

Debates on Japan's Foreign Policy

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DURING THE COLD WAR, polarity between realists and idealists characterized the debate on foreign policy in Japan. The former group supported the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, while the latter group opposed the treaty, arguing that a military alliance might involve Japan in the United States' wars. With the end of the cold war in 1991, however, Japan's foreign policy debate shifted. The Social Democratic Party of Japan, formerly a robust opponent of the Security Treaty, switched to supporting it after party chair Murayama Tomiichi became prime minister in 1994. Now Japanese have a national consensus on sustaining the treaty and on the Japan-U.S. global partnership. Two groups are still debating foreign policy: one wants to ally Japan closely with the United States, while the other is exploring an independent foreign policy.

This chapter examines Japan's recent foreign policy debate in terms of the trilateral relationship among the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the United States. I begin by tracing the debate prior to World War II and looking at each argument in the context of the trilateral relationship. Then I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of current arguments. Finally, I propose an agenda for how Japan can contribute to the development of peaceful trilateral relations among the three countries.

Foreign Policy Debates in the Past

Prior to 1945

Since Japan entered the international community after the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry from the United States in 1853 ended the country's isolationist policy, two main factions have debated foreign policy. One has advocated friendly relations with the leading hegemonic power, while the other has favored an independent foreign policy or a policy that, in some cases, challenged the hegemonic power's world order.

At the end of World War I in 1918, Japan was recognized as a major power and, accordingly, the contrast between the two factions—*Eibeisha*, or Western faction, and *Ajiaba*, or Asian faction—was remarkable. Their controversy was

about Japan's attitude toward post-World War I international systems, such as the League of Nations and the treaties signed at the November 1921-February 1922 Washington Conference, one of which, the Four Power Treaty, superseded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902.

In the 1920s, Japan's mainstream political leaders were Eibeiha. Shidehara Kijuro, a prominent advocate of pro-Western policy and a long-serving foreign minister, thought Japan could protect its interests in Manchuria by cooperating with Great Britain and the United States within the framework of the Washington treaties. After Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), Japan took over Russian interests in Manchuria and expanded its economic position there by sending emigrants, developing the abundant natural resources, and constructing a railroad. Indeed, Japan felt these interests were essential to its national security.

At the Washington Conference, Japan sought some guarantee of its position in Manchuria and was eventually persuaded that the security clause of the Nine-Power Treaty provided it implicitly. The major world powers pledged "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states" (Waldron 1992, 19-20). Although this security clause did not explicitly guarantee Japan's position in Manchuria, Japan believed that Western nations accepted that interpretation at the time.

Japan's presence in Manchuria clashed with Chinese nationalism, however. In particular, Japan's Twenty-One Demands in 1915 were intolerable and humiliating for China and became a symbol of imperialism. Furthermore, to maintain its hold on special interests in Manchuria, Japan tried to control the government in northern China, which fought and then conceded to the Nationalist government in the south.

In 1928, the Nationalist government challenged the Washington treaties system in an attempt to abolish imperialistic interests in China. Eventually, the United States sympathized with Chinese nationalism rather than stand by the Washington treaties. As a result, the Eibeiha lost its influence on foreign policy. The Ajiaha came to power and abandoned cooperative foreign policy with the United States and Great Britain (Waldron 1992, 1-56; Sato 1992, 312-313).

What were the Ajiaha's views? Kitaoka Shin'ichi, in his introduction to the 1995 special issue of *Japan Echo*, points out that the origins of the Ajiaha's views are explained in an essay titled "Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America" written in 1918 by Konoe Fumimaro, a prime minister in the period before Pearl Harbor. Konoe wrote:

In short, although the pacifism of England and America represents the kind of peace-at-any-price principle advocated by those who find it convenient to uphold the status quo, and has nothing to do with justice and humanism, Japanese

intellectuals, intoxicated by this fine rhetoric, equate peace with humanism. In view of Japan's international position, they should espouse the overthrow of the status quo, like Germany, but despite living in such a country they are infected by this pacifism centered on England and America, adoring the League of Nations like the Lord's own gospel. This attitude is contemptible, and abhorrent to justice and humanism. (1995, 14)

