy seems excessive, though clearly useful for foreign policy and domestic politics alike.⁶ But it was clearly the way Nixon and Kissinger handled such matters, whether or not they involved Japan. Indeed, Secretary of State William P. Rogers did not learn about the trip until Kissinger was well on his way.

For the Gaimusho, this was the fulfillment of the "Asakai nightmare" As that postwar Japanese Ambassador to Washington had feared, Japan had faithfully followed the American lead, tilting toward Taipei and spurning Beijing, only

to wake up and learn that America had changed course. Yet paradoxically, Nixon's opening to China liberated U.S.-Japan security relations just as Okinawa reversion did. It did so by removing the other major political burden that the relationship carried.

China was and is enormously important to Japan, of course—culturally, politically, and economically. During the negotiation and ratification of the 1951 peace treaty, however, Japan was squeezed by the United States into recognizing the Republic of China on Taiwan. As years went by, the Japan-Taiwan connection prospered, and Sato—for one—was in no hurry to shift to recognition of the mainland. But the U.S. alliance was visibly denying Japan the opportunity to develop the full range of relations with the mainland. Belief that this was unfair and unreasonable stretched well beyond the Socialist and Communist opposition.

By the early seventies, both nations were moving to broaden ties with the PRC. At the State Department-Gaimusho level, they were coordinating their efforts, to assure that the Asakai nightmare did not come to pass. Kissinger's secret visit exposed these consultations as a sham, and delivered a humiliation from which Sato never recovered.

But if the immediate effect was negative, the longer-term impact was positive. For Japan was freed to pursue its own interests in dealing with its massive neighbor. Sato's successor, Kakuei Tanaka, soon leapfrogged Washington by establishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1972. In subsequent years, this relationship became part of an informal China-Japan-United States alignment against the Soviet Union, one which lasted until the latter's demise. It brought economic benefits to Japanese also, without costing much if anything in dealings with Taiwan.

By the time of the actual transfer of administrative control over Okinawa, therefore, the stage had been set for a much stronger U.S.-Japan security relationship. By 1982, former Ambassador Edwin Reischauer could declare to a Japanese journalist that U.S. ships did in fact carry nuclear weapons into Japanese ports, and trigger only a ripple of political

reaction in Tokyo.⁷ In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan raised her defense spending substantially and supported U.S. engagements in Turkey, Pakistan, and elsewhere on the Soviet periphery. The relationship had become an enormous strategic asset to the United States, and the framework within which Japan broadened—very gradually—its engagement in global political-strategic issues.

How much was Okinawa reversion responsible for this change? Certainly other forces were at work also. One was, ironically, U.S. defeat in Vietnam, which made Japanese less likely to resent the U.S. presence and more prone to consider the consequences of a U.S. absence. Another was, of course, the entrenchment in power of the LDP, whose economic policies had brought Japanese living standards up into the front ranks of the world. A third was the maturing of the Japanese political process. And the fourth was the already-discussed transformation of China policies, the issue that was handled, from a U.S.–Japan relations point of view, as badly as Okinawa was handled well.

On the China issue, good policy substance overcame bad policy process. The content of the historic Nixon–Kissinger action was more durable, in its impact on U.S.–Japan relations, than the deeply disruptive means by which it was achieved.⁸ But on Okinawa reversion, good process was essential to achieving the right substantive outcome. Without careful domestic and bilateral political management, it is hard to see how agreement could have been achieved at all. Reciprocal sensitivity and political skill were a prerequisite for wise substantive resolution of the thorny Okinawa issue.

A similar conclusion seems appropriate concerning reversion's contribution to the stronger bilateral security relations which followed. It was far from the sole contributor. But it was an important one. And it was a prerequisite.

Notes

- 1 In March 1966, State renamed its desk officers "Country Directors" with the aim of making them government-wide policy leaders. The reform was generally a failure, as few who held the title were able to play this role. But Sneider was universally cited as an exception, both by insiders who participated in the process and outsiders who studied it.
- 2 This summary draws upon the unpublished case study prepared by Priscilla Clapp and Haruhiro Fukui for the Brookings Institution study in which this author participated. For a summary, see Destler et al, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations*, Brookings Institution, 1976, pp. 23-35.
- 3 Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 329.
- 4 Unraveling the details of that negotiation consumed about three fascinating years in the life of this author and his Japanese collaborators. See I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle*, (Cornell University Press, 1979; Japanese language edition by Nihon Keizai Press).
- 5 U. Alexis Johnson with Jef Olivarius McAllister, *The Right Hand of Power*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 554.
- 6 Kissinger offered a modest *mea culpa* in his memoirs: "I believe in retrospect that we could have chosen a more sensitive method of informing the Japanese." (*White House Years*, p. 762.) And U. Alexis Johnson reports that "the initial plan . . . was to send me directly to Japan to inform Prime Minister Sato on behalf of the President." Johnson reports learning from Kissinger that "Nixon's phobia about leaks caused him to cancel my trip." (*The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 554-55.) Nixon's frustration with Sato over unfulfilled textile promises may have contributed as well.
- 7 There was also an earlier statement to this effect, made to a Congressional committee by retired Admiral Gene LeRocque. But his word did not, of course, have comparable credibility in Japan.
- 8 The same could be said of "closing the gold window" and moving to flexible exchange rates—it led, in the mid-1970s, to improvement of the U.S. trade balance and contributed thereby to maintenance of the open trade policies upon which Japan depended.

CHAPTER 4

USCAR Policies 1964-1972

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze administrative policies of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). As a background, the political and organizational settings in which USCAR operated are discussed. This will involve political implications of "residual sovereignty," the High Commissioner's organizational relations with Washington, and the political situation in mid-1964. Then we will analyze USCAR policies between mid-1964 and 1969 in relation to Okinawan internal pressures and Japanese participation in Okinawa. Our main concern here is to analyze how the High Commissioners perceived the situation and what policies he followed. Finally, legacies of the American occupation and its current meanings will be examined.

I. Political and Organizational Setting

1. "Residual sovereignty" and its implications

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff began a new over-all examination of U.S. requirements for post-war overseas military bases in May 1945, a month and a half after landing in Okinawa, it was included in their list of the "primary base" areas.⁽¹⁾ However, the Department of State questioned its underlying assumption that the United States would continue its control over Okinawa indefinitely, considering Okinawa "minor islands" as provided in the Postdam Declaration of July 1945, which should be returned to Japan and be demilitarized. There followed a series of debate between State and Defense over the disposition of Okinawa until Amami Oshima's reversion in 1954.

The first debate occurred in 1946 when the trusteeship of the Pacific Islands was being discussed, the second in 1948, and the third in 1952 and 1953. The first debate ended inconclusively, shelving the matter for the time. In the meantime, Okinawa came to be called "junkyards" of the Pacific and "forgotten islands" until the Cold War set in.

The second debate resulted in the provision on Okinawa in NSC 13/2: "The United States Government should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain permanently the facilities at Okinawa, and the base there should be developed accordingly. The problem of obtaining international sanction for our permanent strategic control of the islands should be studied at once in the Department of State."⁽²⁾

However, the rationale to "obtain international sanction" was hard to come by. George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, had proposed a rationale after visiting General MacArthur in Tokyo. He argued that Okinawa was suited as an advance base not only because of natural factors (geographical location, size, physical conformation, water supply, etc.) but also because of the inhabitants: "Inhabitants are clearly not fit for independence. . . . They would be utterly incapable, in any circumstances, of providing for their own defense." Therefore, he concluded, the United States had "a clear responsibility to protect them internationally until some suitable permanent arrangement for their protection can be made. Kennan suggested that the United States could claim the islands "as a consequence of military conquest."⁽³⁾

Kennan was supported by General

MacArthur and the military but met opposition from State and other.⁶⁴ Thus the Article 3 of the Peace Treaty provided that:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations as the sole administratering authority, Nansei Shoto. . . . Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jnrisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

For John Foster Dulles and others in the State Department who were directly involved in the peace settlement with Japan, the question was more complex, for the continuation of the military occupation would not only run against the principle of "no aggrandizement, territorial or other," but also would create further political and legal complications. In a memorandum addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated June 27, 1950.⁶⁵ Dulles persuasively argued that:

"If Japan renounces sovereignty in favor of no one, this would create a chaotic international situation. . . . It might then be claimed

- a) that sovereignty was vested in the inhabitants, who could hereafter asserts, perhaps with United Nations backing, a right to oust the United States;
- b) that the victors in the war over Japan, including the U.S.S.R., have an inchoate right to sovereignty of these islands renounced by Japan in favor of no one in particular;
- c) that the United Nations is entitled to deal, in its own way, with the islands and their inhabitants;
- d) that the United States has, by a subterfuge, actually acquired the sovereignty."

Thus it was imperative for Dulles to accept some form of Japanese sovereignty over the islands, so that Japan could legally grant the United States continuing control over them. The concept of "residual sovereignty" well served this purpose.

But "residual sovereignty" still left the

problem of the final disposition of Okinawa unsettled. It was to be worked out in a friendly way which would combine the natural desires of the inhabitants with the requirements of international peace and security.

The third debate began with Far Eastern Command's Staff Study report of October 16, 1951 on Okinawa.⁶⁶ It concluded that the protection of the bases in Okinawa could be adequately obtained by arrangements similar to those embodied in the Security Treaty with Japan without involvement in any form of exclusive control by the United States.

The State Department quickly seized the opportunity and initiated discussion with Defense.⁶⁷ The discussion resulted in a NSC decision calling for recommendations by State and Defense to the President concerning the long-term military requirements in the islands.⁶⁸ Consequently, a State-Defense working group was organized, and it was finally agreed to return Amami to Japan while the rest of the Ryukyus would remain under the United States control indefinitely.

In informing of the decision to Ambassador Eikichi Araki, Dulles made it quite clear that unless Japan showed more interest and made more efforts in the security of the area, the United States would not relinquish control over Okinawa and Bonins.⁶⁹ This condition was sufficient to prevent the Japanese government from requesting an early return of the islands.

The United States official statements, however, did not convince the inhabitants of Okinawa of the necessity of the continued American occupation. Nor did U.S. officials believed they had succeeded in persuading the Okinawans. They conceived that the American ability to remain in Okinawa was dependent on three factors: the attitude of the Okinawans, U.S. relationship with Japan, and its world wide international position.¹⁰⁰ It was deemed necessary for USCAR, therefore, to acquire "reasonable acquiescence" of the Okinawan people, not only to maintain the effective use of the bases, but also to avoid the Okinawan problem becoming a disturbing factor in the United States relations with Japan and other Asian countries.

2. Organizational Framework

As in all occupied areas during and after World War II, except in minor Pacific islands, the U.S. Army was given responsibility for the occupation. In Okinawa, the commander of the Okinawa Base Command and later the Ryukyus Command was (except in the early months of the postwar period when the Navy was in charge) an Army officer, who also acted as Deputy Governor. The Military Governor was first the Commander in Chief Pacific (CinCPAC), then became the Commanding General of Philippine-Ryukyus Command in Manila, and finally, the Commander in Chief Far East in Tokyo. Though the name of "Military Government" was changed to "Civil Administration" and "Military Governor" to "Governor" in December 1950, the setup remained unchanged. However, Executive Order 10713 of 1957, "providing for Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," installed a High Commissioner in place of the Governor, and the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) was placed under CinCPAC in Hawaii. Thus the High Commissioner served as CG USARYIS and representative for CinCPAC as well.

In the Executive Order, the President delegated to the Secretary of Defense the power to exercise administrative rights given to the United States under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, and the latter in turn designated the Department of the Army as his executive agent.⁽¹¹⁾ Within the Department of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations was delegated authority to handle routine matters concerning Okinawa, and the Under Secretary was given the responsibility for international affairs and administration of the Ryukyus. It was not until 1962, however, that the Under Secretary became more directly involved in the matter. He issued instructions covering procedures for handling administration of the Ryukyus, by which all matters involving significant issues of policy, all matters requiring coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and policy directives to the High Commissioner were to be referred to the Under Secretary for approval. Under the procedures, the Deputy Under Secretary made most of the

decisions regarding major changes in the administration of the Ryukyus, and made the recommendations which were approved by the Under Secretary or Secretary of the Army, or even at higher levels such as the Secretary of Defense or the President, if needed.⁽¹²⁾ Since Washington was disinclined to interfere with the High Commissioner, however, he was given rather wide latitude in administering Okinawa within the broadly established framework of policy. Even such high level policies as amending the Executive Order's provision for the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyus (GRI) and the Price Act of 1960, which established the basic policy guideline and the ceiling of Congressional appropriations for Okinawa, were said to have originated in USCAR.

The Executive Order provided that the Secretary of State was "responsible for the conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands." and the Political Advisor to the High Commissioner and the Civil Administrator were loaned from the State Department. The Army, however, guarded its autonomy from interference of the State Department, for example, in the controversies over the provision of the Japanese Peace Treaty in the 1950s and the Kennedy policy in 1962.

The High Commissioner had firm control over USCAR, his supporting staff. A typical attitude of the High Commissioner to the Civil Administrator, who supervised USCAR, was shown in High Commissioner Paul W. Carraway's testimony before a Congressional hearing that the Civil Administrator "has no authority and no power other than those might be given by the High Commissioner to him for some specific purpose."⁽¹³⁾ Using 1965 as an example, out of seven high officials in the Office of the High Commissioner, only the Political Advisor was a civilian. The military also dominated USCAR: seven out of fifteen top officials of USCAR were civilian, but six of these were in the relatively more technical and lower positions.

3. USCAR policies up to 1964

The stated "mission" of USCAR was "to assure that this strategic area will contribute most effectively to the peace and security of the free world." Its responsibility was to promote "the best interests of the United States and assist in the development of a sound democracy in the Ryukyu Islands." Its "basic operating objectives" were to develop an effective and responsible government based on democratic principles, to achieve a viable economy, and to improve the standards of living of the Okinawans.¹⁴⁾ A semblance of "sound democracy" was necessary to acquire the reasonable acquiescence of the Okinawans and to create a good image of American rule, but developing a sound democracy under alien military rule with little legitimacy was self-contradictory. USCAR made statements to the effect that the Okinawans were accorded responsibilities never dreamed of under Japanese rule and that Okinawa was a "showcase of democracy," but these statements failed to impress the Okinawans and did not match the realities. When the Okinawans demanded more autonomy, USCAR could only say that the Okinawans were not yet ready for "responsible" government.

As successive High Commissioners admitted, the only effective means of acquiring the acquiescence of the Okinawan people was economic. And reasonable acquiescence "can exist only for so long as the people continue to derive substantial economic and social benefits from our presence."¹⁵⁾ This approach was, however, most effective when Japan was still in the process of postwar recovery with American assistance, but it was to lose much of its effectiveness as Japan progressed economically and the gap between Japan and Okinawa in living standards increasingly widened.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary for USCAR to make careful analysis of the local situation and to try to manipulate it; where there was a fear of getting beyond control, concessions to the demands of the Okinawans were necessary. The timing of the concession was of utmost importance, for too late a concession might damage America's freedom to use the bases, the right to maintain the bases, and U.S.-Japan relations as well, while too early

a concession might unnecessarily hasten the reversion.

President Kennedy in March 1962 announced what is known as the "Kennedy policy" in which he recognized the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and looked toward to the day when the security interests of the free world would permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty. In addition to permitting the display of the Japanese flag on public buildings, Kennedy declared that the United States would enter into discussions with the Japanese Government to work out precise arrangements to allow Japanese assistance to Okinawa. Kennedy also amended the Executive Order so that the legislature, not the High Commissioner, could nominate the Chief Executive of the GRI, and further promised an increase in American aid and continuous review of governmental functions in order to broaden autonomy of the Okinawans. The purpose of the policy was to "make some adjustments for the long haul" to the changing of circumstances. The expansion of autonomy and the acceptance of Japanese aid were meant to make both Japan and Okinawa "relatively satisfied" with the *status quo*.¹⁶⁾

The Army and High Commissioner Caraway strongly opposed some important aspects of the policy. The Army was against any new formal statement encouraging Japan's hope of soon regaining Okinawa, for it would invite "renewed or increased pressure for reversion." It opposed the appointment of the Chief Executive by the legislatures on the grounds that "such a procedure would impair Ryukyuan political stability and a principal U.S. means for exercise of ultimate control." It fought against the attempts of the State Department to increase the Japanese Government's influence over Okinawa: such interference would derogate the ultimate authority of the United States.¹⁷⁾

In implementing the Kennedy policy, Caraway discouraged the Japanese Government from raising its level of aid to Okinawa, and did not act on the recommendations of the Kaysen Report for greater autonomy. Instead, by fully using the authority given to USCAR over the GRI, he instituted reform by so-called "direct

rule." He severely criticized the GRI inefficiency and brushed aside the reversion movement and request for autonomy as being "agitation" and an "excuse for avoiding responsibility." Since the GRI was not yet ready to assume the responsibility required of it, he said, it was premature to transfer authority to it.⁽¹⁸⁾ The Okinawan Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) split of 1964 was primarily an Okinawan response to Caraway's failure to implement what had been promised by the Kennedy policy.

Suffering from the non-materialization of the total aid request from the United States and the constant charges of the opposition parties against the political stagnation and retrogression of autonomy under the "direct rule" of Caraway, the ruling OLDP was subjected to increasing internal stresses. Reformist antimainstream elements of the OLDP called for a bolder stand toward the United States, increased autonomy through public election of the Chief Executive, and a timetable for reversion, demanding Chief Executive Seisaku Ota's resignation, which was finally tendered in June 1964. The conservative party's split was eventually healed when both factions were reunited in a new party, the Democratic Party (DP), in December 1964, and a new Chief Executive was appointed from the DP. It was, however, the line of policy of the reformist group that prevailed in the new party; it placed more emphasis on the eventual reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the need for expansion of autonomy to provide for a smooth transition in achieving this goal. Thus, by the time High Commissioner Albert Watson assumed his office in August 1964, the Caraway policy had brought changes in the outlook of the pro-American party, and a new line of policy was clearly in order.

Even before the arrival of Watson, however, a step was taken toward meeting some of the demands of the Okinawans. After two years of prolonged negotiations, the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee and the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee were finally established in April 1974 to consider Japanese aid to Okinawa. Though the terms of reference

were drawn up very carefully to ensure that the committees could do no more than coordinate aid for economic development and welfare of the Okinawans, their establishment showed, for the first time, America's willingness to cooperate formally with the Japanese on the aid program.

II. Albert Watson: Policy of Concession

From 1965 through 1967, the reversion movement in Okinawa received a strong impetus from several outside developments, as well as two events within the islands (the transfer of two court cases to the GRI Court and the twin education bills) which virtually transformed the political climate in Okinawa.

The reversion movement was intensified due to several outside developments. The visit of the Japanese Diet members of the Japan Specialist Party in mid-January 1965 increased activities of the leftist parties and groups. Escalating American involvement in Vietnam increased use of the bases, and all opposition parties and groups protested on the ground that it might lead direct involvement of the Okinawans in the conflict. And Prime Minister Sato's meeting with President Johnson and Sato's subsequent visit to Okinawa in 1965 further stirred up interests in reversion.

In the Okinawan legislative election of November 1965, reversion and the public election of the Chief Executive emerged as issue of primary importance. During 1966 and early 1967, there developed two cases which showed the decline of USCAR's influence over the Okinawans and the strength of the reversion groups, particularly of the Okinawa Teachers' Association (OTA).

In June 1966, High Commissioner Watson ordered a transfer of the so-called "mackerel" case and the "Tomori" case from the GRI Court of Appeals to the USCAR Court. In both cases, the GRI Central Circuit Court had ruled earlier that portions of USCAR ordinances were invalid under the terms of the Executive Order. The High Commissioner considered that such decisions by the GRI court challenged "the validity of two ordinances, and by implication, of all ordinances and the basic right of the United States Administration to govern Okinawa."⁽¹⁹⁾ The

transfer order met with immediate and strong protest from all political groups and the news media. The DP joined opposition party legislators in passing a resolution protesting the transfer order and requesting that the two cases be returned to the CRI Court. Many other organizations passed similar resolutions, a "prefectural people's rally" was held, and the Joint Struggle Council for the Retraction of the Court Transfer Order was formed. By the middle of 1966, according to a USCAR report, the issue became "the focal target of criticism. . . with both the government and opposition parties vociferously attacking the court transfer action through the legislature and through the press."⁽²⁰⁾ On December 2, 1968, the USCAR Court handed down its decision favoring Tomari and the GRI while upholding the validity of the ordinances; it validated Tomari's election to the legislature, and in the "mackerel case" ruled that the taxes imposed by ordinance on mackerel were valid, thus conceding to the Okinawans the point of dispute.

In January 1967, after the court cases transfer issue had died down, the two long-standing education bills became the primary issue. The DP, which had lost a legislative by-election and several mayoralty elections in 1966, renewed its resolve to risk its political life in passing the two bills, which would restrict the political activities of the OTA, the driving force of the reversion movement and the major factor in leading the opposition candidates to victory in the elections. When the DP-controlled Education and Social Affairs Committee of the legislature met in the presence of a thousand policemen and passed the two bills, the Joint Struggle Council for the Prevention of Legislation of the Two Education Bills severely protested the DP's unilateral committee action, and, on February 24, demonstrators succeeded in pushing aside the GRI police guarding the legislature building, forcing the Speaker to postpone the plenary session and to sign an agreement to shelve the two bills. After further debate off the legislature floor, the DP finally withdrew the bills on November 22, 1967.⁽²¹⁾

Protest rallies and demonstration parades during FY 1966 "increased in magnitude and

intensity," and in FY 1967 the number of rallies and parades saw "a significant rise" from 140 to 202.⁽²²⁾ Through its successful struggle against USCAR and the DP, the opposition gained both strength and self-confidence. Of more importance was a considerable change in the DP's attitudes toward reversion. The Party's "essential policies for 1967," which were set up in December 1966, called for "functional reversion," the popular election of the Chief Executive, etc., which were all possible under the United States Administration. On Reversion Day (April 28) of 1967, however, a resolution was passed by unanimous vote. "The most distinctive point of the resolution" was "its request that a specific timetable for the return of the Ryukyus be established."⁽²³⁾

By the middle of 1967, the issue was no longer reversion itself but its timing and conditions, with the DP supporting reversion at the mainland level (hondonami). The Japanese press also changed its position "dramatically" in 1967. "By mid-1967 the press had begun to discuss concrete plans for Okinawa's return."⁽²⁴⁾

High Commissioner Albert Watson [August 1, 1964- October 2, 1966] did not consider the political situation a critical one. In a Congressional hearing in March 1966, he fully concurred with the statement that "we [the United States] are quite conscious of political conditions in Japan (particularly with reference to 1970), and are coordinating our policies and programs as far as the Ryukyus are concerned."⁽²⁵⁾ He hoped, however, that he could keep the reversion movement at a manageable level by removing the irritants and effecting material improvements in the sectors that lagged behind mainland Japan. He reportedly stated that "It is clear that the Ryukyus would rather be ruled by other Japanese than by Americans. . . . You cannot avoid criticism and charges of 'colonialism' but you can do your best to reduce friction."⁽²⁶⁾

Watson took several measures to expand local autonomy. A legislative Screening Committee was established in December 1964 to coordinate and facilitate prior action on proposed GRI Executive Branch bills and to review bills passed by the GRI legislature. USCAR no longer stepped in to block legislation

unless it hampered the U.S. military mission. The Chief Executive sent one bill out of 62 in 1965, and three out of 129 in 1966, to the legislature without clearance from the Committee. In order to lessen the resentment of the Okinawans against the enactment of legislation by means of USCAR ordinances, Watson made it his policy to reduce the number of ordinances. Thus, the number was reduced from 145 to 89 by the end of 1966. He permitted the Chief Executive to appoint directors of the various GRI departments without his approval. Furthermore, in his annual address to the legislature on February 1, 1966, Watson stated, as a further step in the development of autonomy, that it would no longer be his policy to "make detailed report on the economic and political situation, or to request specific legislation, or even to describe in detail the situations requiring legislation."⁽²⁷⁾ USCAR finally granted Senaga Kemejiro of the Okinawa People's Party permission to travel to Japan in October 1967. This signified the loosening of the severe travel restrictions which had been put into effect to prevent leftist activities in Okinawa. More important, the Executive Order was further amended, and the legislature was given the power to elect the Chief Executive, subject to the High Commissioner's approval.⁽²⁸⁾

The measures Watson emphasized most were economic. In the testimony cited above, he stated that "Vocal elements in the Ryukyus and Japan maintain that reversion of the islands to Japan is the only way in which the Ryukyuan can secure benefits obtaining in comparable areas of Japan. We, in cooperation with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of Japan, hope to attain such a level within the existing administrative arrangements for the Ryukyus."⁽²⁹⁾ When he arrived in Okinawa, he set to work on a long-range plan to ensure that "the level of public health, educational and welfare services advance toward levels obtained in comparable areas of Japan and reach them, to the extent possible, by the end of the fiscal year 1971."⁽³⁰⁾ The plan established relative priorities among programs to provide optimum application of available resources, and became the basis of justification of USCAR's

budget request and also the standard for accepting Japanese aid.

The United States Congress, however, failed to meet USCAR's budget request. The direct appropriation was increased to \$14,360 million in FY 1965 from \$9,996 million of the previous year, but then remained at this level for the next three crucial years. It was only the 1969 appropriation that reached the \$20,000 million level. USCAR faced a dilemma. Public health, education and welfare services were the most neglected sector in Okinawa, and the fact that Okinawa was far behind comparable areas in Japan in these sectors was a source of constant dissatisfaction to the Okinawans. Failing to obtain Congressional approval, USCAR had to turn to the Japanese government for needed financial assistance, but such aid would undermine USCAR's authority as had been feared by Caraway.

As was already pointed out, the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee and the U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus Technical Committee indicated USCAR's willingness to receive Japanese aid. In the Consultative Committee the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo communicated to the Japanese delegation the areas in which Japanese aid was desired, and in the Technical Committee details were worked out and specific proposals prepared. USCAR, fearful of the political implications of Japanese aid, put four conditions on accepting the Japanese aid: 1) that it contribute to the welfare and well-being of the Ryukyuan people; 2) that it be absorbable during the period available; 3) that it not interfere with the administrative rights of the United States; and 4) that it not work against the mission of the United States to defend this area.⁽³¹⁾ By accepting Japanese aid according to a longrange plan to ensure that only USCAR could determine in which fieldsaid was to be administered, and by limiting it to about one-third of what the United States contributed, it was hoped that the Japanese influence might be limited to a manageable level. Thus, an increase in U.S. appropriation was the most important condition of accepting an increase in Japanese aid.

Failing to increase U.S. appropriation, USCAR limited Japanese aid to a lower level. At

a meeting of the Consulative Committee on September 20, 1965, the Japanese Government was invited to assist in raising the levels of aid in public health, education and welfare to those prevailing in comparable areas of Japan by the end of FR 1971, and to continue to contribute to the economic development of the islands.⁽³²⁾ Japanese aid, however, increased by only \$2.8 million in FY 1967.

USCAR carefully checked the increase in Japanese influence over Okinawa in other areas as well. On February 2, 1965, less than a year after it had been established, the Consultative Committee had its functions broadened to include consultation not merely on Japanese aid but also on other matters which Japan and the United States could "cooperate in continuing to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the islands." According to Emmerson, "the American representative was scrupulous in rejecting any agenda item which, regardless of how pertinent it was to the conditions in Okinawa, did not directly relate or technical assistance."⁽³³⁾

It must be noted, however, that Watson was much less worried about the Japanese influence in Okinawa than Caraway. While he attempted to control the Japanese influence, he also invited Prime Minister Sato to Okinawa. And it was under his administration that Okinawa was for the first time connected into the Japanese microwave television network, thereby subjecting the Okinawans to stronger Japanese influence.

