

## CHAPTER 6

# Japan's Decision Making Process

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In an article written and published in a Japanese journal in the mid-1970s, I discussed the same topic essentially as a case study in the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy making in the Japanese government.<sup>1</sup> In the present paper I attempt to shed some additional light on and draw some new insights into the same topic, on the basis of information derived from the same sources, however, it will be useful to review some of the main points made in the earlier study so as to avoid excessive duplication or redundancy.

### **Bureaucratic Politics of Okinawa Reversion**

In a nutshell, my 1974 article looked at five major watershed events in the U.S.-Japanese negotiation of the late 1960s that led to the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. These events were: (1) mention of the reversion issue in candidate Eisaku Sato's campaign statement during the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election in July 1964; (2) Sato's visit to Okinawa in August 1965; (3) the second Johnson-Sato summit meeting in November 1967; (4) Sato's public commitment to reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and with the status of U.S. bases identical with that of their counterparts in the rest of Japan (*kakunuki-hondonami* [nuclear-free, homeland-level]); and (5) the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting. On each of these events, I made the following points, among others.

First, Sato mentioned the reversion issue during the 1964 LDP presidential election, not because he had special interest in the issue at that time but because he was urged to do so by a

brain-trust. In other words, his interest in the issue was almost purely instrumental and tactical in the beginning. Second, Sato developed a deep personal interest in the issue following his visit to Okinawa the following summer, a visit that was inspired primarily by political, if not Machiavellian, considerations. Soon thereafter, however, he, and many others in the Japanese government and the ruling party, began to regard the issue as Sato's; Sato now wanted, and needed, more than anybody else and more than achievement of any of his other foreign policy goals, a successful resolution of the issue, i.e., an early reversion of administrative rights over the islands to Japan.

Second, the Foreign Ministry's senior officials were by and large uninterested in the issue in the beginning, especially before the 1967 Johnson-Sato summit, mainly because they did not believe that the U.S., especially its military leadership, would agree to return the control of the islands in the foreseeable future. Disappointed, and more than a little angered, by the bureaucrats' unenthusiastic attitudes, Sato turned for advice to a private advisory group assembled by Chief Cabinet Secretary Toshio Kimura and led by former Waseda University President Nobumoto Ohama. There was considerable mutual distrust, if not open antagonism, between Ohama and members of his group, who believed in and aggressively pushed the view that the U.S. could and would agree to early reversion on a "nuclear-free, homeland-level" basis, and the Foreign Ministry's top echelon, who neither believed in such a view nor found it particularly attractive. The conflict

flared up in the fall of 1967 over a report prepared by the Ohama group, known as Okikon, a few weeks before the Johnson-Sato summit meeting. The original text of the report proposed to seek agreement between the two governments within a year or two on the reversion of Okinawa on a "homeland-level" basis and, specifically, removal of all strategic nuclear weapons from U.S. bases in the islands prior to the reversion. Foreign Ministry officials found the language in the text undiplomatic and indiscreet and proposed to revise it so extensively that Ohama at one point threatened to dissociate himself and his group from the tampered document. The compromise text that resulted from this fracas and that became the basis of Sato's position on the issue during the November 1967 summit envisaged basic agreement on a concrete reversion plan at the summit meeting and on a decision to be made within two or three years on the date of actual reversion.<sup>2</sup>

Third, the Ohama group, i.e., Okikon and its subcommittee on the status of U.S. bases after reversion, known as Kichiken, rather than the Foreign Ministry, remained Sato's primary source of information and advice on the reversion issue until late 1968. The group was then seemingly squeezed out of the official decision making process in Tokyo, as a team of Foreign Ministry professionals took over as Sato's official advisers and spokesmen during the last and critical phases of the U.S.-Japanese negotiation. This official team was a very small group of Foreign Ministry officials from its American Affairs and Treaties Bureaus and operated under the direct command of the foreign minister.<sup>3</sup> Despite its unambiguous official status, however, this team never won Sato's total and unqualified confidence and was kept out of the most delicate and decisive arena of the bilateral negotiation leading up to and during the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit. As he had done in November 1967, Sato again sent a personal emissary to Washington and had him conduct a secret negotiation and strike a secret deal directly with the White House without the knowledge, not to mention the involvement, of the Foreign Ministry team.

