

Redefining Comprehensive Security in Japan

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THE GLOBAL EFFECTS of the end of the cold war have been keenly felt in the Asia Pacific region. Yet the rapid economic development of many Asian countries has given rise to its own post-cold war effects, all of which pose a unique set of challenges for the region. These dual phenomena require creative and region-specific approaches to the notion of security. Most states in the region are trying to adjust to this post-cold war strategic landscape by transforming themselves into developed economies and societies. Any thinking on security in the region must therefore include two elements: achieving peaceful and stable strategic conditions conducive to economic prosperity, and allowing for dynamic social transformation and international power shifts with a minimum of security hazards.

Every country in the region recognizes these conditions and is groping for optimal security policies. Progress in the regional security dialogue—the most notable example of which is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—is one attempt to cope with the current security challenge. Still, it is widely recognized that the three most powerful countries—China, Japan, and the United States—and the relationships between them hold the keys for future regional security. This does not mean that those three will dominate the region: it simply means that the choices they make will affect the nature of the security atmosphere toward one of cooperation or confrontation. Any country with the capability to project power—actual or potential—is itself a source of uncertainty if it does not present credible and consistent strategies for its actions.

Yet none of the three countries have presented a coherent security policy for the region. U.S. policies toward Japan and China drifted during the first Clinton administration. China has shown a willingness both to cooperate (in its increasingly active participation in ARF and other multilateral security frameworks) and to embark on military adventurism (the military exercises aimed at Taiwan during its presidential election). Japan failed to define its role during the Gulf War and has since been questioning the validity of its heretofore "checkbook diplomacy." Moreover, all three suffer from domestic uncertainties: Clinton faces a Republican Congressional majority, China is still unsure of its power constellation in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, and Japan's once-mighty Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is now a party dependent on help from smaller parties in the Diet. Policy fluctuations and domestic uncertainties in the leading

countries are certainly not conducive to the formation of clear strategies to cope with the similarly uncertain international environment.

These factors will not go away in a flush. But it may be possible to reverse the logic: presenting a security vision agreeable to all the relevant countries may decrease the element of uncertainty and thereby invite more consistent policies based on domestic consensus. To use the academically fashionable term, this may be a role for the "epistemic community." This chapter intends to contribute to the debate by presenting a possible security vision from a Japanese perspective.

This chapter argues that Japan's security policies must be based on a modified version of "comprehensive security" strategy. This term was first publicized in the late 1970s in a report by Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi's study group.¹ The concept was greeted with some skepticism, especially from the security experts, for its ambiguous nature and predominantly economic bias. This skepticism was not without foundation; the strengths and weaknesses of the idea of comprehensive security need to be examined so that it can accommodate the new strategic requirements of the region. However, the end of the cold war makes the rationale for comprehensive security more persuasive. The traditional military focus of security has been generally perceived as too narrow. It does not mean the idea of comprehensive security does away with the more traditional idea of security, but that there is now more room for combining the two ideas to work out a coherent military and nonmilitary policy mix. That is the position of this essay.

In the first section I will briefly sketch the historical evolution of the idea of comprehensive security. Though the term was not coined until sometime in the late 1970s, the idea was in fact incorporated into Japan's foreign policy from the early post-World War II period, suggesting the pragmatic nature of a comprehensive security that gives priority to actual utility rather than to theoretical clarity. The second section reassesses the current security milieu and reconstructs, somewhat theoretically, the core thinking of comprehensive security to show its relevance to the current situation. It also highlights the revisions that are needed from the comprehensive security strategy of the past. The third and final section investigates how a modified comprehensive security can be put into practice.

Evolution of Comprehensive Security

Comprehensive Security at the "Preconceived" Phase

The concept of comprehensive security has often been denigrated as vague, imprecise, elusive, or slippery. Even when the term became popular in the late 1970s, it was more of a label for the cluster of ongoing policies than a

path-breaking invention. It is difficult to find references to the term before the 1970s. Still, with the aid of hindsight, Japan's foreign policy did indeed contain elements of the concept well before that period, even though this was more the result of improvising situations forced upon Japan than of its active initiative.

Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, architect of the Japanese peace settlement, had in a sense adopted the idea even before Japan's postwar independence. Early in 1951, John Foster Dulles was appointed by President Truman to carry out the peace settlement with Japan to make it a cold war ally. Yoshida was actually eager to cooperate with the United States, but the point of contention was how best to do so. Dulles wanted Japan to cooperate in deterring and containing—by military force if necessary—the communist camp led by the Soviet Union and closely assisted by Communist China. Yoshida judged that prematurely rearming Japan was counterproductive for countering communism and proposed an alternative. As a former diplomat engaged in guarding Japanese imperial interests in China, Yoshida boasted of his first-hand knowledge of China and had his own views on the Sino-Soviet relationship. It was his belief that the proud Chinese people would not simply mimic and obey the Soviet leadership, despite the superficial similarities of their ideologies. According to one American record, Yoshida told Dulles of

the long term necessity of trading with China, and while he realized that in view of the present communist domination of that country it would be possible to expect great results in the near future, nevertheless, he believed that in the long run the Chinese would adopt the attitude that “war is war and trade is trade” and that it would be possible for a reasonable degree of trade to take place between Japan and China. In this connection, Mr. Yoshida advanced the thought that Japanese business men, because of their long acquaintance with and experience in China, will be the best fifth column of democracy against the Chinese communists. (FRUS 1951, 827–828)

Dulles was far from receptive to the idea. In addition to his concerns on the sensitivity of the U.S. Senate on the issue of China and his conviction on the need to show no sign of appeasement to communist regimes, he was concerned with the possibility of Japan becoming economically dependent on China. He also feared that given the cultural affinity of Japan to China, Japan would be co-opted into the Chinese—and then communist—orbit if things were left to their natural course. Accordingly, he and other American policymakers on Japan tried to find alternatives for Japan's sources of raw materials and markets for its manufactured goods in Southeast Asia.

This Yoshida-Dulles dynamic contains five key elements that would prove to guide the foreign policies pursued by Yoshida and his successors: Japan's aversion to military methods; the idea of using “second track” informal connections (or “businessmen,” as Yoshida called them) as tools of foreign policy; the belief that social change resulting from transnational socioeconomic activities would

change state behavior; the strong conditioning of Japan's foreign policies by the China-Japan-U.S. trilateral relationship; and the role of Southeast Asia and Oceania in Japan's overall strategy.