III. Ferdinand T. Unger (11.2.66-1.17.69) and James B. Lampart (1.28.69-5.14.72): Maintaining the Bases after Reversion

Within the first seven months of his administration, Unger went much further than Watson in expanding autonomy and increasing Japanese aid. As with Watson, Unger recognized the legitimate demand of the Okinawans for reversion: "After 21 years of our administration, the people of the Ryukyu Islands look forward to becoming an integral part of the Japanese nation once again."⁽³⁴⁾ But, he went further when he stated to the legislature that "we are both looking forward to the earliest possible date

when circumstances will permit reunification with Japan. In this context, you and I are striving for the same objectives."⁽³⁵⁾ *USCAR's Standard Response Guide* (October 15, 1967) thus stated that "the Civil Administration is doing all it can to minimize the stresses which will accompany reversion." In the middle of 1967, all Ryukyuan ships were allowed to fly the Japanese flag with a special pennant, and representatives of the Japanese Government and USCAR reached agreement on procedures and details relating to the transfer to the Japanese Government of the authority to issue passports and identity papers to Okinawans travelling outside the islands.

In the field of the expansion of autonomy, Unger announced in June 1967 that he had drawn up a list of 29 additional laws and regulations enacted by USCAR which would be rescinded when the GRI produced substitute legislation more in keeping with Japanese practices. The *Guide* stated that "as more and more laws are enacted, and take the place of ordinances, we will have here a body of law similar in most respects to that existing in Japan proper."

By October 1966 the United States was proposing to the Japanese Government an aid increase of over \$30 million annually. Unger, in his first press conference in November 1966, stated that he welcome any Japanese economic aid as long as it would contribute to the welfare of the Okinawan people. Japanese aid to Okinawa exceeded that of the United States in FY 1968 due to an increase in Japanese aid.

As the Sato-Johnson summit meeting for November 14, 1967 approached, the legislature presented a reversion solution, and a delegation of legislators carried the document to Tokyo and presented it to the Prime Minister. However, deeply disappointed with the failure of the joint communique issued after the summit meeting to set any sort of time-table for the reversion, the opposition parties and groups, with a great deal of support from activities from Japan, launched a series of demonstration marches which culminated in an overwhelming show of strength at the April 28 Reversion Day rally. After the rally, political activities were centered around

the forthcoming election of the Chief Executive in November 1968, which had been announced by High Commissioner Unger in February of the same year.

Reversion was hotly debated during the pre-election period. While USCAR kept relative neutrality, Japanese political parties actively participated to a degree never known in an Okinawan election. The conservatives recommended a gradual transition over a period of years of insure economic stability and adjustment to the laws and organization of the Japanese Government, while the reformists called for "immediate, unconditional and complete reversion." The opposition coalition candidate, Yara Chobyu, won the election by a 30,000 vote margin out of a total of 450,000 votes cast. Even though the conservative party retained the control of the legislature in elections held concurrently, the election of Yara was clearly a political setback for USCAR.

Several days after the election, a B-52 bomber aborted at take off and exploded at the end of the runway. All political elements immediately voiced criticism of the accident; the Joint Struggle Council to Protect Human Lives was formed, and the largest protest rally in Okinawa during the 23 years of American rule was held. A general strike was planned, to which all reversionist and labor organizations, including the All Military Base Workers' Union (*Zengunro*), decided to join.

The strike itself was averted, only with the intervention of the Japanese Government and the cooperation of Chief Executive Yara. But the cancellation of the general strike caused considerable frustration within the reversion movement, and extremists' view began to dominate. The Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council (*Fukkikyo*) added to its "essential policies for 1969" two new policies: removal of American bases from Okinawa and abolition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. June 23, the day the battle of Okinawa came to an end, was named "Anti-War and Peace Day." In coordination with a twenty-four hour strike of the *Zengunro*, which had been engaged in a struggle for higher wages and in protest of the mass dismissals of Okinawa base workers, in

open violation of an ordinance, *Fukkikyo* and the Okinawa Prefecture Labor Unions Council (*Kenryokyo*) staged a mass rally. At one point in the demonstrations, military police moved forward with fixed bayonets to push back the demonstrations, and in the process injured ten Okinawans including the chairman of the Socialist Masses Party. This incident inevitably aroused outrage in both mainland Japan and Okinawa.

Participants in demonstrations and rallies in FY1969 and FY 1969 were 236 and 198, respectively, as compared with 202 in FY 1967. USCAR found itself increasingly losing control over demonstrators; by the beginning of 1969 it could not prevent serious political disturbances without the cooperation of the Japanese Government. The political condition in Okinawa had deteriorated to such an extent that, as shown in the bayonet incident, USCAR might find itself in the position of having to maintain its rule through coercive means. The seriousness of the situation on Okinawa was fully recognized by High Commissioners Unger and Lampart. In March, 1968, Unger testified before a Congressional Committee that "no. 1 subject in the islands is reversion. . . . I can honestly say that great deal of it stems from emotion. But after all, emotion is part of the human motivation and human mechanism. . . ." He readily concurred with the statement made by Under Secretary of the Army James V. Siena that "the longer we administer the islands, the longer frustration and the greater their desire to return."³⁶ Likewise, High Commissioner Lampart in April 1969:³⁷

I believe that the majority of Ryukyans desire early reversion. . . . Over the past year, pressures in the Ryukyus for reversion have grown. I underst and this is also true in Japan. . . . It is true that the people of the Ryukyus expect some progress on the reversion issue this year. Without evidence of such progress, I believe we may face an ever-greater demand both in Okinawa and Japan for reversion with a good possibility of increasingly more aggressive overt acts and demonstrations.

"Two overriding issues confronting United States in the Ryukyus," testified Lampart, were the return of governmental administrative rights to Japan and its timing, and the status of U.S. military bases after reversion. After the summit meeting of November 1967, USCAR clearly differentiated reversion of administrative rights from the retention of the bases.⁽³⁸⁾ Lampart was "convinced that the majority of the Ryukyans, while desiring the return of governmental control to Japan, took it for granted that the United States bases on Okinawa will remain for number of years to come."⁽³⁹⁾ He did not expect the radical movement in Japan and Okinawa would become more serious than it was at the end of 1969. Since radical activity in Okinawa was largely inspired from Tokyo, he reasoned, "if they get over the 10th anniversary of the [mutual security] treaty, things would quiet down."⁽⁴⁰⁾

Lampart considered his primary job to be "to assure that our military bases continue to be operable and that they are operating," and he made "extensive and very careful preparations to be sure that I [Lampart] can carry out this mission, no matter what kind of political circumstances I might be confronted with."⁽⁴¹⁾ Thus USCAR policy under Unger and Lampart was to make every effort to maintain effective use of the bases, while giving in to the Okinawans and the Japanese Government in the field of administration to avoid further troubles.

USCAR offices were moved from the center of Naha to an American base in the outskirts of the city in November 1967. Lampart testified in April that his purpose was to "interfere as little as possible with the day to day operations of the local government unless the security of the military base is involved."⁽⁴²⁾ During 1968 and 1969, basic though informal changes were taking place in USCAR control over the internal administration of the GRI. USCAR's checks on GRI bills and budget drafts were much less rigid. In FY 1969, for example, 49 bills out of 122 were signed into law by the Chief Executive without clearing USCAR. Simultaneously, Japanese influence on GRI and politics in general continued to increase.

By the joint communique issued after the summit conference of November 1967, it was

agreed to establish an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner to take measures to minimize the stresses which would arise when administrative rights were restored to Japan. Furthermore, it was agreed that functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office in Naha would be expanded to permit consultation with the High Commissioner on matters of mutual interest.

When Advisory Committee began its operation in March 1968, Unger emphasized that matters concerning the military uses of Okinawa by U.S. forces, such as the stationing of B-52 bombers, the calls made by nuclear powered submarines to Okinawan ports, and the control of radioactive contamination, were outside the jurisdiction of the Committee. In the field of administration, however, considerable progress was made toward integrating Okinawa with mainland Japan. The first recommendation of the Committee to the High Commissioner was to invite the Japanese Government to send a survey team as an initial step toward the promotion of integration. The survey team, after visiting Okinawa, formulated a three-year plan for integration, which became the basis for discussion and recommendation of the Advisory Committee. After 1968, the Japanese Government could formulate her own aid program to Okinawa.

IV. Conclusions

It is quite clear from the above analyses of USCAR policies since 1964 that Okinawa reversion was a very carefully calculated move. High Commissioners' analysis of the local situations proved to be surprisingly correct. They understood that the reversion movement was in fact a nationalist movement, and carefully made a piece-by-piece concession (a salami tactics) to save time for the progress of Tokyo-Washington negotiations. USCAR's policies were carefully coordinated with pro-reversion forces in Washington. In view of the careful analysis of, and quick learning from the local developments, we can characterize the Okinawa decision as an "analytic" decision making (Steinbrunner).

Okinawa reversion was "rational" for the United States in security, political, and economic

terms: it increased Japan's security interest in the area, and the military functions were largely kept intact; it solved the problem of colonialism; and it could reduce the expenses in maintaining the military bases. Above all, it saved the security relations with Japan from near collapse.

For the Okinawan people, public opinion polls show that an increasing number of them think that they are better off economically after the reversion. After the reversion, the tourism industry has rapidly expanded, accounting for 10% of GPP in 1988 (4% in 1977); while the U.S. military base incomes are diminishing as a source of foreign exchange earnings (5% in 1988 and 16% in 1977).

When it comes to evaluating the American occupation itself, there is more or less a philosophical question. An U.S. Army historian, concluded his official account of the occupation:⁴⁵⁾

On balance, the five years of military government must be judged a qualified success. Under military tutelage the Ryukyans progressively moved toward local self-government and began to enjoy one of Asia's highest standards. . . .

Before that reversion, American policies, especially those developed after 1948, had transformed Okinawan society from one centered on agriculture to a service economy dependent to a considerable extent on the American military establishment. It was a remarkable transformation, a socio-economic lead of perhaps a century or more, yet one accomplished in the span of a few short years. At the same time, for many Okinawans, this transformation meant shattered hopes for land ownership or radically altered social status. These effects, however unintended on the part of military government officers, became realities that could not be reversed or erased by the act of reversion

Footnotes

(This is a revised version of my article of the same title in *The Political Process of Okinawa Reversion*, (in Japanese) The Japan Association of

International Relations, 19--).

- (1) JCS 570, Over-All Examination of the Requirements for the Post-war Military Bases, Memo by Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 5.4.45, NA RG 218). Arnold G. Fischer, Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-50*, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 1988 p.70.
- (2) FR, 692.
- (3) "Summary" attached to PPS 28.
- (4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Charles E. Saltzman), for example, commented that "The fact that they (the Okinawans) are utterly incapable of their own defense does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that we should volunteer it." Ibid. 727-736.
- (5) FR, 51, VI, 1152-53, p.1152.
- (6) "United States Long Term Objectives with Respect to the Ryukyu Islands," *ibid.*, p.1117.
- (7) *ibid.* Seabold to the SD, 1.17.52 (page). The proposal was rejected by the JCS, 1.21.52, p.1321. The report was transmitted to State, 1.25.52, pp.1116-1120.
- (8) NSC 125/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Japan, *ibid.*, p.1302. President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message of January 7, 1954: The United States "shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa."
- (9) FR, 52-54, VI, Memo Conv. 8.13.53, p.1482.
- (10) U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Consideration of H.R. 10937, To Amend the Act Providing for the Economic and Social Development of the Ryukyu Islands*, March 9, 1961, p.5223.
- (11) Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, "Delegation of Authority for Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," June 17, 1957.
- (12) Memorandum to the Chief of Staff, "Procedures on Matters Pertaining to the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," January 2, 1962, and a letter to the author from Edward E. Freimuth, Special Assignment to Under Secretary of the Army, dated November 6, 1974.
- (13) U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Consideration of H.R. 10937*, p.5254.
- (14) USCAR, *Ryukyu Islands Facts Book*, October 1968 Edition, p.3-1.
- (15) Albert Watson's testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations. *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966*, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 1965, p.68.
- (16) *Hearings, Consideration of H.R. 10937*, op. cit., pp.5216-7, 5228 and 5225-6).

- (17) A letter from Howard E. Haguard, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army to Lawrence Speiser of the American Civil Liberties Union, dated July 31, 1961. See also *Chicago Sun-Times*, June 19, 1961, p.12, and John K. Emmerson, *Arms, Yen & Power*, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1972, p.165.
- (18) *Chicago Tribune*, June 4, 1969 and Emmerson, op. cit., pp.165-7.
- (19) *Press Release* (USCAR), 66-257, July 30 1966.
- (20) USCAR, *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, Vol. XV (1967), pp.13-4.
- (21) *Ibid.*, pp.4-8.
- (22) *Ibid.*, pp.32-3.
- (23) *Ibid.*, p.8.
- (24) Johannes A. Binuendijik, "The Dynamics of Okinawan Reversion, 1945-1969," in Gregory Henderson, ed., *Public Diplomacy and Political Change*, New York: Praeger, 1973, p.116.
- (25) U.S. House of Representatives, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1967*, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, p.7.
- (26) *New York Times*, March 21, 1965, p.27.
- (27) USCAR, *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, Vol. XIV (1966), p.227.
- (28) Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 54 (January 10, 1966), p.66.
- (29) *House hearings, 1967*, op. cit., pp.5 and 8.
- (30) *Ibid.*, p.8.
- (31) High Commissioner Albert Watson's Press Conference, September 9, 1965 (mimeographed).
- (32) *House hearings, 1967*, op. cit., pp.8-9.
- (33) Emmerson, op. cit., p.167.
- (34) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p.82.
- (35) USCAR, *Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands*, Vol. XV (1967), p.310.
- (36) *Ibid.*, pp.21, 78, 83-4, and 99.
- (37) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp.165 and 239.
- (38) *Ibid.*, p.165.
- (39) *House hearings, 1970*, p.239.
- (40) U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1970*, 91st Cong., 1st. sess., 1969, pp.467-8.
- (41) *House hearings, 1970*, p.253.
- (42) U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings, Foreign Assistance Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1969*, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p.100.
- (43) Arnod G. Fisch, Jr., op. cit., pp.183-4.

CHAPTER 5

The Okinawa Reversion and After: An Assessment of the Record During the Past Two Decades

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Introduction

There could be varying criteria for assessing the significance of the reversion of Okinawa depending on what kind of expectations one had about Okinawa's future when it was decided that the islands would be returned to Japanese administration. Those expectations are related in turn to what one means by the word "hondonami" (mainland standard).

Let us focus on the following three criteria for the purposes of this essay: (1) the improvement of living standards of the ordinary citizen of Okinawa; (2) the reduction, if not complete withdrawal, of U.S. military bases in Okinawa; and (3) the smoothing of difficulties in the political management of the U.S.-Japan alliance. What follows is a brief attempt by the author to assess the achievements in Okinawa during the past twenty years in these three regards.

1. Economic Improvement

An overwhelming majority of the people of Okinawa today assess the consequences of the reversion in very positive terms. The reasons are multifarious, but the economic improvement of their life is undoubtedly the most cogent one. The opinion survey data show a prevailing anxiety about their economic plight in the earlier years of the post-reversion period, which, however, was replaced rather dramatically by an affirmative outlook in more recent years. (See Table 1).

Table 1 How Okinawa Views the Twenty Years Since Reversion

	1992	1987	1976	1972
Life has improved	61%	48%	9%	8%
No change	18	26	30	50
Life has worsened	7	13	51	41
Don't know	14	13	10	1

Source: *Ryukyu Shimpō*, April 15, 1992.

Note: An opinion survey recently conducted by the *Okinawa Times* indicates that 88% of the interviewees responded in an affirmative way to question on the same theme. The reasons given by them were (1) increased exchange with the mainland, (2) improvement of public facilities, and (3) industrial development, in this order. The *Okinawa Times*, May 14, 1992.

It would not be unreasonable to attribute this attitudinal change of the local population to the effects of the two Ten-Year Development Plans for Okinawa and other related measures taken by the Japanese government during the past two decades. The substantial amount of money (¥3.4 trillion) that was poured into the islands from the national coffers could not but have had marked effects, though not always wholesome, upon the local economy of Okinawa. As a result, the per capita income of Okinawa Prefecture rose from 60% of the national average to 70-75% in recent years, which, although short of the initially-set target (80%), can be regarded as a reasonably good achievement.¹⁾

The most remarkable achievement was in the field of social capital, and things like road systems and harbor and airport facilities have been much improved. As a result Okinawa

surpassed the other prefectures on some scores, such as the rate of pavement of roads (65% of the prefectural roads are paved in Okinawa as compared to the national average of 45%, as of April 1988). The only Japanese prefecture which has no railway system, Okinawa relies heavily on road transportation. The improved infrastructure was no doubt a factor contributing to promotion of the tourist industry. The number of incoming tourists increased from 444,000 in 1972 to 2,395,000 in 1988, in which year income from the tourist industry amounted to 15.5% of total external receipts, whereas military-related income came to 9%.

The Okinawan economy did not fare very well during the first half of the ten-year term of Development Plan I, but it began to pick up during the second half. When the Japanese economy as a whole entered a period of slower growth, Okinawa alone experienced a high growth rate, and so is often described as a latecomer to high economic growth. Although growth soon leveled off, it remained at a slightly higher rate than the national average, which helped the per capita income of Okinawa draw somewhat closer to the national average.

What was not achieved, however, was the second target of the ambitious Development Plan: establishment of the foundations for autonomous development of the prefectural economy. The still unusually high rate of dependency on the national coffers is a symptom of this problem. Most Okinawan public works projects had been financed as much as 80-100% by the central government, while the other prefectures usually get no more than 60% of the total cost subsidized by national funding. At the time of reversion, the structure of the Okinawan economy was skewed to the extent that the secondary industry sector contributed only 18% of the gross product.

It was planned that the share of the secondary industry sector would rise to 30% by the end of the first decade of the Development Plan, but even today Okinawa is a long from that goal. The share of secondary industry in 1987 was 22% as compared with the national average of 36%. More importantly, the breakdown of these figures shows that manufacturing industry

accounted for less than 7% of the net product of Okinawa while it accounted for more than 27% of Net National Product. Okinawa is at present in search of a development plan which will enable the prefecture to stand on its own feet. This is the task facing the authors of the Third Ten-Year Development Plan, which will start this year. (The Law for the Third Ten-Year Development Plan for Okinawa was passed by the Diet in April 1992. The Okinawa Prefectural Government is now preparing its own proposals, which are to be incorporated, after re-examination by the national government, into a concrete policy).

2. Military Base Problems

The phrase "hondo-nami" (mainland standard) often heard around the time of the reversion, was not necessarily defined in an unerring way. It was not without good reason, however, that many of the people in Okinawa had expectations that reversion would bring about some improvement in a situation characterized by the unusually densely concentrated of U.S. military facilities in Okinawa as compared to the rest of Japan.

The past twenty years have witnessed some reduction of U.S. military facilities both in Okinawa and in mainland Japan. Table 2 presents a summary of the past record in this regard.

Table 2 U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa and on the Japanese Mainland

	Number of U.S. military facilities		Land area utilized by the U.S. military (km ²)	
	Okinawa	Mainland	Okinawa	Mainland
1972	83	98	278	196
1992	43	61	242	82
Rate of reduction (%)	46	38	13	58

Source: Data supplied by the Defense Agency.

The rate of reduction was very small for Okinawa as compared with that for the mainland (meaning the whole of Japan minus Okinawa), actually elevating rather than reducing the degree

of concentration of U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (the land for U.S. military use on Okinawa accounted for 59% of the total land area used for that purpose throughout the country in 1972; the figure increased to 75% in 1992).

Some of the U.S. military facilities, the Naha Air Base being among the most important, were transferred to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, thus further reducing the portion of real estate transferred to the civilian sector. The Makiminato housing area (located within the city limits of Naha) is among the most notable examples of the second category. It is only in recent years, however, that a program for redevelopment of the land was actually drawn up. The long delay is explained by the extreme difficulty with which an agreement was reached among the landowners concerned.

As this experience shows, the mere transfer of the right to use the land is not enough; painstaking efforts are needed before the land is put to actual use.

Table 3 indicates that as much as 11% of the total land area of Okinawa Prefecture is now procured for military purposes. A large part of this is located on the main island of Okinawa, as much as 19% of which is used by the U.S. military. Inconveniences that the people of Okinawa experience as a result of the procurement of significant real estate by the U.S. (as well as Japanese) military forces cannot therefore be overlooked.

Table 3 The Percentage of the Total Land Area Used by the Military

(As of 1992)

	U.S. Military	Japan SDF	Total
Okinawa	11.04%	0.29%	11.33%
Mainland	0.02	0.28	0.30
Nationwide	0.09	0.28	0.37

Source: Data supplied by the Defense Agency.

However, the term "base-dependent economy," once commonly used in reference to Okinawa, is no longer an accurate description. It is true that military-related income is still quite substantial. Rent for land and Wages for workers

on the U.S. military bases in Okinawa are among the important budget items of the Defense Agency of the Japanese Government. Both items have shown a dramatic increase during the past two decades; rent increased from ¥15 billion to ¥59 billion, and wages from ¥500 million to ¥31 billion. The accumulated Okinawa-related expenditures of the Defense Agency (including the above-mentioned two items) during the period from 1972 to 1991 comes to ¥1.663 trillion. (This figure should be compared to ¥3.4 trillion for the two Ten-Year Development Plans for Okinawa mentioned earlier.)

Nevertheless, the share of military-related income in the prefecture's gross expenditure showed an impressive decline from 15.6% in 1972 to 5.3% in 1987. (It is significant that the receipt from tourism grew from 8.1% to 10.6% of the gross prefectural expenditure during the same period of time).

One can conclude this section by making the following three points:

(1) The U.S. military presence in Okinawa still remains very substantial physically, in terms of the land area occupied by the military. Psychologically and economically, however, its impact on the local populations has been much reduced. The economic improvement of Okinawa is undoubtedly an important factor explaining this change in the psychological environment.

(2) The importance of the military for the local economy is a debatable question. The owners of military land (about 28,000 individuals) depend most directly on income from the military (more precisely, the Japanese government). A large majority of landowners agreed to an extension of the lease when the 20-year contract expired, while 585 of them refused to renew. The latter group included some 500 "nominal" owners who possessed tiny tracts of land (about 67m² altogether) and refused to renew as a political gesture demonstrating their objection to the U.S. military presence. Significantly, however, while the political/ideological objectors are losing ground, there are signs of growing sentiment among pragmatic and commercial-minded citizens for an early transfer of the land to the civil sector. Apparently, the rising price of land

is a factor contributing to this trend. And the irony is that the same factor. The high price of land constitutes an obstacle to the promotion of manufacturing industry because Okinawa cannot compete with other prefectures (such as Kagoshima, Kumamoto, Fukuoka etc.) which can provide prospective investors with much lower-priced land for factories. A solution to this problem may be to create an Okinawan economy which is comparatively less dependent on land use by fostering high-tech and information industries, for example. An Okinawan economy of such a type, one advocate of this vision maintains, can co-exist with the U.S. military bases. At any rate, land policy will inevitably assume a larger role in the future of Okinawa henceforth.

(3) Speculation is rife about the withdrawal of — if not the whole then at least a substantial portion of — the U.S. military from Okinawa in the not-too-distant future. An article in *The Okinawa Times* (April 16, 1992) reported, quoting from “diplomatic and military sources” in Washington, DC, that there exists within the Pentagon an influential school of thought which is in favor of an early pull-out of the Marines from Okinawa. According to the report, a large part of the Marines will be transferred to Hawaii, and the remaining U.S. forces will be reorganized, reducing the area of land used by the U.S. military to about one-third of the present level by the end of this century. The role of the Okinawan bases would be mainly that of logistic support and training for forward-deployed forces. Both U.S. and Japanese authorities denied the authenticity of this report for understandable reasons, but it would not be unreasonable to assume that the Department of Defense is giving careful consideration to such a plan as one of the scenarios for the next decade. This being the case, it would be advisable for the Japanese Government to map out a long-term development plan for Okinawa, taking into consideration that possibility.

3. The Management of The Alliance

The reversion of Okinawa was considered necessary to facilitate the political handling of the U.S.-Japan alliance system. The special

arrangement provided for the U.S. military presence in Okinawa for a period of about twenty years after the San Francisco Peace Treaty had been signed, acting as a built-in stabilizer of the alliance system, that is to say a convenient device by which the managers of the alliance, both in Tokyo and in Washington, could keep political opposition to the alliance within bounds. Japanese policy makers could feign innocence before the anti-military public about the “uncontrollable behavior” of the U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa, claiming that the islands fell beyond their jurisdiction. The American military leaders could enjoy a maximum degree of freedom as far as their base rights in Okinawa were concerned, thus somewhat compensating for what they had “lost” after Japan regained its sovereignty.

The political advantages of this arrangement gradually diminished during the twenty years after the San Francisco Peace Treaty due to two important developments: the political awakening of the people in Okinawa and the economic growth of Japan. The people of Okinawa began to think that it would be unfair for them alone to be required to make special sacrifices once again for the sake of the U.S.-Japan alliance, after a long history of what appeared to be servile submission to the mainlanders, — the Battle of Okinawa preceding Japan's surrender being part of that long history. Witnessing the remarkable economic recovery of mainland Japan, they ceased to be persuaded that the only hope of an economically decent life for them was continued reliance on the U.S. military bases. Under these circumstances, the managers of the U.S.-Japan alliance tried to save the situation (a) by allowing the Okinawans a greater degree of political autonomy than before and (b) by allowing them an opportunity to enjoy a share in the fruits of Japan's economic growth — hence the growing importance of financial assistance from the Japanese Government to Okinawa during the 1960s.²⁾

Years had passed before the managers of the alliance began to realize that they could no longer rely on these methods. A more dramatic political gesture was needed, they thought, if only for the purpose of stabilizing the U.S.

military presence in Okinawa. They could not have had decided to return the islands to Japanese administration at a better moment. If delayed, the political situation in Okinawa could have had gotten out of control. Also, the increasingly vexing issues of economic friction would have absorbed the minds of political leaders on the both sides of the Pacific, diverting their attention from the Okinawa problem. Even if an agreement was achieved, Congress might well have refused to give it its blessing.

As our analysis in the preceding two sections shows, the twenty years after the reversion was the period during which efforts were made to handle the politically sensitive problem of Okinawan bases within the new framework of a joint, undertaking between Japan and the United States, as opposed a unilateral U.S. undertaking. By taking over the legal and financial burdens from the U.S. authorities, the Japanese government has succeeded in reducing, to a significant degree, the psychological and economic impact of the U.S. military presence on the daily life of the people of Okinawa. Having seized just in time the opportunity to ride on the cnatails of East Asia's most economically advanced country, Okinawa now enjoys fairly good living standards compared with the other economies of the region. (See Table 4 below.)

Table 4 A Comparison of GNP per Capita (1988)

Japan	23,382
Okinawa	17,537
Hong Kong	9,637
Taiwan	6,147
Korea	4,082
Malaysia	2,047
Thailand	1,062
Philippines	667
Indonesia	471

Source: Keizai Koho Center. *Japan: An International Comparison 1991*, p. 12. The figure for Okinawa is calculated assuming its per capita gross product to be 75% of that of Japan. The figures are in U.S.\$, calculated according to the annual exchange rates of the IMF, *International Financial Statistics*.

Conclusion

The balance sheet for the reversion is, one can plausibly claim, in favor of those who are concerned with and responsible for successful management of the U.S.-Japan alliance. It would be dangerous, however, for the managers of the alliance to indulge in complacency. They are going to face a real challenge in the next decade in the sense that it will require their concerted efforts to find the means by which the alliance can adjust itself to the new reality of the post-Cold War era and by which the U.S. military (and we should add Japan's SDF as well) can get along harmoniously with a sound Okinawan economy. The achievements during the past two decades are indeed encouraging, having established a good foundation for this future task. But the task is yet to be accomplished, and in that sense the Okinawa problem is still with us.