Kitaoka criticizes Konoe on three points. First, Konoe overlooked Japan's national interest, which could be maintained only through cooperation with Great Britain and the United States. Second, even if the pacifism of Great Britain and the United States preserved the status quo, pacifism in itself is worthwhile. Third, Konoe had a double standard. While he criticized the hegemony of Great Britain and the United States, he missed the point that Japan coveted domination over Greater East Asia (Kitaoka 1995a, 9). In addition, Kitaoka points out "arguments like Konoe's formed an undercurrent in Japan's diplomatic circles, and they remain alive today in the anti-American sympathies found in some quarters" (Kitaoka 1995b, 3). Granted Konoe was not a warmonger, but he headed three cabinets and made serious mistakes that led to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

In this context, the Ajiha was pursuing an ideology called Asianism. Although the definition of Asianism was controversial because of its variations, Asianism's goal was solidarity among Asian nations (Takeuchi 1993, 287–294).

Asianism had two general tenets. The first was that Asian peoples shared a common culture and spirit as exemplified by the famous phrase "Asia is one" promoted by the philosopher Okakura Kakuzo (Okakura 1970, 1). Because Asia was under the control of European powers, the Ajiha wanted Asian nations to jointly resist those powers. It is noteworthy that the Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen was an advocate of Asianism (Sun Yat-sen 1940, 201–217). He had good relations with some Japanese Asianists who were eager to support the 1911 Chinese Revolution.

The second tenet of Asianism called on Japan to emancipate Asian nations from European imperialists. Asianists believed Japan's presence in Manchuria ensured order in East Asia.

After Zhang Xueliang, leader of Manchuria, formally acknowledged in 1930 the authority of the Nationalist government in Nanjing, the Guandong Army, Japan's field army in Manchuria, attacked a Chinese garrison without official authorization in 1931. This action precipitated a military campaign for the conquest of southern Manchuria that resulted in Japan's establishing the satellite state Manchukuo there in 1932. By providing a rationale for invasion, Asianism influenced Japanese military leaders and public opinion. In this sense, some Asianists were clearly responsible for Japan's invasions of other Asian nations.

During the pre-World War II period, both the Eibeiha and the Ajiha failed to establish friendly relations with China despite their opposite positions

concerning China. The Eibeiha thought their position was similar to that of European imperialists, and they believed Japan's conquest of southern Manchuria would be endorsed by the Washington treaties system. They did not realize that a new age of anticolonialism was dawning and that world leadership was shifting from Great Britain, the old imperialist power, to the United States, advocate of the Open Door doctrine. The Ajiaha challenged the world order under the guise of Asianism, which had become the ideology of Japanese militarism.

Postwar, 1945–1972

Japan's disastrous defeat in World War II totally changed the nature of the foreign policy debate between the two factions. The Eibeiha recognized the age of imperialism had ended and Japan could prosper only through economic interdependence with other nations. The Ajiaha, its mainstream having shifted from the right to the left, opposed Japan's military relationship with the United States and explored a nonaligned policy.

Both factions sought friendly terms with China despite the United States' containment policy toward communist countries. The factions were influenced by the foreign policy of Yoshida's administration. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru believed China would take a different course from the Soviet Union (Yoshida 1957, 72). He also thought cooperation between Japan and China would be crucial for the development of the Japanese economy. At this point, Yoshida's view was pragmatic: he wanted to avoid a confrontation with China (Dower 1979, 401–403). After the San Francisco Conference in 1951 at which the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, circumstances changed, however, because the United States succeeded in encouraging Japan's economic integration with Southeast Asia instead of with China.

Great Britain recognized China in January 1950, but by June the United States was fighting China on the Korean peninsula. In June 1951, the United States and Great Britain announced that neither Beijing nor Taipei would be invited to the San Francisco Conference in September. Great Britain understood that Japan would not approach either Chinese government until after the conference. Yoshida's strategy was to delay having to take sides. However, the U.S. Senate, entrusted with ratifying the peace treaty, expected Japan to oppose China.