Fourth and last, the pattern of decision

making in the Japanese government on the Okinawa reversion issue was very different from the pattern suggested by conventional wisdom: a pattern characterized by the dominant role of bureaucrats; a customary but rigidly enforced procedure of wide-ranging consultation and laborious consensus-building within the bureaucracy; absence of an assertive, not to mention obtrusive, role of the central political leadership; a "bottom-up" process of decision making; a reactive, rather than initiatory, character of the decision making system; etc.<sup>4</sup> In sharp contrast to the image of a helplessly hidebound and inflexible process projected by this conventional view, the decision making process in the Okinawa reversion case was characterized by a very visible, assertive, and decisive role of the top political leadership, a clearly subordinate, and frequently ignored, role of the bureaucracy, an extremely narrow range and strictly controlled process of consultation and consensus-building both within and outside the bureaucracy, a distinctly "top-down" flow of decision making power, etc.

An important conclusion of my erstwhile study of this subject was thus that the decision making process in this case represented a pattern that could not be explained by the conventional model of decision making in the Japanese government. The pattern, however, was neither uncommon or unfamiliar in the history of foreign policy making in postwar Japan—and presumably even in prewar Japan—and had, in fact, been seen in all the cases that had involved intense and widespread public controversy and that had, mainly for that reason, been studied in detail, such as the 1951 signing of the Peace and U.S.-Japan Mutual Security treaties, the 1960 revision of the latter treaty, the 1956 normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, the 1972 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, etc. This led me to propose a "critical decision" model as a complement to the conventional model to which I referred as the "routine decision" model. I also suggested that the new model was applicable both to cases that involved what Lowi called "redistributive" issues and to most cases amenable to explanation by Allison's Model I (rational actor) and Model III

(bureaucratic politics).<sup>5</sup>

### **Linkage Politics in the Okinawa Reversion Negotiation**

So much for the summary of my discussion and arguments in my 1974 article, and let me now turn to the main task of the present paper, that is, an examination of the linkage politics aspects of the U.S.-Japanese negotiation.<sup>6</sup> An appropriate and useful framework for such an examination is found in the "two-level game" model of international negotiations proposed by Robert Putnam in his widely cited 1988 article.<sup>7</sup>

To summarize Putnam's propositions that are directly relevant to my discussion in this paper, an international negotiation may be metaphorically defined as a game played sequentially—simultaneously in the real world—at two separate levels: The leader of each government negotiates, at Level I, "across the table" with his counterpart of the other government and, at Level II, "behind the table" with his or her domestic constituents.<sup>8</sup> The constituents may include a parliament, political parties, government ministries, interest groups, individual advisers, and even public opinion. In order to be effective, agreement reached at Level I must be ratifiable at Level II, that is, must be able to "win" in the Level II game; all agreements that would "win" in one nation's Level II game belong to that nation's "win set." An effective international agreement results from an overlap between the win-sets of both nations; therefore, the larger each nation's "win-set" and the larger the overlap between both nations' sets, the more likely agreement results from an international negotiation. The larger a nation's win-set, or so perceived by the leader (negotiator) of the other nation, however, the more likely its leader (negotiator) is to be "pushed around," that is, the weaker his or her negotiating position; conversely, the smaller a nation's "win-set," the larger its leader's bargaining advantage. The success or failure of an international negotiation thus depends on and is constrained by the state of the Level II, i.e., domestic, game; but the state of the Level II game is also affected by the state of the Level I game, especially for a nation and/or its leader

who, for one reason or another, desperately wants or needs an international agreement.