Foot Notes

- 1) Okinawa Development Agency, *Okinawa Shinkokaihatsu no Genjo to Kadai* (The Present and Future of the Okinawa Development Plan), July 1990, p. 27. The Ryukyu Ginko (The Bank of the Ryukyu), *Sengo Okinawa Keizaishi* (History of the Postwar Economy of Okinawa), 1984, p. 1246 ff provides an analysis of the problem from an Okinawan perspective.
- 2) Akio Watanabe, *The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1970) is a detailed analysis of the pre-reversion political process.

CHAPTER 6

Japan's Decision Making Process

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In an article written and published in a Japanese journal in the mid-1970s, I discussed the same topic essentially as a case study in the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy making in the Japanese government.¹ In the present paper I attempt to shed some additional light on and draw some new insights into the same topic, on the basis of information derived from the same sources, however, it will be useful to review some of the main points made in the earlier study so as to avoid excessive duplication or redundancy.

Bureaucratic Politics of Okinawa Reversion

In a nutshell, my 1974 article looked at five major watershed events in the U.S.-Japanese negotiation of the late 1960s that led to the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. These events were: (1) mention of the reversion issue in candidate Eisaku Sato's campaign statement during the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election in July 1964; (2) Sato's visit to Okinawa in August 1965; (3) the second Johnson-Sato summit meeting in November 1967; (4) Sato's public commitment to reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and with the status of U.S. bases identical with that of their counterparts in the rest of Japan (*kakunuki-hondonami* [nuclear-free, homeland-level]); and (5) the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting. On each of these events, I made the following points, among others.

First, Sato mentioned the reversion issue during the 1964 LDP presidential election, not because he had special interest in the issue at that time but because he was urged to do so by a

brain-trust. In other words, his interest in the issue was almost purely instrumental and tactical in the beginning. Second, Sato developed a deep personal interest in the issue following his visit to Okinawa the following summer, a visit that was inspired primarily by political, if not Machiavellian, considerations. Soon thereafter, however, he, and many others in the Japanese government and the ruling party, began to regard the issue as Sato's; Sato now wanted, and needed, more than anybody else and more than achievement of any of his other foreign policy goals, a successful resolution of the issue, i.e., an early reversion of administrative rights over the islands to Japan.

Second, the Foreign Ministry's senior officials were by and large uninterested in the issue in the beginning, especially before the 1967 Johnson-Sato summit, mainly because they did not believe that the U.S., especially its military leadership, would agree to return the control of the islands in the foreseeable future. Disappointed, and more than a little angered, by the bureaucrats' unenthusiastic attitudes, Sato turned for advice to a private advisory group assembled by Chief Cabinet Secretary Toshio Kimura and led by former Waseda University President Nobumoto Ohama. There was considerable mutual distrust, if not open antagonism, between Ohama and members of his group, who believed in and aggressively pushed the view that the U.S. could and would agree to early reversion on a "nuclear-free, homeland-level" basis, and the Foreign Ministry's top echelon, who neither believed in such a view nor found it particularly attractive. The conflict

flared up in the fall of 1967 over a report prepared by the Ohama group, known as Okikon, a few weeks before the Johnson-Sato summit meeting. The original text of the report proposed to seek agreement between the two governments within a year or two on the reversion of Okinawa on a "homeland-level" basis and, specifically, removal of all strategic nuclear weapons from U.S. bases in the islands prior to the reversion. Foreign Ministry officials found the language in the text undiplomatic and indiscreet and proposed to revise it so extensively that Ohama at one point threatened to dissociate himself and his group from the tampered document. The compromise text that resulted from this fracas and that became the basis of Sato's position on the issue during the November 1967 summit envisaged basic agreement on a concrete reversion plan at the summit meeting and on a decision to be made within two or three years on the date of actual reversion.²

Third, the Ohama group, i.e., Okikon and its subcommittee on the status of U.S. bases after reversion, known as Kichiken, rather than the Foreign Ministry, remained Sato's primary source of information and advice on the reversion issue until late 1968. The group was then seemingly squeezed out of the official decision making process in Tokyo, as a team of Foreign Ministry professionals took over as Sato's official advisers and spokesmen during the last and critical phases of the U.S.-Japanese negotiation. This official team was a very small group of Foreign Ministry officials from its American Affairs and Treaties Bureaus and operated under the direct command of the foreign minister.³ Despite its unambiguous official status, however, this team never won Sato's total and unqualified confidence and was kept out of the most delicate and decisive arena of the bilateral negotiation leading up to and during the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit. As he had done in November 1967, Sato again sent a personal emissary to Washington and had him conduct a secret negotiation and strike a secret deal directly with the White House without the knowledge, not to mention the involvement, of the Foreign Ministry team.

Fourth and last, the pattern of decision

making in the Japanese government on the Okinawa reversion issue was very different from the pattern suggested by conventional wisdom: a pattern characterized by the dominant role of bureaucrats; a customary but rigidly enforced procedure of wide-ranging consultation and laborious consensus-building within the bureaucracy; absence of an assertive, not to mention obtrusive, role of the central political leadership; a "bottom-up" process of decision making; a reactive, rather than initiatory, character of the decision making system; etc.⁴ In sharp contrast to the image of a helplessly hidebound and inflexible process projected by this conventional view, the decision making process in the Okinawa reversion case was characterized by a very visible, assertive, and decisive role of the top political leadership, a clearly subordinate, and frequently ignored, role of the bureaucracy, an extremely narrow range and strictly controlled process of consultation and consensus-building both within and outside the bureaucracy, a distinctly "top-down" flow of decision making power, etc.

An important conclusion of my erstwhile study of this subject was thus that the decision making process in this case represented a pattern that could not be explained by the conventional model of decision making in the Japanese government. The pattern, however, was neither uncommon or unfamiliar in the history of foreign policy making in postwar Japan—and presumably even in prewar Japan—and had, in fact, been seen in all the cases that had involved intense and widespread public controversy and that had, mainly for that reason, been studied in detail, such as the 1951 signing of the Peace and U.S.-Japan Mutual Security treaties, the 1960 revision of the latter treaty, the 1956 normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, the 1972 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, etc. This led me to propose a "critical decision" model as a complement to the conventional model to which I referred as the "routine decision" model. I also suggested that the new model was applicable both to cases that involved what Lowi called "redistributive" issues and to most cases amenable to explanation by Allison's Model I (rational actor) and Model III

(bureaucratic politics).⁵

Linkage Politics in the Okinawa Reversion Negotiation

So much for the summary of my discussion and arguments in my 1974 article, and let me now turn to the main task of the present paper, that is, an examination of the linkage politics aspects of the U.S.-Japanese negotiation.⁶ An appropriate and useful framework for such an examination is found in the "two-level game" model of international negotiations proposed by Robert Putnam in his widely cited 1988 article.⁷

To summarize Putnam's propositions that are directly relevant to my discussion in this paper, an international negotiation may be metaphorically defined as a game played sequentially—simultaneously in the real world—at two separate levels: The leader of each government negotiates, at Level I, "across the table" with his counterpart of the other government and, at Level II, "behind the table" with his or her domestic constituents.⁸ The constituents may include a parliament, political parties, government ministries, interest groups, individual advisers, and even public opinion. In order to be effective, agreement reached at Level I must be ratifiable at Level II, that is, must be able to "win" in the Level II game; all agreements that would "win" in one nation's Level II game belong to that nation's "win set." An effective international agreement results from an overlap between the win-sets of both nations; therefore, the larger each nation's "win-set" and the larger the overlap between both nations' sets, the more likely agreement results from an international negotiation. The larger a nation's win-set, or so perceived by the leader (negotiator) of the other nation, however, the more likely its leader (negotiator) is to be "pushed around," that is, the weaker his or her negotiating position; conversely, the smaller a nation's "win-set," the larger its leader's bargaining advantage. The success or failure of an international negotiation thus depends on and is constrained by the state of the Level II, i.e., domestic, game; but the state of the Level II game is also affected by the state of the Level I game, especially for a nation and/or its leader

who, for one reason or another, desperately wants or needs an international agreement.

Applied to the Okinawa reversion negotiations, Putnam's two-level game model yields explanations of various aspects of the bilateral negotiation and the decision making process in the Japanese government that are not as easily derived from the bureaucratic politics approach. First of all, the Putnam model draws our attention to the size and substance of the win-set on the U.S. side as a basic determinant of the form and contents of a feasible agreement on the issue. The maintenance of a close and friendly alliance relationship with Japan and the long and stable tenure of the pro-American Sato government were so important to Washington that an eventual approval of the reversion of Okinawa, on which Sato staked his political life, was clearly within the U.S. win-set from the beginning.⁹ On the other hand, however, the primary mission of the U.S. bases in Okinawa was the defense, not so much of Japan itself as of the Asia and Pacific region as a whole, particularly the two potential flashpoints in the region, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, and the one current hattle field, Vietnam.¹⁰ Moreover, nuclear weapons were stored at some of these bases.¹¹ The U.S. military, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were convinced that the retention of the U.S. right to use the bases in Okinawa for operations, if not anywhere in the Asia and Pacific region, then at least in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and to deploy nuclear weapons if and when necessary was essential to the fulfillment of their mission in the region.¹²

The U.S. win-set, as it evolved by late 1967, thus called for an early reversion, possibly preceded by removal of all strategic nuclear weapons from the U.S. bases, in the interest of stabilizing and perpetuating the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the pro-American LDP government, conditional on a Japanese commitment, preferably formal, to permit the U.S. military continued unrestricted use of the bases, both for combat operations in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam and for deploying nuclear weapons. These conditions could be satisfied by a change in the conventional Japanese interpretation of the purpose of the so-called prior consultation clause

provided in an exchange of notes between the two governments appended to the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.¹³ Whereas the clause had been traditionally regarded by the Japanese as a means to prevent significant expansion of the use to which U.S. bases in Japan could be put, they were now expected to undertake to use the clause as a means to permit, if not encourage, such expansion.

In short, the U.S. win-set required a Japanese prior commitment to say "yes", rather than "no", to future U.S. requests for important changes in the use of its bases, not only in Okinawa but also in the rest of Japan, specifically including their use for combat operations in the three flashpoints mentioned above, and, not so specifically but no less unequivocally, potential redeployment of nuclear weapons.¹⁴ As we shall see later, another Japanese concession on an unrelated but, to President Nixon, equally or even more important issue, i.e., restraint of Japanese textile exports to the U.S., was added to the U.S. win-set during the last phase of the negotiation leading to the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit.

On the other hand, the Japanese win-set, as perceived by Sato, was considerably more ambiguous, especially before the 1967 Johnson-Sato summit. The ambiguity arose partly from Sato's own indecision (the "blank sheet" position), partly from divisions of opinion among his advisers, especially between the Ohama group and the Foreign Ministry, but also among LDP leaders and members, and partly from uncertainty about the state and direction of the debate in the U.S. government, especially within the White House.¹⁵ By late 1968, however, Sato's position became somewhat better defined: it now included, in addition to the maintenance of a close and friendly alliance relationship with the U.S., an early reversion, if at all possible, on a "nuclear-free, homeland-level" basis.¹⁶ In the next several months, his commitment to the attainment of the latter goal within a few years became much firmer, though never entirely nonnegotiable. By then, some among the Foreign Ministry officials involved in the decision making process, notably North American Division Director Chiba and his

deputy, Yukio Satoh, had also begun to believe that an early reversion on a formally or technically nuclear-free and homeland-level basis was a possible option.¹⁷

There was no real overlap between the U.S. and Japanese win-sets and, therefore, no room for agreement to be reached through a negotiation, unless either one or both sets were modified during, and perhaps as a result of, the negotiation. Even though the U.S. was willing to return the administration of Okinawa to Japan fairly soon, it made its agreement to do so contingent on Japanese agreement to permit the U.S. to continue to use its bases in ways not acceptable to Japan, namely, for combat operations in areas where the Japanese did not want to get involved and for possible redeployment of nuclear weapons. These conditions were clearly incompatible with the Japanese demand for reversion on a nuclear-free, homeland-level basis. As we shall see below, neither the U.S. nor the Japanese win-set fundamentally changed during the negotiation, which therefore turned out to be a seemingly futile search for agreement that was impossible. Moreover, and as mentioned above, the U.S. win-set was subsequently expanded by the addition of a demand for Japanese concessions on an unrelated issue, Japanese textile exports to the U.S. Because such concessions were strongly opposed by many influential groups in Japan, including virtually all major parties, and, particularly because the entanglement of the two issues was opposed even more strongly and universally in Japan, this change in the U.S. win-set should have made it even more difficult for the negotiation to result in agreement.

The "agreement" reached during the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting was thus a miracle, or a mirage, that could not have happened, had both sides negotiated within the boundary of their respective win-sets. As we shall see below, the miracle did happen because the Japanese side went beyond the boundary of its win-set, while the U.S. side temporized on the boundary of its own set. The "agreement" was thus also a remarkable compromise worked out between two theoretically incompatible win-sets, and the negotiation that produced it was an

arduous and complicated joint search for the compromise. The following discussion traces and explains this search from the perspective of Putnam's two-level game model.

I should first point out that the state of the Level II game on the Japanese side was constantly and significantly influenced by the state of the Level I game or, to put it more accurately, by the Japanese actors' perceptions and interpretations of the state of play in the latter game. A series of subtle signals began to reach Japanese actors in a variety of contexts in early 1967. To cite just a few examples, Chiba, posted at the Japanese embassy in Washington at the time, began to notice around that time some change in the attitudes of State and Defense Department officials toward the Okinawa issue, and Chiba's reports led North American Affairs Division Director Edamura in Tokyo to begin to think seriously about the status of the bases.¹⁸ In February, the new High Commissioner, Ferdinand Unger, surprised the Okinawa Legislature by expressing his hope that reversion should take place soon.¹⁹ The next month, the U.S. for the first time permitted the display of the Japanese national flag in Okinawa. During the bilateral meeting of foreign and security policy planners held in the same month, Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba's mention of a "fences and roads" issue—obstruction of local residents' daily activities in Okinawa by the fences and roads built by the U.S. military—elicited a response from a senior State Department official to the effect that Japan should begin to think about a more fundamental issue.²⁰ This response was interpreted by some Foreign Ministry officials as a suggestion that the reversion of the islands might be placed on the official agenda of bilateral negotiation. In April, Ohama visited the U.S., talked with nearly one hundred influential Americans, including State and Defense Department officials, Council of Foreign Relations representatives, and university professors, and upon his return to Tokyo reported to Sato that the U.S. was likely to respond positively to a concrete Japanese reversion plan.²¹ Later in the year, U.S. signals began also to indicate some specific terms of reversion. During the summit meeting in

November of that year, for example, Sato was told in no uncertain terms that Japanese concessions regarding the status of U.S. bases after reversion were essential to U.S. agreement to reversion.²² Upon his return to Tokyo, Sato launched a "security consciousness" campaign to make the Japanese, both inside and outside the government, understand and appreciate the indispensable role of the U.S. military in maintaining the peace and security of the Asia and Pacific region.²³

Despite their deepening awareness and understanding of the broad parameters of the U.S. position on the reversion issue, the Japanese win-set appeared ill-defined and confusing until after the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting began. This was due mainly to three circumstances. First, the U.S. conditions for an early reversion that were known to the Japanese—i.e., Japanese commitments on the post-reversion use of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the rest of Japan for combat operations in the three specific areas in the region and on the possible redeployment of nuclear weapons—were incompatible with the basic Japanese demand for "nuclear-free, homeland-level" status for post-reversion U.S. bases as the term was interpreted by most Japanese at the time. The U.S. conditions as they stood were thus non-ratifiable in the Japanese level II game.

Second, President Nixon had decided by the end of May 1969 to let nuclear weapons be removed from Okinawa prior to reversion, and at least a few top U.S. negotiators knew of that decision, but information about the decision was deliberately and successfully withheld from the Japanese, including Sato, until the eve of the summit talks.²⁴ As a result, until the last moment Sato, and all the other Japanese actors, were uncertain about exactly what *quid pro quo*, especially in reference to the key Japanese demand for early reversion on a "nuclear-free, homeland-level" basis, they could expect from Washington in return for the extremely costly, and potentially suicidal, concessions demanded by the U.S.²⁵

Third and last, while it was possible to misrepresent the non-ratifiable U.S. conditions to the major constituents of the Japanese Level II

game, Sato and his advisers were uncertain, and very nervous, about the implied resort to lies and tricks to achieve one of the most important and "honorable" goals of Japanese foreign policy since World War II.²⁶ Moreover, whether deception or camouflage would work in the Japanese Level II game would depend on how the Level I agreement on the non-ratifiable Japanese concessions was to be expressed in the relevant public document, i.e., the joint communiqué to be issued following the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit. As it turned out, it took until the eve of the summit for the official and unofficial negotiators of the two governments to find mutually acceptable, if not entirely satisfactory, and at least moderately deceptive compromise language to go into the joint communiqué, and for Sato and his principal advisers to overcome their qualms about and accept it.

For a whole year immediately preceding the 1969 summit, Sato and other Japanese actors focused their information-gathering and negotiating efforts on the resolution of the second and third problems mentioned above. Their efforts revolved, not around formal negotiations between the two teams of official negotiators, but around a loose network of mostly informal and often highly personal relationships that developed between a number of individual Japanese and U.S. policy-makers and negotiators. Particularly notable among such relationships, to which Clapp and I referred as "transnational alliances" in our unpublished work, were those between the Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Director-General Togo and the State Department's Country Director for Japan, Richard Sneider, between North American Affairs Division Director Chiba and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton H. Halperin, and between Chiba's deputy, Yukio Satoh, and a U.S. embassy staffer, Rodney Armstrong.²⁷ Mainly through this informal communication network, the Foreign Ministry officials learned by early 1969 that the U.S. position was relatively flexible on the date of reversion but quite rigid on the status of the bases, and that, while the U.S. might agree to remove land-based nuclear weapons before

reversion, it was not likely to accept "homeland-level" treatment of either submarine- or aircraft-borne nuclear missiles. This information led Foreign Minister Aichi in early 1969 to float a two-stage plan: For a limited period after reversion, the U.S. bases would remain intact, with the nuclear weapons staying on them and activities related to the Vietnam War continuing, before they were made to conform to the homeland-level status.²⁸

Faced, however, with the growing ranks of nuclear-free, homeland-level reversion advocates within his own party, Sato rejected Aichi's plan in favor of continuing search for a formula that would make the Okinawa bases *prima facie* nuclear-free and homeland-level.²⁹ In short, he bowed to the imperatives of the Level II game and chose to let domestic political pressures "reverberate" in an international negotiation.³⁰ Confirmed in late May at a meeting between leaders of the Sato cabinet on one hand and those of the Foreign Ministry, on the other, this decision led to frantic efforts by Aichi and other members of the Foreign Ministry team to obtain a firmer commitment from the U.S. side on the removal of nuclear weapons prior to reversion and additional clarification of the U.S. position on the substance and form of the agreement to be reached on the post-reversion use of Okinawa bases for combat operations in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The decision also led to one of the strangest, and one of the most controversial, episodes in the Okinawa reversion negotiation, i.e., a series of back-channel negotiations conducted and secret agreement reached between the heads of the two governments via their surrogates.

On June 3, just as Aichi was to meet Secretary of State Rogers, *The New York Times* reported that President Nixon had already decided to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa. To Aichi's great disappointment and frustration, however, Rogers neither confirmed the accuracy of the press report nor offered any additional information on other details of the current U.S. position on the reversion issue.³¹ Ironically, the only tangible progress made at this meeting was a deepened awareness on Aichi's part of the seriousness of the textile trade

issue. During the meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Tokyo at the end of July, Rogers informed Aichi of the U.S. approval of the reversion of Okinawa on a homeland-level basis in 1972, sought a formal Japanese commitment on the post-reversion use of the bases for combat operations in the three specific areas, but refused to promise prior removal of nuclear arsenal.³² Frustrated by and impatient with the stalemate in the formal negotiation between the Foreign Ministry and State Department teams, Sato sent a personal emissary ("Mr. Yoshida") to Washington in mid-July to open a back-channel of negotiation and seek a deal directly with the emissary's old acquaintance, NSC Adviser Kissinger. As the latter has subsequently revealed, the deal involved an exchange of Japanese concessions on the textile issue for U.S. concessions on the issue of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.³³ By this time, extraction of substantial concessions from Japan on textile trade had become an integral part of the U.S. win-set; a number of Senators and Congressmen, as well as President Nixon himself, wanted such concessions from Japan and, without them, would have made the ratification of the Level I agreement in the U.S. Level II game considerably more complicated and time-consuming than it turned out to be.

From this point onward, the Okinawa reversion negotiation proceeded in two separate channels, one official, and at least partially public and visible, the other unofficial and strictly confidential. Sato was the hinge between the two channels on the Japanese side, Nixon and Kissinger on the U.S. side. Considering the extreme degree of secrecy in which the back-channel negotiation was held on both sides, it is remarkable how much coordination, though not integration, between the results of actions taken in the two separate channels, though not actions themselves, was achieved on each side. The text of the joint communiqué issued by the two heads of government at the end of their summit meeting was not surprising but as expected to most of the major actors on either side. It was, in fact, a model of bureaucratise with which members of both official negotiating teams must

have felt quite comfortable, even though those who were not used to the bureaucratise must have found it confounding and, perhaps, even mystifying.³⁴ Moreover, there was no mention whatever of the textile deal. These features of the document helped make the Level I agreement ratifiable in Japan, at least in the short run. In this sense, the back-channel negotiation may be said to have been successful.

The back-channel negotiation, however, also proved costly in several ways. First, it caused a considerable amount of mutual suspicion, distrust, and wariness between Sato and Aichi on one hand and the Foreign Ministry officials, on the other. About ten days before Sato's official party arrived in Washington on November 17, his emissary had again visited Kissinger, had been reassured of the U.S. commitment to remove nuclear weapons before reversion in exchange for the Japanese commitments on the prior consultation system and textiles, and had returned to Tokyo to report back to Sato.³⁵ But none other than Sato and the emissary, not even Aichi or Togo or Minister Bunroku Yoshino, who was officially in charge of the textile negotiation at the Japanese embassy in Washington, was aware of any of such secret goings-on.³⁶ The emissary and Kissinger, acting respectively for Sato and Nixon, had also agreed on an elaborate scenario for the exchanges to take place between the two leaders during the first session of the summit meeting: Sato would begin with a categorical opposition to any introduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa after reversion, Nixon would respond with the maximum U.S. demands on the nuclear and base use issues, Sato would then produce the compromise plan which had been agreed on in advance, and Nixon would accept that plan.³⁷ Accordingly, Sato first showed Nixon a draft of the joint communiqué that did not include the key reference in Paragraph 8 to the prior consultation system: "without prejudice ... under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security".³⁸ This was a draft known to few, if any, other than Sato, his emissary, Kissinger, and Nixon. Nixon duly rejected this version, Sato then produced the longer version that included the key passage in Paragraph 8, and Nixon

accepted it. In return, Sato confirmed his commitment on the textile issue.

A compromise was thus realized and a miracle produced. "Agreement" that was theoretically impossible was made possible by making it appear ratifiable in the Level II games on both sides. This apparent ratifiability was attained, however, essentially by technical camouflage, if not outright deception, in the text of the joint communiqué and concealment of a vital component of the "agreement", namely Sato's commitment on the textile issue.³⁹ These aspects of the "agreement", especially the entanglement of the textile issue, were not immediately apparent even to some members of the two official negotiating teams, not to mention to other constituents in the Level II game in each country. For that reason, the "agreement" played well in both countries for a short while: Sato's stature rose and the LDP won impressively in the lower house general election that followed within a month of the summit meeting. In the longer run, however, the "agreement" proved seriously flawed for the resolution of the Okinawa issue, and fatally for the textile issue. Administrative rights over the islands were returned to Japan on schedule in May 1972, but, consistent with the correct interpretation of the letter and spirit of the "agreement", but contrary to expectations of the Japanese public and, especially the local population in Okinawa, the status and functions of the U.S. bases did not significantly change. This kept Okinawa reversion a festering issue in Japanese domestic politics long after the formal transfer of administrative rights over the islands from Washington to Tokyo. In the meantime, the secret covenant on the textile issue began to unravel within a few months, causing considerable ill will between the top leaders, and many other citizens, of the two nations.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has shown that the Okinawa reversion negotiation can be interpreted as an unorthodox two-level game in which mutually incompatible, i.e., non-overlapping, national win-sets were forced into artificial compatibility to produce a dubious "agreement" by fiat. As the model predicts, the portion of the

agreement (on textiles) which could not be ratified in the Japanese Level II game proved nonenforceable, and as the model implies, the portion (on the change in the operation of the prior consultation system) which had to be camouflaged in that game spawned well-founded suspicion and not so well-founded fear among many constituents of the Level II game on the Japanese side. It is thus tempting to conclude that the negotiation was a disastrous failure, rather than a sterling success.

On the other hand, not only was Okinawa reversion realized on schedule but the event was doubtless welcome to most Japanese, including those in Okinawa. After all, it was what they had fought to bring about for more than three decades. U.S.-Japanese relations have obviously been better for this event, both in the short run and in the long run; Okinawa could have become the southern version of the northern territories issue that continues to this day to strain and poison Japanese-Russian relations. In a broad historical perspective, then, this negotiation and its main product should perhaps be more positively evaluated.

Its virtues and vices in terms of U.S.-Japanese relations and the domestic politics of each nation aside, the Okinawa reversion negotiation also sheds some new light on the nature of two-level games that governments play, and thus helps further develop and refine Putnam's model. Above all, the case shows that a theoretically impossible international agreement may be manufactured in the real world through manipulation of one or more national win-sets, manipulation that involves misrepresentation or concealment of the true nature of the agreement reached. This will happen especially in cases where either or both governments (or leaders) desperately want or need an agreement and where the agreement concerns multiple issues with trade-off possibilities. The foregoing discussion has shown the potential hazards and costs of such an agreement.

Notes

1 See my "Okinawa henkan kosho: Nihon seifu

- ni okeru kettei katei" [Okinawa reversion: Decision making in the Japanese government]. *Kokusai seiji* [International Relations] 52:2 (1974), 97-124.
- 2 Sato tried unsuccessfully to gain prior approval of this position from the Johnson White House through a personal emissary dispatched to Washington before the arrival of Sato's official party, an exercise repeated with much greater success, two years later.
 - 3 These were Bureau Director-General Togo, Councillor Ogawara, and North American Affairs Division Director Chiba from the American Affairs Bureau, Bureau Director-General Sato, Councillor Takashima, and Treaties Division Director Nakajima from the Treaties Bureau, and a few assistants from each bureau. Foreign Vice Minister Ushiba and Ambassador Shimoda in Washington played only minor roles in the Okinawa reversion negotiation.
 - 4 As pointed out in a footnote in the 1974 article, this system and pattern, known as *ringisei*, was discussed by Kiyooki Tsuji in his "Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of *Ringisei*," in Robert E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 457-75. Another widely cited English-language source on the subject is Ezra F. Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), passim.
 - 5 The references are to the three types of policy issues—i.e., distributive, redistributive, and regulatory—discussed in Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964), pp. 677-715, and to the three models of foreign policy decision making—i.e., Model I (rational actor), Model II (organizational process), and Model III (bureaucratic politics)—discussed in Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
 - 6 The term "linkage politics" is borrowed from James Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1969).
 - 7 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.
 - 8 For simplicity, I assume that the international negotiations under consideration are bilateral, rather than multilateral.
 - 9 Priscilla Clapp and Haruhiro Fukui, "Decision Making in U.S.-Japanese Relations: Okinawa Reversion" (unpublished manuscript, 1975), chap. 7, p. 7. Edwin O. Reischauer, both as a Harvard professor and the U.S. ambassador to Japan, was probably the most authoritative, influential, and consistent advocate of the sympathetic view of the Japanese position on the issue. His opinion had an important impact on the attitudes of American leaders, including both President Johnson and President Nixon. *Ibid.*, chap. 7, pp. 10-11.
 - 10 Fukui, "Okinawa henkan kosho," p. 116.
 - 11 See also Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 325.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, p. 328.
 - 13 The relevant part of the exchange of notes reads: "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan."