In December 1951, Yoshida wrote the famous letter in which he assured John Foster Dulles, foreign policy advisor to the secretary of state and architect of the treaty negotiations, ". . . that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime of China" (Dower 1979, 408). According to Dower, most of this letter was allegedly written by

Dulles. Two months later, Japan started formal peace negotiations with the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) in Taipei, although Yoshida stood firm in not recognizing the Guomindang as the sole legitimate government of China. Japan signed a bilateral peace treaty with Taiwan on April 28, 1952, the day the San Francisco Peace Treaty was formally implemented.

Thereafter, the obstacles to the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations were the United States' tough policy toward China and the Taiwan issue. The Eibeiha had no influence in terms of U.S. foreign policy. As for the Taiwan issue, most conservative Japanese felt grateful to Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang for their generous attitude toward war reparations, trials of war criminals, and continuation of the emperor system.

Yoshida's view of the two Chinas was more deliberate than that of American anticommunists. Some of his successors took an even more pro-mainland China position. Ikeda Hayato, prime minister from 1960 to 1964, made an enthusiastic effort to strengthen nongovernmental ties with China under the framework of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Despite complaints from the United States and Taiwan, Ikeda allowed the start of trade with China under an agreement signed by Liao Chengzhi, a Chinese communist active in Sino-Japanese relations, and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (Wakamiya 1995, 138). Although the Kishi administration (1957-1960) and the Sato administration (1964-1972) were pro-Taiwan, when U.S. foreign policy shifted in favor of China in 1971, the majority of Japanese conservatives quickly did the same.

Within the Ajiaha, the typical leftist outlook can be summed up in the famous statement of socialist politician Asanuma Inejiro: "American imperialism is the common enemy for Japan and China" (Asanuma 1995, 559). Ajiaha leftists clearly opposed the United States' containment policy and sympathized with communist countries. But because they were pacifists, they never sought to militarily challenge the Pax Americana. They reflected the anti-American feeling among the Japanese, and their goal was the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations.

Politician Matsumura Kenzo's argument was that of a typical conservative Asianist. He attributed China's development to nationalism rather than communist ideology and felt that no distinction should be made between communist Asia and capitalist Asia. All Asian nations share a common culture, he emphasized. Pointing out that the Soviets withdrew their advisers from mainland China, he suggested Japan should step in and support China's economic development. Because Japan was capitalist and Asian, it could be a bridge between developing Asian countries and developed countries (Matsumura 1963, 152-156).

In summary, Japan's early postwar foreign policy was predominately based on the Eibeiha's views. Japan stood firmly by the United States and did not challenge its policies because Japan was the less powerful and realized the U.S. system

provided many benefits at a reasonable cost. Within these constraints, Japan had to wait for a chance to normalize diplomatic relations with mainland China. China criticized the Yoshida administration as the instigator of Japan's dependence on the United States and the Kishi and Sato administrations for their pro-Taiwan stance. However, Japan's policy toward mainland China was mainly a reflection of U.S. policy during the cold war. In this context, Japan and China could only develop civilian ties as a way to share their goal of normal diplomatic relations, and it was the Ajiaha that played the biggest role in nurturing such ties. The polarity between the Ajiaha and the Eibeiha worked to balance Japan's policies toward the United States and China, while the idea of Japan's acting as a bridge between East and West became popular among the public.

Postwar, 1972–1989

In 1971, the Nixon administration decided to realign the balance of power among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. In July 1971, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China to arrange a visit by President Richard Nixon in 1972. In Japan, the administration of Sato Eisaku, an advocate of Taiwan, was followed by Tanaka Kakuei's administration, which promptly embarked on the normalization of diplomatic relations with China.

Japan, the United States, and China shared the common interest of allying against the Soviet Union. In 1978, the Fukuda administration signed the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty. In accordance with the new pro-China policy of the United States, Japanese pro-Westernists and Asianists tried to develop friendly relations with mainland China. In the process, the main proponents of better Sino-Japanese ties shifted from the Ajiaha to the Eibeiha. Old Asianists retired or died, and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, a supporter of the United States, played an important role in reinforcing ties with China. Traditional Asianism based on an image of a weak Asia became obsolete because of Asia's new industrialization, and the failure of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976 further contributed to the decline of the Ajiaha.

In conclusion, after the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the disagreements between the Eibeiha and the Ajiaha lost relevance. Normalization was the beginning of building trust and interdependence among Japan, China, and the United States.