The military aversion inherent in Japan's policies was due to the discredit of the military in the eyes of the Japanese public, the no-war clause of the 1946 Constitution, the economic burden of rearmament, and sensitivity to the fear of Japanese remilitarization shared by Asian countries. But the Northeast Asian military milieu in the late 1950s made the Japanese stance acceptable. The rise of the "deterrence" strategy in the West from the 1950s—as opposed to the more traditional "defense" strategy—made it easy for Japan to evade the traditional security aspects of international affairs. Because Japan is separated from Russia only by sea, it became an indispensable strategic asset for the American cold war strategy, both geographically and economically. On the other hand, the Soviet concentration of conventional forces toward Europe made American deterrence in Asia quite credible. The main military danger for Japan was to be drawn into a global war initiated by the aggressive policies of the superpowers somewhere remote from Japan. This sense of threat, coupled with the continued American occupation of Okinawa until 1972 and the social conflicts that ensued with the American base presence, and the American involvement in the Vietnam War made the U.S.-Japan security link a highly sensitive and ideologically charged issue within Japanese political discourse. Several successive conservative governments established and modestly strengthened Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in and after 1954, but with the political price of being accused of bowing to American pressure.

The second, third, and fourth elements of this "preconceived" comprehensive security were pursued by successive governments as the general policy of *seikei bunri* (separation of politics and economy). Japanese business leaders, in their private capacity but with de facto government endorsement, made deals with their Chinese counterparts on the understanding that they would not affect Chinese nonrecognition status. Not surprisingly, China continued to insist on giving political spins to these deals; a natural limit to this approach without formal political sanction existed. Politics did intervene from time to time, notably at the height of the Cultural Revolution and the Vietnam War in the late 1960s.²

Regionalism in this period was thus enhanced in the context of the cold war division. Japan increased its ties with the Southeast Asian nations (which later formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand. The predominant form of these links was economic. The memories of the war made political dialogue a sensitive topic, and for the postcolonial countries of Southeast Asia, political and military issues were often viewed as a new excuse for great-power imperialism. Japan used reparations as a tool for economic cooperation, and concluded close economic ties

with Australia and New Zealand. The establishment of the Asian Development Bank in 1966 marked a significant milestone for Japan's reentry into regional international society through the economic door.

Three Shocks and a Strategy

This situation changed in the 1970s in the wake of three shocks that successively hit Japan in the early years of the decade. The first was the Nixon administration's announcement in July 1971 that Nixon would visit Beijing. The second was Nixon's unilateral declaration of the end of the gold standard in August 1971, and the third was the first "oil shock" of 1973. These three shocks radically eroded the basic conditions that were taken for granted in Japan in the postwar era: the U.S.-China confrontation, the fixed exchange rate that gave Japan access to American and other international markets, and favorable terms of trade based on cheap oil. These three shocks gave a real sense of insecurity to the Japanese populace for the first time since its postwar independence.

For the rest of the decade, Japanese leaders groped for a strategy to cope with the new environment. This search resulted in the conceptualization of "comprehensive security" in the late 1970s. But what was new was the label, not the content. Given the weakening domestic base of the ruling LDP and the strength of the largest opposition, the Socialist Party, there was little room to put bold innovations into practice.

The first challenge was how to cope with the U.S. recognition of China. In one swoop it removed the political barriers against a full-fledged economic relationship with China. But Chinese internal instability and adherence to political principles rather than economic rationality made a deepening of the relationship difficult. Moreover, although China was increasingly perceived as a *de facto* ally to the West in its efforts to contain the USSR, its large army—with its limited but nonetheless real nuclear capability—demanded a more stable Japan-China relationship. These concerns led Japan to choose the strategy of co-opting China into a predominantly economic regional framework. This meshed well with Deng Xiaoping's strategy of "reform and openness" started in late 1978. It was no coincidence that Ohira Masayoshi, the strongest advocate of comprehensive security, authorized the first governmental yen loan to China and proposed the idea of "Pacific regionalism" with Australia, an effort that later resulted in the formation of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) (Kikuchi 1995).

The second challenge was how to readjust the U.S.-Japan relationship in light of the changes in the relative capabilities of both countries. The consensus among the Japanese leaders was to keep the close political, military, and economic ties with the United States intact. Given the reduced tension between the United

States and China, a military threat against Japan seemed remote until the end of the decade when the Soviet Union launched its massive military buildup. It was concluded that Japan's optimal defense strategy would be to continue to rely on American deterrence. But given the increasing American insistence on burden-sharing with its allies, Japan's military priority was to find an optimal balance between two objectives: shouldering the American burden to the extent that the bilateral partnership would continue and that the American commitment to Japan would remain credible, and avoiding the impression of a Japanese military buildup to other Asian countries, including China, South Korea, and the ASEAN members. This balancing resulted in the first clarification of Japan's fundamental defense doctrine: "basic defense capabilities," a concept conceived of and coined by Kubo Takuya, a civilian undersecretary of the Defense Agency.

This concept attempts to justify Japan's defense capabilities as needing to cope with a "limited and small-scale" invasion attempt, while remaining dependent on the American military to repel a larger-scale attack. This idea caused outrage among the uniforms, who deemed it a half-assed defense concept, and the mainly socialist opposition for allowing a military buildup at all. The "1 percent ceiling," which was introduced to cajole the left, limited Japan's defense budget to within 1 percent of the GNP, and allowed Japan to go slowly but steadily toward boosting its defense capabilities.

Another tool for readjusting the U.S.-Japan relationship was the conscious use of Japanese financial resources. Japan began to use its Official Development Assistance (ODA) for various political objectives. Japan awarded China with a huge loan in yen, and ODA was used to improve Japan's relationship with the oil-producing countries and to supplement the American policy of propping up allies like Pakistan and Egypt.

The third challenge was how to cope with the changed oil supply situation. The panic caused by the 1973 oil shock, followed by high inflation, made energy a top concern for most Japanese. But the result was ironic. Though the government increased its oil reserves to avert a short-term shock were a cutoff to occur, the so-called oil diplomacy—which challenged U.S. insistence in opposing the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and increased Japan's political and economic ties with the countries of OPEC—did not result in much. The major manifestation of this policy was the Iranian-Japanese Petroleum Corporation project concluded between the Shah and a Japanese trading company with virtual government sanction, a project later abandoned in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq-Iran war.

Despite these policy failures, the increased oil price had a miraculous effect on the Japanese economy. The higher prices spurred on a wave of advanced technological innovation to save on oil consumption, a move that made many Japanese manufactured products, especially cars, very competitive. It also shifted the focus of Japanese industry toward the technology-intensive field of consumer

electronics. Economic interdependence under the organization of the market mechanism proved to be a remarkably good way to adjust to the shock, a result virtually no one foresaw.