- 14 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 2, pp. 45-46; Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 326.
- 15 *Ibid.*, "Decision Making," chap. 4, pp. 14-18.
- 16 *Ibid.*, chap. 2, pp. 2-4.
- 17 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, pp. 21-22.
- 18 Fukui, "Okinawa henkan kosho," p. 108.
- 19 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 2, pp. 36-37.
- 20 Fukui, "Okinawa henkan kosho," p. 108.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 109; Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 2, p. 38.
- 22 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, p. 11.
- 23 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, pp. 11-13; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 25, 1967.
- 24 See Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 329, 332.
- 25 Based on interviews with Kiichi Aichi, December 22, 1971, and Eisaku Sato, February 26, 1973.
- 26 Based on interviews with Shigeru Hori, January 24, 1972, and Sato, February 26, 1973.
- 27 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 4, pp. 20, 26-28.
- 28 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, pp. 30-31.
- 29 See Sato's and Aichi's statements before the House of Councillors Budget Committee in *Asahi Shimbun*, March 19, 1969.
- 30 Putnam discusses reverberation of international pressures within domestic politics. See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," p. 456. See also his comment that the Japanese propensity for seeking broad consensus tends to constrict the Japanese win-set. *Ibid.*, p. 449.
- 31 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 5, pp. 17-20.
- 32 *Ibid.*, chap. 5, pp. 22-23.
- 33 Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 330-331.
- 34 To quote, for illustrative purposes, the two key paragraphs of the communiqué:
- Paragraph 4: "The President and the Prime Minister especially noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister ... stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security ... The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan ... The President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Viet-Nam would be concluded before the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Viet-Nam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States' efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference."
- Paragraph 8: "The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States

Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.”

35 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 332.

36 Clapp and Fukui, “Decision Making,” chap. 5, p. 42.

37 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 335.

38 Clapp and Fukui, “Decision Making,” chap. 5, p. 43.

39 For details on the Okinawa-textile deal, see I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), chap. 5. The Japanese translation of the book is available in *Nichibei sen'i funso* (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 1980).

CHAPTER 7
**American Decision Making on
 Reversion of Okinawa: A Memoir**

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This paper describes the process of decision-making in the American government on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. It focuses on the period 1966–69 and is written as a memoir.

From 1966 to 1969 I served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and had responsibility for the Okinawa reversion issue. In 1969 I joined the staff of the National Security Council in the Nixon Administration with responsibility for planning and NSC operations. There are disadvantages as well as advantages in writing about this subject from the perspective of a participant. The disadvantages are that only the events known to the author are discussed and the role of other participants is not given its full due. The advantages are that one is writing from personal experience, and the reader gets an understanding of the thinking and planning of one participant.

I present this paper not as the final word but as a contribution to understanding both the decision-making process within the American government on Okinawa reversion and the more general subject of American decision-making on national security issues. My objective is to explain my view of what took place within the bureaucracy between 1966 and 1969 which permitted two American Presidents to act on the reversion issue without provoking a major controversy within the government.

The Blue Sky Period

Before going into the American government I taught at Harvard University and did research at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. Between 1963 and 1966 I had visited Japan a

number of times and had been exposed to the Japanese concern that failure to move on the Okinawa issue could provoke a crisis in U.S.–Japanese relations in 1970 when the Security Treaty was open to cancellation by either nation. Thus, the reversion question was high on the list of issues on which I wanted to work when I joined the Department of Defense in 1966. One advantage of this issue was that it was not a matter which was receiving attention from senior officials. In contrast to issues such as Vietnam, this meant that I could seek to influence policy on this question without the frustration of not knowing what was being done at higher levels of the government to which I was not privy.

Shortly after I arrived at the Department of Defense, I was assigned by Adam Yarmolinsk, then the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), to serve on an inter-agency task force on Okinawa. The mandate of this group was not to consider the question of possible reversion. In fact, the explicit premise of the task force mandate was that reversion would not occur until the “sky was blue,” that is, until there were no clouds in the sky, no threats to peace and security in Asia. Obviously, that was not expected to occur any time soon.

The mission of the task force was to find ways to ameliorate the Okinawa situation under the assumption that reversion was impossible. The inter-agency group was, as I recall, focussed on such issues as permitting greater Japanese government participation in Okinawan matters such as education. I viewed this task as

essentially hopeless. From my perspective the value of the task force was in getting to know the key government players who were concerned with reversion, setting the stage for more serious efforts, and learning what was needed to change government policy.

The most important participant in the task force was its chair, Richard Sneider. "Dick," as he was universally known, was the State Department country director for Japan, and he was a very unusual foreign service officer. He believed that he was in charge of all dealings with the government of Japan and succeeded far more than most country directors in imposing that view on the other agencies of the government. Dick and I immediately established not only a close working relationship but also a friendship which was to last until his untimely death a few years ago.

To my surprise and pleasure, the task force report did make some progress in beginning to open up the issue of reversion. We were able to get agreement that 1970 was a critical date and that preserving the security relation with Japan was more important than preserving the status quo on Okinawa. The American Ambassador to Japan and the High Commissioner for Okinawa (by tradition an Army General) were instructed to work together and to report regularly to Washington on the mounting local pressures for reversion and their suggestions for how to respond. (Shortly thereafter U. Alexis Johnson was appointed to be Ambassador to Japan, and the Army civilians who were in charge of Okinawa and had worked on the task force appointed a new high commissioner who was open to reversion.)

After the task force completed its work, I met privately with Dick Sneider to discuss how to proceed. Dick noted that neither the Secretary of State nor the President was likely to be willing to move on this issue over opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, the foreign service had a strong tradition of not challenging the expertise of other career services, especially the military. Thus, as long as the Pentagon believed that reversion was incompatible with American security, little progress could be made.

Real movement toward early reversion

depended on changing the view of the Joint Chiefs. Once there was some movement, we could consider how to advance the process by getting the Japanese government and then the State Department to express the need for early reversion.

Revising the Military Position

The first step was to inform the Secretary of Defense of our plans and intentions. Robert McNamara gave substantial scope to those who worked for him in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and he backed up the positions they took. However, he expected to be fully consulted before any of his subordinates undertook to make major changes in American policy which would require his backing.

With the support of my boss, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, who had been in the battle of Okinawa, I prepared a memorandum for the Secretary. In this memorandum I laid out the situation as I saw it and sought the Secretary's approval for setting in train a process designed to lead to American acceptance of reversion prior to 1970.

The memorandum, which was sent to the Secretary on August 7, 1967, described the dangers which would result from failure to conclude an agreement before 1970. It argued that the ultimate risk was setting off a series of events in Japan which would jeopardize the very existence of the security treaty. The most prudent course of action was to agree to reversion, which would guarantee the continuation of the Security Treaty for the indefinite future. With one significant exception, it argued that reversion would not mean giving up the bases on Okinawa. Instead, we could continue to use the bases on the same terms that we used bases in Japan.

Nuclear weapons were a special problem. Given anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, it would be impossible to get special permission to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa after reversion. Even if the Government of Japan were to be willing, the public outcry would threaten the Security Treaty itself. Fortunately, the memorandum argued that giving up the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa would not

adversely affect our security interests. Nuclear weapons could be stored further back in the Pacific and still be flown to anywhere they might be needed in a very short time.

Finally, the memorandum noted, we would need special transition rules to protect current military operations in support of the war in Vietnam.

The memorandum ended with a request for a meeting with the Secretary to discuss the issue. McNamara scribbled a handwritten note which said, in effect: No meeting is necessary, just do it. I had my mandate, but it was up to me to figure out what to do.

The task force which had prepared the first report was continued and was now charged with considering the consequences of reversion. This inter-agency requirement provided the basis for inaugurating a process within the Defense Department designed to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a serious new look at the question of whether military requirements could be met by a reversion process which would permit continued operation of the Okinawa bases at the homeland level.

To do this in a serious way we needed to develop a methodology for analyzing the consequences of losing use of a specific military base. Working with researchers from the RAND Corporation (with which my office had a contract), we began to develop this needed methodology and to apply it to the Okinawa base issue. Our objective was to understand the cost of losing the base completely versus the cost of losing only those special rights which we had on Okinawa. The bases on Okinawa were not subject to the limitations which the United States had accepted on other American bases in Japan, including the need for prior consultation before undertaking military action.

We began the process of informally educating the American military on the need for early reversion and, hence, the need to take a hard look at the military consequences of reversion, at the task force meetings which included representatives of the Joint Staff. This process continued at regular lunch meetings which I held with Joint Staff officials and which permitted frank and informal conversations.

Through these channels we were able to argue that failure to agree on early reversion would jeopardize continued access to bases on Okinawa and in Japan.

These informal contacts were augmented by a formal process by which the Secretary of Defense solicited the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. First, the Secretary simply asked the Chiefs for their views on the military consequences of reversion. Unfortunately, this form of memorandum typically did not generate a careful evaluation. Rather, following standard practice, the Joint Staff action officer assigned to the problem simply pulled from the file what the Chiefs had previously said on the subject and repeated it. Thus, the answer was that reversion would be incompatible with the military requirements of the United States. Okinawa should be thought of not as an island with bases but as an island base.

A second memorandum was then sent from the Secretary to the Chiefs asking a series of specific questions about the consequences of reversion for the various military functions performed on the base. In response the Chiefs began to come to grips with the specific issues involved.

Finally, the Chiefs were sent a copy of the study of the military consequences of reversion which my office had prepared with support from the Office of Systems Analysis. The Chiefs were then asked to comment on this study.

As a result of this process of both informal consultation and development of formal positions, the Joint Staff agreed to include in the task force report an assessment that it would be possible to use the bases after reversion and, therefore, early reversion would be consistent with American security needs. The remainder of the task force report described the diplomatic need for reversion.

This significant progress in changing the views of the American military on the security implications of reversion led the State Department and the American Embassy in Tokyo to feel more comfortable in asserting their view that early reversion was necessary to preserve the American-Japanese security relation.

This inter-agency process was part of what was then known as the SIG-IRG system. The highest reporting level in this structure was the Under Secretary of State. There was no formal process for moving a paper prepared by this process to the President for his consideration. Thus, although the task force report was completed and available before the Johnson-Sato summit planned for November, it was not sent to Cabinet officers or to the President.

A memorandum from the Secretary of State and the President needed to be drafted which would make specific recommendations about what posture to take at the summit meeting. Issues came to Lyndon Johnson only on the basis of formal recommendations from cabinet officers. Since Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, had not previously been involved in these deliberations, there was no way to predict how he would respond. As Sneider and I began working on the memorandum, we recognized that the key to getting the Secretary of State and the President to make a bold move was to secure the vigorous support of the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Alexis Johnson.

Johnson, stationed in Tokyo, did not fully comprehend how much progress was being made in Washington. Like all effective ambassadors he was concerned about being accused of "localitis." Johnson did not want to argue for the need to make a firm commitment to early reversion unless that position would be viewed as reasonable in Washington and stood a chance of being adopted. To secure his support for our memorandum, Dick and I decided to fly to Tokyo for a frank discussion with Johnson.

At the same time Dick and I had been engaged in informal conversations with Gaimusho officials about the reversion issue. Japanese officials were pressing us to learn what was feasible. They did not want the Prime Minister asking for things at the summit meeting that were impossible and which would be viewed as unreasonable. In the end they understood that the Japanese government would have to be willing to state forthrightly its need for a commitment for early reversion.

As the summit drew near, senior

government officials, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President, were drawn into the process. At the same time Prime Minister Sato began to make his needs clear. Emboldened by reports he was receiving from the Gaimusho and from his own emissaries, he decided to press for a commitment for early reversion. However, the American government was not willing to do this without a clear understanding of how the bases would be used after reversion, and there was not enough time left before the meeting to conduct these negotiations. The upshot was the famous recognition by the President of the need for reversion within a few years.

For Dick and me, and those working with us, this was a great victory; the Blue Sky position was dead. The American government had not stated that reversion would be impossible until the security problems of Asia were settled. We knew we were close to agreement within the American government on procedures for using the bases for conventional operations that would be acceptable to the Japanese government and sustainable in Japan over opposition protests. The nuclear issues remained to be finally resolved, but we were confident that we were moving towards acceptance of the need to remove nuclear weapons from the island before reversion. Further significant progress would need to await the Presidential election and the inauguration of a new President.

The Nixon Administration Review

Following the election of Richard Nixon and the appointment of Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor, both Dick Sneider and I were asked to join the NSC staff. Dick was to be responsible for East Asian affairs. My duties would include managing the new National Security Council decision process. (At this time Alex Johnson came back to Washington as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.)

Kissinger and I had taught together at Harvard, and he asked me to come to New York to work with him on the transition. At his request I worked on a memorandum to the President-elect which proposed the creation of a

new system for examining national security issues. The key to the new approach, which Mr. Nixon approved, was to have the President direct the bureaucracy to conduct studies on key issues and come up with a set of options with the pros and cons of each option. These options would be presented to the President and the National Security Council in the place of recommendations from each Department. The memorandum identified nine issues "which will require early attention by the NSC." The nine issues were: Vietnam, Middle East, Europe, International Monetary Policy, Strategic Forces, U.S. Security Policy, Contingency Planning, Japan, and AID.

The paragraph of the memorandum on Japan read as follows:

8. Japan. A number of issues in U.S.-Japanese relations will arise during the next twelve months, and the Japanese Prime Minister is likely to request a meeting in the Fall. Therefore, an Ad Hoc Working Group should be set up to examine the full range of U.S.-Japanese relations (including the issue of the reversion of Okinawa, the future of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, U.S. bases in Japan, and U.S.-Japanese economic relations).

The President-elect approved the memorandum on December 30, 1968, and we immediately set to work to draft the directives necessary to put the new system into place and to direct the first set of studies. On Inauguration Day Henry Kissinger signed seven National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) on Vietnam, Middle East, Military Posture, Foreign Aid, Japan, NATO, and International Monetary Policy. Each NSSM directed an inter-agency task force to prepare a report covering the issues identified in the NSSM and providing the President with a list of options and the pros and cons for each option. The Japan study (NSSM 5) directed the Inter-agency Group to consider the issues listed in the memorandum which had been sent to the President in December including the question of reversion.

One of the assignments given to the East Asian Committee chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia was thus to consider options for the United States on Okinawa reversion. Richard Sneider represented the National Security Council on the Inter-

agency Group and was able to insure that the report was written expeditiously and that it made the case for early reversion of Okinawa.

Under the rules establishing the new NSSM/NSDM system the report was not to contain recommendations or the positions of various agencies. Rather it was to spell out the available options and the pros and cons of each. Thus, the debate and controversy that would have taken place if agencies had to take positions on reversion and on the still contentious issue of the removal of nuclear weapons were avoided. All agency representatives could agree that early reversion was one option and that within that option removal of nuclear weapons was one possible way of dealing with the clash between the American desire for maximum flexibility and the Japanese public's hostility to nuclear weapons.

The nuclear issue turned out to be less difficult than Dick and I feared. Successive exchanges with the Joint Chiefs during the previous administration and a visit to the Chiefs by Under Secretary of State Alex Johnson helped to turn the tide. The Chiefs were no longer opposed to early reversion and were now ready to conclude that removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa would cause only "administrative inconvenience." Thus, the pros and cons of removal did not include any assertion that the ability of the United States to deter aggression in the region or to respond to military attacks would be significantly affected by the removal of the nuclear weapons then stored in Okinawa to storage sites further back in the Pacific or even in the continental United States.

When the report was ready, it was scrutinized first by the NSC staff and then by the inter-agency NSC Review Committee. Next it was scheduled for a meeting of the National Security Council. The NSC meeting, which I attended as a staff observer and note taker along with Dick Sneider and Al Haig, was surprisingly free of acrimony and disagreement. Alex Johnson made the case for early reversion and was not challenged at any point. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that they shared the view that early

reversion was the most prudent course. General Wheeler also made it clear that the Chiefs would not "fall on their swords" if the agreement called for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. This was a clear signal that the Chiefs were on board and would not be going to the Congress or the press to complain about what was being done.

Following the procedure then in effect, after the NSC meeting I met with the NSC staff person responsible for the issue discussed at the meeting, in this case Dick Sneider, to draft a proposed National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) for the President's signature. That memorandum, which both Henry Kissinger and then President Nixon approved without change, authorized negotiations with the Japanese government to include in the communiqué for the pending visit of the Prime

Minister a commitment to begin negotiations for an early return of Okinawa to Japan.

The issue of nuclear weapons was specifically reserved for talks between the President and the Prime Minister at the summit. Although there was no doubt about the need to operate the bases on Okinawa at the homeland level after reversion, it was felt that the key concession of no storage of nuclear weapons should be given directly to Prime Minister Sato by President Nixon.

My work on the Okinawa reversion issue largely came to an end with the approval of this National Security Decision Memorandum and its distribution to the government. In September 1969, I left the government to become a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

CHAPTER 8

The Road to the Reversion of Okinawa Comparing Decision-making Processes: Japan and the U.S.

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1. The Okinawa Problem for Japan and the U.S.

In the following section, I will outline what the problem of the Okinawa Reversion meant for Japan and the United States.

(1) "Okinawa" to the Japanese

First of all, Okinawa was a territorial problem which had critical implications for nationalism. There were few if any Japanese who did not wish to recover territories lost as a result of World War Two. Reflecting this sentiment, following the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, every Japanese Prime Minister touched upon Okinawa at each opportunity for talks with a President of the United States. As this was a politico-security issue, Prime Ministers Nobusuke Kishi and Eisaku Sato, who were brothers by blood and who both placed greater emphasis on grand politics, raised the issue more insistently with the Americans than Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who preferred to discuss economic issues.

Second, to the Japanese, Okinawa was a problem affecting friendly relations with the United States. There were two aspects to this. One was that Okinawa was a problem which could be solved only through negotiations with the U.S. The problem therefore was one which had to be solved by a pro-American administration. If a pro-American administration could realize this national desire, that administration would not only have contributed to the advancement of Japan's national interests, but would also have proved to the Japanese that it had been taken seriously and respected by the American Government. If, however, the

requests of the pro-American administration with respect to Okinawa were treated coolly by the American Government, the *raison d'être* of the pro American administration within Japanese politics would come to be questioned. The other aspect was that Okinawa was a problem which could conceivably damage friendly relations between the U.S. and Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was skeptical towards any proposals to bring up the subject of Okinawa, especially because it both knew the strategic value of Okinawa for the Americans and placed great emphasis on friendly U.S.-Japanese relations.

In other words, for a pro-American administration, the reversion of Okinawa had the potential for being an enormous achievement if it could be realized, but at the same time it could be disastrous if it were attempted and did not materialize. The damage caused to a pro-American administration was therefore smaller if Okinawa was not brought up at all. To put it another way, Okinawa was, for a pro-American Japanese administration, full of dilemmas in that it was both the most attractive and the most dangerous issue on the agenda.

Third, Okinawa was also a symbol of anti-Americanism within Japan. The control of Okinawa by the U.S. for strategic purposes was the ideal target for Japanese postwar anti-Americanism, which was leftist and tended to be strongly pacifist. In comparison to the conservative nationalists who supported the Sato government's negotiations concerning the reversion of Okinawa, the leftist nationalists openly expressed their anti-Americanism, and

launched a "Recapture Okinawa Movement." This group not only called for the return of administrative rights over Okinawa, but also wished for the return of all American military bases in both Okinawa and the Japanese mainland. In other words, they were opposed to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty itself.

Conservative and progressive (kakushin) forces in postwar Japan had continuously confronted each other over Japan's relation to the Pax Americana system. Okinawa became an issue which radicalized this confrontation, and the question of whether the "Okinawa Reversion Negotiation" forces or the "Recapture Okinawa Movement" forces would prevail was one which had the potential for greatly altering the Japanese political map and the international political map of the Western Pacific in the 1970s.

(2) "Okinawa" to the U.S.

What did the Okinawa problem mean to the United States? The Okinawa problem was not a national political issue but a problem which mainly concerned the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom. First of all, it was a problem concerning the Pentagon. Since the U.S. had obtained administrative rights over Okinawa with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. could freely use its bases on Okinawa without worrying about changes in the local political climate, unlike its other military bases in Japan or elsewhere in Asia. In particular, as the war in Vietnam escalated, the Pentagon did not want to lose the free use of its Okinawan military bases.

Secondly, Okinawa was a major problem with respect to U.S.-Japan relations. If the Okinawa problem were handled incorrectly, the danger existed that relations with Japan, which was the only industrialized and friendly country in Asia, would be damaged. Given the extraordinary intensity of anti-American nationalism at the time of the 1960 Security Treaty problem, it was uncertain whether a 1970 Security Treaty problem could be easily weathered. Anti-war movements and anti-American feelings within Japan had already grown stronger with the escalation of the Vietnam War, and if a 1970 Security Treaty problem erupted simultaneously with the closely

related territorial problem of Okinawa, U.S.-Japanese relations could founder. For the Japan Desk at Foggy Bottom, which was concerned about such a situation, the Okinawa problem was an extremely critical problem for U.S.-Japan relations and for the overall Asian policy of the U.S. in 1970 and beyond. That being the case, it was a problem which both the White House and Capitol Hill had to handle seriously.

The majority of Americans, however, had no interest in such a problem. Fortunately, neither the American Government nor the people had territorial ambitions. The problem was therefore one which could be handled by the government, taking into account the effects on American military capabilities and relations with the friendly country. This is in direct contrast to the situation in Japan, where the Okinawa problem was of national concern.

2. Decision-Making processes of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations

Next, the decision-making processes of Japan and the United States will be compared. In the case of the Okinawa problem, it appears that the processes were quite different from the commonly-held images of such processes in both countries. Generally speaking, the President plays a very large role in the forming of U.S. foreign policy, while in Japan, the Prime Minister assumes the role of reconciling different views and makes policy through a consensus, based upon the minute preparations made by the bureaucratic apparatus. In certain phases of the Okinawa Reversion, however, precisely the opposite took place.

It should be noted that the decision-making process in both countries (and especially in the United States) differed considerably before and after November 1967. A discussion of the process leading up to the Okinawa Reversion must therefore be divided into two periods: the first half, which was the period before November 1967, and the second half, which was the period that followed.

(1) The Kennedy Period

The person who was responsible for bringing the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference to a successful conclusion was John

Foster Dulles, who had been appointed as special ambassador by President Harry S. Truman. Dulles had served the Eisenhower Administration for eight years as its Secretary of State, and had therefore managed American policy towards Japan throughout the 1950s.

Regarding Okinawa, Dulles had recognized only the "residual sovereignty" of Japan, and with respect to administrative rights over Okinawa, he took the position that, "So long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East, the U.S. will find it necessary to continue the present status."¹⁷ Since it was not possible for "the conditions of threat and tension" to cease to exist, Dulles had therefore taken the position that the U.S. would not relinquish its military bases or administrative rights in Okinawa for the foreseeable future—at least while the Cold War continued.

In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy expressed the situation from the opposite standpoint and gave the problem a fresh orientation. Although the Pentagon had not changed its position that there were military reasons why Okinawa must be retained, some notable persons emerged who stressed the need to return Okinawa. One was the American Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, and the other was Senator Mike Mansfield⁽²⁾. Ambassador Reischauer attempted to persuade the President through Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who visited Japan in January 1962. On March 19, 1962, President Kennedy released the following statement on the Ryukyu Islands: "I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the Free World will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty." Although it could be said that nothing new had been said, since Kennedy had not specified a target date for the return of Okinawa, his statement changed the nuance of the American position. He expected the "eventual restoration" of the administration of the Ryukyus, and in preparation for such an event, the self-government and welfare of the population of Okinawa would be enhanced. Although at the time, in consideration of the Pentagon's position, the Kayser Commission

report was suppressed so as to avoid touching upon the subject of the return of administrative rights in Okinawa, Kennedy had established a long-term vision through his own statement.

This is a good example of the positive exercise of leadership in America, in which the President personally listens to the views of his trustworthy advisers and publicly presents a new direction in policy. Nevertheless, the principal thesis in Washington at that time was still the Pentagon's position, which was that Okinawa would be controlled for an indefinite period, and the prevailing atmosphere was still that any direct negation of such a position was tantamount to a political offense which would damage the national security interests of the United States. This situation did not change until 1967.

(2) The Johnson Period

As the saying goes, "New wine should be poured into new wineskins." Such is the case in the United States: Newly-elected presidents always set up their own decision-making systems. A typical example of such a system is the one set up by Franklin D. Roosevelt, who enlarged the leadership role of the president by going over the heads of the bureaucracy and giving important roles to individuals who could represent some facet of Roosevelt's own will. Another example is the system established by Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, who entrusted much to the Cabinet members with formal responsibility over the problem in question, and who respected the advice of such Cabinet members while making the critical decisions himself.

President Lyndon B. Johnson was not as good at handling foreign affairs as he was at domestic matters, and most of the energy which he expended on foreign issues was spent on the Vietnam War. In most foreign policy issues, therefore, President Johnson adopted Truman's style. Okinawa in particular was a case which was suited to a style of decision-making in which Secretary of States Dean Rusk would cooperate with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and form a consensus between the civilian and military branches of the government, after which they would advise the President.

In accordance with that policy, the system of a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and Interdepartmental Regions Groups (IRGs) was set up within the bureaucracy in 1966, as a new policymaking apparatus. One of the IRGs which was formed was the Special Ryukyu Islands Working Group, chaired by Richard Sneider, the Japan Desk of the State Department. The view is now common that, generally speaking, the interdepartmental consensus-building organizations were not able to produce very satisfactory results. The Sneider Group was, however, a notable exception.⁽³⁾

The work of this group served as the impetus for reversal of Washington's understanding of the Okinawa problem. It soon became clear that, in the case of conventional weapons, it made little real difference whether the Okinawan bases were placed under the control of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or whether they remained under the direct administration of the U.S. as bases which the Americans could freely use. (The issue of American nuclear weapons, however, was a different problem.) Which, then, was the more desirable scenario: A worsening of U.S.-Japan relations without the return of Okinawa to Japan, or the continued use of bases in Okinawa following the return of Okinawa and the subsequent strengthening of U.S.-Japan relations? It was a matter well worth considering. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Morton Halperin, who was the Defense Department's member in the Sneider group, worked excellently together with Sneider, and was especially responsible for persuading the Pentagon.

By the summer of 1967, Halperin had obtained the approval of both his superior, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs John McNaughton, and Secretary of Defense McNamara. In private, Secretary of State Rusk also took a favorable stance towards Sneider's position. More than a few members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to be opposed to any change in the status of the Okinawan bases, and McNamara and Rusk continued to take a careful position in public.

3. The Initiative of the Sato Administration

It was not until Sato became Prime Minister, in November 1964, that the Japanese government actively started to work towards the reversion of Okinawa. Until then, the understanding reached in the early 1950s between Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Dulles, which confirmed that Japan possessed residual sovereignty over Okinawa, was as far as previous Japanese prime ministers had gotten with American presidents regarding Okinawa. In the June 1957 summit between Eisenhower and Kishi and the June 1961 summit between Kennedy and Ikeda, Washington rejected the reversion of Okinawa, making the removal of "threat and tension... in the Far East" a condition for such reversion.

In March 1962, as mentioned above, Kennedy released his statement that he was "look(ing) forward to the day" of "eventual restoration" of full sovereignty to Japan. At the time, it was still unclear whether this was merely a rhetorical change, or if it was a notice of real changes to come. Such was the situation when Sato decided to challenge Prime Minister Ikeda in the Liberal Democratic Party President elections, which were planned for July 1964. In order to prepare his policy platform, Sato established a brain trust, "Sato Operation" (S-OPE), centering around Minoru Kusuda, a reporter for the newspaper *Sankei Shimbun*. The group proposed that negotiations be conducted for the reversion of Okinawa, along with efforts to improve relations with China, and Sato agreed to these proposals in May 1964⁽⁴⁾. Although Sato lost the July elections by a narrow margin, he was appointed Prime Minister following the resignation of Ikeda in November 1964 due to illness.