Applied to the Okinawa reversion negotiations, Putnam's two-level game model yields explanations of various aspects of the bilateral negotiation and the decision making process in the Japanese government that are not as easily derived from the bureaucratic politics approach. First of all, the Putnam model draws our attention to the size and substance of the win-set on the U.S. side as a basic determinant of the form and contents of a feasible agreement on the issue. The maintenance of a close and friendly alliance relationship with Japan and the long and stable tenure of the pro-American Sato government were so important to Washington that an eventual approval of the reversion of Okinawa, on which Sato staked his political life, was clearly within the U.S. win-set from the beginning.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, however, the primary mission of the U.S. bases in Okinawa was the defense, not so much of Japan itself as of the Asia and Pacific region as a whole, particularly the two potential flashpoints in the region, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, and the one current battle field, Vietnam.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, nuclear weapons were stored at some of these bases.<sup>11</sup> The U.S. military, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were convinced that the retention of the U.S. right to use the bases in Okinawa for operations, if not anywhere in the Asia and Pacific region, then at least in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and to deploy nuclear weapons if and when necessary was essential to the fulfillment of their mission in the region.<sup>12</sup>

The U.S. win-set, as it evolved by late 1967, thus called for an early reversion, possibly preceded by removal of all strategic nuclear weapons from the U.S. bases, in the interest of stabilizing and perpetuating the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the pro-American LDP government, conditional on a Japanese commitment, preferably formal, to permit the U.S. military continued unrestricted use of the bases, both for combat operations in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam and for deploying nuclear weapons. These conditions could be satisfied by a change in the conventional Japanese interpretation of the purpose of the so-called prior consultation clause

provided in an exchange of notes between the two governments appended to the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.<sup>13</sup> Whereas the clause had been traditionally regarded by the Japanese as a means to prevent significant expansion of the use to which U.S. bases in Japan could be put, they were now expected to undertake to use the clause as a means to permit, if not encourage, such expansion.

In short, the U.S. win-set required a Japanese prior commitment to say "yes", rather than "no", to future U.S. requests for important changes in the use of its bases, not only in Okinawa but also in the rest of Japan, specifically including their use for combat operations in the three flashpoints mentioned above, and, not so specifically but no less unequivocally, potential redeployment of nuclear weapons.<sup>14</sup> As we shall see later, another Japanese concession on an unrelated but, to President Nixon, equally or even more important issue, i.e., restraint of Japanese textile exports to the U.S., was added to the U.S. win-set during the last phase of the negotiation leading to the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit.

On the other hand, the Japanese win-set, as perceived by Sato, was considerably more ambiguous, especially before the 1967 Johnson-Sato summit. The ambiguity arose partly from Sato's own indecision (the "blank sheet" position), partly from divisions of opinion among his advisers, especially between the Ohama group and the Foreign Ministry, but also among LDP leaders and members, and partly from uncertainty about the state and direction of the debate in the U.S. government, especially within the White House.<sup>15</sup> By late 1968, however, Sato's position became somewhat better defined: it now included, in addition to the maintenance of a close and friendly alliance relationship with the U.S., an early reversion, if at all possible, on a "nuclear-free, homeland-level" basis.<sup>16</sup> In the next several months, his commitment to the attainment of the latter goal within a few years became much firmer, though never entirely nonnegotiable. By then, some among the Foreign Ministry officials involved in the decision making process, notably North American Division Director Chiba and his

deputy, Yukio Satoh, had also begun to believe that an early reversion on a formally or technically nuclear-free and homeland-level basis was a possible option.<sup>17</sup>