These fundamental policy lines continued through the 1980s, when we saw renewed tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, the rapid pace of economic development in the newly industrializing economies and ASEAN countries, and the ubiquitous emphasis on the market mechanism as the means to economic development. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, the dominant figure in Japanese politics during much of the 1980s, played up the U.S.-Japan relationship and used Japanese economic resources to help improve Japan's relationship with China and to supplement American strategy. On the other hand, Nakasone's nationalistic proclivities were, in the end, more symbolic than substantive. Strong attacks from Asian countries, especially China and South Korea, on the so-called textbook incident (Japan's intervention in textbook description on the events of World War II sanctioned by the Ministry of Education infuriated those two countries) and Nakasone's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine (where many of Japan's war dead are commemorated) constrained Nakasone's ability to move. Japan increasingly saw its technological prowess and financial capability as the major tools of its influence.

Thus, whether we label it as such or not, Japan's foreign policy was fairly consistent throughout the postwar period, until the end of the cold war. The four major components of foreign policy were (1) securing American commitment to the defense of Japan, and maintaining the close relationship with the United States to keep the American deterrence credible; (2) emphasizing the nonpolitical nature of the economy as the optimal topic for international dialogue in the region; (3) forecasting the security consequences of increased transnational economic interdependence by indirectly modifying state behavior toward a more cooperative stance; and (4) recognizing the limits of the state's ability to manage this highly complex economic interdependence.

But one obvious policy shift took place after the turning point in the early 1970s. The previous policy was threefold: to play down the looming U.S.-China confrontation, to reenter international society through economic means, and to import and adapt advanced economic models that would help to provide some kind of domestic consensus. After the shocks, Japan's foreign policy focused on papering over the immense trade friction that had developed with the United States in the larger context of U.S.-Japan alliance, molding China economically to the international open economy, and searching for an optimal mode for regional dialogue. This appeared to work well for the early part of the 1980s, but as the cold war tension began to thaw, American concerns with economic competition from Japan heightened. At the same time, the rise of the Asian nations including China made a true multilateralism in the Asia Pacific region a real possibility. The comprehensive security strategy of the 1970s and 1980s

increasingly showed signs of strain under the new international environment, and ultimately resulted in the disparaging term "checkbook diplomacy" in the wake of the Gulf War. A reassessment of the entire security milieu is in order.

Theoretical Reconstruction of Comprehensive Security

Since the end of the cold war, it is generally recognized that no clear division of friends and enemies in the region exists, or at least not to the extent of the cold war days. It is true that several security alliances, especially U.S. bilateral links with several countries, still exist. But with the exception of the U.S.-South Korea tie—which specifically targets North Korea as a clear enemy—the objectives of those security links are increasingly changing toward a reassurance against unexpected strategic mishaps rather than toward preparing to fight potential enemies.

This situation is similar to that of Europe, where the collective defense posture at the height of the cold war shifted to the common security and collective security approach in the form of arms control, confidence-building measures, and peacekeeping operations under the sanction of various international organizations. To use theoretical jargon, the shift was from the "satisfied power vs. dissatisfied power" division to the avoidance of security dilemmas.

But another development—the dynamic economic transformation under way in the region—makes the situation in Asia Pacific significantly different from that in Europe. In Asia no state is truly satisfied. The developing countries of the region in particular want to change the status quo: they would like to be taken much more seriously. Even though a few countries did experience some degree of maritime interdependence in the medieval age, for the first time the region is experiencing a multipolar modern state system with extensive interdependence.

What characterizes the Asia Pacific region is the interrelated dynamism of the changes in four areas: society, state, the interstate system, and transnational interdependence. None of the four is fully dependent on any other, but all four are all related and changing. Just as Georg Hegel described the teleological development of two variables as "dialectic," this entire correlated dynamism among the four variables can be referred to as the "tetralectic" of society, the state, the interstate system, and transnational interdependence. The basic thrust of the change in each is as follows.

Society. Societies in the developing Asian countries are changing toward the pursuit of a more middle-class, materially enriched life while accepting a somewhat limited freedom of expression. The possible pitfalls of rapid economic development—widening income inequality, mismanagement of labor strife, misallocation of economic resources, environmental hazards—can be bottlenecks

for economic development. A responsive state acting as manager and adjuster of the pace and mode of economic development can help solve these problems.

In the advanced countries, societies are adjusting to the transition from a "politics of productivity" (as characterized by Charles Maier) to more mature, knowledge-oriented industrial societies. These countries are highly interdependent but at the same time are comprised of very individualized and fragmented societies.

State. The changes in society as analyzed above have made the capability of the state—and this applies to both developing countries and developed ones—relatively limited. Because it is common for a developing state to experience a shortage of resources, it often uses a "symbolism of independence" to prop up its legitimacy and then promises a richer economic life to its citizens. The developed states are reinventing themselves to adjust to this state/society division in the new technological environment to prepare for a heavier welfare burden and increased medical costs. Regardless, the state with limited resources prefers a peaceful and economically beneficial international environment.

Interstate system. Because the Asia Pacific region has no historical experience as a multistate system comprised of equals, and due to the lack of a common, regionwide cultural background, it needs to create a common "diplomatic culture." This culture contextually defines (1) the actors within the system; (2) who represents the state; (3) what constitutes the division between national and international; and (4) what distinguishes "official" and "private." This system must also address the changing relationship between the state and society in both the developing and the developed countries.

Transnational interdependence. As society gets more industrialized, its parts become more interdependent. This idea has been expressed by Emile Durkheim as "organic unity." For the developing countries to allocate relatively scarce resources in a rational way, exposure to the international economy is necessary. Moreover, the ongoing technological revolution in communication makes the interdependence of the developed countries even stronger and more global. As the contemporary international currency system shows, hyperinterdependence limits the ability of the state to manage its affairs, thereby making management of this transnational interdependence the "collective goods" of states.

The complicated synergy of the dynamism of these four variables, or the "tetralectic," allows us to compose various scenarios of positive cycles of expansion and negative cycles of shrinkage. If society develops smoothly, the state increasingly shifts its legitimacy by being more responsive to social needs; a more democratized mode of governance, in other words. This leads to more transparency and mutual confidence in the interstate system, thereby allowing the arenas of dialogue and collective interest to help solve security dilemmas. A stable interstate system enhances transnational interdependence by increasing the number of people who have a stake in better cooperation.