Sato immediately decided on a visit to the U.S., and began preparing for a summit meeting with President Johnson. In December 1964, preparations for requesting the reversion of Okinawa were carried out, led by Chief Cabinet Secretary Tomisaburo Hashimoto and Special Regional Division Chief of the Prime Minister's Office Kokichi Yamano. Nobuyuki Nakajima, Director, First North America Division of the Foreign Ministry, joined the process, and a set

of talking papers was prepared. During the process, Yamano was notified that the Prime Minister planned to visit Okinawa in the summer of 1965⁵⁾. The distinctive character of the decision-making process involved in the Okinawa Reversion is evident in these events. Okinawa was placed on the foreign policy agenda, not by the bureaucracy, but by a decision made by the Prime Minister, bases upon the advise of his private brain trust, and the Okinawa policy which was formed in this manner was to be carried out under the leadership of the Prime Minister.

Despite Prime Minister Sato's zeal, all he obtained in the January 1965 Sato-Johnson summit was a reconfirmation of Kennedy's March 1962 statement. In other words, Johnson, the new President, gave him only the fine-sounding phrase that he was "looking forward to the day" when Okinawa could be returned. In August 1965, Sato visited Okinawa, as scheduled, and made clear his determination to realize the reversion of Okinawa by standing, "Until Okinawa is reverted to the Motherland, the postwar period for Japan will not end." Sato had thus staked his political fate on this goal.

It was thus in 1965 that the Sato Administration identified the Okinawa Reversion as a critical issue. Although this was after President Kennedy had started to take a new approach to the issue, bases upon the advise of Reischauer and Mansfield and the Kayser Report, it preceded by two years the debate over a change in policy within the Washington bureaucracy, which did not begin until 1967. After the Kennedy statement, the Okinawa problem was largely forgotten within Washington. Prime Minister Sato's official request to President Johnson, however, forced Washington to reconsider the problem. At the same time, Sneider, who had been closely observing political processes within Japan, had been following the statements of Sato, who was trying to realize the reversion of Okinawa within a pro-American framework, and the activities of a number of other movements, including the anti-Sato camp. Sneider responded by reorienting the activities of his Interdepartmental Group in Washington towards a reconsideration

of policy towards Okinawa.

During this period, Prime Minister Sato was supported by a number of groups regarding the Okinawa problem. At the political level, Hashimoto, Kiichi Aichi and Toshio Kimura were in positions of responsibility within the Prime Minister's closest circle of advisers, while Yamano of the Prime Minister's Office was responsible at the working level. The activities of S-OPE as a brain trust were formalized, for all practical purposes, following the appointment of Kusuda as the Prime Minister's Chief Secretary in March 1967. In addition, the groups which had been directing nationalistic civilian activities played major roles. Ichiro Suetsugu, who had been energetically directing civilian movements concerning demobilization, war crimes and territorial problems, cooperated with Noboru Takeshita in the early 1960s in the creation of a Youth Organization for Overseas Cooperation (i.e. a Peace Corps). As a result, he acquired a channel of communications with the Sato faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, and from early 1965 he supported, through Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeshita, the efforts of the government to tackle the Okinawa problem. Together with Nobumoto Ohama, the President of Waseda University and Chairman of the Nanpo Doho Engokai (Southern Compatriots' Support Committee), and Secretary-General Tsugunobu Yoshida, Suetsugu created a forum of scholars and other intellectuals, and made efforts to increase public support for the reversion of Okinawa. The group of scholars represented by Ohama became the advisory committee for the Prime Minister known as the "Committee on Okinawa and Other Problems" (in Japanese, "Okinawa Mondai To Kondankai," hereinafter referred to as the Okinawa Committee) in August 1967.

It was this committee which played a key role in the development of Okinawa policy, preparatory to the second Sato-Johnson summit in November 1967. Between August 16 and November 1, 1967, the Okinawa Committee held seven meetings. Prime Minister Sato personally attended these meetings and actively participated in the discussions. Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, Vice Minister Nobuhiko Ushihara and two other

high officials of the Foreign Ministry also were regular participants at the meetings, but it was the Prime Minister, Ohama and Kimura who led the discussions, while Yamano served as secretary. The Okinawa Committee therefore assumed the nature of a temporary civilian-governmental supreme committee regarding the Okinawa problem.

After discussing the return of administrative rights and the status of the military bases, the members of the Okinawa Committee found themselves in opposition over whether or not Japan should demand a target date for the reversion of Okinawa at the November 1967 summit. The Foreign Ministry questioned a time limit of "one or two years," as Suetsugu and Yoshida had advocated. In the Interim Report, which was drafted by Ohama, it was decided that an agreement would be sought whereby "the date for the return of administrative rights would be determined within a few years."⁶⁷ It had thus been decided to seek a promise regarding the date of reversion before the "1970 Security Treaty" problem materialized.

During that time, the Foreign Ministry was not asleep, either. Director, First North America Division, North American Affairs Bureau, Kazuo Chiba and others were energetically gathering information. In September 1967, Foreign Minister Miki visited the U.S., met Secretary of State Rusk and requested the reversion of Okinawa. Rusk responded by asking, "How much responsibility is Japan prepared to accept?" While Rusk thus maintained his official position of caution, he agreed to the opening of discussions regarding reversion. Afterwards, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, Fumihiko Togo and others pressed forwards with their American counterparts in the drafting of a joint communiqué, to be released during the summit meeting. Although they had agreed to discussions with the eventual objective of reversion, the Americans steadfastly refused to state clearly the date by which reversion would take place. Within the Japanese government, the Foreign Ministry also took this position. The Foreign Ministry was apprehensive that any demand by the Japanese for such a timetable

during the Vietnam War and one year before the U.S. presidential elections, would catch the Americans at one of the worst times possible, militarily and politically, and would create a difficult problem⁶⁸. Although the Foreign Ministry eventually learned that the American government had finally agreed, in principle, to reversion, it felt that it was its responsibility to deter the Japanese from making excessive demands based on over-optimistic expectations about the American response.

In comparison, the members of the Okinawa Committee had been pursuing all along the resolution of the Okinawa problem as a postwar problem, from a nationalistic standpoint, and recognized the basic problem was how to realize the early reversion of Okinawa. In addition, Suetsugu and others visited the U.S. in April 1966 and March 1967, and had been impressed by the change in Washington regarding Okinawa. Although they had received a cool response during their 1966 visit, the number of American officials in high places who showed a friendly or flexible response had increased by the time of their 1967 visit. The problem for the Okinawa Committee members was therefore whether or not the Japanese had the will to realize the reversion and how such reversion was to be realized, any they felt that the time was ripe to make one final push in order to achieve success⁶⁹. Prime Minister Sato would follow this policy of the Okinawa Committee during the summit meeting.

A few days before his own departure for the U.S., Prime Minister Sato sent a personal emissary to Washington. The emissary met Walt Rostow, the President's National Security Advisor, and relayed the Prime Minister's request that reversion be slated for sometime "within a few years." Ambassador Alexis Johnson, who had arrived in Washington five days before Prime Minister Sato arrived in the U.S., met the Prime Minister in Seattle on November 12. The next day, in the airplane on their way to Washington, the Prime Minister and the Ambassador talked alone, for three hours. In response to Sato's strong request that the phrase "within a few years" be inserted into the communiqué, Johnson said the conditions in

Japan for setting a date for reversion had not been fulfilled yet. This preparatory meeting in the airplane was crucial to what followed in Washington. The memorandum prepared on this day by Rostow for the President reads, "A principal item of business—the formula for handling the Ryukyus in the communiqué—is still being negotiated out. Ambassador Johnson is travelling with the Prime Minister from the West Coast and will be in this evening."⁹⁷ and states that he will be back with the words of "within a few years."

In the evening, after his arrival in Washington, the Prime Minister made clear during a meeting at Blair House, where he was staying during his visit, his intention to ask the President for reversion "within a few years." Upon hearing this, Togo of the Foreign Ministry could not help but feel perplexed. Draft work on the communiqué continued, with the diplomats applying all of their technical skills to the wording. In the summit meetings that began the next day, Sato emphasized that, with the reversion of Okinawa, Japan's national security responsibilities would be increased, and that the functions of the Okinawan military bases would not be damaged. After receiving the approval of the congressional leaders, President Johnson finally accepted the target date of "within a few years."

The decision-making process outlined above is a complete reversal of the popular image of the process commonly preferred in each country. The United States is generally characterized by a top-down process, in which the President exercises strong leadership, while Japan is noted for a bottom-up process, in which the Prime Minister approves a policy which has been carefully prepared by the bureaucracy. In the case discussed above, however, President Johnson adopted a cautious and careful bottom-up method, while Prime Minister Sato displayed strong leadership in taking a top-down approach. Sato personally controlled the entire process, from placing the Okinawa problem on the agenda, to formulating policy, making decisions and conducting negotiations.

As Haruhiro Fukui has pointed out, there are more examples than is commonly believed in

post-World War Two Japan of a small group of persons, centered on the Prime Minister, exercising leadership in resolving critical ground-breaking foreign policy issues. Fukui called this type of decision-making process a "critical decision model," to be distinguished from the "routine decision model."⁹⁸

Prime Minister Yoshida managed the entire process leading up to the signing of the 1951 Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and Prime Minister Kishi did likewise for the reversion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. In that respect, Sato can be said to have followed examples. In contrast to Yoshida and Kishi, however, who were both able to utilize and rely on the Foreign Ministry, Sato was not able to receive the active cooperation of the Foreign Ministry at this early stage. Sato therefore had to create his own team of governmental and civilian advisers. In this respect, therefore, Sato's method is similar to that taken by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama during the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations in 1956. Hatoyama was able to put the normalization issue on the agenda, in the face of opposition by the Foreign Ministry, then led by Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu. Once the negotiations with the Soviets began, however, they were placed under the control of Shigemitsu, who considered the Foreign Ministry his own semi-autonomous kingdom. While Hatoyama was able to reserve the right of final decision for himself, he was unable to exercise direct personal control over the entire process. (If Foreign Minister Miki had been able to exercise some sort of independent control over the Okinawa reversion negotiations, the decision-making process in the Okinawa reversion case would have been similar to that in the 1956 Soviet-Japan negotiations.) In every respect, therefore, the Okinawa reversion can be said to have been a case of the Prime Minister exercising the strongest degree of control.

4. "Nuclear-Free, Mainland-Level" Reversion

(1) Normalization of Japanese Government Organizations

At the summit meeting, it was decided that

the Bonin Islands (Japanese name: Ogasawara Islands) would be returned within one year, and that the date for the reversion of Okinawa would be set within a few years. Afterwards, the role of the Japanese Foreign Ministry was expanded in the negotiations conducted on the matter between the U.S. and Japan. Why?

First, the Foreign Ministry, while unable to recognize adequately the change in Washington in 1967, led by Sneider and Halperin, was able to see the results of such change for during the summit. The United States Government, including the Pentagon, had agreed to the reversion. Since a decision had been made in favor of reversion, the Foreign Ministry had no choice but to make every effort to effect the best reversion possible.

Second, the reversion process of the Bonins was set into motion, while the Okinawa issue entered the stage at which the conditions for reversion would be negotiated. That was a stage at which the technical capabilities of the Foreign Ministry were useful, and the character of the negotiations were such that the Foreign Ministry alone was qualified to handle them. The issues of national sovereignty and the application of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were the forte of the Foreign Ministry.

Third, in its personnel transfers and appointments of 1967 and 1968, the Foreign Ministry prepared a lineup for the handing of the Okinawa reversion negotiations. The best and brightest of the Foreign Ministry, including first and foremost the security experts who had starred in the drafting of the 1960 Security Treaty, were placed in all of the key positions. Ambassador to the U.S. Takezo Shimoda, Vice-Minister Ushiba, Vice-Minister Haruki Mori, Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, Togo, Counsellor, North American Affairs Bureau, Yoshio Ogawara, Director, North America Division, Chiba, Deputy Head, North America Division, Yukio Sato, Director General, Treaties Bureau, Shoji Sato, Vice Director-General, Treaties Bureau, Masuro Takashima, and Director, Treaties Division, Toshijiro Nakajima were among those who came to play major roles.

Forth, a change in Foreign Ministers was

made in 1968. Foreign Minister Miki had been more a potential rival for power than a member of Prime Minister Sato's team. U.S. Ambassador Johnson realized this, and constantly strove to maintain a direct channel with Prime Minister Sato, even as he negotiated with Miki. During the period when Miki was Foreign Minister, Prime Minister Sato, Miki and the Foreign Ministry were unable to function as a single, well-coordinated machine. In the November 1968 elections for Liberal Democratic Party President, Miki had to resign his portfolio in order to challenge Sato. After winning a third term as Party President, Sato appointed his trusted friend Aichi to the Foreign Minister position. As a result, it became easier for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry to establish a more cooperative relationship.

The Sato Administration had also prepared its negotiating team. It consisted of Chief Cabinet Secretary Toshio Kimura and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shigeru Hori, and was a "blue-ribbon team" in terms of talent and ability.

In this way, the Japanese Government prepared its organization for the reversion negotiations, but it was then forced to wait a while. The 1968 presidential election campaign was underway in the U.S., the Vietnam War was turning into a nasty quagmire, and President Johnson had announced his intention not to seek a second term in office. It was therefore necessary to wait until a new president was elected, and until he had formed a new team and determined his foreign policy.

(2) The Decision-Making Process of the Nixon Administration

Upon his election, Richard Nixon immediately formed his team. In December 1968, he appointed Henry Kissinger as his National Security Adviser. Kissinger asked Halperin, his former Harvard colleague, to join the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and simultaneously asked Halperin for advice regarding the formation of a decision-making system on the NSC. Halperin proposed a system in which officers from various Departments would form a consulting committee under the NSC, and this was approved by Kissinger and Nixon. In addition, Halperin recommended

Sneider for the NSC staff, as an expert on Far Eastern affairs, and this was also approved.

Even while the election campaign was in progress, Nixon had announced that he would follow the policy of Okinawa reversion which had been agreed upon by Sato and Johnson. But the addition of Halperin and Sneider to the NSC staff, which was destined to play a key role in the formulation of policy by the new administration, made it that much more certain that the Nixon administration would inherit the previous administration's Okinawa policy. The details of that have been excellently described by the paper which has been submitted to this conference by Halperin himself, and probably need not be repeated here.

In the first NSC meeting, held on January 21, 1969, one day after Nixon's inauguration, the decision was made to give high priority to the resolution of issues involving Japan, including the Okinawa problem. National Security Study Memorandum 5 was submitted on March 21, the Nixon Administration's policy regarding the Okinawa Reversion was finalized in the NSC meeting held on April 30, and the NSC made its final decision on May 28, in National Security Decision Memorandum 13. In the meantime, Alexis Johnson, who had been appointed Under Secretary of State, had effectively persuaded the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others in the U.S. Government to support the position in favor of returning Okinawa. The decision stipulated that Okinawa would revert in 1972, without nuclear weapons, and that the Security Treaty would apply to Okinawa after reversion. *In order for this to be realized, however, it was necessary to induce Japan to take a more active policy regarding Far Eastern security issues such as Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, and for that to happen, the Japanese Government had to obtain assurance that the prior consultation clause in the Security Treaty would be applied. Until such conditions could be met, the official position taken with respect to nuclear weapons was that the handling of such weapons was undetermined, and the final decision on that issue was left up to the President.*

Although the system taken by the Nixon Administration to concentrate power in the NSC,

which came under the direct control of the White House, was a dramatic change from Johnson's system of respecting the proposals of the bureaucracy, both systems represent the two types of decision-making systems in American administrations, and are not exceptions. While on later occasions, such as the so-called "Nixon Shocks" of the summer of 1971, the White House would make critical foreign policy decisions without consulting the State Department, a close relationship between the White House and the bureaucracy regarding organizational, personnel and policy matters was maintained during the early years of the Nixon Administration, including the time when the Okinawa Reversion was handled.

(3) The "Nuclear-Free" Secret Negotiations

Kusuda, who was the Sato Administration's Chief Secretary, expressed the spirit which was commonly held by the members who supported Sato's team as a "passion for anonymity."¹⁷ Although Americans, who place great value on active initiative taken by each individual, may not be as moved by that phrase as Kusuda was, those in positions of responsibility in the American Government displayed extremely high ethical standards regarding the maintenance of secrecy on policy matters. High officials in the American Government who knew about the reversal of American policy on Okinawa in 1967 did not reveal this information to their Japanese friends, and the nuclear-free policy of May 1969 was kept secret by even those high U.S. Government officials who had close Japanese friends, although the secret did leak to the New York Times on June 5. As luck would have it, the Japanese Government did not view the New York Times article as accurate information.

As a result of the maintenance of secrecy regarding the Nixon Administration's policy to accept a nuclear-free policy, the Japanese Government continued its negotiations in a state of great tension, until the Sato-Nixon summit meeting in November 1969. Unlike the case in 1967, Foreign Minister Aichi and the other high officials Togo and Chiba were able to communicate closely with the Prime Minister and his immediate advisers while carefully conducting preparations for the summit meeting.

At this stage, it looked as if the negotiations with the U.S. had reverted to a normal style, in the sense that they relied on regular Foreign Ministry channels.

Of course, channels outside the Foreign Ministry had not closed entirely. The "Okinawan Bases Problem Study Group" (Kichiken), which was formed as a sub-committee of the Okinawa Committee under its head, Tadao Kusumi, held twenty meetings between February 1968 and March 1969, and held discussions which were in line with the "nuclear-free, mainland-level" policy. In January 1969, the Kichiken held the Kyoto Conference, inviting nine prominent American military figures and scholars, which had a considerable impact on the Japanese and Americans officials who were involved in the Okinawa Reversion. On March 8, the Kichiken released a report centered on the ideas of "nuclear-free, mainland-level and reversion in 1972." Three days later, Prime Minister Sato, in a question-and-answer session in the National Diet, made a statement which followed that idea. Since Sato had indicated this policy to Ambassador Shimoda on January 6, the Kichiken report probably served no more than to reinforce him in his conviction in his policy.

This official statement by Sato on March 11, which went much further than any previous statements on the matter, was made before the Nixon Administration had finalized its decision on the matter, and was probably intended as a message to the American Government. Naturally, the Foreign Ministry took a cautious stance regarding the intentions of the Nixon Administration. As a result, the impression is that Sato was again following his earlier method of taking action based upon the advice of his civilian brain trust, rather than that of the Foreign Ministry.

Upon discovering that he could not force a change in the unyielding position of the American Government regarding nuclear weapons by working through regular diplomatic channels, Sato sent the personal emissary mentioned earlier to Washington on July 18, and had him contact Kissinger. Kissinger states in his memoirs that the purpose of that emissary

was to resolve the dispute between the U.S. and Japan regarding restrictions on Japanese textile exports to the U.S., the resolution of which was needed by Nixon for domestic political reasons and which would pave the way for an agreement on "nuclear-free" reversion.

An agreement on "nuclear-free" reversion was a condition which the Sato administration absolutely needed to secure, from the standpoint of domestic politics. It was now questionable how much a reversion without a "nuclear-free" agreement would be welcomed by the Japanese people. On the other hand, a satisfactory resolution of the textile issue was crucial for the Nixon Administration to receive the support of the Deep South. It is noteworthy that a trade-off, which would have benefited both administrations domestically, was not conducted openly as a dry, business-like compromise. The Nixon Administration could not resist the temptation to tie the textile issue together with the Okinawa negotiations, while the Sato Administration was excessive in its fear of seeing Okinawa and textiles linked together. Thus, unofficial negotiations between Kissinger and Sato's personal emissary took place, and an understanding was reached. Sato, however, who had displayed such superb leadership until then, was unable to carry out his part of the understanding domestically, either before or after the summit meeting.

To sum it up, although the Japanese side of the Okinawa negotiations was carried out by the Foreign Ministry after the November 1967 summit meeting, Sato used separate, unofficial channels for the handling of delicate problems. There were two such "delicate problems." One was the "nuclear-free" issue, and the other was the linkage between Okinawa and the textile issue. The resolution of these issues required that high-level political decisions be made, and it was natural that the Prime Minister should personally handle them. It therefore cannot be stated conclusively that the use of personal emissaries in itself was an error.

Rather, the problem was that conducting negotiations by sending personal emissaries was in direct conflict with the custom of *nemawashi*, which is, simply put, the building of an informal

consensus through prior consultations with all of the parties involved. Although *nemawashi* takes a long time to complete, once a consensus is built, those who have been involved in the process have a moral obligation to faithfully cooperate. If a leader makes a decision on his own, without prior consultation, the persons involved in the problem have little motivation to cooperate in the implementation of the decision. Liberal Democratic Party and bureaucracy were not willing to join forces and fight together on issues against which a pressure group strongly voiced opposition.

The various text of the *communiqué* of the Sato-Nixon meetings of November 1969 were virtually prepared by the Foreign Ministry, and the details were worked out by Director General, North American Affairs Bureau, Togo and Sneider, and by Foreign Minister Aichi and Secretary of State Rogers. In addition, the texts were evaluated in the final stages by Sato's emissary and Kissinger. The texts were then agreed upon at the summit meeting.⁽¹²⁾ Article Eight of the Joint *Communiqué* stipulated that nuclear weapons would be removed, with the qualification, "Without prejudice to the position of the United States Government and with respect to the prior consultation system under the treaty." In connection with this, Nixon gave the following "good news" to Sato immediately after the agreements on November 19. "We have decided to begin the removal of the Mace-B within three weeks."⁽¹³⁾

After this summit meeting, negotiations regarding the reversion were conducted entirely by the Foreign Ministry on the Japanese side, up through the actual reversion, which took place in May 1972. The textile negotiations, which were bogged down momentarily, were finally resolved by an agreement reached on October 15, 1971, after the Prime Minister appointed Kiichi Miyazawa as his Minister of International Trade and Industry, in place of Masayoshi Ohira, and then Kakuei Tanaka in place of Miyazawa. (The textiles agreement was signed on January 3, 1972.)⁽¹⁴⁾

SUMMARY

I. Decision-Making Process in Japan.

1. "Prime Minister-Directed" Type

The Prime Minister played a leading role in all aspects of the Okinawa problem, i.e. raising the issue, forming policy, deciding policy and negotiations.

2. Policy-making under Sato.

(A) The Prime Minister was supported by both the Foreign Ministry and his private brain trust.

(B) The Private brain trust (i.e. the Okinawa Committee) played the main role through 1967. From 1968, the role of the Foreign Ministry increased; civilian advisory groups such as the *Kichiken*, however, continued to play roles which cannot be ignored. After November 1969, the Foreign Ministry was dominant.

3. Negotiation with the U.S.

(A) Regular diplomatic channels through the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's direct channel were simultaneously used. The Prime Minister's direct channel includes negotiations between the Prime Minister and the American Ambassador and other important Americans, the dispatch of a personal emissary, and negotiations conducted at the summit meetings.

(B) While both channels were used together throughout the reversion process, the important of the Foreign Ministry's channel was greater in 1969 than it was in 1967.

(C) The Foreign Ministry always played the main role in the drafting of the *communiqué* of the summit and the text of the treaty.

4. Characteristics

(A) The Prime Minister took the standpoint that a cooperative relationship with the

U.S. was essential for Japan and the world. While he actually cooperated by all possible means, he actively approached the American Government, concentrating his efforts on the reversion.

- (B) The Prime Minister approached the American Government directly, by making official requests to the U.S., and indirectly, through such actions as visiting Okinawa in August 1965, and making statements in Japan such as his March, 1969, statement to the National Diet.
- (C) While he was unable to obtain absolute confirmation, the Prime Minister was able to make policy decisions which roughly matched the policy decisions made by the U.S. Government, such as the change in policy in 1967 and the new policies of the Nixon Administration.
- (D) The Prime Minister benefited by the fact that there were strong opposition forces in Japan, and persons within the U.S. Government who understood Japan's position.

II. Decision-Making Process in the U.S.

1. The decision-making systems of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations contrasted with each other.
 - (A) President Johnson ordered Secretary of State Rusk to prepare policy for the President, and Rusk sought a military-political consensus through the use of the SIG-IRG system. This was a bottom-up system, in which the President authorized or vetoed policy which had been formulated within the bureaucracy.
 - (B) President Nixon concentrated power in the White House, and ordered Kissinger to prepare policy through the use of the NSC. The bureaucracy therefore only had a supporting role.
2. Nevertheless, U.S. policy towards the

Okinawa problems was highly consistent.

The reasons are as follows:

- (A) Both Presidents attached great importance to good U.S.-Japan relations, and desired a Japan which was friendly toward the U.S. to play a greater role in Asia.
- (B) The difficulties faced by the Japanese Government regarding the 1970 Security Treaty problem was recognized by the U.S. Government, and a consensus was reached within the U.S. Government from 1967 onward that a return of administrative rights over Okinawa was possible without damaging the functions of the military bases there. Sneider and Halperin, who played key roles in this process, were given the important job of drafting NSC documents under the Nixon Administration. In other words, although the decision-making system of the two administrations were different, there was continuity in the core staff of both. Consequently, it was possible to maintain continuity in the basic position and content of policy from one administration to the next.

3. Negotiations with Japan

Channels of both the State Department and the White House were always in existence, but under the Johnson Administration, the importance of the State Department's channel was overwhelming, while the importance of the White House's channel was greater under the Nixon Administration. In either case, however, Alexis Johnson and Sneider played key roles, albeit under different positions.

4. Characteristics


Regardless of the fact that the U.S. Government had reasons for not wanting to get involved in the Okinawa Reversion issue, a flexible and innovative planning of policy took place, based upon a broad long-term vision, both in 1967 and 1969, which enabled an agreement with Japan. As can

be seen in the graph given below, such an agreement halted the downslide in U.S.-Japan relations in 1969-1970, and made possible the establishment of a long-term

cooperative relationship.

Japanese Attitudes Toward the United

U.S. Like & Dislike in Japan, 1960 - 1980



Source:

States, 1960-1980

NOTES

- (1) Joint communiqué by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi, June 19, 1957.
- (2) Interview with Reischauer, 1978-1979, at Harvard University. Interview with Mansfield, October 1, 1991, in Washington, D.C.
- (3) I. M. Destler, et al., *Managing and Alliance: the Politics of U.S.-Japan Relations*, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 28-29; Priscilla Clapp, "Okinawa Reversion: Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington 1966-1969," *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), vol. 52, 1974, pp. 16-25.
- (4) Minoru Kusuda, *Shuseki Hishokan* (Chief Secretary), Tokyo, 1975, p.29; Hitoshi Senda, *Sato Naikaku Kaiso* (Recollections of the Sato Cabinet), Tokyo, 1984, pp. 24-31; Minoru Kusuda ed., *Sato Seiken 2797 Nichi* (2,797 Days of the Sato Administration), 2 vols., Tokyo, 1983, vol. 1, pp. 61-64; in the policy statement

Asu e no Tatakai (Fight for Tomorrow), drafted by S-OPE, the expressions related to the Okinawa Reversion have been made abstract, in order to avoid turning foreign policy issues into political struggles.

- (5) Kokichi Yamano, *Okinawa Henkan Hitorigoto* (Personal Remembrances of the Okinawa Reversion), Tokyo, 1972, pp. 23-25.
- (6) *Ibid.*, pp. 142-148.
- (7) Fumihiko Togo, *Nichibei Gaiko Sanju-nen* (Thirty Years of Japan-U.S. Diplomacy), Tokyo, 1982, pp. 133-135.
- (8) Suetsugu, op. cit., pp. 211-223; also interview with Suetsugu.
- (9) Walt Rostow, Memo for the President on Visit of Prime Minister Sato, November 13, 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, from Shin'ichi Kitaoka ed. *Chronology and Documents Relating to the Reversion of Okinawa*, 1992; U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat*, New York, 1984.