There was no real overlap between the U.S. and Japanese win-sets and, therefore, no room for agreement to be reached through a negotiation, unless either one or both sets were modified during, and perhaps as a result of, the negotiation. Even though the U.S. was willing to return the administration of Okinawa to Japan fairly soon, it made its agreement to do so contingent on Japanese agreement to permit the U.S. to continue to use its bases in ways not acceptable to Japan, namely, for combat operations in areas where the Japanese did not want to get involved and for possible redeployment of nuclear weapons. These conditions were clearly incompatible with the Japanese demand for reversion on a nuclear-free, homeland-level basis. As we shall see below, neither the U.S. nor the Japanese win-set fundamentally changed during the negotiation, which therefore turned out to be a seemingly futile search for agreement that was impossible. Moreover, and as mentioned above, the U.S. win-set was subsequently expanded by the addition of a demand for Japanese concessions on an unrelated issue, Japanese textile exports to the U.S. Because such concessions were strongly opposed by many influential groups in Japan, including virtually all major parties, and, particularly because the entanglement of the two issues was opposed even more strongly and universally in Japan, this change in the U.S. win-set should have made it even more difficult for the negotiation to result in agreement.

The "agreement" reached during the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting was thus a miracle, or a mirage, that could not have happened, had both sides negotiated within the boundary of their respective win-sets. As we shall see below, the miracle did happen because the Japanese side went beyond the boundary of its win-set, while the U.S. side temporized on the boundary of its own set. The "agreement" was thus also a remarkable compromise worked out between two theoretically incompatible win-sets, and the negotiation that produced it was an

arduous and complicated joint search for the compromise. The following discussion traces and explains this search from the perspective of Putnam's two-level game model.

I should first point out that the state of the Level II game on the Japanese side was constantly and significantly influenced by the state of the Level I game or, to put it more accurately, by the Japanese actors' perceptions and interpretations of the state of play in the latter game. A series of subtle signals began to reach Japanese actors in a variety of contexts in early 1967. To cite just a few examples, Chiba, posted at the Japanese embassy in Washington at the time, began to notice around that time some change in the attitudes of State and Defense Department officials toward the Okinawa issue, and Chiba's reports led North American Affairs Division Director Edamura in Tokyo to begin to think seriously about the status of the bases.<sup>18</sup> In February, the new High Commissioner, Ferdinand Unger, surprised the Okinawa Legislature by expressing his hope that reversion should take place soon.<sup>19</sup> The next month, the U.S. for the first time permitted the display of the Japanese national flag in Okinawa. During the bilateral meeting of foreign and security policy planners held in the same month, Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba's mention of a "fences and roads" issue—obstruction of local residents' daily activities in Okinawa by the fences and roads built by the U.S. military—elicited a response from a senior State Department official to the effect that Japan should begin to think about a more fundamental issue.<sup>20</sup> This response was interpreted by some Foreign Ministry officials as a suggestion that the reversion of the islands might be placed on the official agenda of bilateral negotiation. In April, Ohama visited the U.S., talked with nearly one hundred influential Americans, including State and Defense Department officials, Council of Foreign Relations representatives, and university professors, and upon his return to Tokyo reported to Sato that the U.S. was likely to respond positively to a concrete Japanese reversion plan.<sup>21</sup> Later in the year, U.S. signals began also to indicate some specific terms of reversion. During the summit meeting in

November of that year, for example, Sato was told in no uncertain terms that Japanese concessions regarding the status of U.S. bases after reversion were essential to U.S. agreement to reversion.<sup>22</sup> Upon his return to Tokyo, Sato launched a "security consciousness" campaign to make the Japanese, both inside and outside the government, understand and appreciate the indispensable role of the U.S. military in maintaining the peace and security of the Asia and Pacific region.<sup>23</sup>

Despite their deepening awareness and understanding of the broad parameters of the U.S. position on the reversion issue, the Japanese win-set appeared ill-defined and confusing until after the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit meeting began. This was due mainly to three circumstances. First, the U.S. conditions for an early reversion that were known to the Japanese—i.e., Japanese commitments on the post-reversion use of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the rest of Japan for combat operations in the three specific areas in the region and on the possible redeployment of nuclear weapons—were incompatible with the basic Japanese demand for "nuclear-free, homeland-level" status for post-reversion U.S. bases as the term was interpreted by most Japanese at the time. The U.S. conditions as they stood were thus non-ratifiable in the Japanese level II game.