Social strife, to the contrary, may invite repressive measures by the state that may ultimately result in its collapse. This will heighten the insecurities of other states, and may increase the burden of state in the form of refugees. The strained resources of the state and the sense of increased uncertainty can break down the interstate dialogue process, thereby increasing the risk of adverse transnational events. This may result in the disruption of the market mechanism—something that could have unforeseeable consequences, especially in the highly developed societies.

These are just imagined scenarios that attempt to depict the state of interdependence of the four variables. But it was this logic—whether it was conscious or unconscious—that led to actual policy formation, for example, on North Korea. There is no doubt that no country, including China, sees the current regime of North Korea in anything resembling a favorable light. Still, the regime's ability to ward off a crisis over the suspicion of nuclear weapons development suggests that even such a regime is better than a collapsed state. When the debate about putting pressure on North Korea by applying sanctions for not observing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) went on, the countries in the region, especially South Korea, China, and Japan, preferred the policy of moderation, fearing that too much pressure on North Korea might result in either a desperate military adventure by North Korea or the collapse of the regime, thereby causing anarchy on the Korean peninsula. The end result was a compromise to create positive incentives for North Korea to abide by the NPT rules. It may appear as an unnecessary concession to possible violation of international rules, but it was argued that increased contact of the closed and economically battered regime with the outside world would make the North Korean leaders recognize the advantages of greater openness.

As has been noted in the previous section, the dynamic relationship among society, the state, the interstate system, and transnational interdependence was generally included in the notion of comprehensive security. While the notion of collective security or common security focuses more on interstate relationships based on the status quo, the crux of comprehensive security lies in the dynamic changes taking place within the state and within society. Nevertheless, comprehensive security at present must take into account the basic changes in the international security milieu. In addition to the evident increase in the importance of regional thinking, the change in the role of the military must be noted.

Military thought and strategy during the heyday of the cold war was based on the doctrine of global deterrence. The main mission of military force was to deter the "unthinkable" scenario. As we have seen, this global deterrence assumption made it possible for Japan to ignore almost completely the role of the military in its security development and thought. The political rationale for the SDF was to contribute toward the stabilization of the global deterrence system

and to assure that American deterrence was extended to Japan. This assumption has evaporated with the cold war.

The role of the post-cold war military has yet to be defined, but it is now clear that the military must prepare for actual fighting operations, though the amount of physical violence involved is presumed to be much lower than that of the cold war scenario. Moreover, the mission of the military has become much more diversified. As demonstrated by the United Nations peacekeeping operations, recent military activities involve not only the policing of the civilian population but more traditional civilian activities like medical and food distribution and infrastructure construction. These changes mean that it is no longer tenable to avoid the role of the military in the context of comprehensive security. Even though comprehensive security fathomed important aspects of the nature of complex interdependence, its avoidance of the military was unjustified; it was possible only because of the specific historical conditions of global deterrence. What makes comprehensive security truly comprehensive is a fair—not too little, not too much—allocation of thought to military issues.

Putting Comprehensive Security into Practice

Even if we consider the idea of comprehensive security as laid out as above as desirable in principle, the application of it to policy requires careful management: it must combine a wide variety of options while being attentive to the possibility that a policy designed for one objective can have adverse effects on another objective.

Here we will focus our discussion on Japan's state policy. But the matter is far from simple. In the comprehensive security context, three areas need to be examined from a theoretical perspective: the state-society relationship, the inter-state relationship, and the state-interdependence relationship. Of course for specific policy prescriptions, this number must be multiplied by the variety of states, societies, and areas of issue. Only the basic handling of the key issues will be presented here.

Security Policy Based on National Consensus

The most urgent problem for Japan on the security front is to adapt itself to the post-cold war security environment. The key to this adaptation is to overcome the long-held division of military and economic components of security policy. Japan, like all other countries, no longer lives in the world of global deterrence. The cold war represented an unwavering, do-or-die world. Now, with this era behind us, the role left for the military as an instrument of national policy has

become at least partly a more traditional one: deterrence and defense against local neighbors, and a tool for political influence. But a new role has appeared to emerge for the military: to provide a minimum of order should extreme chaos or a potentially chaotic situation break out, one with which the traditional police cannot cope. This sort of role is most apparent in the quantitative increase and qualitative proliferation of the peacekeeping operations. This role of high-powered international police force must be closely coordinated with activities once viewed as nonmilitary and civilian. For example, once the military secured the safety of transportation, it would be up to civilians to take care of the materials to be transported.

In both traditional and emergent ways, the actual use of the military must be restricted and based upon international legitimacy. The military as instrument of national policy must be the instrument of last resort, specifically for self-defense. The use of the military as international policing tool must be done with utmost restraint.

Given this change, the debate in Japan on becoming a "normal state" or aspiring to be a "civilian power" is somewhat theological. If a "normal" state suggests one with a cold war military posture of high-level alert, then Japan will be the only one around: no such "normal state" exists anymore. On the other hand, the use of nonmilitary methods such as providing long-term assistance and offering emergency aid must be associated with a basic minimum of stability and order, which the military is most capable of providing.

Japan needs to think more about combining military and civilian roles, for at least two reasons. First, because Japan is an influential member of international society, just giving away money is irresponsible; it avoids the hard work necessary for achieving and maintaining a more harmonious international order. Second, Japan's security is increasingly connected with the stability of its surroundings. Taking responsibility for the maintenance of that stability is a precondition for its own security.

The first thing the Japanese government must recognize is this change in global military thinking. Japan's negligence on things military was made possible by the U.S. extension of its deterrence to Japan and by the overall stability of global deterrence. What is lost is not the former but the latter. Since global deterrence no longer exists, a new international order must be constructed, and Japan cannot avoid taking part in it. The current academic debate on the constitutionality of collective self-defense must take into account this wider context.

A far more important issue is to improve the lines of communication between the three branches of the SDF, civilian government officials (including the police), private enterprises, and civilian nonprofit organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Such a move would truly deepen the meaning of international cooperation. This requires more openness on the part of the government, and a less ideological attitude from private organizations on military

issues. This is one way for the Japanese state to establish legitimacy relative to Japanese society.

Japan's Security Policy and the Regional Interstate System

Comprehensive security implies a dualistic structure with regard to the interstate system: system of power and regime creation. In practice, these two levels intermingle, but throughout the Asia Pacific region the trilateral relationship between China, Japan, and the United States is the key to the system of power, while the dialogue processes centered around APEC and the ARF function as the place of regime creation. The situation in Northeast Asia is both highly complicated and fluid; it is also an area where the system of power and regime creation overlap.