- (10) Haruhiko Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho: Nihon Seifu ni Okeru Kettei Katei" (Okinawa Reversion: Decision-Making Process in the Japanese Government), *Kokusai Seiji*, vol. 52, 1974, pp. 97-100.
- (11) Kusuda, *op. cit.*, p. 37. Kusuda heard these words from Douglass Cater of the Johnson Administration.
- (12) Togo, *op. cit.*; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, city, 1979; also interviews of persons involved.
- (13) Kusuda *ed.*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p.62.
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CHAPTER 9
The United States and Japan
The Past and Future

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The twentieth century relationship between America and Japan has been unique in three respects. First, within this century, U.S.-Japan relations have experienced volatile—and often rapid—shifts of mood and policy, ranging from unmitigated hostility to close alliance. The pendulum is still in motion, although not swinging toward extremes.

Second, two societies having radically different cultures have been thrust together in an intimate manner in the past four decades, with economics the key factor, but with political and strategic links also strong. Despite our profound differences, there is no other bilateral relationship existing today based upon such an extensive network of ties.

Third, both states are in the throes of reconsidering their global and regional roles in this revolutionary age, and finding a redefinition of those roles difficult and painful. Moreover, the bilateral relation itself is inextricably involved in these reconsiderations.

It would be well to start by looking at the past, amplifying the first of the theses set forth above. At the beginning of this century, Japan had already acquired a reputation of being Asia's most apt pupil of "the advanced West." The relative order marking the transition from Tokugawa centralized feudalism, the eagerness with which the new entrepreneurial class undertook economic modernization, and the acceptance of constitutionalism along with certain other attributes of the Western state impressed Westerners, including Americans. In contrast to China—which seemed to be hopelessly stuck in the past and always verging

on chaos—Japan was a model of stability, purpose and directed energy.

The 20th century was scarcely five years old, however, when the U.S. concern about Japanese expansionism made itself manifest. Victory in the Russo-Japanese War, coupled with the earlier triumph over China in 1894-95 gave Japan unprecedented power in Northeast Asia, and there were clear signs that the advocates of an "active continental policy" were in the ascendancy. The United States, with its own colony in Asia (the Philippines) acquiesced in the progressive incorporation of Korea into the Japanese empire, but by the time of World War I, it viewed with growing alarm such actions as the so-called 21 Demands made by Japan upon China, and other evidence suggesting that Tokyo intended to establish itself as a regional hegemonist. The successful effort to substitute collective agreements relating China and broader security issues for the Anglo-Japanese alliance were among the steps taken to counter Japan.

Other issues such as U.S. immigration policies in the 1920s added to the tension. Racial sentiments constituted a powerful issue in the relationship, overt in the United States, more covert—but deeply implanted—in Japan. Thus, only a few years after World War I, a number of Asians were predicting that the next war would be that between the United States and Japan, with the entire Pacific region at stake.

Then came a brief interlude. Taisho democracy reached its high-tide in Japan, with civilian rule stronger, political pluralism advancing and the advocates of international

cooperation seemingly gaining ground. In the United States, meanwhile, the effort to build a collective framework for Pacific-Asia in the form of the Washington Conference agreements, while partly motivated by a desire to contain Japan, was also based on a need to show that the U.S. was a responsible nation interested in forwarding peace. In the aftermath of the refusal to participate in the League of Nations and the general disillusionment with Europe, a Republican administration wanted to earn some credentials as a team player on the international front.

The events in the 1930s and up to Pearl Harbor need not detain us here since in their broadest dimensions, they are well known. Clearly, global trends played a very considerable role in shaping Japanese policies during this period: worldwide depression; the deep political fissures in the West, signalled by the rise of Fascism and the growing potency of the Communist movement—signs that democracy was not necessarily the wave of the future; and the vacuum of power on the Asian continent, with its vortex in China. In this climate, the Japanese moderates were placed under multiple handicaps, and the battle for policy control was ultimately won by others.

World War II was the bloodiest, most costly war in human history, and nowhere was its ferocity greater than in Pacific-Asia. The propaganda leading up to, and accompanying it, moreover, featured two dominant themes on both sides: racism and aggression. Japanese organs played extensively upon the superiority of the yellow race, and the need to overthrow white imperialism. American sources, while concentrating upon Japan (and generally supportive of China), repeatedly advanced the "yellow peril". Not without reason, Japan was displayed as seeking the domination of the entire region, posing the threat of an Asian hierarchical order controlled by Tokyo.

Given this background, why did American-Japanese relations undergo such a remarkable change after August, 1945, and in a remarkably brief period of time? One factor, largely unreported, relates to the early post-war attitudes formed by Americans and Japanese who had

direct contact with each other. Here, a personal note is relevant. As a Japanese language officer with American naval intelligence, I was assigned to a joint unit which, among its duties, had the task of sampling the opinions toward each other of Japanese citizens and U.S. military men to discern how the Occupation was faring.

To our surprise, we discovered that despite all of the virulent hostile propaganda on both sides in the recent past—or perhaps because of its excessive qualities—attitudes toward each other became positive at an early point. A majority of American GIs reported that they liked the Japanese traits of hard work, discipline, cleanliness and politeness although they did not think the Japanese were straight-forward in answering questions, nor tolerant of minority races. A majority of Japanese stated that they appreciated the qualities of generosity, friendliness and energy shown by Americans, but were not happy with their boisterousness and waste. On balance, these non-scientific polls captured the general mood on both sides, and indicate one reason why a remarkably smooth transition from war to peace was possible.

It is also important to underline the fact that Japan could fit into a hierarchical or patron-client relationship much more easily than an egalitarian one, and while the United States preached egalitarianism, in the aftermath of this war, it was prepared—psychologically as well as materially—to lead.

A struggle ensued within the U.S., to be sure, over whether a hard-line policy should be applied to Japan—with litmus paper tests being such issues as trying the Emperor as a war criminal and the extent of reparations. But in the end, the American moderates triumphed over hard liners at home and abroad, with Douglas MacArthur a critical factor in determining the ultimate policies.

Thus, in the course of less than seven years, the Occupation passed through three quite different phases: punishment and reform (essentially over by the close of 1947); economic rehabilitation (stimulated by new domestic policies, U.S. aid, and such events as the Korean War); and proffered alliance (symbolized by the security accord which accompanied the San

San Francisco Treaty of 1951).

Of the many American favors provided to Japan during this period, the greatest was the willingness of the U.S. to accept the burden of Japan's security, enabling it to concentrate upon economic development. In this connection, it is vitally important to note that given its prewar and wartime economic advances, Japan—unlike many other states—was prepared to take maximum advantage of this gift once certain old obstacles were removed.

It should not be argued that these gifts were merely the result of American altruism. U.S. leaders believed that it was in our national interest to enable Japan to become self-reliant economically (hence, no longer a burden to the U.S. taxpayer) while also making certain that it would never again pose a military threat. At the same time, to ensure a political balance of power, with the Communist menace in mind, it was essential to enable Japanese democracy to succeed. Nonetheless, the ideological quotient in American policy was very high during these years, and hence, the American people were willing to make sacrifices for principles—with remuneration of a material type quite secondary.

Under the international and domestic circumstances that followed, Japan had largely cast off the aura of defeat and weakness by the onset of the 1970s, and by the 1980s, it was emerging as an ascendant if unidimensional power. The American-Japanese relationship was paradoxically deepening on the one hand and showing signs of serious strain on the other, with economics having risen to the fore in international relations everywhere.

At this critical juncture, it is thus important to ask of the U.S.-Japan relationship, "Where are we, and where will we go?" Because the domestic issues confronting each country are central to shaping aspects of their bilateral relations, let me start with a brief evaluation of each country's domestic scene.

As is well known, the U.S. is apparently emerging from the longest recession in the post-1945 period. Given the structural changes that lie ahead, "recovery" may be less pronounced or regular than in past times, although a modest upswing seems underway.

Belatedly, the American private sector has recognized the need for major improvements in production system, labor-management relations, research cooperation, and response to the market-place, domestic and foreign. In some cases, the changes have just commenced, but as they unfold, they should provide the basis for an enhanced American competitiveness. Yet we are only at the beginning of what is destined to be a long process, with retreats as well as advances, and a considerable amount of pain.

Government, moreover, lags. The unwillingness—or inability—to handle effectively such macroeconomic issues as the budget deficit and taxation policies has combined with certain American cultural traits like the quick profits emphasis within industry and consumerism over savings to produce or aggravate many of the current problems. The recent debate over whether the U.S. should establish an industrial policy—or more accurately, strengthen such policies as exist—symbolizes the search for new approaches in safeguarding America's economic future.

Closely connected are problems relating to high-level manpower. Virtually everyone recognizes the weaknesses within the American primary and secondary educational system today. Youth lacking basic skills constitute a serious drain on the economy and the society at large. Moreover, there has been a growing reluctance among younger generations of Americans to prepare for scientific and engineering careers. In comparative terms, American youth do not score well in mathematics and science.

Yet the answers are elusive. Whatever its deficiencies, the educational system cannot serve as a substitute for the family and society at large. And the American family is in trouble—at all economic and social strata, but especially where children face poverty and one-parent situations, such as is true to an alarming extent in the black community. American higher education remains the best in the world, but the reforms required at primary and secondary levels must encompass both the system itself and the society surrounding that system.

On the political front, various questions, some of them generic to most democracies in

this era, have come to the fore. There are no living political heroes in America. An investigatory media, not seriously concerned about balance, constantly emphasizes the negative side of politics and politicians. A growing cynicism and indifference among the people are worrisome results. And candidates are packaged for the electorate by professionals, with exceedingly high costs involved—what is genuine, what is spurious?

Despite the range of economic, social and political problems, one should not sell the United States short. It is still the most productive, most powerful and most resilient society in the world. Its contributions in science, social science and the arts generally continue to serve as a standard for the world. Many within the younger generations, moreover, are showing a determination to cope with the revolutionary times in which they live that is highly encouraging. Further, waves of new immigrants, a significant number from Asia, are adding vitality to the scene. Nonetheless, domestic concerns must now receive a greater priority than that given in the recent past.

In foreign policy, one key issue has become of commanding interest: how strong should be the ideological quotient? What weight should be given human rights and democratization in determining attitudes and policies toward other nations? To a greater extent than either Europeans or Asians, the American people have historically demanded a moral foundation for U.S. foreign policy. Policies resting upon balance of power considerations, or other factors connected with perceived national interests have rarely satisfied them.

Naturally, there have been ample contradictions and inconsistencies in the application of moral principles. Yet as recent events with respect to China, Myanmar and even Thailand indicate, an ideological yardstick is still applied, even when in some cases, it appears to damage American interests. To be sure, this issue engenders debate—does an effort to isolate or punish a state deemed abusive to its people help or hurt the cause of political openness? And are there gradations or degrees that should be taken into account? Most importantly, should the

premium not be upon multilateralizing such issues if effective results are to be achieved?

Meanwhile, the United States wrestles with its present and future role in the creation of a more peaceful, prosperous global order. One thing is certain: the age of *pax Americana* has ended. At the same time, in a period when the United States is the only power with a global reach, it must take the initiative in many (not all) situations if there is to be effective, concerted action.

Thus, America ponders how to accept a role short of sole authority while continuing to be a leader—sometimes involving higher costs and risks. Unilateralism must give way to multilateralism in the decision-making process as well as in the implementation of policy. Is the U.S. to be primarily a catalyst in critical situations, with the assumption that others will play roles compatible with their capacities, both in personnel and finances? Under such conditions, it would be easier to share decision-making more fully, although undifferentiated collective leadership is a myth, whether at the domestic or international level. If, as is more likely, in certain settings—as in the Gulf crisis—the initiation and primary responsibilities are American, how should decision-making be shared?

Unquestionably, American strategic policies in the Pacific-Asian region are going to undergo significant changes in the not distant future. The broad shift will be away from fixed American bases manned by U.S. personnel on foreign soil and toward mobile defenses (air and sea), staging areas and bases kept in readiness by aligned nations (with technical American personnel present in some cases), enhanced lift capacity and rapid deployment ability.

In the foreseeable future, the likelihood of a major power conflict in this or any other area is extremely low. Conflicts will be those derivative from domestic strife or between neighbors. Some will be allowed to take place with minimal or no external involvement. Invariably, the crucial issue will be whether there are sufficient reasons for a consort of powers, generally under one state's leadership, to become involved in seeking a solution or at a minimum, a containment of the

conflict. In sum, each conflict will be situation-specific, and likely to require a different configuration of concentric arcs focused on resolving or containing it. Closest will be the parties immediately involved, with others having a stake in the outcome—and often, some degree of involvement—forming the arcs beyond the initial one. It is in this manner that both the Cambodian and Korean tensions have been approached.

Underlying American strategic policy will be a recognition that power—the capacity to defend oneself and to influence others—rests first upon a strong domestic economy and a sturdy social base. Security as well as prosperity begins at home. Thus, the willingness of the United States to play a responsible international role today consistent with its overall strength rests upon three variables: the willingness of other powers to share in the risks and costs of constructing a new global order in accordance with their capacities; the ability of key states, including the U.S., to create or strengthen negotiating mechanisms and decision-making institutions above the nation-state level, so that most vital issues can be handled in a systematic, orderly manner before they reach a crisis stage; and the capacity of a U.S. administration to handle domestic problems more effectively so that the American people can lift their eyes beyond the troubles close at hand.

The United States will not withdraw from Pacific-Asia. It is a part of this region physically, and increasingly, the western United States is participating in one of many natural economic territories (NETs) being formed that cut across political boundaries. The economic and political stake of the U.S. in Asia has never been greater. At the same time, the old order whereby the costs of international leadership were inordinately born by the U.S. is coming to a close, however difficult may be the adjustments (including those of the United States) to that fact.

Against this picture, let me explore the Japanese scene, admittedly doing so as a foreigner. First, changes in the Japanese economic structure are taking place at an accelerating rate, although these are not always easily seen. The assertiveness and independence

of the private sector with relation to government (including MITI) has been rising for some time, and in general terms, with the internationalization of Japanese industry and finance, issues of control have become infinitely more complex. Most of the conditions decried by Americans and others still exist in degree: the keiretsu system characterized by interlocking and relatively exclusive corporate structures; the combination of intensive competition and in-group collaboration that marks the economic system at home and abroad; the excessive dedication to capturing markets or pursuing investment in a given arena, conveying the image of shock troops storming a battle-field; the low priority assigned domestic consumers; and the reluctance to meld with outsiders, be the issue management, technology transfer or research sharing. Having outlined the central issues, one should reiterate that with respect to most if not all of these matters, changes are underway, product of a combination of internal evolution and external pressures. How rapidly they unfold will be the key determinant of the future level of tension between Japan and others, most notably the United States.

Meanwhile, elements of fragility exist in an overall strong economy. The recent stock-market decline, the questionable Japanese investments in certain overseas settings, the hazards of internationalization, the aging of the population, hence, the need for a stronger social security system, and the issue of foreign workers point to matters that concern many Japanese. The very fact that Japan appears to be entering a modest recession, with foreign investments returning home in some cases, while the United States is only beginning to show signs of recovery is a global worry. One of the great issues of the coming decade will be the availability of capital to assist faltering or underdeveloped economies while donors retain the capacity to fuel continued growth at home.

On Japan's political front, the need for political reform has become ever more imperative despite the stout resistance displayed by entrenched interests. Urban residents suffer serious discrimination and the multi-representative districts encourage party

factionalism. Corruption because of the high cost of politics and the absence of strong leaders breeds the same cynicism and indifference as in the United States. A major political overhaul is needed, including party restructuring. Meanwhile, homogeneity—with all of its advantages—also lends itself to a remoteness from other races, and prejudicial attitudes.

Again, it would be a major mistake to emphasize only the problems of contemporary Japan. Its problems are those of a post-modern, increasingly affluent and cosmopolitan society—and such problems are infinitely preferable to those of poor, underdeveloped states or nations that have pursued erroneous economic and political policies. Japan has enjoyed political stability, a steadily rising living standard for its people, and economic policies that have served as the model for many late developing societies. It will cast a major influence over its region and the world for the foreseeable future.

When one turns to the relationship between the domestic setting and the outside world, perhaps it is possible to define the principal challenges faced by Japan and the United States as follows. Japan must seek to alter a culture that has been strongly exclusivist, communally oriented, hierarchical and devotedly homogeneous so that it fits with the growing openness, heterogeneity, and quest for partnership characterizing the world in which it is becoming a major actor. The instinct to think in terms of “we versus them,” reflective of the long-time insularity of this society and its remarkably uniform culture, must give way to beliefs and practices based upon the concept of “us together.” Genuine partnership with outsiders requires significant cultural changes. Quite apart from the initial American encouragement, it was very natural that up to date, Japan has emphasized almost exclusively economics and its own growth. That was to make the most of its inner strengths. Now, it must cultivate the traits—and policies—of a leading participant in the global order.

The United States, on the other hand, must learn how to share international decision-making even while it retains—at least for a time—the position of first among equals. At the same time,

it must raise its priorities with respect to domestic programs and policies without succumbing to the isolationist policies of the past, policies now totally out of date.

Only as each nation successfully meets the central challenges before it can our bilateral relations be strengthened. Let me now examine specifically the latter relation with this connection in mind. It might not be amiss to start with feelings or emotions. Unfortunately, the sensationalists both in the media and in other fields garner the greatest attention in both nations. Extremism is often the surest way to attract a mass audience. Write about a coming American-Japanese war, suggest that the Japanese and Germans are taking over the world, threaten to turn Japanese military technology over to the Russians, or announce that American workers are lazy—all of these statements will assure headlines and heated responses.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that certain negative sentiments about each other have grown within the American and Japanese communities, as evidenced by a variety of polls. A number of Americans believe that most Japanese are excessively preoccupied with economic gains, in the process being selfish, exclusivist, and predatory. Others point to evidence of a strong racist strain in Japanese attitudes, especially toward minorities.

A number of Japanese believe that Americans have indeed grown lazy, lacking the will to compete and seeking a scape-goat for their own shortcomings—shortcomings that cry out for attention both from governmental and private sources. Many feel that racial prejudices enter into the attacks on Japan believing that such attacks are more virulent than those directed against Europe over the same issues.

Those U.S. citizens who regard Japan as a trustworthy ally have declined somewhat, and those Japanese citizens who find the U.S. to be an ally upon whom they can count have also been somewhat reduced in numbers. Yet the shifts have not been large. Moreover, the polls do not indicate that there is any strong sentiment in either society for an ending of the alliance, nor an animus against individuals from the other society. On balance, negativism in attitudes,

while not to be ignored, has been exaggerated.

Meanwhile, the trade imbalance remains intolerably high despite the American recession and the resulting lowered imports; indeed, it appears to be rising again. Some degree of managed trade has probably prevented more comprehensive protectionism, and "the Japan issue" has thus far not benefitted those in the current U.S. election campaign who sought to raise it. Most encouraging, as noted earlier, certain elements within the U.S. private sector have begun a process of restructuring, entry into research consortiums, and further internationalization in an effort to improve competitiveness. There are also signs that many aspects of Japanese economic practice including the keiretsu structure and the distribution system are undergoing change. Greater systemic compatibility is an indispensable requirement for increased harmony, as was emphasized in the recent proposals made by the group headed by Prime Minister Nakasone and President Carter. Thus, the trends now appearing in both societies are hopeful. It would be foolish, however, to argue that the immediate future of U.S.-Japan economic relations warrants complacency. Greater efforts are urgently needed by both parties on such immediate concerns as Japan's weak domestic economy and America's serious budget deficit.

The political aspects of the relationship are somewhat more favorable, at present, but here too, there are problems. The gap between the American tendency to respond strongly to human rights violations and retreats from democracy and the Japanese tendency to downplay these matters has not been substantially reduced despite Tokyo's cooperation with respect to recent crises—from Tiananmen to the Gulf war. At an earlier point, Prime Minister Kaifu enunciated four political guidelines which, according to him, would be applied when considering economic assistance to other nations. These included the size of a state's military budget, its policies with respect to strategic arms transfers and nuclear questions, and its record on human rights and democratization. Were the Kaifu declaration to be implemented, it would go far in aligning the U.S. and Japan on these vital

issues. However, the evidence, including recent pronouncements of Japanese officials, suggests that it is likely to remain mainly rhetoric, applied only sparingly and sporadically.

Nonetheless, Japan has indicated a desire to play a stronger political role and taken initiatives on problems like Cambodia that are encouraging. There will be instances where Tokyo can play a role as catalyst, initiator or middle man, and such courses should be pursued when appropriate. The need for Japan to become more fully involved in the regional and global order—and not merely as follower—is increasingly apparent. To be responsible, one must also have status. Despite the very difficult problems involved, the time has come to enlarge the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, adding Japan and Germany to the roster.

In the security realm, U.S.-Japanese cooperation has never been closer or more effective. The level of consultations is being raised, the sharing of intelligence goes forward, joint exercises are actively carried, and a liaison with other nations is progressing. There is little opposition in either country to a continuance of the mutual security treaty, and equally important, little opposition throughout Asia, including China. The reasons vary. Some Asians feel that an American-Japanese security bond guarantees against a militarily resurgent Japan. Others see the bond as a means of insuring a continued American strategic presence in the region.

It is clear, however, that Japan is faced with a dilemma not of its own making. On the one hand, the general tendency in the United States is to ask Japan to do more with respect to security (without being precise as to what is wanted) whereas the tendency in Japan itself and in the rest of Asia, is to want Japan to continue its present policies or in some cases, to do less. Of course, it is relatively easy to underwrite additional costs of American forces stationed in Japan, but what else?

As noted earlier, a review and revision of American security strategy for Pacific-Asia is inevitable, with important, if incremental, changes already underway. And as also noted, the major task will be to persuade the American people that whatever security burdens they carry,

these are necessary and not disproportionate to those of others. Much thought and work should go into a consideration of future security options at the bilateral as well as at other levels. Nothing would assist in this process more than Japanese willingness to devote personnel as well as money to peace keeping operations, and connect its financial assistance to the military-political criteria earlier suggested by Kaifu and others.

Despite the difficulties, if one surveys American-Japanese relations in their totality at this point in time, there is reason for cautious optimism. The very nature of the problems and issues signals the intensity and depth of the relationship. Never in history have two separate nations been so closely associated in so many respects. In such a setting, any effort to insist upon national sovereignty in the classical sense, treating it as inviolable, is misguided. When one country's domestic policies seriously affect the welfare of another country, they cease to be purely a domestic matter.

Given the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship today, it is critically important to revitalize the SII talks, as was pledged in the recent Tokyo Declaration. Speaking bluntly, external pressure is frequently necessary to prod governments—and the private sector as well—and never more so than in democratic societies where the countervailing pressures are often powerful.

Meanwhile, one of the most critical areas in which to make progress is with respect to cooperative research and development in such frontier areas as biotechnology, the environment, and space. If partnership is to go beyond rhetoric, the supreme tests lie here.

In broader terms, as noted earlier, the urgent need is for the greater compatibility of our two economic systems, and greater transparency or openness, especially on the part of Japan. Some have suggested a II Maekawa Commission dedicated to exploring these issues. Whatever the formula, both nations must concentrate on this matter as the single most determinant of our future relations.

At the same time, it is now imperative to encase American-Japanese relations in a growing network of multilateral commitments. The future

for both of us is heavily dependent upon whether we can regularize both regional and global decision-making processes, placing them in an institutional framework. The GATT must not be allowed to fail, and the responsibility of both Japan and the United States in this connection is great. At the same time, APEC should be given an opportunity to expand its functions, and the North American Free Trade Area should gradually be enlarged to encompass key market economies, including Japan. Whatever the temporary compromises, our goals must be to steadily enlarge the free trade arena, oppose regional or sub-regional exclusivism and refine the means of adjusting economic disputes. Environmental issues, moreover, must be incorporated into all economic discussion, a trend just getting underway.

Similarly, in the political realm, issues like human rights must be internationalized, with more effective mechanisms for handling violations. Egregious violators of basic human rights like the present Myanmar dictatorship should not go unnoticed or unchallenged. At the same time, unilateral action should be discouraged since it is generally ineffective or even counter-productive. Japan and the United States should develop a common course of action with respect to such matters in company with others.

One important additional need at the bilateral level is to bring our younger generations into closer contact with each other through a variety of means: intense summer programs, educational exchanges and mutual apprenticeships. The substantial generational changes taking place in both societies make it imperative that a growing network of contacts extend to those who will play key roles in the 21st century.

The risks of a major power conflict are at their lowest point in modern history. In handling other types of conflict or tensions, several approaches are warranted. In certain cases, as noted earlier, the most effective method is the construction of a series of concentric arcs around a specific situation. The imagery is arcs not circles since there must be a capacity for interaction between and among the different

levels. Both the United States and Japan have very important roles to play in these situation-specific security issues. And we are likely to see more tensions of this type emerge in the decades immediately ahead, some of them involving major states within the Pacific-Asian region.

At the same time, there are certain situations which demand broader multilateral treatment: nuclear proliferation; strategic arms transfers; and terrorism. The time has come to enter into collective discussions at both unofficial and official levels regarding such issues. And we should not shrink from some bold new thinking, including the concept of a nuclear-free zone for the North Pacific beyond that being enunciated for the Korean Peninsula, further reductions in conventional military forces, and more refined verification systems.

It is worrisome that most Asian states are increasing rather than decreasing their military expenditures despite the end of the Cold War and the lull in international tension. We must take seriously the need to tackle both the issues

giving rise to military buildups and the buildups themselves before additional complications arise.

Accounting for nearly forty percent of the global GNP, possessed of power in political and military terms exceeding that of other nations, and committed to, as well as dependent upon internationalism, the United States and Japan have an unique responsibility to play leadership roles in the construction of a more peaceful, prosperous world. Leadership, to be sure, must be within a framework of consultation and cooperation with others, focusing upon the means of creating consensus and subsequently, upon the appropriate means of implementation. If our two nations can work closely together in this project, our bilateral relations will grow stronger, although the new partnership will harbor elements of competition as well as cooperation. In the final analysis, by virtue of their importance, the United States and Japan are destined to pioneer in integrating domestic, bilateral, regional and global policies on behalf of a more coherent global order.

CHAPTER 10
**Asia and U.S.-Japan Relations
 Since the Reversion of Okinawa**

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I

The Reversion of Okinawa was really a milestone in the U.S.-Japan relationship, as it enabled the two countries to move from one relationship to another. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the basic instrument of the partnership, was signed in 1951, and was revised in 1980, but it was still on a fragile basis in the middle of the 1960s. It had a fundamental weakness in the fact that it was an alliance between the victor and the vanquished. Though the alliance was mutually beneficial objectively, not a few Japanese were unhappy with it. Huge demonstrations in 1960, when the treaty was revised in a form more favorable to Japan, were the most eloquent expression of such a feeling.

The causes of the opposition to the Treaty were many and diverse, and should not be simplified, but the main reason of the strength of the opposition can be found in the slogan, "Tai-bei jyuzoku" (Japan is in a subordinate position relative to the U.S.). Whether this was true or not was debatable, and many Americans, especially diplomats and foreign policy-makers, tried hard to erase this memory. But the fact was that many felt so and Okinawa symbolized the unequal aspects of the relationship between the two countries.

The above danger was recognized by some, the most prominent among whom was Professor Reischauer, who wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* in 1960, and was appointed to be the Ambassador to Japan. He pointed out the gap in perception between Japanese and Americans. After he came to Japan, Ambassador Reischauer

made strenuous efforts to have dialogues by visiting many places in Japan to talk and began to work for the reversion of Okinawa earlier than any Japanese. Careful handling of the matter by Prime Minister Sato and good judgment by U.S. policy-makers about military strategy made the reversion possible. The general election in the end of 1960 after the agreement to return Okinawa within two to three years resulted in a land-slide victory for the governing party and 1970 did not repeat 1960, though many had been afraid of this occurring.