Second, President Nixon had decided by the end of May 1969 to let nuclear weapons be removed from Okinawa prior to reversion, and at least a few top U.S. negotiators knew of that decision, but information about the decision was deliberately and successfully withheld from the Japanese, including Sato, until the eve of the summit talks.<sup>24</sup> As a result, until the last moment Sato, and all the other Japanese actors, were uncertain about exactly what *quid pro quo*, especially in reference to the key Japanese demand for early reversion on a "nuclear-free, homeland-level" basis, they could expect from Washington in return for the extremely costly, and potentially suicidal, concessions demanded by the U.S.<sup>25</sup>

Third and last, while it was possible to misrepresent the non-ratifiable U.S. conditions to the major constituents of the Japanese Level II

game, Sato and his advisers were uncertain, and very nervous, about the implied resort to lies and tricks to achieve one of the most important and "honorable" goals of Japanese foreign policy since World War II.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, whether deception or camouflage would work in the Japanese Level II game would depend on how the Level I agreement on the non-ratifiable Japanese concessions was to be expressed in the relevant public document, i.e., the joint communiqué to be issued following the November 1969 Nixon-Sato summit. As it turned out, it took until the eve of the summit for the official and unofficial negotiators of the two governments to find mutually acceptable, if not entirely satisfactory, and at least moderately deceptive compromise language to go into the joint communiqué, and for Sato and his principal advisers to overcome their qualms about and accept it.

For a whole year immediately preceding the 1969 summit, Sato and other Japanese actors focused their information-gathering and negotiating efforts on the resolution of the second and third problems mentioned above. Their efforts revolved, not around formal negotiations between the two teams of official negotiators, but around a loose network of mostly informal and often highly personal relationships that developed between a number of individual Japanese and U.S. policy-makers and negotiators. Particularly notable among such relationships, to which Clapp and I referred as "transnational alliances" in our unpublished work, were those between the Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Director-General Togo and the State Department's Country Director for Japan, Richard Sneider, between North American Affairs Division Director Chiba and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton H. Halperin, and between Chiba's deputy, Yukio Satoh, and a U.S. embassy staffer, Rodney Armstrong.<sup>27</sup> Mainly through this informal communication network, the Foreign Ministry officials learned by early 1969 that the U.S. position was relatively flexible on the date of reversion but quite rigid on the status of the bases, and that, while the U.S. might agree to remove land-based nuclear weapons before

reversion, it was not likely to accept "homeland-level" treatment of either submarine- or aircraft-borne nuclear missiles. This information led Foreign Minister Aichi in early 1969 to float a two-stage plan: For a limited period after reversion, the U.S. bases would remain intact, with the nuclear weapons staying on them and activities related to the Vietnam War continuing, before they were made to conform to the homeland-level status.<sup>28</sup>

Faced, however, with the growing ranks of nuclear-free, homeland-level reversion advocates within his own party, Sato rejected Aichi's plan in favor of continuing search for a formula that would make the Okinawa bases *prima facie* nuclear-free and homeland-level.<sup>29</sup> In short, he bowed to the imperatives of the Level II game and chose to let domestic political pressures "reverberate" in an international negotiation.<sup>30</sup> Confirmed in late May at a meeting between leaders of the Sato cabinet on one hand and those of the Foreign Ministry, on the other, this decision led to frantic efforts by Aichi and other members of the Foreign Ministry team to obtain a firmer commitment from the U.S. side on the removal of nuclear weapons prior to reversion and additional clarification of the U.S. position on the substance and form of the agreement to be reached on the post-reversion use of Okinawa bases for combat operations in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The decision also led to one of the strangest, and one of the most controversial, episodes in the Okinawa reversion negotiation, i.e., a series of back-channel negotiations conducted and secret agreement reached between the heads of the two governments via their surrogates.