The Trilateral Relationship

The trilateral relationship between China, Japan, and the United States will for the foreseeable future be the key determinant of Japan's defense policy. Japan continues to see the American presence in the region as vital to its security. On the other hand, Japan also attaches significance to making China's military regime more open and cooperative.

To pursue these objectives, the U.S.-Japan security relationship will continue to be important, but the emphasis needs to be shifted. The relationship has had two aims: to defend Japanese territorial independence (stipulated in Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), and to support the American military roles in the Far East (as defined by Article 6 of the same treaty). In the cold war days, the emphasis was on the former. Because the conflict between the two camps over the control of Japan could have started a global war, there was strategic rationale to having the capability and will to defend Japan: it was in the West's overall interests to do so. Now, however, any possible threat to Japanese territory will almost certainly derive from some kind of regional disturbance. The American military presence in the region, Japan's defense capability, and regional stability are all preconditions for Japan's territorial security. Hence the distinction between Japanese territorial defense and the maintenance of regional stability is increasingly blurred.

To make this transition, Japan and the United States have each been trying to create a shared strategic vision. Among others, the *East Asian Strategic Report* issued by the Clinton administration in early 1995, the new *Defense Planning Outline* (DPO) of November 1995, and the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996 addressed this issue of strategic vision. None of the three documents advocate a radical departure from the policies of the past. The United

States will stay engaged in the region, Japan's defense doctrine will continue to be based on the idea of "basic defense capability," and closer cooperation between the two countries must be promoted. Notably, in the joint declaration no mention is made on the size of American forces stationed specifically in Japan; only the number of approximately 100,000 forward deployed troops in the region is named.

The new DPO also justifies the basic defense capability concept on the grounds that efforts to stabilize the international environment will continue, and that the U.S.-Japan security alliance will play a significant role in the peace and stability of the region. The upshot is the review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation announced in the joint declaration "including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan" (*Gaiko Forum* 1996, 162).

Another aspect of these strategic reviews is the relative de-emphasis of the nuclear deterrence. The significance of American deterrence is indeed mentioned, but the clear trend is to marginalize the importance of nuclear weapons as military force. Hence, Japan and the United States agreed to continue cooperating in the study of ballistic missile defense, to oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to endorse the complete test ban treaty (CTBT) negotiations.

These strategic reviews reflect the intention of the governments of Japan and the United States to legitimize the continuation of the security relationship in the eyes of the citizens of both nations. No doubt the alliance is costly for both: the United States sends troops far away from home, and Japan pays not only the pecuniary but also the social costs of hosting large numbers of American troops. The strategic readjustment must mesh with the search for less costly and equitable ways of cost-sharing.

The key to stability in the region is whether this readjustment between Japan and the United States is associated with the nonhostile security relationship with China. The Chinese reaction to the U.S.-Japan joint declaration was wary at best. It opposes the regional widening of the bilateral security relationship and the development of a missile defense that may invalidate Chinese nuclear capability. But at the same time the Chinese government has shown a willingness to avoid a clear-cut confrontation with the United States and Japan, as was seen in the recent Taiwan strait maneuvers and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands issue. China has also demonstrated a relatively cooperative attitude toward regional dialogue and global nuclear nonproliferation in the NPT review conference. Given the financial difficulties of the central government, it appears reasonable to assume that China prefers a less tense international environment, at least for the moment.

If this assessment is correct, the best way to cope with China is through a combination of strategic engagement and tactical tit-for-tat policies. Since there

is no doubt about the undesirable state of affairs in China in terms of human rights, it may be necessary to resort to negative sanctions from time to time to show disapproval. But it must be recognized that the harsh nature of the Chinese government partly derives from the weakness of the state in terms of its resources. States in the nondeveloped world tend to resort to predatory measures because they cannot afford the luxury of giving away benefits. If this is true for China, giving positive incentives to the Chinese state to loosen harsh measures may indeed in the long term be effective.

Both Japan and the United States need to make Chinese political and military leaders realize that there is something called a security dilemma, but without alienating them. The unilateral pursuit of national security by increasing military capability often backfires; it induces others to adopt a more hostile attitude. Both countries also need to emphasize that regional instability is the common threat for the countries in the region, and that the U.S.-Japan security relationship now focuses mainly on this issue. For this, dialogues at various levels and in various settings can be effective.

It must also be recognized that the security dilemma may backfire against the West. An outright containment policy of Chinese military power at this stage is likely to be counterproductive. It is generally recognized that China currently lacks the ability to project enough power to conduct a modern war successfully. A military buildup must obviously be opposed, but too much pressure and premature timing may strengthen the nationalist sentiment in China and increase the desire for military reinforcement at every possible opportunity.

It seems better to insist on a more open and freer economy, and to increase freedom of expression through strategic engagement. The objective is to shift the legitimacy of the Chinese state toward a more responsive and more rational economic-oriented policy. By the time China achieves a certain level of economic development, it should have strong internal voices of support for cooperation and democracy. This is a clear and obtainable policy objective, one that must be envisioned and implemented over a long-term window of at least several decades.

Taiwan

Taiwan plays a tremendously important role in the trilateral relationship between China, Japan, and the United States. Even though neither the United States nor Japan questions China's ultimate sovereignty over Taiwan, the Taiwanese presidential election in March 1996 had a profound effect on the Western populace: many saw Taiwan as a kind of model case for democratization. Although China refuses to promise not to use force if and when Taiwan denies Chinese sovereignty or declares independence, those two extreme options run dead counter to the interests of both. A sensible policy for Taiwan is to avoid

extreme measures like those, to bolster closer exchange with China, and to promote increased representation of Taiwan in the international arena short of declaring sovereignty. The closer exchange will benefit China economically, but it will also at the same time demonstrate the merits of democracy and free enterprise to the Chinese people. The more China sees Taiwan not just as a piece of Chinese territory but as an economic and social entity whose interests are not incompatible with its own, the more China will view the Taiwanese international representation as efforts that are actually in sync with Chinese national interests. It is as if the USSR had multiple representation in the UN General Assembly, with the votes of Belarus and the Ukraine. On the other hand, efforts to block Taiwanese international representation will only increase the support to the radical independence movement.

This policy will maintain the uncertain military and political status quo and enhance social and economic change in the Taiwan Strait. To supplement this policy, the United States and Japan should stick to their own strategic uncertainties. They should not simply declare the defense of Taiwan to be integral to their own interests: they should keep a careful watch on the military balance there to prevent adventurism on either side or conflict by miscalculation. This may upset China as an infringement of its sovereign rights, but given the strategic location of Taiwan, as well as its robust economy of twenty million people, peace in the Taiwan Strait is by definition a matter of international concern, especially for Japan and the United States. In the meantime, Taiwanese leaders must be discouraged from the costly and possibly futile course of seeking to become a full-fledged sovereign state. The final resolution of the Taiwan issue should come toward the end of China's modernization drive and its effort to become a truly cooperative member of international society.