It was a remarkable achievement in view of the Vietnam War, which made the United States unpopular among the Japanese and made life difficult for Japanese policy-makers. The prestige of the United States had never been tarnished so much. The war made the U.S. government unpopular among the Americans. The government of the two countries had to act from weak positions at home. Therefore it was praiseworthy that the two governments took bold action. Prime Minister Sato decided to work for the reversion of Okinawa. If the U.S. government had failed to respond favorably, the Sato government would have had to resign in a dishonorable way, and the United States would have become so unpopular among the Japanese that the U.S.-Japan alliance might have been jeopardized. The lesson is that one must sometimes take a bold initiative, especially in adversity.

II

Okinawa was indeed a thorn in the side,

and, if not taken care of, may have damaged the U.S.-Japan relationship. The reversion of Okinawa removed the thorn and generated goodwill, without which U.S.-Japan relations might not have endured the storm later. In 1971 the Japanese had to experience two shocks: the dollar was made inconvertible in July and in August the Sino-U.S. rapprochement was achieved with the announcement of the coming visit of President Nixon to Beijing. The two shocks were preceded by trade conflict: the Nixon administration asked the Japanese government to voluntarily restrict its export of artificial fiber to the U.S. Compromise was slow to emerge.

All these developments were inevitable, as the U.S. ceased to be as strong as it had been. In the middle of the 1960s some people talked about one and a half polar world, instead of a bipolar world. But the Vietnam War changed the situation dramatically. The leadership was weakened at home, the prestige of the U.S. was tarnished abroad and its economy was weakened as society lost its former stability. The relative position of the U.S. economy was bound to decline as it had been too high in the 1950s, but the Vietnam War quickened the process. Therefore the United States had to reduce its commitments and to act more vigorously to serve its particular interests. The world became more multi-polar.

Adaptation to new reality is always difficult and conflicts of interest and views tend to appear in the transition. For example, the normalization of the relationship between Washington and Beijing could have caused bitter feelings among the Japanese, for they had been willing to normalize Japanese relations with China, and had been prevented from doing so by the U.S. In fact, it had been a nightmare among the Japanese foreign policy establishment that the U.S. should establish diplomatic relations with China before Japan did. Their nightmare virtually became reality, but the resentment was not widespread. Prime Minister Sato should be given credit for his demeanor when he was informed of the U.S.-China rapprochement over Japanese heads. Also the rapprochement itself was a necessary and inevitable diplomatic act. But without the

goodwill generated by the reversion of Okinawa, Sato might have acted differently, or his position might have been untenable at home. It was fortunate that Japan and the United States could enter the turbulent waters of the 1970s after the Okinawa problem had been solved.

Since then we have come a very long way. Japan was able to join the international efforts to overcome the oil shocks and stagflation. China was peacefully brought into the international community. Japan and the United States cooperated to cope with the increased threat from the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The two countries have come through a difficult adjustment process as the balance of economic power changed. In the Gulf War, the two countries cooperated.

In all these there were differences of views and interests, and cooperation was far from satisfactory. Some were frustrated and unhappy, and became critical with the others. But this is only natural between nations. What is remarkable is that the U.S.-Japan alliance weathered all these storms and is now considered to be the most important bilateral relation in the world.

Yet we must learn from frictions and conflicts, as they demonstrate difficulties involved in transition from one type of relation to another. Though the alliance was transformed into an alliance of equals, old habits persisted.

It may be pertinent here to touch upon the tiresome process in which the details of the reversion were worked out in the two countries. In Japan the government was surprised to experience considerable difficulties in the ratification of the agreement in the Diet. The opposition attacked the government for pledging support to the U.S. military forces in case of a war on the Korean Peninsula. It was necessary and justified that the government should give such a pledge, because the U.S. military facilities in Okinawa were no longer given a special status. Before the reversion U.S. military forces were equipped with nuclear weapons, and were not obliged to consult prior to major changes in deployment, but after the reversion the U.S. military lost such prerogatives. As it was unwise to deploy tactically nuclear weapons on or near

the front line, denuclearization caused no problem. But general use of the bases in Japan was a different matter. One important function of them was to support U.S. military actions in Asia, on the Korean Peninsula in particular. Therefore the U.S. was justified to demand that Japan would cooperate willingly in the case of a war on the Korean Peninsula, and Sato was right to respond positively. It was a necessary act of cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. But the Japanese government did not make its different stance clear. A good opportunity to have serious and open discussions on security policy was missed.

The process was disturbed by the trade issues, i.e. U.S. demand of voluntary export restrictions of artificial fiber. It was understandable from the U.S. domestic perspective that the Nixon administration should so demand. But it was dubious whether it was the right policy. It was true that some of the industries concerned were having hard times. But statistics showed that the Japanese exports were still small and were not an important cause of the hardship of the U.S. industries. Their position could have been improved by efforts to modernize and increase competitiveness. VER can sometimes give breathing space in which one can modernize. But in more cases than not it becomes a hindrance as it makes one lazy. It is necessary to point out his small taint in the grand act of the reversion of Okinawa, since VER was repeatedly used in the 1970s to the detriment of true U.S. economic interests. The strong sometimes forget the need for reforms at home, as history shows.

III

Old habits die slowly in any case. But in U.S.-Japan relations, the nature of the alliance reinforced the old habits. For while it is beneficial to both, the U.S.-Japan alliance is of the most imbalanced kind. To put it more correctly, it is beneficial because it is imbalanced. The clearest imbalance lies in military and security policies.

Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has enjoyed security at nominal cost. The

U.S. capability of nuclear deterrence constituted the basis of the Japanese national security policy, and the presence of the powerful American navy in the Western Pacific served as an effective counterforce against the Soviet Union. The military capabilities of the United States alone assured Japan's national security, and their effectiveness remained unchallenged until the beginning of the 1970s. This was the major reason why Japan could keep its defense spending low. During the 1950s, when Japan's gross national product was still small, military spending occasionally exceeded 2% of the GNP, but later it decreased gradually, and has remained below or around 1% since the mid-1960s.

On the other hand, the U.S. spent about 10% of its GNP for military purposes until the late 1960s. Military spending once declined to a little below 6% in the mid-1970s, but again increased to over 7% due to President Reagan's military expansion policy. U.S. military spending has been about 5-9% higher than that of Japan in percentage of GNP. It must be pointed out, however, that the above imbalance is both natural and beneficial. It is natural given the geopolitical location of the Japanese archipelago. The Japan archipelago is located at the edge of the Western Pacific and occupies a strategic point, blocking entry from Eurasia into the Pacific basin. U.S. control over the Pacific has been made almost perfect just because the U.S., which has the world's strongest navy, has an alliance with Japan, which is in a geopolitically advantageous position. Whether other countries around the world liked it or not, this fact constituted the basic framework of the world's political structure after the war. One must also remember that this fact made it possible for Japan to maintain a limited defense capacity after the war.

Thus, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty brought benefits to Japan. Simultaneously, it was also beneficial for the U.S. as it allowed Americans to procure cooperation from Japan, a country located in a geopolitically advantageous position. In a word, the Treaty offered common interest to both countries. In other words, a heavy defense capacity of Japan is superfluous.

Military capability which is superfluous can often cause concern, and in the case of Japan, even natural and necessary defense capacity can make the other Asian countries uneasy because of the memory of the Pacific War. Therefore, the U.S.-Japan alliance contributes to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as it has kept Japan's military power at a limited level. It has made the Japanese safe and secure and hence the Asians safe. The so-called "capping" theory is an unfortunately vulgar description of the above important functions. In view of all this, it is easily predictable that any change that may occur in the U.S.-Japanese relation would cause a drastic change in the political and economic structure of the world.

Unfortunately, the first imbalance has been not an unimportant reason of the second imbalance, namely the trade imbalance. The trade imbalance is caused by several factors, the most important one being Americans' propensity to spend excessively. But military expenditures is one important way of spending. The great gap in military spending may have had negligible impact when the U.S. boasted of overwhelming national power, which has ceased to be the case since the beginning of the 1970s.

This large military spending has put a burden on the U.S. The U.S. industrial investment has been about 10% lower than in Japan. This is because Americans are more oriented toward consumption than the Japanese, and also because the U.S. is compelled to spend a lot for military expenditure. The cost of maintaining a massive military capability is not limited to the economic sphere. There is a great requirement for human resources, as evidenced by the fact that nearly 40% of American university graduates from the faculties of science and engineering become employed by the war industry. On the other hand, in Japan, where the ratio of university students specializing in science and engineering is high and the number of such graduates almost equals that of the U.S., such "outflux" is rare. By this comparison, one can easily understand the weight of this burden on the U.S. In other words, Japan is allowed to make heavier investments in plant and equipment and utilize human resources in private

industries, just because it is not required to bear the heavy military burden. Here again, it is possible to argue that the trade imbalance made a not unimportant contribution to the peace and stability of the world. The most important case was the Japanese financing in the first half of the 1980s, when the tension between the Communist camp and the free world was heightened.

Japan supported the dollar system. As is well known, the United States, afflicted with its own fiscal deficit and the deteriorated international balance of payments, has been operating its economy with borrowings from abroad. A large proportion of these borrowings comes from Japan. If there had not been for the influx of funds from Japan, the Reagan administration could not have adopted the policy to maintain a military balance with the Soviet Union, or even predominance over the Soviets, while developing its own domestic economy. Here, one must be reminded that Japan sends about 40% of its exports to the United States, and that, based on this trade with the U.S., Japan has been able to continue its own economic growth. Although these relations have somewhat unhealthy elements and seem unsustainable in the long run, the relation between the United States, having the largest economy in the world, and Japan, which is now the world's largest creditor nation, will become a major factor determining the future of the dollar system.

The above two imbalances can be faced and discussed without raising emotions to a high level. But the third imbalance, i.e. that of structure and basic working principles, complicates the situation. The first is that the U.S. is fundamentally an open society, while Japan is basically a closed one. With respect to the trade system in the narrow sense, some people may assert that the American system is not extremely open in comparison with those of other countries. If VER is taken into account, the U.S. is more protective than Japan, which is very open as far as tariffs are concerned. It is true, however, that American society has unparalleled openness. This is particularly true of American universities. One may also note the existence of lobbyists who publicly act for the interest of Israel or Japan in American politics. These seem

never to happen in Japan or France, or in any other Western European countries. An open society which permits the free activity of people has a great importance for traders. On the other hand, Japan is a difficult country to approach and understand, regardless of the intention of the Japanese. If one thinks of the language barrier, one can understand it. Japanese is a strange language, albeit a well-developed one, and therefore is difficult to learn. And it is very difficult to understand any foreign country without learning its language. In a word, the U.S. is a universal country and Japan particularistic. Perhaps the difference is due to the fact that the U.S. is a multi-racial and heterogeneous society, while Japan does not have important minority races and in this sense is a homogeneous society.

The above brings up another imbalance, i.e., the structure and power of the governments. The U.S. government has power where the Japanese government does not, and vice versa. The U.S. president is infinitely stronger in foreign and security policy than the Japanese prime minister. But the Japanese government is stronger in the management of its economy than the U.S. administration. The case in point was the Gulf War. While President Bush took a bold and decisive leadership role, Prime Minister Kaifu remained timid. But the Japanese government did raise taxes to make a financial contribution, which the U.S. administration could not afford to do.

One can find the cause in different constitutional arrangements, for one. But the basic working principles rooted in historical experience are as important. In the United States, individual initiative is appreciated, while in Japan consensus and tradition is respected. I do not agree with the argument that Japan is an alien country. The United States itself was considered to be such by many Europeans less than a century ago. But we must frankly admit the differences. And it is not a bad thing, for heterogeneity in the world creates new possibilities. And yet, such differences are perplexing and irritating.

IV

One of the fundamental questions for the world to consider is whether Japan and the United States can maintain imbalanced but beneficial relations in the different setting of the post-Cold War world. History is full of unhappy collisions. But theoretically there is no reason why the two countries cannot maintain friendly relations. There are many factors, favorable and unfavorable.

First of all, human psychology is irrational but strong. And imbalanced relations can be tormented by psychological problems, however beneficial they are. Many Americans seem to think that Japan has gained unreasonable profit from the U.S.-Japan relation, particularly because there is an established fact that Japan has achieved its remarkable economic success primarily by depending on the United States in double ways. It is understandable, but it is not a constructive judgment. Indeed it is an error often committed by the Number One nation, which tends to take for granted that other countries will accept every demand it makes, and to feel that it can maintain its supreme position without effort.

The first American attitude can be exemplified by several U.S. actions. For example, it demanded that Japan and West Germany lower their interest rates without the U.S. making a noticeable effort to reduce its own budget deficit. Given the deteriorated balance of its international payments, it is only natural that the United States need an influx of funds from abroad and, for this purpose, the interest rates of foreign countries must be lower than that of the U.S. It is selfish, however, for the United States to demand favors of foreign countries, without making an effort to eliminate the fundamental cause of the trade deficit.

The second is the psychology of Americans in general to believe that the U.S. economy can be revitalized without increasing consumption and savings. If any country is to acquire new industrial capabilities, investment in plants and equipment is essential, which in turn requires investment funds from some sort of savings. Americans do not seem to fully understand this simple arithmetic, probably because they do not

feel the urgent need to tighten their belts and double their efforts to tide over the existing difficulties. The same mistake can be found in their attitude of criticizing the closed nature of the markets and unfair commercial practices of their trading partners, forgetting their laziness to try to export. Yet, this American attitude does not reflect perfect confidence, partly because they are afraid that they may be losing the battle. Americans are ambivalent and are not satisfied.

The Japanese are also ambivalent. Generally speaking, they tend to underestimate the real strength of the top country. Rapid development and success brings euphoria. Furthermore, they tend to underestimate the importance of the function of the Number One country as well as the difficulties and cost involved. The best example could be found in the reaction of a considerable number of the Japanese to the Gulf War. The Japanese must at least recognize that Japan is a beneficiary of the international order, which the United States maintains through their efforts. The Japanese should also recognize the cost of these American efforts.

Unfortunately, the Japanese do not act that way. Nevertheless, the Japanese are not confident as they are aware of their own fragility, which is covered by the United States. Therefore the Japanese are both resentful of and grateful to the Americans. In the past, the threat of the Soviet Union served as a glue to make the two cooperate and overcome the psychological difficulties. But the Soviet threat has vanished almost completely.

Moreover, there emerged a mistaken idea that the coming world is that of geo-economics in which economic might will be decisive, and that Japan and the United States are rivals in this newly emergent field. But the idea is theoretically mistaken and it will not catch the minds of many. Economic relations are basically non-adversarial. Both can gain from it, and can lose, once they are overly conscious of its adversarial aspects.

Moreover, the Americans are becoming more serious about their economy, as the Cold War is over. They have begun to realize that

revitalization is long overdue, for which self-reform is essential.

Also, there is some possibility of convergence. Huge military expenditures have begun to decrease and will further decrease. The burden on the U.S. may cease to be intolerably larger than that on Japan. Surely the U.S. must perform the central role in providing the world with peace and stability, while the Japanese role will remain that of a supporter. But such a supportive role will be more important and will be easier for Japan to perform. For, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, U.S. action will become less adversarial, and more like police action. Moreover such acts will be done under the mandates given by the United Nations and/or according to a consensus of international society. There is no reason why Japan cannot join in peace-keeping operations. Though Japan's record in the Gulf War was far from satisfactory, the trial came too abruptly for the Japanese. Also, Japanese politics is slow-moving, and the stimulus given by the Gulf War has had negligible impact on the Japanese. It is true that imbalance in the security role can decrease to a tolerable degree.

In the realm of international economy, the Japanese are now conscious of the fact that they cannot maintain their prosperity unless the world at large is prosperous. Indeed the success of Japan in its economy is not very special. One important reason has been that Japan has been able to continue the policies of the small and weak after its economy became powerful. In other words, "security rent" has been cheap until recently. But, such is no longer possible.

If the U.S. economy becomes more commercially-oriented and the Japanese government more responsible in the management of the world, its imbalance will become an acceptable one to both. Perhaps patience and bold initiative are required: patience, because necessary changes cannot take place soon and take time; bold initiative, because only by cooperation for common good is mutual respect and confidence born, as was the case with the reversion of Okinawa.

SUMMARY

**Okinawa Reversion:
Its Long-Term Significance in US-Japan Relations
—Past and Future—**

May 13-14, 1992

SESSION I: The Cold War in Asia Introductory Remarks

This first session commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa opened with two paper presentations by Tadashi Aruga, on "The Cold War in Asia" and Thomas Schelling, on "Vietnam: Reflections and Lessons". In introductory remarks prior to the presentations, Minoru Kusuda, the Executive Director of one of the seminar's co-sponsors, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP), set the tone for much of the debate. Kusuda-san stressed the significance of the Okinawa reversion, not only for establishing a new era in the US-Japan relationship, but also in representing an extraordinary and rare event in the history of international relations whereby territory lost in a war was returned peacefully through diplomatic negotiations.

In other introductory remarks, the foresight of the United States at the time was commended. The reversion was held out as a model of two countries working together to deal with a common problem before a crisis developed and dealing with it in a way that was consistent with the domestic interests of both countries as well as with their common security interests. The reversion of Okinawa strengthened the US-Japan relationship, and not only laid the foundation for the closeness and strength of this bilateral alliance, but also helped foster security in Asia and the rest of the world. It was also suggested that the reversion process and decision should be viewed as a model for dealing with current issues in US-Japan relations, and more specifically as a guiding model in the current Russian-Japanese

dispute over the Northern Islands.

The Cold War: Asia vs. Europe

In attempting to understand the significance of the Okinawa reversion as both a product of the Cold War and a factor contributing to its eventual conclusion this, it is necessary to define its parameters, with particular attention being paid to the distinction between post-WWII hostilities in Europe and Asia. Professor Aruga's paper forwarded two main arguments which may be summarized as follows.

First, in defining the Cold War, it becomes apparent that the traditional Cold War scenario as played out in post-war Europe is inapplicable in many ways as a description of tensions and balance of power politics in the Asian region. In contrast to Europe where the conflict centered around two cohesive blocs aligned along pro- and anti-Communist lines, in Asia tensions were much less cohesive and decisively defined. Thus, while in Europe the Cold War became a geopolitical confrontation between two cohesive sides led by the United States (as the champion of free market democracy) and the now eclipsed Soviet Union (as the champion of Eastern bloc, state run communist economies), in Asia there were socialist countries, communist countries, as well as countries allied with the United States, none of which came together in any similar cohesive grouping.

Communism in Asia took its form under the leadership of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, and yet these two communist powers soon developed a conflicting relationship undermining any solidarity based on communist

ideology. Similarly, although there were many countries in the Asian region aligned with the US, these countries did not have any strong ties among themselves. American allies in Asia emerged with different political systems, political culture, and paths towards economic development. Thus it was argued that in the Asian context, it is more accurate to describe three Cold Wars—the Sino-Soviet, Soviet-US, and US-Chinese. Compared with its position in Europe, the role of the Soviet Union in Asia was considerably limited, whereas the role of the United States was by far the greatest in Asia than elsewhere, with the US also playing crucial roles in Asia's two main physical wars—Korea and Vietnam.

The second theme of the presentation further distinguished the tensions in Europe from those in Asia by considering the relationship between nationalism and communism as ideologies and movements in the two regions. In general, whereas nationalism was used as a counter-movement against the communist threat in Europe, in Asia the two ideologies were intertwined, with communist forces using nationalist sentiment to support anti-imperialist claims against the West. In Europe, communist ideology was used to bury nationalism and to create artificial multi-ethnic states based on ideology rather than nationalism. Nationalism, however, triumphed, and it was pointed out in the discussion that in fact Russian president Boris Yeltsin used nationalism to defeat communism in the Soviet Union.

In contrast, communist forces in Asia filled the power vacuum left in many countries in the wake of independence movements which brought the collapse of colonialism. This relationship led to differing views about the American presence in both regions—in Europe the American military presence was endorsed by the Europeans as an "imperialism by invitation", whereas in Asia there was more of an anti-imperialist feeling stemming from the close connection between the communist movement and nationalist movements for independence.

However, it was also argued that nationalism as a movement was not the monopoly of the communists in Asia, as

demonstrated by the existence of such leaders as Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, and Ngo Dinh Diem. The point here is not that the communists were the only nationalists in the region, but rather that they were able to take advantage in these years of the destruction and division caused by the war itself as well as of the organizational techniques borrowed from the Bolsheviks. Even in Japan the "Peace Constitution" and Security Treaty was originally viewed by many as an extension of American occupation and an attempt by the American military to suppress the rise of Asian nationalism. The status of tensions and attitudes in Asia reached a major turning point in the years 1972-1973. It was during this time that Cold War tensions in the Asian framework lessened considerably, with improvements in the US-Sino relationship as well as the Japanese-Sino relationship. Significantly, it was during this period that the Okinawa reversion was realized, and the theme of the ensuing discussions pointed to the reversion as one of the key elements in the structure of the US-Japan alliance that developed later in the 1970s and early 1980s.

During the discussion, it was suggested that while the year 1972 is significant as a turning point in the region, one should go back to 1969 to find the real impetus for the change in tensions which eventually made possible the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. It was in 1969 that Soviet and Chinese troops fought on Damanski Island, and in the same year Brezhnev developed a more assertive stance to encircle or contain China, in a type of "collective Asian security" strategy. Finally, it was in 1969 that the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated, thereby paving the way for the partial withdrawal of the United States from Asia.

It was also suggested that Japan's business interests were furthered considerably by the Cold War, which was seen as a positive contributor towards Japan's economic recovery. Japan's economy benefited greatly from both US aid initiatives as well as from the opportunities it was afforded to "catch up" during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

One of the more provocative points raised

in the discussion came from an American participant who argued that the Cold War really began in Asia and that Japan played a major role in bringing the Cold War to an end. While in Europe the Cold War was defined by a fairly rigid power balance, in Asia the situation was more fluid with balances shifting. However, throughout the continuum of change in Asia, it was suggested that the US-Japan alliance remained a constant variable, which blossomed after the Vietnam War both in the defense and economic areas. While the United States played the military role which left countries free to make their own political choices, Japan provided the engine for economic development in Asia.

In general, it was asserted that events in Europe, which were so dramatic at the end of the Cold War, were simply a manifestation of a system that crumbled; yet it began crumbling because of the way Moscow perceived the direction of events in Asia. From the early 1980s it was the US-Japan alliance that created these perceptions, and again the Okinawa reversion served as an essential starting point in structuring the US-Japan bilateral relationship that emerged so strongly in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Finally, it was suggested that parallels might be drawn using the Okinawa reversion as a model in addressing the disputes between Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories. Specifically, it was pointed out that John Foster Dulles developed the concept of "residual sovereignty" which allowed the United States to administer Okinawa and use its military bases there unhindered for another two decades. If Russia granted residual sovereignty over the two larger Kuril Islands to Japan, Russia might still administer those territories for some unspecified time. The two smaller islands would return to Japanese sovereignty immediately, in the same way that the strategically less important Amami Islands were returned by the United States in 1953. Discussion of these comparisons and the potential lessons which the Okinawa reversion could contribute to the current dispute between Russia and Japan are explored in detail in Session Four.

Vietnam: Reflections and Lessons

The significance of the Vietnam War in the evolution of the Cold War in Asia and more specifically in the process which led to the eventual reversion of Okinawa was outlined by Professor Thomas Schelling. The most salient characteristic of the US engagement in Vietnam was that both the Johnson and Nixon administrations saw the initial Viet Cong insurgency and the later full scale military engagement with North Vietnamese forces as an integral part of the Cold War. More significantly, this conception appeared to entail the view not only that the war was an integral part of the Cold War, but that North Vietnam was an integral part of a monolithic and almost seamless Communist bloc and this was the perception even after the split between China and the Soviet Union had become visible to the outside world as both serious and most likely irreversible.

Three main themes were raised in the presentation and discussion. First, one of the significant issues raised was that of expectations and interpretations. In hindsight analysis, the North Vietnamese were not much concerned whether they were part of the Cold War — however willing they were to receive material assistance from the Soviet Union, they were unlikely to think of themselves as any kind of satellite or as another Cuba, and their own relations with China were clearly incompatible with any thought of a Moscow-Beijing-Hanoi axis. Moreover, any interests they had in Cambodia and other neighbouring nations were surely their own and not interests subordinated to those of Moscow. In short, the 17th parallel created in the 1950s as a national boundary was in no way a spiritual descendant of the conference at Potsdam.

The question, however, is whether the fact that the North Vietnamese construed the stakes and issues of the Vietnam War differently from the US invalidates the American interpretation which linked the struggle to the Cold War and the assumption that what was at stake at the 17th parallel was exactly the same as that at the 38th parallel twenty years earlier. If indeed the 17th parallel acquired the symbolic status of the 38th parallel, did it acquire this status at the time

Indochina was divided in the 1950s or had it acquired that status as a consequence of US involvement? In other words, did the United States cultivate an unnecessary sense of commitment when it elected to construe the attempts to subvert and invade South Vietnam as part of the Moscow-inspired and Moscow-led Cold War?

What escalated in Vietnam was not only the commitment of resources and the level of violence and involvement, but also the stakes in the battle. It is important to understand how the stakes can come to be raised so high, and this can be analyzed as the product of two mechanisms—justification and deterrence. It was suggested that perhaps the Cold War thinking of the US might not be peculiar to the Cold War, but rather, as the Gulf War illustrates, when the US or an alliance led by the US engages in military action, that action has to be justified—and the justification will almost certainly adduce principles that transcend the concrete local issues. Exalting those principles and dedicating the nation to those principles will almost certainly enlarge the stakes in the game.

Hence the dilemma is as follows: the need to find justification in broad principles rather than local interests is genuine and legitimate, and the importance of providing grounds for the belief that the US and its allies cannot afford to back down should not be minimized. Yet these two needs are met only at great risk, as the Vietnam War illustrated.

The second theme of the discussion focused on the inability of the the United States to provoke Chinese intervention during the Vietnam War in any significant way. One of the seemingly incomprehensible developments of the Vietnam War was that, despite the fact that the US had been engaging in a costly and bitter struggle with a close ally of the Soviet Union who was also being aided by the Soviet Union, by the end of the War relations between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as relations between the US and China, were remarkably improved beyond any expectations.

Two reasons were suggested for this apparent inability to engage the Chinese in the Vietnam conflict. First, since the Americans

didn't send ground troops to Vietnam, there was really only an air threat to the Chinese, which was much less menacing to them. Moreover, Vietnam was opposed to direct Chinese involvement. Second, the Chinese and the Soviets in Vietnam thought it would be better to wait for the Americans to tire themselves out, which is eventually happened by the early 1970s.

The third theme dealt with the issue of nuclear weapons during the Vietnam conflict. There was virtually no reference in the US to a possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, and this points to a general lesson observed most recently in the Gulf Crisis—namely, that while nuclear weapons may be useful weapons to hold in reserve, they are not weapons which are necessarily used when it's expedient. It was argued that by the late 1960s nuclear weapons, although clearly not neutralized in Europe, had ceased to play the decisive role in US military planning or NATO military planning which such weapons originally played. This is confirmed simply by looking at the huge amounts invested in conventional weapons which would be utterly useless in the event of a war that went instantly nuclear. In Japan's case, there was a growing consensus at the time that it would not be prudent to have Japan move closer towards becoming a nuclear weapons site. In connection with this view, it was important that when Okinawa reverted there would be no exception regarding nuclear weapons for the island.

It was argued by some participants that Vietnam was actually a "moral" victory for the United States, because although the US paid a high price in trying to contain communism in Vietnam, in so doing it provided those nations in the region with a chance to develop their economies. The remarkable growth achieved by the ASEAN economies in the 1970s and 1980s was made possible by the fact that the threat to their political stability was contained as a result of America's involvement in Vietnam. America was not only able to contain the expansionism of China and the Soviet Union through the war effort, but it was also able to stimulate the birth of the free market political pluralism in East Asia.