Current Foreign Policy Debate

The first priority of U.S. foreign policy in the cold war era was the deterrence of the Soviet Union. Japan and China, which sided with the United States in the

cold war, were not viewed as challengers. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, some Americans saw Japan and China as possible rivals. Moreover, rising nationalism in China and Japan is contributing to the loosening of trilateral ties. The redefining of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in April 1996 can be seen as an attempt to refasten the loosening ties between the two nations. But China views the redefinition as a containment effort against itself. Against this political backdrop, the following sections examine the direction of Japan's foreign policy debate.

Maintaining the Hegemonic Status Quo

With the end of the cold war, the relevance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has been called into question, and Japan has striven to define a role for itself in the new world order. While supporters of the U.S.-led world order, of which the U.S.-Japan security arrangement is a vital component, believe in maintaining the current hegemonic stability, they also believe that Japan should exhibit more conspicuous leadership. The argument in favor of a higher profile for Japan has two sides: one stipulates that Japan become a "normal" state that assumes a global security role and the other that Japan emerge as a global civilian power. Advocates of the first side want Japan to participate in United Nations standby forces, while supporters of the second side want Japan to focus on foreign policies that would enable it ". . . to act as a model for, and lend assistance to, poorer countries in their own efforts for economic and democratic development; [to participate in] international peacekeeping; [to support the] promotion of human rights; and [to work for] environmental protection" (Funabashi 1991-1992, 66).

Some people maintain that Japan should lend logistic support to U.S. military campaigns according to the right of collective self-defense (Kitaoka 1996, 14-16). Except for this point, there is not so much difference among the supporters of the U.S.-led world order. Both sides stress the importance of Japan's civilian role, and those who see Japan as a global civilian power also stipulate an active role for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the United Nation's peacekeeping operations. Both sides object to Japan becoming a military superpower and support a robust alliance with the United States (Ozawa 1993, 102-105).

Journalist Funabashi Yoichi, who favors Japan as a global civilian power, says the U.S.-Japan alliance is not merely the result of *realpolitik*: "It is a far more pervasive engagement and a symbol of friendship and stability between two societies." He also says Japan's excessive reliance on its bilateral relationship with the United States should be balanced by strengthening Japan's multilateral and regional diplomacies through such bodies as the United Nations and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Still, the U.S.-Japan security

tie should anchor the regional security framework (Funabashi 1991–1992, 68). In this context, advocates of Japan as a global civilian power take a positive view of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in April 1996. They also want friendlier terms with China to the extent possible under the framework of the Security Treaty. The Japanese government's official view concurs with this position (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996, 9–12). Although some scholars assert the need for containing the possible expansion of China, such an assertion is not predominant (Nakajima 1996, 77–85).

In Support of a New Regime

Those who argue against the current hegemonic status quo can be classified into three types: liberal pacifists, realists, and nationalists. The liberals' typical view is presented in the *Sekai* article "Our Vision for Asia Pacific Regional Security" (Koseki 1994). In essence, although the liberals currently approve of the Security Treaty, they think it should be eventually replaced by another security regime. They claim a treaty that includes the promotion of economic cooperation would restrain Japanese militarism and guarantee the stability of the Asia Pacific region. They believe traditional security arrangements such as the Security Treaty or the North America Treaty Organization (NATO), which are aimed at a common enemy, are not useful for the post-cold war era. Instead, they prefer newer agreements such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which do not assume an antagonist. They claim a weakening of U.S.-Japan military ties would work for, rather than against, the nonmilitarization of Japan. Kamo Takehiko contends that strict adherence to a U.S.-Japan alliance based on a common enemy would hinder the development of new thinking on security (Kamo 1993, 197).

While liberals insist on the importance of building a new regime, some realists arrive at the same conclusion, albeit by different logic. For instance, Nakanishi Terumasa, a prominent scholar of international politics, points out alliances are based only on each participant's national interests. This thinking leads to the conclusion that the U.S.-Japan alliance may eventually lose its rationale. Nakanishi predicts China will establish a closer relationship with the United States, and he criticizes Japan's foreign policy for its dependence on the United States. He proposes a regime that functions like ARF does in Southeast Asia would be significant to the stability of East Asia (Nakanishi 1996, 47–83).