Building Regimes

A stabilized relationship between China, Japan, and the United States is a necessary but not sufficient condition for security in Asia Pacific. It must be paralleled with the effort to build an interstate regime that endorses a more cooperative approach to managing security.

On regime building, the three powerful countries have been less vocal than one would predict, at least based on their national strengths. But this is appropriate for regime building. A regime needs to have some sense of legitimacy. One key legitimizing factor in interstate rights is the equality of sovereign rights. Since the interests of the large countries can be taken into account by the lesser powers but not vice versa, initiatives by lesser powers can muster endorsement more easily. Hence, the basis for regime building should go beyond the trilateral relationship. The relationship of the powerful three does not appear to be stable; even if it is stable, it seems like the triumvirate utterly dominates the other countries.

Regime building has been much more successful in Southeast Asia than in Northeast Asia. Given the marked difference of security environments, this is surprising. Southeast Asia has somehow found its own "comprehensive security" in the form of the ASEAN, which has come to be seen as embodying an "Asian mode" of international conduct. The issue now is the validity and limitation of this "Asian way" as a matrix of a future regional interstate regime. By contrast, Northeast Asia has not produced any reliable international regime that includes all the parties concerned, though this is partly because of the strategic importance of Northeast Asia. The area around the Korean peninsula is surrounded by the four major powers of the world: the United States, Russia, China, and Japan. In addition, the countries of the area are either traditional powers very proud of their own cultures and independence (China, Korea, Japan) or the relative newcomers to this part of the world who do not have much cultural affinity to the region (the United States and Russia). These factors make the situation in the area complicated and delicate; any workable arrangement on the region is likely to result from extensive private and informal dealings rather than from an institutionalized and formal approach.

Southeast Asia

At least since the late 1970s, Japan has recognized ASEAN as an important partner in the Asia Pacific region. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and ARF are the meeting points of two versions of comprehensive security. The ASEAN countries have felt their way to build a tacit consensus on the mode of international conduct among themselves—an extant regime of interstate dialogue of sorts. The idea was to accept everyone's mutual interest in interstate stability by agreeing to the principles of nonintervention in internal affairs and shelving politically sensitive issues of ethnic group rivalries or territorial sovereignty. They also gave priority to economic development to reinforce the state's postindependence legitimacy relative to its own society.³ Japan showed an understanding of this approach while seeking to lead the ASEAN countries and the other Asian developing countries into the wider economic interdependence preferred by the advanced countries.

APEC and ARF can be seen as a kind of merge between the Japanese approach and the ASEAN approach by enlarging the concept of comprehensive security to a regional scale. These two processes are complimentary. APEC is limited in scope (economy only), has a wider membership (nonsovereign entities like Hong Kong and Taiwan or Latin American countries like Chile and Mexico are represented), and is relatively tilted toward the advanced countries. ARF is wider in scope (no set agenda other than the custom of respecting consensus), limited in membership (not inclined to include North and South America as within its geographic scope, emphasis on consensus on new

participation), and promoted by ASEAN. These two groupings, along with associated track-two approaches, aim (1) to present a rational and apparently mutually beneficial common goal of prosperity through economic interdependence; (2) to find the optimal way of defining what is official and what is nonofficial, thereby fostering the habit of dialogue among states; and (3) to embed the United States and China into the international regime of diplomacy, where they are supposed to act as powerful but equal members of international society.

Still, many challenges lie ahead. First, an arms buildup in the region, especially that of naval and air forces, could change the nature of the game. China, along with all the Southeast Asian countries, has long cherished its sovereignty; the countries have become even more conscious of sovereignty because of the UN Law of the Sea, which has increased UN authority over large stretches of ocean. The weakness of the state in those countries has prevented the full-fledged pursuit of their individual sovereign defense, but without careful common security measures such as confidence-building measures and possibly some arms control agreements the danger of an arms race lurks. This would surely break down the dialogue process.⁴

Second, the agenda for dialogue both in APEC and ARF is no doubt too narrow to handle these kinds of confrontational security issues, especially ones concerning a military threat. What the dialogue in those meetings can achieve is preventive diplomacy at best. There is no prospect in sight for regional peace-keeping; no peace-making mechanism exists, let alone one for peace enforcement. The Spratly Islands issue is a case in point. While successive dialogues through informal workshops have resulted in China's pledge to abide by international law in dealing with the matter, no sanctions are in place against possible violation.

Third, the future virility and vibrancy of ASEAN should not be taken for granted. The ongoing expansion to the "ASEAN 10," incorporating Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia to the current seven members, may adversely affect the unity of the grouping. The increased involvement with neighboring giants like China and India may complicate the internal mechanism of ASEAN, given the delicate nature of Chinese and Indian ethnic problems in many of the ASEAN nations. Power succession in the ASEAN nations has not been institutionalized; if domestic turmoil results from a succession struggle, ASEAN unity may be seriously crippled.

Given these possible pitfalls, reassurance by means of collective defense and collective security measures is hardly a foregone conclusion. It is telling that most ASEAN countries have various degrees of security links with outside powers such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. As a confidence-building measure, ARF has promoted increased transparency within the militaries of the member states. However, as Desmond

Ball points out, there is a natural limit to what transparency can achieve (Ball 1993/1994, 106–108). The combination of promoting interdependence, fostering the habit of dialogue, and reassurance by military presence are all indispensable for comprehensive security.

Another neglected area is the sharing of memory and history at the regional level. The issue of Japanese responsibility during World War II, the legitimacy of the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the historical interpretation of colonialism and independence are three typical areas that have a highly emotional effect in the region. There must be a freer and less politicized scholarly dialogue on the history of the region, a sort of track two approach to sharing history. This would surely produce an improved common regional identity.

Northeast Asia

The crux of Northeast Asian security is the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, it ranks as the place most likely to experience instability in the region. This is not because of some simplified “cold war legacy,” but because from the late nineteenth century—when the modernization process began in this part of the world—no stable international framework concerning the peninsula has existed. The Korean people were first divided into a modernization-oriented group and a traditionalist group that sought adherence to the Chinese order. After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the peninsula became the pawn of an imperialist rivalry between Russia and Japan. After Japan annexed Korea in 1910, it was immediately clear that the governing of the proud and arduous Korean people was beyond the capabilities of the Japanese state. The Japanese government eventually resorted to oppressive measures in Korea, measures that ended in 1945 with the defeat of Japan in World War II. But both the United States and the USSR, which replaced Japan as foreign occupiers, also experienced difficulties in governing the Korean people. As the cold war kicked in, the two separate Korean states declared their independence, followed by war and eventually military standstill.