However, it was also argued by some

participants that the Vietnam conflict had major negative effects on Japanese politics and the Japanese perception of the United States. While the Korean War was a significant factor in enabling the Japanese economy to rebuild, the same cannot really be said about the Vietnam War because the Japanese economy by the 1960s had developed sufficiently to maintain its growth without such a conflict. Moreover, a further undesirable influence of the Vietnam conflict was the extreme pacifism which grew in Japan as a result of the war. It was suggested that it wasn't until the reversion of Okinawa that the Japanese people came to realize the magnanimity of the American people and the ability of the United States to make major changes which strengthened the bilateral relationship between both countries.

Four lessons from Vietnam were proposed by some of the participants, despite the caveat from one of the speakers that "Of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst may be the lessons we draw from it". The first lesson to be drawn is not to mislead your opponent, which the United States did in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Second, it is unclear whether democracies, and specifically the United States, can ever successfully fight limited protracted wars. Third, conflicts such as those in Korea and Vietnam are twofold—there is the military conflict abroad and the political conflict at home. Fourth, it is crucial always to have indigenous roots and to encourage an active indigenous role.

Two further conclusions were drawn about the outcome of the war and the experience of the United States. First, the US underestimated the extraordinary toughness of the Vietnamese, and second, it overestimated systematically and over a long period of time the strength of the economies of the communist countries, most notably the Soviet Union.

Conclusion: Implications for Okinawa Reversion

One of the extraordinary aspects about the timing of the reversion of Okinawa is that it occurred while the United States was fighting a war in Asia, particularly since it was using the Okinawan bases for direct combat operations. It

was suggested that it is a measure of the trust that developed at the military level as well as the State Department-Gaimusho level between Japan and the United States that the American government was willing in the end to proceed on the rather convoluted paragraph in the reversion communique. Translated into English, this clause says that if the Vietnam War is still on when reversion occurs, the United States will be permitted to continue conducting combat operations from Okinawa.

A further lesson drawn by some people in the US government about Vietnam and the Cold War was that it was not so easy to tell in Asia, as it presumably was in Europe, whether something was worth fighting for, or whether a change that was occurring with the use of force was something that threatened the security interests of the United States and those of Japan.

For some people reversion was an opportunity to get the Japanese government to say some things about the security of Asia and also to remove the luxury which the Japanese government had become accustomed to in adopting the position that "we have no view, but we can't stop the Americans". On the other hand, reversion meant that the American government was putting itself in a position where it would not again get involved in a war in Asia without knowing that it had the active support of the Japanese government and without the Japanese government being forced to identify itself publicly with those military operations.

SESSION II: Postwar Japan-US Relations and Okinawa

It was again affirmed that Japan and the United States accomplished a political rarity in procuring the reversion of Okinawa, in that action was taken in advance to avert a crisis that was not yet certain or broadly visible and therefore not yet exerting strong pressure on the domestic political agenda.

The Okinawa reversion occurred between two very different twenty-year periods in the US-Japan Security relationship. In the 1950s and 1960s, the US-Japan Security Alliance was politically vulnerable and a constant target of opposition parties in Japan seeking to dislodge

the LDP from its Diet majority. In the 1970s and 1980s, by contrast, the Security Alliance was politically solid, with opposition parties and student activists turning to other issues. The reversion of Okinawa was one of the prime reasons why US-Japan security relations were so much smoother from the 1970s onwards.

Maintaining these security relations was a central goal of those in both nations who championed the reversion. By exploiting a logical connection, these reversion architects used the negotiations to buttress Japan's commitments in the region. Since the return of the Ryukyus made Japan fully sovereign over its entire territory, it was reasonable that Tokyo should then bear more responsibility to the security of East Asia.

It was suggested that even more importantly, reversion buttressed the security relationship through crisis avoidance. Although few in 1969 could have foreseen the peace that would descend upon the alliance thereafter, almost all those who worked for reversion feared the opposite—namely, that failure to achieve timely reversion could prove disastrous for future relations between the two nations. The campaign for reversion in Japan would grow, with protesters intensifying pressure on the Tokyo government to commit to a reversion formula severely restricting the freedom of action of US forces based in Okinawa.

Three reasons were suggested for the ability of the US and Japan to procure reversion before the issue approached the crisis stage. First was the role of political leaders—Lyndon Johnson was willing to move things forward in 1967, Richard Nixon made the final key decision in 1969, and Eisaku Sato underscored reversion's importance by staking his reputation and political career on resolving it, and only proceeded after consensus had been achieved at each stage in both capitals. Second, under the guidance of a forward-looking group of middle-level officials in Washington, it was possible to get US civilian and military officials to reach agreement on the main US concern regarding flexibility in the use of the bases within the framework of a strong alliance with Japan. Third, under the presidency of someone like

Nixon who proved sympathetic to Japan, the US was able to make the essential compromise that the same rules would govern nuclear weapons on the Ryukyus as applied to the US deployments in Japan proper.

However, although a new security treaty crisis was averted, relations between the two countries remained hampered by the "textile issue". Nixon and Kissinger used Sato's need for reversion as leverage in procuring an agreement which would address Nixon's campaign promise to the American textile industry. Yet although Sato promised to conclude an export restraint agreement, he twice failed to deliver, leaving relations tense and vulnerable to the two Nixon "shocks" of the summer of 1971—the breakthrough in US relations with mainland China and the decision to stop supporting the dollar through sales of gold.

Ironically, however, Nixon's opening to China liberated US-Japan security relations just as the Okinawa reversion had, by removing the other major political burden which the relationship carried. By the early 1970s both the US and Japan were moving to broaden ties with China, and both the State Department and the Gaimusho were coordinating their efforts. Thus Japan was freed to pursue its own interests in dealing with China, and by the time of the actual transfer of administrative control over Okinawa, the stage had been set for a much stronger US-Japan security relationship.

In addition to the Okinawa reversion, four other factors contributed to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance. First, the US defeat in Vietnam made the Japanese less likely to resent the US presence and more apt to consider the consequences of a US absence. Second, the LDP emerged firmly entrenched in power as their economic policies brought Japanese living standards to the forefront of international standards. Third, the Japanese political process had matured considerably. And fourth, there was the transformation of policy towards China, whereby good policy substance overcame bad policy process. The content of the historic Nixon-Kissinger rapprochement with China was more durable than the deeply disruptive and

secretive means by which it was achieved. In contrast, in the Okinawa reversion, good process was essential to achieving the right substantive outcome, for the agreement could hardly have been reached without careful domestic and bilateral political management.

It was suggested that in addition to analyzing the Okinawa reversion as a model of crisis avoidance, it is important to evaluate how the Okinawa problem has been managed, an aspect which is seen as inseparable from the assessment of the overall Okinawa issue. The standard used in this evaluation is captured by the concept of "hondonami" or mainland standard, and addresses such issues as what kind of future did the Okinawans depict after reversion and what were the future prospects of the Okinawan people in general.

The main "hondonami" standard was identified as economic improvement, and pointed to two ten-year plans for the promotion and development of Okinawa. The first plan, which has had favourable results, focused on improving the income level of Okinawans. The second plan aimed at laying the foundation for the autonomous management of the Okinawan economy, and this has been seen as less successful, partially because of the obstacles posed by the military bases towards industrial development. A significant portion of the current opposition to the military bases on Okinawa comes from those who want a more efficient use of the land available and see the bases as impeding investment. Moreover, sentiment among Okinawans tends to suggest that the Japanese government has not done enough to compensate the Okinawans who were victims of the war. In their eyes, US forces and Self-Defense Forces tend to be seen as one. Because the US bases have been returned to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, there is an underlying sentiment that only when they are returned to the civilian sector will the reversion of the territory be considered finalized.

Because Okinawa has been seen as a direct victim of the Pacific War, it is the place in Japan where pacifism is strongest and where there is the strongest opposition against military installations. However, it was suggested that the

Okinawa base question would not be solved by a mere reduction in military bases, but rather must entail the reorganization of the American forces in the Western Pacific. In line with this thinking, two possible strategies were suggested. First, in light of the improved defense capability of Japan and Korea, a division of labour regarding defense can be set up among Japan, Korea, and the US. Second, in order to keep the American bases in Japan concentrated and at a minimum level during peacetime, it is necessary to ensure rapid redeployment contingencies. To accomplish this, the Self-Defense Forces and American forces can jointly use the bases with the intention that the Japanese government guarantees rapid redeployment of the American forces when necessary. It was also suggested that a discussion of the timing of reduction in forces is absolutely crucial, and in this regard the military adjustment currently taking place in the Philippines is something which should be analyzed and understood carefully.

SESSION III: The Road to the Reversion of Okinawa

In an examination of Japan's decision-making process and its application in the Okinawa reversion, it was suggested that a helpful way of understanding the dynamics of negotiations and decision-making on both sides is to utilize Robert Putnam's "two-level game" model. According to this model of negotiation analysis, an international negotiation between two governments may be regarded as a game played sequentially at two separate levels. The leader of each government negotiates at Level I "across the table" with his counterpart of the other government and at Level II "behind the table" with his domestic constituents. In order to be effective, an agreement reached at Level I must be ratifiable or "winnable" at Level II. All agreements that would win in one nation's Level II game belong to that nation's "win-set". According to this conception, an effective international agreement results from an overlap between the win-sets of both nations. The implication is that the larger each nation's win-set and the larger the overlap between both nations' sets, the more likely an agreement

results from an international negotiation.

Applied to the Okinawa reversion negotiations, Putnam's model points to the size and substance of the US and Japanese win-sets as a basic determinant of the form and contents of a feasible agreement on the Okinawa reversion issue. The maintenance of a close and friendly alliance relationship with Japan and the long and stable tenure of the pro-American Sato government were important enough to Washington that an eventual approval of the reversion of Okinawa, on which Sato staked his political life, was clearly within the US win-set from the very beginning.

However, in the estimation of the US military, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the retention of the US right to use the bases in Okinawa for two purposes—for operations in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and to deploy nuclear weapons—was essential to the fulfillment of their mission in the region. Thus by late 1967, the US win-set called for an early reversion, possibly preceded by removal of all strategic nuclear weapons from the US bases, in the interest of stabilizing and perpetuating the US-Japanese alliance and the pro-American LDP government. This would be conditional on a Japanese commitment to permit the US military to continue unrestricted use of the bases, both for combat operations in the region and for deploying nuclear weapons.

These conditions could be satisfied by a change in the conventional Japanese interpretation of the purpose of the "prior consultation" clause provided in an exchange of notes between the two governments appended to the 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Whereas the clause had been traditionally regarded by the Japanese as a means to prevent significant expansion of the use of the US bases in Japan, the Japanese were now expected to view the clause as a means to permit and possibly encourage such expansion. Simply stated, the US win-set required a prior Japanese commitment to agree to future US requests for changes in the use of its bases, not only in Okinawa but also in the rest of Japan. During the last phase of the negotiations leading to the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit, another

Japanese concession regarding restraint of Japanese textile exports to the US was added to the US win-set.

One of the remarkable things about the successful reversion of Okinawa was that, according to the model outlined above, there simply wasn't enough overlap between the US and Japanese win-sets for agreement to be reached through negotiation, unless either one or both sets were modified during the negotiation. The US was willing to return the administration of Okinawa to Japan fairly quickly, but it made its position contingent on Japanese agreement to permit the US to continue to use its bases in ways not acceptable to Japan—namely, for combat operations in areas where the Japanese did not want to get involved and for possible redeployment of nuclear weapons.

In light of this apparent impasse, it was suggested that the "agreement" reached during the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting was somewhat miraculous. In terms of the Putnam model, the agreement could not have been reached if both sides had negotiated within the boundary of their respective win-sets. The agreement was reached because the Japanese side went beyond the boundary of its own set, while the US side temporized on the boundary of its set.

The Japanese win-set appeared ill-defined and confusing until after the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meetings began, and this was largely due to three factors. First, the US conditions for an early reversion that were known to the Japanese at that time were non-ratifiable in the Japanese Level II game. Second, President Nixon had decided by the end of May 1969 to let nuclear weapons be removed from Okinawa prior to reversion, but this information was successfully and deliberately withheld from the Japanese until the eve of the summit talks. And third, while it was possible to misrepresent the non-ratifiable US conditions to the major constituents of the Japanese Level II game, Sato and his advisors were uncertain and nervous about the implied resort to lies and deceit in achieving one of the most important and "honorable" goals of Japanese foreign policy in the post-War period. In the end, the agreement

was a remarkable compromise worked out between two theoretically incompatible win-sets, and the negotiation that produced it was an arduous and complicated joint search for that compromise.

However, in the longer run, the agreement proved seriously flawed for the resolution of the Okinawa issue and fatally for the textile issue. Although administrative rights over the islands were returned to Japan on schedule in May 1972, the status and functions of the US bases did not significantly change. This kept Okinawa reversion a festering issue in Japanese domestic politics long after the formal transfer of administrative rights. In the meantime, the secret agreement on the textile issue began unravelling within a few months, causing considerable ill will between the top leaders and citizens of the two countries.

Having said that, it was pointed out in the discussion that not only was Okinawa reversion realized on schedule, but the event was also a welcome event to most Japanese, including those in Okinawa. The return of the islands was what they had fought to achieve for more than three decades, and US-Japan relations have obviously benefitted greatly from this event, both in the short run and longer term perspective. As parallels being currently drawn in both this seminar and the media have demonstrated, Okinawa could have become a southern version of the Northern Territories issue that continues to strain and hinder Japanese-Russian relations.

SESSION IV: US-Japan Relations Since Okinawa Reversion

The fourth and final session opened with a presentation by Professor Robert Scalapino which attempted to draw conclusions from and highlight trends in the broader framework of the US-Japan relationship. It was suggested that the special relationship between the two nations exhibits three distinctive features. First, this century has witnessed wider fluctuations between extensive hostility and close alliance in the relations between Japan and the United States than most, if not all, nations. Second, despite the fact that both countries have radically different cultures, Japan and the United States

have maintained the most intimate relationship which has emerged with a base in economics and extensive political and security ramifications. And third, most importantly, both nations are in the process of reconsidering their global and regional roles, and this is a difficult process with inevitable implications for the bilateral relationship.

One of the interesting aspects of the immediate post-War period, it was suggested, was how quickly two peoples reverted from deep hostility to a quite friendly relationship with each other. Polls taken at the time suggested that the American Occupation Forces came to respect certain qualities about the Japanese—the work ethic, cleanliness, and decorum of Japanese society—despite the fact that the Americans often felt they weren't always getting straight answers when they asked questions and that there were some prejudices against other races. At the same time, the Japanese expressed appreciation for what they perceived as the generosity of the Americans—their willingness to share food and other things, their friendliness, and their hard work—even though they also perceived the Americans as being somewhat loud and wasteful. Finally, a further factor in the successful occupation period was the natural emergence of a hierarchical, patron-client relationship between the two countries. Japan was simply prepared, or so it seemed to the Americans, to take authority, and the Americans were prepared to give authority in this period. It was emphasized that one of the essential aspects underlying this remarkably close bilateral alliance is the continuum today between the domestic situations, bilateral relations, regional ties, and global responsibilities of the two nations. And yet it is precisely among the areas of this continuum that the greatest threats to the stability and durability of the relationship appear. Thus looking at the domestic scene, the problems that post-modern, politically open societies are facing have profound implications for the US-Japan relationship. These problems relate to how freedom and authority are to be balanced and how to balance responsibility with the opportunities for total expression. In this regard the role of the media is particularly significant,

especially in the US, where the tendency towards sensationalism and the creation of negative images influence the citizenry in terms of their cynicism and indifference to the political structure.

As a result of these developments, a certain degree of negativism has emerged in our bilateral relations, reflecting a certain citizenry perception of qualities on the "other" side that are undesirable. Thus Americans feel that Japan has sometimes been selfish and unconcerned about others, driving for market share at the expense of reciprocity. Likewise, the Japanese tend to feel that they have been made a scapegoat for basic problems which lie within the American structure. Again, the degree to which these perceptions are distorted and exaggerated is largely a factor of the role of the media and the sensationalism involving "bashing" on both sides which has achieved prominence since the run-up to the Pearl Harbor anniversary celebrations this past year.

In the economic realm, there is also a greater need to reach towards a greater compatibility between our economic structures. The problem today largely stems from the fact that two societies steeped in very different traditions with different timings of development and different economic strategies, have been suddenly thrust together even though the respective structures were not sufficiently compatible to enable a balancing out of benefits and costs.

The challenges which face Japan and the United States may be summarized as follows. For Japan, how can it bring a political culture which has been traditionally inward-looking, highly homogenous, and hierarchical in nature, to reach out to a world that is diverse, requires a greater flexibility, and insists upon some degree of partnership. For the United States, the central challenge is how to move away from its customary unilateralism in the international arena towards greater decision-making sharing, while at the same time maintaining its world leadership within a more consensus-building process. In short, the US must adjust to the end of the Cold War by rejecting any notions of unilateralism in favor of consensus-building; at

the same time it must turn its energies inward to domestic problems without reverting to isolationism.

One of the main themes of the discussion was the the necessity of encasing the bilateral relationship in a broader framework, and more specifically the need to start thinking about security problems in new terms. It was suggested that a way to approach the changing strategic international environment, particularly within the Asian region, is to isolate those issues that are "situation-specific" and build around them "concentric arcs" based on three elements—the intimacy of involvement with the problem, the perceived national interest, and the capacity to affect the outcome.

For example, in addressing the issues of the Korean Peninsula, the first arc would be North and South Korea. The second arc would comprise the four major states that have a huge stake historically and in contemporary terms with the Korean issue—the United States, Japan, Russia, and China. Indeed, the actions of these four nations in the past year have made a significant difference in progress towards resolving the Korean issue. Finally, a further arc would involve the international community in general, through such agencies as the United Nations, which are trying to operate with respect to a possible free economic zone.

The future of US-Japan relations has been profoundly influenced this past year by two major structural changes—that in the security sphere involving the demise of the Soviet Union, which has implications for our economic relations, and the more gradual change in the economic sphere involving the steady rise of Japanese economic power and its implications for security, particularly with regard to the United States. The removal of the Soviet threat removes what has been called the "security umbrella" of the economic relationship, meaning that there was always the guarantee that if an economic conflict between the US and Japan began to threaten the relationship, those overseeing the security dimension would immediately bring the importance of the alliance into perspective. Similarly, the rise of Japan as an economic power relative to the United States

fuels the tendency in the US to generalize and find a broader pattern in specific economic conflicts which, when kept in perspective, can be seen as inevitable and even sometimes constructive or useful.

The problem suggested by these structural changes is often exacerbated by the way that America tends to deal with economic conflicts, which is considerably different from the way it dealt with Okinawa. In the Okinawa reversion, the basic initiative came from the Japanese, to whom the Americans were seeking to respond. On economic policy conflicts, however, the initiator is almost always the United States, and the pattern involves the dynamic of "gaiatsu", whereby the US puts pressure on Japan.

Some participants suggested that it is possible to project a progressive unraveling of the US-Japan relationship based on the problems outlined above which tend to be exacerbated by misperceptions and rhetoric in both countries. Yet at the same time it was also emphasized that there is a lot of common ground between the two nations which hold them together. Indeed it was even suggested that perhaps one of the reasons why we have so much "noise" in our economic conflicts but so little actual acts of trade war is due to this interdependence. Moreover, the changes which have transformed the international stage over the past year suggest the emergence of new opportunities for some sort of multilateral security structure in the Asia-Pacific region. Until recently, this was unthinkable, as everything was framed in bilateral structures. However, it was argued that we may now be in a situation in which not only the rationale for continuing the bilateral relationships is progressively undermined by the lack of a common enemy, but also the loosening up of politics and rivalries may offer more leeway for imaginative construction of a more comprehensive regional security arrangement.

Continuing this positive outlook, it was asserted by some participants that the US-Japan relationship is nowhere near as bad as the recent media rhetoric would suggest. Change in both the US and Japan is likely to be slow, but regardless the US is not going to abandon its security commitment in Asia and the Japanese

are going to need time to formulate a more positive and active role in both the region and the world in general. On the domestic front, the US is already addressing its economic problems and Japan is making efforts towards achieving a more open economy.

In line with this thinking, it was argued that there is nothing to be gained, on either side, from a worsening of the US-Japan relationship, and that politically it's in the American interest to maintain this relationship in a positive manner. Nowhere has this been made more apparent than in the present presidential election campaign in the United States. Japan has simply not become an issue in the campaign and is unlikely to become so at any point.

Having said this, there are some worrisome aspects about the relationship which were brought up in the discussion as particularly relevant when comparing the situation today to that at the time of the Okinawa reversion. In comparing the two time periods and the difference in the relationships, four differences become apparent. First, with regards to the realm of decision-making, in the late 1960s the process was controlled to a large degree by people who believed in the importance of the relationship and who were able to coordinate their efforts successfully. This contrasts with the situation today, where there is no real control of the process in the US government, in large part because so many different elements of the bureaucracy now have strong interests in Japan (which formerly was not the case), and this merely serves to complicate the relationship. Congress is infinitely more important in the process today and the media has become more inclined to sensationalism.

A second factor is that there was a strong political leadership in the 1960s on this issue, whereas today both countries suffer from weak political leadership, to the point where the Level II game (in terms of Putnam's model of negotiation) threatens to overwhelm the Level I game. This was illustrated quite dramatically when George Bush visited Tokyo at the beginning of this year and played out an entirely domestic political game in Japan. This not only had disastrous results for the US-Japan

relationship, but interestingly, and in a sense to the benefit of the relationship, it also had bad results domestically in American politics.

Third, the successful negotiation of the Okinawa reversion reflected the high level of mutual trust and confidence that the reversion could be accomplished without compromising our interests, largely because there was a sense that our interests were compatible. Today it seems as if this trust and mutual respect have declined, and this is particularly captured by the apparent depth of the "kenbei" phenomenon in Japan, which in some ways may be more profound than the elements of "Japan-bashing" in the United States.

Finally, the biggest difference is that there was a major asymmetry of power in the 1960s which in a sense gave the Americans the freedom to be magnanimous and made Japan a kind of model of how a defeated nation or client in a patron-client relationship should behave. As this asymmetry has been replaced by a growing equality in the relationship, there is clearly a reduction in the American willingness or ability to be magnanimous, as well as a much greater resistance on the part of Japan to play the role of a client. And yet, it was argued that neither country has been willing to adjust their behaviour to accept the implications of this growing equality.

One of the major themes of the discussion concluded that the most important thing to improve the US-Japan relationship is for both countries to focus on their domestic problems. In the United States, this entails addressing the budget deficit, improving the educational system, dealing with the problems of race relations, social problems, and political reform. In Japan, this involves opening up the society more and playing a more active and responsible role in international society.

These changes will by their very nature entail a protracted and often drawn out process with the inevitability that there will be elements of tension-ridden bilateral approaches to continuing problems on trade and economic issues. In this regard, developments such as Super 301, the Structural Impediments Initiative, and voluntary adjustment for different product

areas are in a sense inevitable transitional elements until these larger domestic-oriented problems are resolved.

In concluding remarks, it was stressed by many participants that the successful evolution of the USTM Japan relationship now depends greatly on integrating the bilateral alliance within larger, multiple webs of interdependence. It was argued that there has been reluctance, at least in the United States, to move in this direction. Referring to the policy initiative outlined in Secretary of State Baker's November visit to Tokyo, some participants maintained that the notion of the US as the hub with spokes reaching out to all the different countries of the region through its bilateral alliances needs to be replaced by embedding the relationship in something larger than itself.

A further theme expressed by some participants embraced a more optimistic view of the future relationship between the two nations, asserting that the key to maintaining the closeness of the relationship is the dynamism of the private sector which really serves as the economic glue essential to the "global partnership". While this aspect tends to be overlooked by academics and pundits in the media, the fact remains that the arena controlled by the government has been shrinking as the interactions of the private sector have increased. And this means that there are built-in constraints on the ability of governments to do "mischief" to the relationship.

To cite some examples, Japan is the major export market for the United States outside Canada, with American business selling more in Japan than to France, Italy, and Germany combined. Since 1985 American exports to the world have doubled, yet US exports to Japan have outpaced even this remarkable growth. Finally, to ensure survivability and competitive growth, Japanese globalization of business inevitably must create localization, with local management such as American managers in their American companies. This necessity will further integrate the economies, leading to an increase in strategic alliances between American and Japanese corporations.

Finally, the issue of what lessons from the

Okinawa reversion can be applied in resolving the Northern Territories dispute between Russia and Japan was brought up, and it was suggested that this Seminar should use this anniversary gathering to send a message to President Yeltsin. In drawing parallels between the Okinawa reversion and the current territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, advocates of this attempt to benefit from history past suggest four areas of convergence which validate such an exercise. First, the Russian military today is in a similar position to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the mid-1960s, in that the JCS were still opposed to reversion and it wasn't until 1967-68 that they changed their minds. The Russian military presently is opposed to reversion of the Northern Territories.

Second, instead of framing negotiations for the Northern Territories in terms of money for land, a message should be sent to Yeltsin about how the reversion of Okinawa laid the foundation for a more stable and stronger relationship between the United States and Japan, a strategic bilateral alliance which was crucial in "winning" the cold war and which is now one of the pillars of the future new world order. The Russians should see their negotiations regarding the Northern Territories in the same way—what they are negotiating is a long-term relationship with Japan, not just a means for achieving aid in this period of hardship.

Third, in the case of Okinawa, Japan was very flexible in terms of the details of the reversion in order to ensure that the legitimate security interests of the US were protected. It was suggested that Japan would be prepared to be flexible on the same set of issues with regard to Russia today.

The fourth parallel involves the Shikotan and Habomai group of islands, which should be returned immediately, very much as the Amami group was returned in 1953. Under this strategy, Dulles' "residual sovereignty" could serve as a guideline with enough ambiguity perhaps to facilitate some of the more difficult issues in the present negotiations.

On the other hand, despite this comprehensive comparison, it was cautioned by

some participants about the problems in drawing parallels between the Northern Islands and Okinawa. Okinawa was the case of two countries with common interests developing under a firm alliance who wanted to strengthen this relationship and were resolved to settle the Okinawan question as part of this objective. It would be inappropriate to underestimate the importance of the fact that Japan and the US were allies with common interests which they were trying to protect and further.

CONCLUSION

One of the main themes which emerged in this final session and which helped tie together all of the sessions was the sense of optimism about the future of the US-Japan relationship. Pervasive in most of the discussions was the sentiment that, as we look back on the reversion of Okinawa and how it paved the way for the global partnership between Japan and the United States today, it is important to acknowledge the positive aspects of our relationship which seem to be obscured in the recent hysteria of Japan-bashing and *kenbei* being highlighted in the media and the "war of words" across the Pacific.

Indeed at this time of historic change worldwide, it was argued that Japan and the United States are in a process of pioneering the modification of classic concepts of sovereignty. The SII talks, for example, have been enormously important in illustrating the degree to which the domestic policies of a country, when they impact seriously upon another country, are not just a matter of domestic concern. The revitalization of these talks is important, and furthermore it was felt that Japan should be more assertive in addressing those aspects of American economic policy which are deleterious not only to the US but also to Japan and other countries. At the same time, the United States should be encouraged to continue its frank discussions of aspects of Japanese domestic policy, and this type of communication should be endeavoured on either side without rancour or mistrust. Finally, it was emphasized that, when one looks beyond the difficulties in policy negotiations between the two countries and beyond the ostensible cultural differences

between the two societies, one should be struck by the fundamental similarities in values between the peoples of both countries. As we celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa, we are not only celebrating an historic agreement which helped solidify one of the world's most important bilateral relationships, but we are also expressing our commitment towards exploring new horizons in the recently proclaimed global partnership.

In his closing remarks, Ambassador Matsunaga quoted from a speech given by former Prime Minister Sato in November 1969 at

the National Press Club in Washington. Looking at the US-Japan relationship on the eve of the Okinawa reversion, Prime Minister Sato observed that "Both the Japanese and the Americans are never satisfied with the present, and their tendency is to endeavor constantly to bring about a better society in the future." It is in this spirit that the Okinawa reversion was eventually realized, and it is with this legacy that both countries begin to address the challenges for the twenty-first century.

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