Some conservatives harbor anti-American feelings. With the end of the cold war, the anti-hegemonic mainstream has shifted from the liberal pacifists to conservative nationalists. Few of them have a clear strategy or actual option for challenging the U.S.-led world order. Furthermore, they do not demand the immediate abrogation of U.S.-Japan security ties. Rather, they criticize Japan's subordination.

One extremist is Ishihara Shintaro, the well-known author of *A Japan That Can Say No*. He sympathizes with the idea of the East Asian Economic Caucus and says Japan should act as a member of the Asian bloc (Ishihara 1994).

Fukuda Kazuya, a young conservative critic, is concerned that Japan cannot defend itself without the support of the U.S. military. He proposes replacing the Security Treaty with an arrangement such as the former Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In other words, Japan and the United States—each with its own culture and military—should cooperate as equals. For that purpose, the existing Security Treaty should be ended, which would eliminate many of the domestic dilemmas resulting from Japan's subordinate diplomacy (Fukuda 1996, 187–209).

Although these arguments are minority views, an undercurrent of nationalism is evident. Conservative anti-Americanism is currently rising in academic journalism. At the same time, Asianism, which had been a pillar of anti-Americanism, is now obsolete. Therefore, anti-Americanism does not also require supporting China as the liberal pacifists did early in the cold war era.

Some Problems

Why the Status Quo Won't Work

There are three main drawbacks to the case for maintaining the current hegemonic status quo. First, the robust alliance between Japan and the United States is not favorable for China. Although the purpose of the United States' China policy is not containment but engagement, mainland China is seriously concerned that a redefinition of the Security Treaty might serve as a threatening military alliance.

We should be aware of two points when considering Chinese concerns. One is the ambiguity of the U.S. engagement strategy, which has some Chinese scholars worried (Chu 1996, 3–5). If the United States insists on spreading its democratic values and beliefs in human rights into China, or if it encourages Taiwanese independence, which Beijing considers an internal affair, the U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific region will be viewed as a threat by mainland China.

Another is China's perception of international politics, which tends to be based on realpolitik. Beijing prefers a balance of power rather than stability enforced by the sole superpower, the United States. In contrast, Japan prefers the current situation. Today, the basic U.S. position is to deal with China as an important member of the international community, which is characterized by free trade. If China insists on a balance of power, it might view the U.S.-Japan alliance as an effort at containment.

A second problem with the argument for U.S. hegemony has to do with Japan. The United States could try to implement a policy that balances China

against Japan. In 1989, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made separate visits to Beijing and presented a common message: the United States wants good relations with a strong China to offset the eventual resurgence of Japan's military power (Whiting 1990–1991, 131). Okazaki Hisahiko, an outspoken pro-American, criticized as groundless Kissinger's "... conceptual framework in which he sees Japan regaining big-power status, cutting loose from its U.S. moorings and acting unilaterally" (Okazaki 1995). If the United States encourages Japan to take a global security role and at the same time fuels Chinese concern about Japan, the situation would be a nightmare for Japan. It reminds us of the sudden change in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan in 1971, when Nixon sought reconciliation with China.

Japan's policy toward mainland China and Taiwan was constrained by the United States in the 1950s and the 1960s. Yet the United States changed its policy in 1971 without prior notice to Japan. In addition, the United States allegedly used Japan to approach mainland China in the early 1970s. Namely, because it could not promptly abrogate diplomatic relations with Taiwan it pressured Japan to normalize relations with China so the U.S.-Taiwan security treaty could be extended (Tawara 1976, 260). Thus Japanese normalization of diplomatic relations with China preceded that of the United States. While this is conjecture, we have no evidence to the contrary.

Japanese Asianists had substantial ties with mainland China and attributed Japan's antagonism toward China to Americans and pro-Taiwan conservatives in Japan. Now those ties are obsolete. Relations between Japan and China today depend more on each country's policies than they did during the cold war. In this context, the issue of Japan's autonomy under the Security Treaty takes on new importance. Independent diplomacy by Japan might accelerate U.S. efforts to implement its balancing strategy, while subordinate diplomacy might lead to another "Nixon shock."