Given this historical background, security policy on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia in general should combine two objectives into one: averting the short-term threat of military conflict and creating an appropriate international framework that can keep the peace after the peninsula is unified. The short-term military threat, grave though it is, should not be seen as distinct from the long-term agenda. The latter involves how to overcome the possible political, economic, and social costs of the reunification of Korea, and how to create a stable international constellation in Northeast Asia after Korea is unified.

The connection between short-term and long-term security limits the utility of the formal approach to Northeast Asian security. Stabilization of the status

quo—realizable by achieving an objectively equitable balance in the region or by building a reasonable level of confidence among the parties, or combination of both—would mean a *de facto*, if not *de jure*, legitimization of the division of the peninsula. But this kind of arrangement, however peaceful, would not satisfy the Korean people, most of whom strongly desire reunification. It would also weaken the legitimacy of the state, creating yet another source of instability. But mistrust between the two Koreas also makes it difficult to produce a schedule for unification agreeable to both.

Even the second track approach does not bode well for enhancing dialogue in the field of political and security affairs. North Korea is represented in the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue and in the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, but its actual participation has been quite limited. Given the obvious absence of freedom of speech in the North Korean regime, the dialogue as official or private status may not make much difference.

At present, the *modus operandi* of dialogue in Northeast Asia has an interesting characteristic: it encompasses multilayered formal and informal dialogues among various combinations of the countries but omitting an all-inclusive regional dialogue. Politically, the proposed four-power consultation among the two Koreas, the United States, and China will be the key arena for dialogue if it can be formally started. In the nonpolitical arena, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), based on the Geneva agreement between the North and the United States, is seen as very important. A handful of bilateral relations and ongoing negotiations among the countries in the region also exists.

The objective of these dialogues is twofold. First, by giving economic aid and incentives to North Korea, increased contact of the North Korean people with the outside world becomes much more likely. This approach aims to weaken the North Korean hard-liners and to strengthen the more moderate groups—if they indeed exist—under Kim Jong Il. Second, the policy of providing assistance to the North, even at a moderate pace, would make the eventual landing somewhat softer. It is widely assumed that sooner or later the current North Korean regime will hit a deadlock. But a sudden and drastic collapse of the North Korean regime can cause significant security risks, either from a breakaway and desperate military faction or from complete anarchy, a situation that would create a massive number of refugees. All of North Korea's neighbors are hoping for a painless death of the North Korean state. Economic assistance can provide a shock-mitigating net of at least some efficacy against a hard landing and be a springboard for the cooperative interstate relationship after Kim is gone.

Of course, the threat of North Korean military forces and the threat of an accidental military conflict on the Korean peninsula are serious. It must be made crystal clear that a military option will be disastrous for whoever launches it. For this purpose, a rapid reaction against any confrontational use of force must remain a viable option.

Japan's policy toward the Korean peninsula could be called selective engagement. The peace and security of the peninsula is a matter of serious concern for Japan, but the active participation of Japan in Korean politics would almost certainly be counterproductive, given the history of Japanese colonization and the ongoing territorial dispute over the island of Takeshima (Tokudo), already the focus of extreme nationalism in both countries. Japan is engaged in KEDO and other measures of economic engagement in North Korea, and is hoping that this will lead to a more stable dialogue between the Northeast Asian countries. Japan has also been active in assembling track one and track two dialogues in the area at bilateral and multilateral levels. Militarily, Japan's policy has been to consolidate its indirect military relationship with South Korea by supporting the American military presence on the peninsula.

The question of whether Western democracy should give positive sanctions to the North Korean regime poses a moral dilemma. But it is now increasingly necessary to focus on the regional responsibility of the North Korean people once the Kim dynasty disappears. Hence, the idea of comprehensive security, with its goal of changing society and state, seems to provide the best long-term option.

States in the Sea of Interdependence

Stabilizing interstate relationships by a careful balance of the power constellation in the region and creating regimes are significant elements of comprehensive security, but the basic assumption of the concept lies in the realization that in advanced industrial societies, the state—either singularly or collectively—cannot control society completely in an attempt to avoid social hazards. This minimalist view of state capability, if shared by the parties concerned, is supposed to encourage positive regime building to prevent social hazards or to mitigate their effects when they occur.

By social hazard I refer to a phenomenon in which a certain malfunction of one part of the social network gives rise to widespread damage. The malfunction can be caused either by intentional terrorism or unintended accident, by either state or non-state actors. A typical social hazard is a financial crisis derived from a run on a bank; it can be caused by well-meaning citizens who fear for the security of their deposits. But if its effect spreads, it could be disastrous for the entire global economy.

Most social hazards can and should be dealt with as routine management problems. But many issues lie in a kind of gray area between national security and routine social management. Food, energy, and the threat of transnational terrorism fall into this category.

A stable supply of food and energy is the most traditional concern of comprehensive security. A notable change from the comprehensive security of the 1970s

is that food and energy issues were then considered only in a regional context. Whatever happens to the global supply and demand of food and energy greatly depends on the way the Asian countries, notably China and India, will tackle these issues, though it is not likely to become the Malthusian scenarios painted by Lester Brown (1995) and Kent Calder (1996). From a comprehensive security viewpoint, three elements must be considered: the future vision on food and energy supply, the management of short-term supply disruption risks, and the guarantee of communications and transportation networks.

Over the longer term, it is not the supply and demand balance per se but the fear of a future shortage that is the cause of uncertainty. Experience since the 1970s tells us that the long-term supply and demand relationship of specific commodities is best managed by the price mechanism. This is not to say that the price mechanism is omnipotent; there just happens to be no better alternative at the moment. But the fear of an unknown future may compel certain powers in the region to make a futile attempt toward resource self-sufficiency. This misguided notion of self-control in industrial societies leads to the slippery slope of shrinking equilibrium. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that if a country wants to enjoy the fruits of a highly advanced economy, the national autonomy on the economy has to be sacrificed. Even the much-hyped Three Gorges Dam project—which will produce 85 billion kilowatts per year when completed in 2009—will provide a meager one-tenth of the present total electricity supply of China, and a much smaller portion in 2009. By collectively exchanging assessments of future supply and demand and by discussing the best measures for the long-term security of food and energy, countries can avoid the psychological fear of shortages and share the vision of interdependence and the common interest of economic management.