On June 3, just as Aichi was to meet Secretary of State Rogers, *The New York Times* reported that President Nixon had already decided to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa. To Aichi's great disappointment and frustration, however, Rogers neither confirmed the accuracy of the press report nor offered any additional information on other details of the current U.S. position on the reversion issue.<sup>31</sup> Ironically, the only tangible progress made at this meeting was a deepened awareness on Aichi's part of the seriousness of the textile trade

issue. During the meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Tokyo at the end of July, Rogers informed Aichi of the U.S. approval of the reversion of Okinawa on a homeland-level basis in 1972, sought a formal Japanese commitment on the post-reversion use of the bases for combat operations in the three specific areas, but refused to promise prior removal of nuclear arsenal.<sup>32</sup> Frustrated by and impatient with the stalemate in the formal negotiation between the Foreign Ministry and State Department teams, Sato sent a personal emissary ("Mr. Yoshida") to Washington in mid-July to open a back-channel of negotiation and seek a deal directly with the emissary's old acquaintance, NSC Adviser Kissinger. As the latter has subsequently revealed, the deal involved an exchange of Japanese concessions on the textile issue for U.S. concessions on the issue of nuclear weapons in Okinawa.<sup>33</sup> By this time, extraction of substantial concessions from Japan on textile trade had become an integral part of the U.S. win-set; a number of Senators and Congressmen, as well as President Nixon himself, wanted such concessions from Japan and, without them, would have made the ratification of the Level I agreement in the U.S. Level II game considerably more complicated and time-consuming than it turned out to be.

From this point onward, the Okinawa reversion negotiation proceeded in two separate channels, one official, and at least partially public and visible, the other unofficial and strictly confidential. Sato was the hinge between the two channels on the Japanese side, Nixon and Kissinger on the U.S. side. Considering the extreme degree of secrecy in which the back-channel negotiation was held on both sides, it is remarkable how much coordination, though not integration, between the results of actions taken in the two separate channels, though not actions themselves, was achieved on each side. The text of the joint communiqué issued by the two heads of government at the end of their summit meeting was not surprising but as expected to most of the major actors on either side. It was, in fact, a model of bureaucratism with which members of both official negotiating teams must

have felt quite comfortable, even though those who were not used to the bureaucratism must have found it confounding and, perhaps, even mystifying.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, there was no mention whatever of the textile deal. These features of the document helped make the Level I agreement ratifiable in Japan, at least in the short run. In this sense, the back-channel negotiation may be said to have been successful.

The back-channel negotiation, however, also proved costly in several ways. First, it caused a considerable amount of mutual suspicion, distrust, and wariness between Sato and Aichi on one hand and the Foreign Ministry officials, on the other. About ten days before Sato's official party arrived in Washington on November 17, his emissary had again visited Kissinger, had been reassured of the U.S. commitment to remove nuclear weapons before reversion in exchange for the Japanese commitments on the prior consultation system and textiles, and had returned to Tokyo to report back to Sato.<sup>35</sup> But none other than Sato and the emissary, not even Aichi or Togo or Minister Bunroku Yoshino, who was officially in charge of the textile negotiation at the Japanese embassy in Washington, was aware of any of such secret goings-on.<sup>36</sup> The emissary and Kissinger, acting respectively for Sato and Nixon, had also agreed on an elaborate scenario for the exchanges to take place between the two leaders during the first session of the summit meeting: Sato would begin with a categorical opposition to any introduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa after reversion, Nixon would respond with the maximum U.S. demands on the nuclear and base use issues, Sato would then produce the compromise plan which had been agreed on in advance, and Nixon would accept that plan.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly, Sato first showed Nixon a draft of the joint communiqué that did not include the key reference in Paragraph 8 to the prior consultation system: "without prejudice ... under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security".<sup>38</sup> This was a draft known to few, if any, other than Sato, his emissary, Kissinger, and Nixon. Nixon duly rejected this version, Sato then produced the longer version that included the key passage in Paragraph 8, and Nixon

accepted it. In return, Sato confirmed his commitment on the textile issue.