The third weakness in the case for stability imposed unilaterally by the United States is this: U.S. leadership will not continue indefinitely. Even if the United States continues to be the only world superpower in the next century, China will become more forceful in East Asia. Eventually, a peaceful power transition from the United States to China could happen. If the only rationale for the Japan-U.S. security tie is hegemonic stability, then we must consider this possibility. In truth, though, Pax Sinica appears unlikely. It seems too far from the current situation. Also, epic power shifts are rare.

Kosaka Masataka, an outstanding Japanese political scientist, examined the prospects for Pax Sinica (Kosaka 1996, 430–434). He was skeptical for three reasons. First, the future of China is ambiguous. Second, countries in the Asia Pacific region, which is composed of both contiguous nations and island nations, can be influenced by outsiders. Third, China does not have legitimacy as a regional leader because of its dictatorial political system. If China abandoned

its dictatorial system, Kosaka argues, the regional situation would change totally.

Suppose China became a fully developed democracy and emulated the United States as a leader of free trade. Would there then be any reasons for Japan to challenge a Pax Sinica? The answer is no. Certainly, the possibility of Pax Sinica is slim now. But Japan stands by the U.S.-led world order not only because of its military, economic, and cultural ties to the United States but also because Japan benefits from that order. Inasmuch as China could be a successor of the American free trade system, Pax Sinica could conceivably follow Pax Americana, just as Pax Americana succeeded Pax Britannica.

The Demerits of a More Assertive Japan

For Japan to pursue a policy independent from the United States is unwise because, first, a more autonomous Japan might accelerate Asia's new balance-of-power game and, second, it might distance the United States and Japan, thereby undermining the Security Treaty.

During the cold war, the U.S. military umbrella as protection against communist countries had credibility. Although Japan did not expect the United States to fight a nuclear war on its behalf, the American nuclear arsenal and its resoluteness against the communist bloc helped Japan deter the former Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, however, the United States is eager to support noncommunist Russia. These new circumstances mean the Americans now view the Security Treaty as a kind of insurance against Japanese assertiveness and the uncertain security environment in Asia Pacific.

In East Asia, the U.S. military umbrella will lose credibility if the United States follows a balance-of-power policy. In such a case, deteriorating U.S.-Japan relations could lead to greater Japanese independence and perhaps an open arms race with China or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea has good relations with China and Russia, and the United States is trying to approach North Korea. Vietnam, while still having difficulties in dealing with China, is turning toward Japan. A more assertive Japan will accelerate these political games. Kosaka warns that a balance-of-power policy will not work in East Asia for two reasons: the diversity of countries' sizes and the ambiguity of national policies (Kosaka 1996, 435-438). Furthermore, balance of power will not establish a common agenda in the region, nor does balance of power necessarily operate in a period of power transition.

Some advocates of an independent policy for Japan favor replacing the Security Treaty with a developed standard, for example, a NATO-style security arrangement patterned after the ARF, which is already effectively building regional

confidence. These people argue that the Security Treaty is offensive to China or that the United States will some day retreat from Asia even if sentiment in the region opposes such action. In its present form, though, the forum does not provide a credible security guarantee for members. Japanese do not anticipate this type of arrangement being substituted for the Security Treaty. Japanese critics of this scenario who support the treaty point out that the Washington treaties system, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, did not serve Japan's national interest and warn that the ARF is an inadequate successor to the Security Treaty.

Another possible scenario is to make a NATO-style security arrangement. But the obstacles in East Asia to the establishment of a new security regime are the lack of a common culture and distrust. Kent E. Calder writes:

But conspicuous gaps in cross-regional networks and in cross-regional political-economic relations clearly exist to a greater degree [in East Asia] than in Europe or North America. Regional political unity that transcends both nation-states and their balance-of-power propensities will be difficult to achieve. . . .

SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization], which John Foster Dulles hoped to see evolve into an Eastern NATO, was defunct within a decade of its foundation in the mid-1950s. (1996, 135-136)

As we try to envision a future security arrangement for Asia Pacific, the controversial point is the role for a superpower. Can an Asia Pacific security regime operate without a hegemonic power? On this point, there is a theoretical debate among neo-realist and neo-liberal American scholars. Hegemonic stability theory states that liberal interdependent regimes do not prosper in the absence of hegemony (Gilpin 1975, 4). On the other hand, regime theory argues that a world order can be maintained by an international regime instead of by hegemony (Keohane 1984, 31-46). In exploring the possibility for a security arrangement in Asia Pacific other than the military umbrella of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, we must prudently examine every option.