The issue of nuclear use must be considered from both military and energy viewpoints, and should include an environmental viewpoint as well. The end of the cold war gave rise to a broad reassessment of the basic assumptions of the nuclear question. The supply glut of radioactive materials, increased attention to nuclear proliferation in the undeveloped nations, and higher public sensitivity to the environmental effects of nuclear energy facilities have placed the past policies of weapons nonproliferation and promotion of civilian use of nuclear energy under attack. The radioactive hazards of potential nuclear plant accidents is no less of a significant threat to the region than is nuclear weapons. There must be an arena for discussion to promote nonproliferation, vertical and horizontal, of nuclear military use. A clearly defined role for nuclear energy regarding future energy supply and demand is also needed, as is further discussion on the environmental effects of civilian nuclear energy.

Managing the risk of a sudden disruption of the food and energy supply is another matter. The economic confusion deriving from a temporary disruption of resources can have a serious impact for more than one country. To prepare for

such a situation and to minimize the damage is a plan from which everyone can benefit. A stockpile and emergency-supply scheme at the regional level could be devised and implemented.

Another element of food and energy security is the guarantee of the free flow of goods, especially on the sea lanes. The economic dynamism in Asia Pacific has been closely associated with maritime trade; maritime safety is a public good for the region and for the world. Even though for the foreseeable future no power is likely to fight a face-to-face battle with the U.S. Navy, the heightened insecurity regarding strategic choke points like the South China Sea itself affects psychology and lowers the level of trade. To avert this risk, the American maritime presence must be firmly maintained as the guarantor of last resort. Routine policing of the sea can be shared by regional powers under international agreed-upon rules. Last but not least, the quasi-sovereign right on resources in the sea must be understood flexibly and harmoniously: the historical reality is that the prosperity of the region is enhanced by the liberal and secure usage of these sea lanes.

Another social hazard is the terrorist threat, be it based on ethnicity, religion, or any socially aggressive belief. Open societies need to be associated with efforts to eradicate violent measures as a means of protest. Whatever causes the terrorist organizations have, terrorist attacks are a fundamental challenge to international society. Japan, as a country that just experienced a horrific form of terrorism (sarin poisoning on the subways), needs to encourage increased international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

The concern over food, energy, and terrorism forces us to go beyond a regional perspective. It is already clear that nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the potential source of Islamic violent fundamentalism in the Middle East (the source of much of the world's oil), ethnic and religious strife in Central Asia, Russian involvement in Asia Pacific, the future of the Asia-Europe Meeting dialogue process, and the overall safety risks of the Indian Ocean are all matters of deep concern for the Asia Pacific region. The need for a global regime to oversee the various functional categories and to supplement the current regional regime building will increase as the Asia Pacific region extends its clout in the global arena.

Conclusion

Security in the Asia Pacific region is currently characterized by concerns regarding both the state and society. The maintenance of the state is necessary as a hedge against anarchy and as a provider of order during the course of modernization. Still, a state can be a threat to other states and to its own society. Given these contradictions, comprehensive security is clearly the best strategy, a strategy

that derives from Japan's search for security policies in the postwar period. Still, the Japanese notion of comprehensive security has been prejudiced on two scores: its lack of regional thinking, and its refusal to deal with military realities, a situation made possible only by the context of cold war deterrence. In the post-cold war context, both elements have to be incorporated into a general strategic vision.

The main goal of comprehensive security is to create a situation in which societies, states, an interstate system, and industrial interdependence can simultaneously develop, the aggregate product of which would be a "zone of peace." For the state elites in the developing countries, the positive incentives of comprehensive security are attractive: it props up state legitimacy over society and mitigates the burden of military spending that assumes a hostile interstate relationship. In the meantime, the state's less-harsh approach to society can enhance the growth of groups that have a vested interest in interdependence with the outside world. This social development is expected to transform the state into a more responsive, representative entity. At the same time, through the evolution of dialogue, a sort of "diplomatic culture" should develop out of the interstate system, which in turn will guide the mode of conduct of the abiding states. Finally, through these workings, an advanced industrial interdependence will emerge in which the state recognizes its inherent limits to control society, thereby confining its role to one of risk managers working cooperatively with other states.

This strategy is appropriate for the advanced states because they are also undergoing extensive reorganization. Even the United States, the most powerful state in the world, is having serious trouble reassembling its legitimacy in conducting foreign and military policy. The same logic used for the developing countries can be applied to the advanced countries.

No doubt this is a rosy scenario; events may well not proceed in the manner outlined above. Nevertheless, on balance, this strategy appears more hopeful than others. The unilateral pursuit of a subjectively determined military balance by each state as a method of maintaining the peace seems deeply flawed. The further entrenchment of the status quo and the increased exchange will in all likelihood continue. The radical pursuit of social values, including self-determination based on social identity, or a human rights movement that ignores the realities of state security, seems equally flawed.

The core of Asia Pacific is the trilateral relationship between China, Japan, and the United States, and the continual adjustment of the three states in the post-cold war milieu is a necessary condition for regional comprehensive security. This is most important in military matters: the changed role of the military as the last resort of reassurance has made the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan security relationship inevitable. All three states must strive to share strategic visions through collective security measures like de-emphasizing nuclear arsenals,

common security measures like confidence-building measures in information exchange, and increased transparency.

Despite the weight those three countries carry at the crude systemic level, regime building in general must be pursued at the subregional or regional level, or even on the level of the issues themselves. Given the increasing interdependence, a relatively minor actor at the system level can cause systemwide damage by its aggressive behavior or by its collapse. So the regime must be built with proper openness in accordance with local and functional conditions.

In view of the diversity of the Asia Pacific region, balancing social, state, interstate systemic, and interdependent development in a peaceful way is, to put it mildly, a tough assignment. But this is the challenge that Europe faced and overcame in the first half of this millennium when it created a system of sovereign states out of medieval society. The future system of the region will not look like its European counterpart: there are too many differences regarding geography, culture, age, technology, and many other factors. Still, this is the challenge that the Asia Pacific must meet head-on as we begin the next millennium.

Endnotes

1. For information about this report, see Chapman, Drifte, and Gow (1984).
2. For an analysis of the Japan-China relationship in this period, see Soeya (1995).
3. For a recent evaluation of ARF, see Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum* (Adelphi Paper no. 302, 1996).
4. For an analysis of regional arms acquisition, see Ball (1993/1994).

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