A compromise was thus realized and a miracle produced. "Agreement" that was theoretically impossible was made possible by making it appear ratifiable in the Level II games on both sides. This apparent ratifiability was attained, however, essentially by technical camouflage, if not outright deception, in the text of the joint communiqué and concealment of a vital component of the "agreement", namely Sato's commitment on the textile issue.<sup>39</sup> These aspects of the "agreement", especially the entanglement of the textile issue, were not immediately apparent even to some members of the two official negotiating teams, not to mention to other constituents in the Level II game in each country. For that reason, the "agreement" played well in both countries for a short while: Sato's stature rose and the LDP won impressively in the lower house general election that followed within a month of the summit meeting. In the longer run, however, the "agreement" proved seriously flawed for the resolution of the Okinawa issue, and fatally for the textile issue. Administrative rights over the islands were returned to Japan on schedule in May 1972, but, consistent with the correct interpretation of the letter and spirit of the "agreement", but contrary to expectations of the Japanese public and, especially the local population in Okinawa, the status and functions of the U.S. bases did not significantly change. This kept Okinawa reversion a festering issue in Japanese domestic politics long after the formal transfer of administrative rights over the islands from Washington to Tokyo. In the meantime, the secret covenant on the textile issue began to unravel within a few months, causing considerable ill will between the top leaders, and many other citizens, of the two nations.

### Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has shown that the Okinawa reversion negotiation can be interpreted as an unorthodox two-level game in which mutually incompatible, i.e., non-overlapping, national win-sets were forced into artificial compatibility to produce a dubious "agreement" by fiat. As the model predicts, the portion of the

agreement (on textiles) which could not be ratified in the Japanese Level II game proved nonenforceable, and as the model implies, the portion (on the change in the operation of the prior consultation system) which had to be camouflaged in that game spawned well-founded suspicion and not so well-founded fear among many constituents of the Level II game on the Japanese side. It is thus tempting to conclude that the negotiation was a disastrous failure, rather than a sterling success.

On the other hand, not only was Okinawa reversion realized on schedule but the event was doubtless welcome to most Japanese, including those in Okinawa. After all, it was what they had fought to bring about for more than three decades. U.S.-Japanese relations have obviously been better for this event, both in the short run and in the long run; Okinawa could have become the southern version of the northern territories issue that continues to this day to strain and poison Japanese-Russian relations. In a broad historical perspective, then, this negotiation and its main product should perhaps be more positively evaluated.

Its virtues and vices in terms of U.S.-Japanese relations and the domestic politics of each nation aside, the Okinawa reversion negotiation also sheds some new light on the nature of two-level games that governments play, and thus helps further develop and refine Putnam's model. Above all, the case shows that a theoretically impossible international agreement may be manufactured in the real world through manipulation of one or more national win-sets, manipulation that involves misrepresentation or concealment of the true nature of the agreement reached. This will happen especially in cases where either or both governments (or leaders) desperately want or need an agreement and where the agreement concerns multiple issues with trade-off possibilities. The foregoing discussion has shown the potential hazards and costs of such an agreement.