Both the argument for keeping the U.S. military umbrella and that for doing away with it have their flaws. But, at least for now, both camps argue the importance of creating and strengthening a security arrangement tailored to Asia Pacific. In addition, the anti-American, nationalistic sentiments of some Japanese notwithstanding, there is no persuasive argument against the continued benign hegemony of the United States in Asia Pacific.

Japan does not have a lot of options in terms of relations with the United States and China. We should explore ways to achieve friendlier terms with China and to establish a regional security arrangement in Asia Pacific, based on a solid U.S.-Japan security tie. What, then, is Japan's role in developing better trilateral relations?

A New Agenda for Japan

A Bridge or a Soft Power?

Japan is often perceived as a bridge between East and West. While much of Japan's traditional culture came from ancient China, Japanese imported science, technology, and political systems from Europe and succeeded in modernizing the country. In this sense, Japanese tend to define their role as a bridge between China and the United States. Former Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru said recently that Japan should assume an intermediary role between China and the West (*Yomiuri Shimbun* 1997, 3). Funabashi Yoichi disagrees, writing: "The bridging role itself is not a viable objective, and to solely aspire to that role is mere posturing" (Funabashi 1995, 252).

Today's Asia is not the traditional Asia. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the coastal regions of China, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have well-developed economies even though their old political systems crumbled. An industrialized China or ASEAN members might become more Westernized than Japan in terms of economics or human rights policy. It is conceivable, therefore, that traditional distinctions between East and West might fade in the near future.

Ogura Kazuo suggests the concept of "Asia" was originally devised in the West and has been laden with images Westerners view as negative, such as despotism, subservience to authority, and feudalism. In reality, Asia has emerged as a symbol of positive values such as the spirit of humanity, discipline, diligence, and an emphasis on family ties. As Asia absorbed much from the West, now it is time for Asia to become the teacher by offering solutions to environmental, educational, and human rights problems caused by Western-style modernization (Ogura 1993, 37-44).

Japanese society is already a model of East-West fusion, but the model is not necessarily applicable to political relations among China, Japan, and the United States. Today, the satiric phrases "Japan passing" and "Japan nothing" have replaced "Japan bashing." Although the Japanese want to bridge the East and West, Asian nations and Americans are directly developing and deepening their mutual relations. If Japan cannot articulate its agenda and continues to serve simply as a messenger between China and the United States, those nations might ignore Japan. To avoid "Japan nothing," Japan should have its own vision and use its "soft" power to construct and support a regional security arrangement in Asia.

Japan has abundant soft power, which can be defined as science, technology, and national cohesion that provides efficiency. But Japan lacks a universally applicable culture and the capability to fully use international institutions and communications (Nye 1990, 159-170). To create a new security arrangement in the Asia Pacific region, what Japan lacks will be more important than what it

has. In this instance, we must reflect on our education, relatively closed society, and insularity.

Historical Issues

If Japan wants to remain a trustworthy soft power, the nation must reach a consensus about its brutal invasions of Asian nations. On December 2, 1996, some intellectuals in the Group to Write New History Textbooks, which was formed to edit a new high school history book, held a press conference. Group members expressed concern about current textbooks' negative views of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), and Japan's modern history as a whole, asserting that the Japanese view of history was distorted by the victors of World War II, namely, the Americans and the Soviets. Furthermore, they argued that every country has its own interpretation of history, and this is not necessarily shared by other countries. Japan concedes too much if its mature nationalism must be compromised with other Asian nations' growing nationalism. Therefore, they contend, the restoration of Japan's own historical view is crucial (Kobayashi 1997, 73).

The premises of the Group to Write New History Textbooks differ from traditional nationalist beliefs. First, the group does not refuse to apologize for Japan's invasions throughout Asia. Kobayashi Yoshinori, a member of the group and among the most popular cartoonists in Japan, portrays in his *Gomanizumu Sengen* comic series how Japan was responsible for those invasions. He maintains, however, that it is misguided to assert that everything Japan did during the war was wrong (1996, 71–72). Second, the group members are not extreme rightists but popular writers and moderate conservatives. Third, this group is a reaction to the negative view of Japan's modern history.

The group directly opposes the official junior high school textbook's claim that the Japanese army forcibly recruited the so-called comfort women to provide sex for soldiers. Group members are concerned the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, which has the authority to screen textbooks, has thoroughly accepted the Japanese leftists' view of history. In short, they are fed up with the historical view that Japan was totally evil and brutal. This can be called a new nationalism.

In the past fifty years, the majority of Japanese have viewed World War II negatively, agreeing that an irrational military government led Japan to disaster. However, they approve of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Russo-Japanese War. For the most part, Japanese have been proud of their history. Shiba Ryotaro, the most popular author in postwar Japan, exemplified this position. Fujiwara Nobukatu, an educational specialist and a main member of the group, emphasizes that he is the successor of Shiba's historical

view. However, while Shiba clearly hated militarism because of his own experience, Fujiwara sees World War II in a more tolerant light. Fujiwara's outlook symbolizes the evolution in the Japanese interpretation of history.

For decades after the war, Japanese accepted the severe criticism of Japan's militarism. But now, some Japanese are irritated that this historical issue constrains Japan's international position. When China or Asian nations use Japan's past militarism as a foreign policy card, some Japanese are reluctant to accept Asian nations' criticism. These Japanese point out European imperialists also invaded Asian nations, so why is Japan the only one criticized? This criticism could cause new frictions between Japan and China.

In 1988, Barry Buzan pointed out that the question of Japanese history must be settled in order for Japan to assume a global political role commensurate with its economic power. He wrote:

Or imagine reactions if Japan had resorted to military means over the disputed Senkaku or Takeshima Islands (not to mention the four northern islands, Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which Japan claims from the Soviet Union) as Britain did over the Falkland Islands in 1982 and China did over the Paracel Islands in 1974 or the Spratly Islands. Because of lingering images from the war, international responses would have been much more negative and sensationalist if the perpetrators had been the war losers rather than, as they were, the war winners.

... As the classical term "national interest" implies, nationalism is in an important sense the basis of a state's foreign policy. Until Japan's nationalism is accepted as equal in status to that of other countries, it follows that the Japanese will be unable to play a full political role in the international community. (1988, 560)

Buzan suggests establishing a consensus about Japan's history based on three criteria: accounting for the well-known facts of Japan, acceptable to countries that suffered at the hand of Japan, and acceptable in Japan (Buzan 1988, 563). On this point, Hayashi Kentaro, a conservative historian, recently stated that while Japanese should oppose Asian nations' misperceptions of issues such as the comfort women, they must concede that Japan's military attacks on these nations were wrong (Hayashi 1997, 59). It is uncertain now whether Japan's growing nationalism will evolve into a healthy nationalism or into ethno-nationalism. To avoid the latter, we must discuss historical issues much more to achieve a reasonable consensus.

In Conclusion

Before World War II, the Ajiaha and the Eibeiha failed to establish appropriate relations with mainland China. The Eibeiha missed the power shift from Great Britain to the United States. The Ajiaha clashed with Nationalist China, which did not accept Japan's position in Manchuria.

After the war, the Ajiaha succeeded in developing and deepening relations with China, while the Eibeiha did the same with the United States. Although Japan could not prevent a confrontation between China and the United States, it eventually succeeded in dealing in friendly terms with both nations under a U.S. foreign policy aimed at balancing the former Soviet Union against China.

Since the end of the cold war, trilateral relations have become unpredictable. Hegemonic stability, a balance-of-power game, and stability through a new security arrangement are possibilities. Also possible is a power shift from a retreating United States to an expanding China. In this context, the desirable outcome will be interdependence among Asia Pacific nations based on an arrangement such as APEC, sustained by a leading power.

In Japan's foreign policy debate, the traditional split between the Ajiaha and the Eibeiha will lose relevance. Japan should support whichever country leads and contribute to a new regional arrangement as a soft power. For these purposes, nourishing Japan's soft power and establishing a consensus about Japan's history are crucial.

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