### Notes

1 See my "Okinawa henkan kosho: Nihon seifu

- ni okeru kettei katei" [Okinawa reversion: Decision making in the Japanese government]. *Kokusai seiji* [International Relations] 52:2 (1974), 97-124.
- 2 Sato tried unsuccessfully to gain prior approval of this position from the Johnson White House through a personal emissary dispatched to Washington before the arrival of Sato's official party, an exercise repeated with much greater success, two years later.
  - 3 These were Bureau Director-General Togo, Councillor Ogawara, and North American Affairs Division Director Chiba from the American Affairs Bureau, Bureau Director-General Sato, Councillor Takashima, and Treaties Division Director Nakajima from the Treaties Bureau, and a few assistants from each bureau. Foreign Vice Minister Ushiba and Ambassador Shimoda in Washington played only minor roles in the Okinawa reversion negotiation.
  - 4 As pointed out in a footnote in the 1974 article, this system and pattern, known as *ringisei*, was discussed by Kiyooki Tsuji in his "Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of *Ringisei*," in Robert E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 457-75. Another widely cited English-language source on the subject is Ezra F. Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), passim.
  - 5 The references are to the three types of policy issues—i.e., distributive, redistributive, and regulatory—discussed in Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964), pp. 677-715, and to the three models of foreign policy decision making—i.e., Model I (rational actor), Model II (organizational process), and Model III (bureaucratic politics)—discussed in Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
  - 6 The term "linkage politics" is borrowed from James Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1969).
  - 7 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.
  - 8 For simplicity, I assume that the international negotiations under consideration are bilateral, rather than multilateral.
  - 9 Priscilla Clapp and Haruhiro Fukui, "Decision Making in U.S.-Japanese Relations: Okinawa Reversion" (unpublished manuscript, 1975), chap. 7, p. 7. Edwin O. Reischauer, both as a Harvard professor and the U.S. ambassador to Japan, was probably the most authoritative, influential, and consistent advocate of the sympathetic view of the Japanese position on the issue. His opinion had an important impact on the attitudes of American leaders, including both President Johnson and President Nixon. *Ibid.*, chap. 7, pp. 10-11.
  - 10 Fukui, "Okinawa henkan kosho," p. 116.
  - 11 See also Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 325.
  - 12 *Ibid.*, p. 328.
  - 13 The relevant part of the exchange of notes reads: "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan."

- 14 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 2, pp. 45-46; Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 326.
- 15 *Ibid.*, "Decision Making," chap. 4, pp. 14-18.
- 16 *Ibid.*, chap. 2, pp. 2-4.
- 17 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, pp. 21-22.
- 18 Fukui, "Okinawa henkan kosho," p. 108.
- 19 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 2, pp. 36-37.
- 20 Fukui, "Okinawa henkan kosho," p. 108.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 109; Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 2, p. 38.
- 22 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, p. 11.
- 23 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, pp. 11-13; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 25, 1967.
- 24 See Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 329, 332.
- 25 Based on interviews with Kiichi Aichi, December 22, 1971, and Eisaku Sato, February 26, 1973.
- 26 Based on interviews with Shigeru Hori, January 24, 1972, and Sato, February 26, 1973.
- 27 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 4, pp. 20, 26-28.
- 28 *Ibid.*, chap. 4, pp. 30-31.
- 29 See Sato's and Aichi's statements before the House of Councillors Budget Committee in *Asahi Shimbun*, March 19, 1969.
- 30 Putnam discusses reverberation of international pressures within domestic politics. See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," p. 456. See also his comment that the Japanese propensity for seeking broad consensus tends to constrict the Japanese win-set. *Ibid.*, p. 449.
- 31 Clapp and Fukui, "Decision Making," chap. 5, pp. 17-20.
- 32 *Ibid.*, chap. 5, pp. 22-23.
- 33 Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 330-331.
- 34 To quote, for illustrative purposes, the two key paragraphs of the communiqué:
- Paragraph 4: "The President and the Prime Minister especially noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister ... stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security ... The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan ... The President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Viet-Nam would be concluded before the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Viet-Nam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States' efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference."
- Paragraph 8: "The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States

Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.”

35 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 332.

36 Clapp and Fukui, “Decision Making,” chap. 5, p. 42.

37 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 335.

38 Clapp and Fukui, “Decision Making,” chap. 5, p. 43.

39 For details on the Okinawa-textile deal, see I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), chap. 5. The Japanese translation of the book is available in *Nichibei sen'i funso* (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 1980).